

**Ohr, Bruce (ODAG)**

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**From:** Ohr, Bruce (ODAG)  
**Sent:** Friday, April 29, 2016 5:15 PM  
**To:** Nellie Ohr  
**Subject:** RE: Jen leaving FinCen for HSBC

I heard!

**From:** Nellie Ohr (b) (6)  
**Sent:** Friday, April 29, 2016 3:18 PM  
**To:** Ohr, Bruce (ODAG)  
**Subject:** Jen leaving FinCen for HSBC

<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-banks-moneylaundering-hsbc-idUSKCN0XN2W7>

**Nellie Ohr**

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**From:** Nellie Ohr  
**Sent:** Friday, April 29, 2016 1:17 PM  
**To:** Ohr, Bruce (ODAG)  
**Subject:** Fwd: Kleptocracy Initiative Weekly News Highlights

Hi Honey!

As usual, this entire issue is interesting, but I thought you'd be especially interested in this item.

-N

[China Quashes G-20 Anticorruption Task Force, Will Host Conference Instead – Wall Street Journal](#)  
The move reflects China's commitment to pursuing its anti-corruption campaign on its own terms.

-----Original Message-----

From: The Kleptocracy Initiative <info@kleptocracyinitiative.org>

To: (b) (6) Nellie Email

Sent: Fri, Apr 29, 2016 11:24 am

Subject: Kleptocracy Initiative Weekly News Highlights

KI Weekly News Highlights: April 23-29, 2016



 Tweet

 Forward

### **Weekend: April 23-24, 2016**

#### [Former Top U.K. Spy Now Works for Team Putin and a Mobbed-Up Russian Lawyer](#) – *Daily Beast*

Andrew Fulton's GPW & Co., a private investigation firm, is retained by Andrey Pavlov, a Kluyuev Gang lawyer who is fighting to keep his name off EU sanctions lists.

#### [US/Azerbaijan: Lobbyists Continue to Flout Travel Rules](#) – *OCCRP*

"We haven't seen this brazenness since the Abramoff days... You've got a foreign government participating in trying to lie to the US Congress, and hoodwink the American public. ... [And] the House Ethics Committee tried violating congressional rules and burying the OCE report."

### **Monday, April 25, 2016**

#### [China Quashes G-20 Anticorruption Task Force, Will Host Conference Instead](#) – *Wall Street Journal*

The move reflects China's commitment to pursuing its anti-corruption campaign on its own terms.

#### [Kazakhstan Refuses to Investigate Panama Paper Links to President's Family](#) – *Newsweek*

President Nursultan Nazarbayev's grandson was named as an offshore account holder in the leaks – but a top prosecutor has ruled out any action.

### **Tuesday, April 26, 2016**

Trump's Campaign Chief is Questioned About Ties to Russian Billionaire – Yahoo

Oleg Deripaska partnered with Manafort and others in a \$26.2 million Cayman Islands investment. Now the oligarch wants to know what happened to his money.

China Faces Higher Risk of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorist Groups, Central Bank Official Warns – South China Morning Post

New threats emerge as China becomes more integrated into the global financial system.

Inside Trump Adviser Manafort's World of Politics and Global Financial Dealmaking – Washington Post

Further background on a lucrative career in kleptocracy.

Russia: The Cellist and the Lawyer – OCCRP

A new report suggests that Sergei Rodulgin received money from a shell company while it was being used in the fraud uncovered by Sergei Magnitsky.

**Wednesday, April 27, 2016**

Anti-Graft Body Finds Irregularities at China Construction Bank – Reuters

336 people were found to be involved in "disciplinary violations" – a Party euphemism for graft.

Under the Umbrella: Russia "Covers" Ukraine's Former President and PM – Ukraine Today

Lifting sanctions against Yanukovich's family members may enable him to shift ill-gotten gains.

Names Of Russia's Elite Vanish From Public Property Records – RFE/RL

Putin's inner circle – including Kiril Shamalov – appear to be quietly expunging evidence of their ill-gotten gains, amid moves by the security services to curtail public access.

**Thursday, April 28, 2016**

The Quiet American - Slate

"Paul Manafort made a career out of stealthily reinventing the world's nastiest tyrants as noble defenders of freedom. Getting Donald Trump elected will be a

cinch.”

[The Kremlin's Candidate - Politico](#)

Putin's propaganda machine is throwing its weight behind Trump.

[French Lawmakers Adopt Non-Binding Proposal to Lift Russia Sanctions - Reuters](#)

The sanctions were imposed in the wake of Russia's annexation of Crimea, and are due to expire in July.

[Kremlin's Infowar in the Baltics – Ukraine Today](#)

Estonia and neighboring countries are on the frontline of Putin's aggressive propaganda.

**Friday, April 29, 2016**

[Two Telenor Executives Resign After VimpelCom Probe – Wall Street Journal](#)

A report identified shortcomings – though no illegality - in the Norwegian firm's handling of its stake in the telecoms giant.

[Australia to Block Vast Land Sale to China-Led Consortium – Financial Times](#)

As China continues to buy up huge tracts of land worldwide, Canberra blocks an agricultural deal because of its “size and significance.”


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**Nellie Ohr**

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**From:** Nellie Ohr  
**Sent:** Friday, May 06, 2016 4:31 PM  
**To:** Ohr, Bruce (ODAG)  
**Subject:** Re: June 5 Dinner With DPP Alison Saunders

Cool, thanks!

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Ohr, Bruce (ODAG) (ODAG) <Bruce.G.Ohr@usdoj.gov>  
**To:** Nellie Ohr (b) (6)  
**Sent:** Fri, May 6, 2016 2:21 pm  
**Subject:** FW: June 5 Dinner With DPP Alison Saunders

The British are coming!

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**From:** Turcotte, Denise  
**Sent:** Friday, May 06, 2016 1:05 PM  
**To:** Ohr, Bruce (ODAG)  
**Cc:** Miller, Carina (CRM)  
**Subject:** June 5 Dinner With DPP Alison Saunders

Bruce,

The DPP and her party would be delighted to have dinner at your home. DPP Saunders will also be travelling with her Executive Assistant, so there will be four of them in total, that is, Alison Saunders, Helen Kershaw (EA), Sue Patten and Patrick Stevens. They have suggested that you pick them up from the Palomar Hotel at 7pm. Will that work? They should be at the hotel by about 4:00 pm, so if you would prefer to make that any earlier, please let us know.

They are awaiting visa details for one person in the party, but subject to that, Hilary Ryan will send me (or Carina) their information shortly, so that we can arrange for security on June 6.

Bruce, I am also copying Carina, and introducing you both via email, as she is now Bruce's new Executive Assistant.

Denise

**.WASH POL2-3 Bress, Stefan**

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**From:** .WASH POL2-3 (b) (6)  
**Sent:** Friday, April 22, 2016 7:22 AM  
**To:** Ohr, Bruce (ODAG)  
**Cc:** Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF); Nellie Ohr  
**Subject:** AW: Analyst Russian Organized Crime - April 2016

Bruce,

due to a (b) (6) my wife (b) (6) will not be able to attend our dinner. But I will be happy to eat her portion of food and drink her glass of wine. :-)

See you soon,  
Have a great weekend,

(b) (6)

-----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----

Von: Ohr, Bruce (ODAG) [mailto:[Bruce.G.Ohr@usdoj.gov](mailto:Bruce.G.Ohr@usdoj.gov)]  
Gesendet: Mittwoch, 20. April 2016 12:21  
An: .WASH POL2-3 (b) (6)  
Cc: Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF); Nellie Ohr  
Betreff: RE: Analyst Russian Organized Crime - April 2016

(b) (6)-

Excellent! So we will plan on Monday at 7 p.m. at my house, which is located at (b) (6). We hope that your wife will be able to attend as well. Thank you, and I am looking forward to seeing everyone!

- Bruce

-----Original Message-----

From: .WASH POL2-3 (b) (6)  
Sent: Wednesday, April 20, 2016 11:28 AM  
To: Ohr, Bruce (ODAG)  
Subject: WG: Analyst Russian Organized Crime - April 2016

Hi Bruce,

I will be out of office until Friday, you could try to reach me via cell phone: (b) (6).

We are available for a dinner on Monday, Tuesday or Wednesday. Please not too early... 7.00 would be perfect... Just tell me when and where...perfect would be an email.

We would be 4 px in total.

Best,

(b) (6)

-----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----

Von: Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF) (b) (6)  
Gesendet: Mittwoch, 20. April 2016 10:56  
An: .WASH POL2-3 (b) (6)  
Cc: Ohr, Bruce (ODAG)  
Betreff: RE: Analyst Russian Organized Crime - April 2016

Hi (b) (6),

No problem with the addition!



By the way, Bruce will be calling you today as he and Nellie would like to host the delegation for dinner sometime during the week that they are here, if your schedules permit.

Also, on our end, we have invited Joe Wheatley and Ivana Nizich, who are two trial attorneys from DOJ's Organized Crime and Gang Section (my and Bruce's old section.) Joe has met with the analysts before (I guess Ian will probably remember him), but Ivana is new to OCGS. Both are very experienced prosecutors and have worked on some Eurasian OC matters before.

I will plan to meet you guys at 1:45 at the Visitors center at Main DOJ. My cell in case you have any trouble getting there is (b) (6).

Look forward to seeing you guys next week!

Best,  
Lisa

-----Original Message-----

From: .WASH POL2-3 (b) (6)  
Sent: Wednesday, April 20, 2016 10:17 AM  
To: Ohr, Bruce (ODAG); Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF)  
Cc: Mchich, Lisa (OCDETF)  
Subject: WG: Analyst Russian Organized Crime - April 2016

Bruce,

sorry, but there is one more in our delegation:

Last Name/First Name/PoB/DoB/Passport:

5. (b) (6)

See u soon,  
Thanks,

(b) (6)

-----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----

Von: .WASH POL2-3 (b) (6)  
Gesendet: Dienstag, 12. April 2016 13:22  
An: 'Ohr, Bruce (ODAG)'; Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF)  
Cc: Mchich, Lisa (OCDETF)  
Betreff: AW: Analyst Russian Organized Crime - April 2016

Lisa, Bruce,

for the analytical exchange on April 26th, 2.00 pm the delegation will be:

Last Name/First Name/PoB/DoB/Passport:

1. (b) (6)

Please let me know, if you have any further question.

Thanks,

(b) (6)

-----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----

Von: Ohr, Bruce (ODAG) [<mailto:Bruce.G.Ohr@usdoj.gov>]  
Gesendet: Montag, 7. März 2016 19:12  
An: Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF)  
Cc: .WASH POL2-3 (b) (6); (b) (6) (OCDETF)  
Betreff: Re: Analyst Russian Organized Crime - April 2016

Hi (b) (6) ,

That time works for me as well. I'm looking forward to seeing them! Thank you very much!

Bruce

On Mar 7, 2016, at 6:47 PM, Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF) (b) (6) > wrote:

Hi (b) (6) ,

I haven't had a chance to confer with Bruce yet, but would certainly love to meet with the "A team"! Tuesday, April 26 at 2:00 works for me, but I've added Bruce's Chief of Staff, Lisa Mchich, for scheduling purposes.

Thanks so much for reaching out.

Best,  
Lisa

From: .WASH POL2-3 (b) (6)  
Sent: Monday, March 07, 2016 3:59 PM  
To: Ohr, Bruce (ODAG); Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF)  
Subject: Analyst Russian Organized Crime - April 2016

Hi Lisa, Bruce

our Russian Analysts will come into town again. If you or some of your colleagues would like to talk to them - it would be doable for us on Tuesday, 26th April from 2.00-3.00.

I just received their agenda proposal:

- "Stability of the Putin regime" before the Duma elections
- Impact of Russian influence operations in Europe ("PsyOps/InfoWar")
- Situation of Eurasian organized crime (how organized crime is used for politics within Russia and abroad)

Please let me know if you're interested, Have a great week, (b) (6)

-----  
German Embassy

(b) (6)

First Secretary

(b) (6)

Tel: (b) (6)

Cell: (b) (6)

Fax: (b) (6)

eMail: (b) (6)

<image001.png>

INVALID HTML

Nellie Ohr

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**From:** Nellie Ohr  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 20, 2016 12:49 PM  
**To:** Ohr, Bruce (ODAG)  
**Subject:** Re: Analyst Russian Organized Crime - April 2016

Thanks! I'm deleting these emails now

**Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF)**

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**From:** Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 20, 2016 12:27 PM  
**To:** Ohr, Bruce (ODAG); .WASH POL2-3 (b) (6)  
**Cc:** Nellie Ohr  
**Subject:** RE: Analyst Russian Organized Crime - April 2016

I look forward to it as well! Thanks, Bruce and Nellie!!

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Ohr, Bruce (ODAG)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 20, 2016 12:21 PM  
**To:** .WASH POL2-3 (b) (6)  
**Cc:** Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF); Nellie Ohr  
**Subject:** RE: Analyst Russian Organized Crime - April 2016

Duplicative Records



Nellie Ohr

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**From:** Nellie Ohr  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 19, 2016 12:04 PM  
**To:** Ohr, Bruce (ODAG)  
**Subject:** Galeotti summarizes Russia's approach to drug problem in leadup to UN Gen Assembly

<http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Research/Files/Papers/2015/04/global-drug-policy/Galeotti--Russia-final.pdf?la=en>

This seems to be part of a Brookings series looking at drug policy

# Narcotics and Nationalism: Russian Drug Policies and Futures

Mark Galeotti

New York University Center for Global Affairs

Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence  
Latin America Initiative

1  
narcotics  
and  
nationalism  
:  
russian  
drug  
policies  
and  
futures

Improving Global Drug Policy: Comparative Perspectives and UNGASS 2016

# Narcotics and Nationalism: Russian Drug Policies and Futures

Mark Galeotti

New York University Center for Global Affairs

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Key Findings

- With 6 percent of the population using drugs, Russia is suffering from serious and problematic drug consumption and a growing public health crisis.

- The Kremlin regards the drug challenge as a nationalist, securitized, and moral problem. Drug addiction is considered a moral deficiency rather than a medical issue, which reinforces the Russian government's predilection for a punitive approach

which reinforces the Russian government's predilection for a punitive approach.

•

Extensive availability of heroin from Afghanistan is particularly problematic. Russia is both a transshipment and a destination country for Afghanistan's opiates.

•

Framed as a security threat, the influx of Afghan heroin is viewed at best as a Western failure and at worst as a malign attempt to damage Russia. Domestically, the Russian government adopts a law enforcement model toward traffickers and users alike, rather than harm reduction, drug prevention, and treatment models.

•

Even so, efforts to address drug trafficking and consumption in Russia have been undermined or warped by the lack of resourcing, political will, and turf wars among Russian security agencies. Russia's growing economic problems also necessitate liquidity on the part of many financial institutions, encouraging them to turn a blind eye to dirty money.

### Policy Recommendations

•

Russia needs to adopt a more inclusive and comprehensive strategy that balances interdiction and law enforcement with treatment, prevention, and harm reduction methods.

•

Russia needs to engage local governments, communities, and non-governmental organizations, as well as foreign partners.

•

Law enforcement cooperation must not remain hostage to geopolitical rivalries. Afghanistan's drug policy needs to encourage effective efforts to sustainably reduce production rather than be used as a means for asserting regional hegemony.....

Nellie Ohr

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**From:** Nellie Ohr  
**Sent:** Friday, April 15, 2016 1:31 PM  
**To:** Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF); Ohr, Bruce (ODAG)  
**Subject:** Corruption Is The New Communism

Corruption Is The New Communism

Brian Whitmore

12 April 2016

<http://www.rferl.mobi/a/corruption-is-the-new-communism/27669638.html?platform=hootsuite>

Soviet tanks roll into Budapest and Prague.

Russian banks set up secretive offshore accounts and shady shell companies that stealthily buy influence and gobble up strategic assets across Europe.

Quislings in the East and fellow travelers in the West toe the Leninist line.

Business and industrial lobbies in both East and West parrot Putinist talking points.

A network of Communist parties and front groups advance Moscow's interests.

A web of opaque front corporations, murky energy deals, and complex money-laundering schemes ensnare foreign elites and form a ready-made Kremlin lobby.

Past, meet present.

In many ways, Russian corruption is the new Soviet Communism. The Kremlin's black cash is the new Red Menace. In the East, an alliance of satellite states with Soviet-style socialist command economies and authoritarian political systems has been replaced with a loose grouping of kleptocracies with Russian-style crony-capitalist economies and dysfunctional governance.

And the Soviet Union's attempts to subvert the West with the power of an idea has given way to Vladimir Putin's Russia seeking to corrupt it with the lure of easy money.

The more things change, the more they stay the same.

"The Kremlin does not need to be the outright leader of a bloc of nations a la Warsaw Pact; instead, it can exacerbate existing divides, subvert international institutions and help create a world where its own form of corrupt authoritarianism flourishes," Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss wrote in their widely circulated report, [The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture, and Money](#).

#### **Capturing Elites**

The Soviet Union sought to spread Communism and establish a bloc of nations loyal to Moscow. Vladimir Putin's Russia seeks to spread its corrupt business model to establish a bloc of nations dependent upon the Kremlin. The Soviet Union was primarily concerned with its immediate neighborhood, Eastern Europe, but also sought to spread its socialist model outward.

Putin's Russia is also concentrating on its immediate neighborhood, the ex-USSR, but has also set its sights on pushing kleptocracy farther afield.

It has used murky energy schemes with opaque ownership structures like RosUkrEnergo, EuralTransGas, and Moldovagaz as carrots [to capture and control elites](#) in former Soviet states like Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova. Farther West, the Kremlin has deployed [shifty shell companies](#) like Vemex, an energy trading company with a mindbogglingly opaque ownership structure ultimately leading to Gazprom, which has captured between 10-12 percent of the Czech energy market.

The Kremlin has indeed mastered the art of the corrupt deal to create patron-client relations well beyond Russia's borders.

"Gazprom, with the silent support of the Kremlin has set up 50 or so middleman companies, silently linked to Gazprom and scattered throughout Europe," the late energy analyst Roman Kupchinsky, former director of RFE/RL's Ukrainian Service, [said in testimony before the U.S. Senate's Foreign Relations Committee](#) in June 2008.

Kupchinsky cited the Vienna-based Centrex group, owned by a Cyprus-based Holding company and RN Privatstiftung in Austria, as well as the Gazprom Germania network.

Such fronts, he added, "do not add any value to the price of Russian gas being sold on European markets; yet they earn enormous sums of money which appears to simply vanish through shell companies in Cyprus and in Liechtenstein."

Kupchinsky also told the committee that "in Hungary, shady companies with suspected links to organized crime and to Gazprom seek to control large segments of the domestic gas distribution and power generation business."

### **'This Is The Story Of An Invasion'**

There is also evidence that Putin has recruited some members of his old intelligence network in the East German Stasi to set up front companies throughout Europe.

A September 2007 [investigative report](#) by German journalist Hans-Martin Tillack uncovered how Gazprom Germania was "something of a club for former members of the East German security services."

"This is the story of an invasion. A massive campaign, planned well in advance. The General Staff is located far away in the east, in Moscow, the capital of Russia. The target area is Germany -- and the rest of Western Europe,"

#### Tillack wrote

"But the story of this invasion is teeming with ex-Stasi officers and shady figures. It is a story of letterbox companies that do not even have a letterbox, of companies nestled within companies. The overriding impression? That they are concealing the flow of funds."

But it is an invasion in which many elites in the West are either willing -- or unwitting -- participants.

"Acquiescence to Russian corruption, with illicit funds regularly laundered throughout the West, works to the Kremlin's advantage both domestically and internationally," Pomerantsev and Weiss wrote.

"If the premise of the neoliberal idea of globalization is that money is politically neutral, that interdependence will be an impulse towards rapprochement, and that international commerce sublimates violence into harmony, the Russian view remains at best mercantilist, with money and trade used as weapons and interdependence a mechanism for aggression."

Communism, despite its faults, attempted to appeal to universal human ideals and aspirations. But in practice, it cut against human nature.

Corruption appeals to the most universal and basest human instinct -- greed. And sadly, it is often in sync with human nature -- which makes the new Red Menace potentially more dangerous and insidious than the old one.

Corruption isn't just a matter of good governance anymore. It's now a national security issue and needs to be treated as such.



## Ohr, Bruce (ODAG)

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**From:** Ohr, Bruce (ODAG)  
**Sent:** Friday, April 15, 2016 9:07 AM  
**To:** Nellie Ohr  
**Subject:** Re: Iran uses commerce as a cover for its intelligence operations in Latin America

Interesting!

On Apr 15, 2016, at 8:53 AM, Nellie Ohr (b) (6) wrote:

See my bolding and note at bottom

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6) (b) (6)  
To: (b) (6) (b) (6); (b) (6) (b) (6); Nellie Ohr  
(b) (6); (b) (6) (b) (6)  
Sent: Fri, Apr 15, 2016 8:34 am  
Subject: Iran uses commerce as a cover for its intelligence operations in Latin America

Three former Venezuelan government officials who defected from Hugo Chavez's regime spoke to the Brazilian magazine *Veja* about an alleged alliance between Argentina, Venezuela, and Iran, which included a deal in which Argentina would get Interpol to remove from its database the names of Iranians suspected of bombing a Jewish center in Buenos Aires in 1994.

Alberto Nisman, an Argentine prosecutor, had been investigating the deadly bombing before he was found dead in his apartment in January with a gunshot wound to the head. He was about to testify to Argentina's legislature that the administration of Argentine President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner had helped cover up Iran's hand in the bombing.

Nisman alleged that the Fernandez regime engaged in the cover-up to secure an oil-for-grain deal with Iran (Argentina is energy poor), but *Veja's* sources take it a step further. They say the late Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez helped broker a deal between Argentina and Iran that secured cash for Argentina (including funds for Fernandez's 2007 presidential run) and nuclear intelligence for Iran on top of derailing the AMIA probe.

"Not only is [the *Veja* report] credible, but it underscores the allegations prosecutor Nisman put forth about Iran's longstanding desire to have Argentina restart nuclear cooperation with Iran," Toby Dershowitz of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies told *Business Insider*.

Nisman believed the bombing of the Jewish center, called AMIA, may have been about more than Iran's attitude toward Israel and the Jewish people. He believed it was a punishment directed at Argentina. Back in the 1980s, Iranian nuclear scientists received training at Argentine nuclear plants. Iranian nuclear scientist Ali Akbar Salehi was mentioned in Nisman's report as being among the back-channel negotiators who reportedly wanted to clear the names of Iranians from an Interpol database. He spent six months learning about nuclear technology in the 1980s. In 1987, Argentine scientists went to Iran to help upgrade a Tehran research reactor.

"The DOJ and other USG agencies should be concerned about who killed a prosecutor with whom it had an important relationship and whether it was aimed at silencing him and his work implicating Iran," Dershowitz said. "Nisman's work was akin to a canary in a coal mine, and his suspicious death is a matter I hope the next attorney general and others will pursue impartially even if it comes at an inconvenient time as the P5+1 negotiate a nuclear deal with Iran."

To Dershowitz, Nisman's report was about more than just AMIA. It was about how Iran operates in Latin America — how it recruits, how it uses resources, how it activates sleeper cells.

According to a member of the military who said he was in the room during negotiations between Venezuela and Iran, here's how a conversation between Chavez and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, then Iran's president, on January 13, 2007, went down (via *Veja*):

**Ahmadinejad** — it's a matter of life or death. I need you to help me broker a deal with Argentina to help my country's nuclear program. We need Argentina to share its nuclear technology. Without their collaboration it would be impossible to advance our nuclear program.

**Chávez** — Very quickly, I will do that Comrade.

**Ahmadinejad** — Don't worry about what it costs. Iran will have all the money necessary to convince Argentines ... I need you to convince Argentina to continue to insisting that Interpol take Iranian officials off their list.

**Chávez** — I will personally take charge of this.

The kind of nuclear technology Iran was looking for, specifically, was a heavy-water nuclear reactor. It's expensive, complicated, and old-fashioned technology, but it allows plutonium to be obtained from natural uranium. That means the uranium doesn't have to be enriched, which makes the whole operation more discreet.

To sweeten the deal for Argentina, Venezuela allegedly bought \$1.8 billion worth of Argentine bonds 2007 and \$6 billion worth in 2008. Remember that Argentina has been a pariah of international markets since it defaulted in 2002. The Kirchners (Cristina and her husband, late-president Nestor) each thanked Venezuela for these purchases publicly.

Also in January 2007, Ahmadinejad and Chavez allegedly hatched the plan for "aerotererror," as Chavistas came to call it. It was a flight from Caracas to Damascus to Tehran that was made twice a month. It flew from Caracas carrying cocaine to be distributed to Hezbollah in Damascus and sold. The plane then went to Tehran carrying Venezuelan passports and other documents that helped Iranian terrorists travel around the world undetected.

Where this story makes a turn for the bizarre is that the woman who was allegedly handling the Argentine side of negotiations was former defense minister Nilda Garre, who is now Argentina's ambassador to the Organization of American States.

Veja's sources say she had a sexual relationship with Chavez.

"It was something along the lines of '50 Shades of Grey,'" the former Venezuelan official said, adding that when the two were together, all of Miraflores (Venezuela's presidential palace) could hear it.

"I cannot say that the Argentine government gave nuclear secrets, but I know it received much by legal means (debt securities) and illegal (bags of money) in exchange for some valuable asset to the Iranians."

Another former Chavista said: "In Argentina, the holder of secrets is the former ambassador Garre."

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There was also an Iran-Venezuela-Russia triangle involving Bank Rossiya people through Mosnarbank-Yevrofinans.

**Nellie Ohr**

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**From:** Nellie Ohr  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2016 10:23 AM  
**To:** Ohr, Bruce (ODAG)  
**Subject:** EU drug markets report

Hi Honey! You might find this interesting. It

[Mark Galeotti](#) retweeted

6d

[Giacomo Fassina](#) @GiacomoFassina

Very thorough report by [@EMCDDA](#) & [@Europol](#) on drug flows and use in Europe & worldwide

[http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/publications/2374/TD0416161ENN\\_1.PDF](http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/publications/2374/TD0416161ENN_1.PDF)

I've saved the PDF on my hard drive

7

## Executive summary

This report explores the concept of the illicit drug market within the broader context of changing patterns of drug use, cultural and social factors and links to wider criminality. Drug markets continue to be one of the most profitable areas for organised crime groups (OCGs) and it is estimated that EU citizens spend over EUR 24 billion (range EUR 21 to 31 billion) every year on illicit drugs. The impacts that drug markets have on society are correspondingly large and go beyond the harms caused by drug use. They include involvement in other types of criminal activities and in terrorism; impacts on legal businesses and the wider economy; strain on and corruption of government institutions; and impacts on wider society.

Three overarching themes emerge from our analysis:

n

The increasing organisational and technical complexity, interconnectedness and specialisation of groups involved in drug markets.

n

Globalisation and technology are accelerating the rate of change in the drug market.

n

Drug market-related activities are concentrated in a number of established and emerging geographical locations.

These developments challenge those trying to respond to the problems created by the illicit drug market and the associated wider problems and suggest that:

n

A systemic analysis of drug market business models will be helpful for both operational and policy purposes.

n

Partnerships between national authorities and with industry are becoming ever more important, as is engagement with international organisations and third countries.

n

Efficient use of resources can be achieved through the identification and targeting of geographical locations where drug market-related activities are concentrated.

n

Continuing recognition of the value of a strategic response, informed by sound information used to identify new opportunities as well as challenges, is essential. The report also looks in more detail at the markets for the main drug types and the key points are summarised below.

Graphic

## Cannabis

is the most widely used drug in Europe and it is estimated that cannabis accounts for around 38 % of the retail market for illicit drugs and is worth more than EUR 9.3 billion annually (range EUR 8.4 to 12.9 billion). Some 22 million adults in the EU have used it in the last year and around 1 % of European adults use it on an almost daily basis, increasing the risk of health and social problems. OCGs are heavily involved, making full use of technological innovations to produce larger quantities of more potent products in Europe itself. While the market is dominated by herbal cannabis grown within the EU, the cannabis resin from Morocco has been increasing in potency and may be trafficked to the EU alongside other illicit goods and human beings, a trend potentially exacerbated by instability in North Africa and the Middle East.

## The heroin

market is the second largest illicit drug market in the EU. It is estimated at EUR 6.8 billion annually (range EUR 6.0 to 7.8 billion) and is responsible for a significant proportion of drug-related deaths and social costs. Following a period of decline, there are recent signs of increasing availability that may signal increased harms. Opium production remains generally high in Afghanistan. Production techniques, locations, trafficking routes and modi operandi are increasingly flexible and dynamic, as shown by an increase in very large heroin seizures, suggesting a shift to maritime container trafficking, and new

8

## EU Drug Markets Report

routes involving Africa, the Southern Caucasus, Syria and Iraq are emerging. Nevertheless, the Balkan route remains a key corridor for heroin entry to the EU. There are also signs of diversification in the market, with prescription medicines and new synthetic opioids increasingly being misused.

## Cocaine

is Europe's most commonly used illicit stimulant, with a retail market estimated to be worth at least EUR 5.7 billion annually (range EUR 4.5 to 7.0 billion). Most use occurs in western and southern Europe and has been fairly stable over recent years, although there are signs of increasing availability. Coca cultivation appears to be increasing after a period of decline but there is uncertainty about how much cocaine is produced and where this occurs. Sea and air transport are used to traffic cocaine to Europe, with Colombia, Brazil and Venezuela being key departure points. The Caribbean and West Africa remain important transit areas, while Central America is emerging. Use of maritime containers shipped through major European ports is a continuing problem. An evolving array of concealment methods is used, including cocaine being incorporated into 'carrier materials' (e.g. plastics) before being chemically extracted on arrival in Europe. Colombian and Italian groups continue to dominate wholesale cocaine supply to Europe, in cooperation with other groups (e.g. Dutch, British and Spanish). West African, especially Nigerian, groups are also active in transporting cocaine from Africa to Europe and Balkan OCGs are emerging actors. The market for the main synthetic stimulants,

amphetamine, methamphetamine and MDMA

, is estimated to be at least EUR 1.8 billion annually (range EUR 1.2 to 2.5 billion) in the case of amphetamines (including methamphetamine) and EUR 0.67 billion (range EUR 0.61 to 0.72 billion) for MDMA/ecstasy. Amphetamines appeal to both recreational and marginalised drug users and the market for them interacts with those for cocaine and some new psychoactive substances. Recent concerns include the availability of high-dose MDMA products and the increased use of methamphetamine. In the EU, the Netherlands and Belgium are important for MDMA and amphetamine production, while most methamphetamine appears to be made in the Czech Republic. Production is becoming more sophisticated and diverse, and the use of new precursor and pre-precursor chemicals may increase health risks. The dumping of toxic waste also poses health risks and causes environmental damage. Aggressive marketing is becoming more apparent in the ecstasy market suggesting competition between suppliers and more active targeting of specific groups of users.

A large number of new psychoactive substances (NPS) are sold openly as 'legal' replacements for illicit drugs. There are no signs of a slowdown in the development of these substances; 100 new substances were reported for the first time in 2015 and the EU Early Warning System is monitoring over 560. The market supplies both recreational and, increasingly, marginalised users and producers anticipate legal and regulatory controls by developing new substances. Globalised supply chains allow bulk quantities of NPS to be ordered online and transported to Europe where they are packaged and marketed on the open or illicit drug market. It is a low-risk, high-profit business attractive to organised crime and there are signs of production in Europe. Distinct but overlapping markets have emerged, such as 'legal highs', 'research chemicals' and 'dietary supplements' sold through 'bricks and mortar' and online shops. With increased availability, harms have increased, such as acute, sometimes fatal, poisonings and harms associated with injecting cathinones.


Nellie Ohr

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**From:** Nellie Ohr  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2016 2:04 PM  
**To:** Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF); Ohr, Bruce (ODAG)  
**Subject:** New National Guard will not fight organized crime--and other observations by Galeotti

You recall that Zolotov's Baltik-Escort company was thought to have served as a liaison between the SPb mayor's office with the Tambov group back in the 1990s. Dawisha mentions this "alleged" link on p 127.

## Putin's new National Guard – what does it say when you need your own personal army?

 Zolotov

Zolotov, Putin's Praetorian

The idea of creating a National Guard (NG) for Russia bringing together public security forces under a single command has been raised periodically and always abandoned for very good reasons, not least the lack of any apparent need to have a Praetorian Guard on steroids. In 2012, for example, [I didn't think it likely](#): it would upend the balance of power within the security agencies, create a monster, and not really meet any true security need. So what does it say that Putin today announced that such a *natsgvardiya* was going to be formed? After a meeting with security luminaries include MVD Interior Troops commander (and new NG head) [Viktor Zolotov](#) – a [trusted ex-bodyguard](#) – he [announced](#) [my translation]:

Decisions have been made: we are creating a new federal executive body on the basis of the Interior Troops – creating the National Guard, which will handle the fight against terrorism, the fight against organised crime, and in close cooperation with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, will continue to perform those functions which are [currently] performed by the OMON (riot police), SOBR (SWAT) and so on. We will arrange, as we discussed with the Interior Minister [Vladimir Kolokoltsev], not only in the decree, but in a future federal law, so that there will be no discord in order to get everything working smoothly and clearly. I hope very much that the troops of the National Guard will effectively perform their tasks, as has been the case up now, and that they will strengthen the work on the areas that are considered priorities.

**The NG will thus also take over the OMON and SOBR, making it a powerful paramilitary security force, with elements right across the country.**

Meanwhile, the Federal Drugs Control Service (FSKN) and Federal Migration Service (FMS) will be [brought under the MVD](#) (Ministry of Internal Affairs), albeit remaining separate services. (Again, an idea which had been [mooted before](#).) This may be a consolation prize for Kolokoltsev but appears, unsurprisingly, to have been [a bitter pill for FSKN chief Viktor Ivanov](#), moving from independent director to ministerial subordinate.

The creation of a National Guard is **a big deal**. We await details, but here are a few first observations:

**1. No discussion, no lead time.** As with so many crucial decisions, this came essentially unheralded, underlining the extent to which **policy comes from a small, tight circle** around Putin. It is not just that they have good operational security; they also clearly see no reason to prepare the public in advance. This is just the way politics goes these days.

**2. Big worries in a little circle.** There is no real reason for creating the NG out of the Interior Troops (VV) and other forces unless you have **a serious worry about public unrest**. Let's be clear, whatever Putin says the **militarised security forces of the VV and now NG have little real role fighting crime or terrorism; they are**

**public security forces**, riot and insurrection control and deterrence assets. The OMON and SOBR do play a certain role, but detaching them from the investigations elements of the MVD actually reduces their value in fighting crime. (And the MVD will likely have to recreate some kind of SWAT forces of its own.)

**3. Putin's Own.** The NG, as a federal agency, will be **directly subordinated to the government**, without a minister in the way. With Zolotov at its head, then it is even more clearly a personal, presidential Praetorian force, under a maximalist loyalist. **This may not only be a force to keep the masses in check, but also the elite.**

**4. Upsetting the power ministry balance.** In the past, there was a key desire to retain a degree of balance between the various security agencies. The MVD has now been weakened (and having the FMS and FSKN is by no means enough of a recompense), and the **Federal Security Service (FSB) has a more direct rival** in the domestic security stakes.

**Postscript, 6 April:** I see from the [text of the law](#) that **FGUP Okhrany, the private security corporation of the MVD, is being transferred to the NG**. This is a major blow to the MVD, as it made quite a bit of revenue for them. It also raises questions about the future of the Vnevedomstvennaya okhrana, the police's private security department, which was often a good way for cops to do some paid overtime and eke out their salaries. Will they still be able to do this? If not, then that may well be a further encouragement to more petty and predatory corruption by cops seeing their real wages shrink (as bonuses have also already been cut) and options legally to make up the shortfall vanish...

<https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2016/04/05/putins-new-national-guard-what-does-it-say-when-you-need-your-own-personal-army/>

Nellie Ohr

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**From:** Nellie Ohr  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2016 4:21 PM  
**To:** Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF); Ohr, Bruce (ODAG)  
**Subject:** Details on Praetorian guard reshuffle: Promotion for Zolotov. Demotion for Viktor Ivanov?? VVP as beleaguered emperor in 1917

From today's Jamestown Eurasia Monitor, 7 April 2016

See bolded bits

### Putin's New Praetorian Guard

This week (April 6), without prior warning or any meaningful public debate, President Vladimir Putin announced a massive overhaul of security, public order and law enforcement in Russia by creating a special new internal army. Formed immediately by presidential order (*ukaz*), the new "National Guard" will be based on the existing Interior Ministry Troops—a 200,000 strong armed force with mechanized motor-rifle brigades and divisions, special troops and an air force, previously subordinated to the interior ministry, which is in charge of Russia's police forces. The National Guard will include not only the Interior Troops that are mostly manned by conscript soldiers, but also special paramilitary police units known as OMON and SOBR as well as the interdepartmental government security guard service (*Vnevedomstvenaya Okhrana*). These units of contract servicemen number some 200,000 and will, thus, boost the National Guard to around 400,000 ([Interfax](#), April 6).

The creation of the National Guard requires major changes to existing legislation. The Kremlin has introduced a package of bills to the Duma to make the National Guard a legal entity with sweeping powers to arrest, interrogate and use of deadly weapons against Russian civilian suspects or "troublemakers." Putin expressed full confidence the Duma would approve the National Guard legislative package without any delay "so there could be no possible misunderstandings"; but the overhaul is going ahead before the legislators have time to even consider the changes. By separate *ukaz*, Putin appointed Army General **Viktor Zolotov** (62) as the commander-in-chief of the National Guard. Zolotov will be subordinated solely and directly to the president and have the administrative rank of a cabinet member ([Interfax](#), April 6).

Zolotov is Putin's long-time close associate from St. Petersburg and the president's chief bodyguard and sparring partner in boxing and judo. Born in St. Petersburg, Zolotov served in the KGB bodyguard 9<sup>th</sup> Main Directorate. From 2000, when Putin became president, until 2013, Zolotov was the chief of the presidential security service. In May 2012, Zolotov was appointed a permanent member of Russia's Security Council. In 2013, Zolotov, who did not have any police or military service background, was appointed deputy commander of the Interior Troops. In May 2014, Zolotov became commander of the Interior Troops. Plans to create a National Guard in Russia, based on the Interior Troops, have reportedly circulated in the Kremlin in previous years. Zolotov—a professional bodyguard, whom Putin apparently considers absolutely loyal—was clearly being groomed to become the commander of the new joint security force ([Kommersant](#), April 5).

In an apparent move to compensate the interior ministry, Putin announced that the antinarcotics service—the Federal Drug Control Service (FSKN)—and the Federal Migration Service (FMS), which controls foreigners on Russian territory, will be merged with the Ministry of Interior. Bribes from illegal immigrants and narco-traders make the FSKN and FMS prime illegal moneymakers within Russian law



enforcement. Both the FSKN and FMS will be **transformed into directorates** within the interior ministry; their present staff will be cut and rotated. Russia's entire police force is being rebooted, and officers will be reinstated into new structures ([Kommersant](#), April 5). In Russia, obtaining a good moneymaking position traditionally requires paying a substantial bribe, in advance, to the decision-making superiors.

Putin has declared the National Guard's prime task to be fighting terrorists and organized crime, but the force seems too big and too heavily armed with new tanks and other heavy weapons for such a mission. The Federal Security Service (FSB), the Investigative Committee and the Ministry of Interior will continue to work organized crime and terrorist threats, and it is not clear how the National Guard could be the leading antiterrorist or anticrime force. In Soviet times, the Interior Ministry Troops were a heavily armed internal force created to deal with domestic enemies—the people of Russia primarily, whom the Communists always considered an inherent threat. Today, Putin apparently believes the internal threat to his regime is rising rapidly, although all opinion polls continue to put Putin's approval ratings at record highs. Of course, the Russian economy is in the doldrums, mass poverty is on the rise, and social unrest is possible in the future. But the consensus opinion of social scientists and pollsters is that at least two to three more calm years can be expected ahead ([Ng.ru](#), April 6).

When rigged Duma elections triggered mass antigovernment demonstrations in Moscow at the end of 2011 and in spring 2012, the interior ministry did not initially demonstrate great efficiency and struggled to muster enough trained manpower to effectively control the streets of Moscow. In 2012 the number of specialized anti-riot OMON police in all of Russia was estimated at some 25,000, the number stationed permanently in Moscow—only some 2,000. The Internal Troops units used as backup in Moscow in spring 2012 were inept conscripts, with less than a year of service under their belts. The precinct Moscow police, on the other hand, are corrupt; their morale is low and their riot training—zero. The Moscow OMON was boosted to 6,000 by other OMON units flown in from all over Russia. This left Russian provincial cities exposed if protests spread. The different OMONs from various regions are closely connected to local authorities; they have never trained together and do not know other cities ([Novaya Gazeta](#), March 2, 2012).

Putin's sudden decision to create a joint massive praetorian National Guard by merging together all the OMON units and the Interior Troops may have been triggered by the publication of the so-called "Panama Papers," which disclosed corrupt offshore financial schemes that involved, among others, some of Putin's closest acquaintances. The Kremlin has accused the US State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of being instrumental in their publication—allegedly aimed at Putin ([Interfax](#), April 4). According to Putin himself, the release of the Panama Papers is an attempt to weaken Russia from the inside, to "split society and undermine trust in the government." Putin added: "They will pit us one against another, like it was done during the tragic time of World War I" ([Interfax](#), April 7). Apparently Putin is referring to the Bolshevik revolution led by Vladimir Lenin, which was partially financed by the German General Staff. **It seems, Putin considers himself as some besieged emperor in the Kremlin, while a US-led and financed revolutionary regime change has been commenced, with the Panama Papers as a declaration of war. A massive praetorian National Guard, headed by an absolutely loyal bodyguard, is seen as the only means to stop the onslaught.**

*--Pavel Felgenhauer*

It is aimed to head off a threat from Russian elites as well as from the masses, says Galeotti.  
(can find citation on request)

As for the masses, the usually Kremlin-friendly Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) said 3/4 of respondents were unhappy with their salaries. Median salary was about 24,000 rubles/month [if it's 75 to the dollar, that's about \$330/month?]. Only 15% get more than 30,000/month. 80% say they live paycheck-to-paycheck.

about 65,000/month. Only 12% get more than 80,000/month. 60% say they live paycheck-to-paycheck.

A decent living salary to support family of 3, in the opinion of people polled by reputable commercial survey firm ROMIR, was about 73,000/month, and that was about equal to the actual average salary. {How to explain the discrepancy? Perhaps the ROMIR poll gives family monthly income with 2-3 wage-earners??? Or maybe ROMIR was doing the survey for someone who wanted to show higher numbers?}

Почти половина россиян, работающих по найму, получают зарплату меньше 20 тысяч рублей в месяц (46%), и абсолютное большинство (75%) отметили, что их это не устраивает, свидетельствуют данные фонда "Общественное мнение" (ФОМ).

[http://1prime.ru/state\\_regulation/20160407/824702686.html](http://1prime.ru/state_regulation/20160407/824702686.html)

**Nellie Ohr**

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**From:** Nellie Ohr  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 31, 2016 4:11 PM  
**To:** Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF); Ohr, Bruce (ODAG)  
**Subject:** Spain declares Viktor Ivanov's #2 a wanted man AND the OCCRP report on Rotenberg/Bayevskiy buying apts for Putin's women; AND Moscow gets tough on OC?

[Nikolay Aulov](#)

Interpol has info that he's linked with the Tambov group

Испания объявила в розыск замдиректора Госнарконтроля РФ Николая Аулова

<http://crimerussia.ru/gromkie-dela/ispaniya-obyavila-v-rozysk-zamdirektora-gosnarkontrolya-rf-nikolaya-aulova/>

Как сообщил [«Znak.com»](#) со ссылкой на «Росбалт», Испания в лице судьи Центрального следственного суда № 5 Испании Хосе Де ла Мата Амайя, вынесла решение об аресте и объявлении в международный розыск россиянина, заместителя директора Госнарконтроля РФ Николая Аулова. Материалы для его экстрадиции уже переданы в штаб-квартиру Интерпола и запущена процедура по организации задержания замдиректора ФСКН в случае пересечения им границы европейского или иного государства.

По данным Интерпола, Николай Аулов имеет отношение к деятельности «тамбовской» ОПГ, возглавляемой криминальным авторитетом Геннадием Петровым. Преступник был задержан еще в 2008 году во время громкой спецоперации «Тройка», проводимой сотрудниками полиции Испании на территории своей страны. Петрову были предъявлены обвинения в легализации денежных средств, полученных незаконным путем. По мнению следователей королевства, Геннадий Петров возглавлял не только «тамбовскую», но и «малышевскую» криминальные группировки.

При этом известно, что правоохранительные органы Испании ни разу не пытались допросить Николая Аулова, и несмотря на длительное время расследования преступлений, совершенных в этой западноевропейской стране членами российских ОПГ, ему никогда не инкриминировали никаких подобных деяний. Фамилия замдиректора ФСКН ранее не была озвучена в материалах данного уголовного дела.

Напоминаем, что несколько недель назад, в рамках расследования тех же самых преступлений, Испания объявила в международный розыск депутата Государственной думы РФ Владислава Резника. Тогда его коллеги сочли, что такое решение носит исключительно политический характер. Адвокаты Резника обжаловали решение испанского суда.

При этом еще в 2009 году многие отечественные и зарубежные СМИ сообщили, что по данным испанских следователей, арестованные в королевстве члены «русской мафии» связаны со многими российскими чиновниками и политиками. Тем не менее, «главного мафиози» - Геннадия Петрова в 2010 году испанские правоохранители отпустили под залог и он официально вернулся в Россию.

Безусловно, объявление в международный розыск замдиректора Госнарконтроля РФ Николая Аулова в России будет расценено, как негативное политическое решение.

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This is probably the "information attack" that VVP's press secretary was warning against. Roman Anin usually works for Novaya.

Roman Anin, [Russia: Businessman Handles Insider Homes](#), 31 March 2016,  
<https://www.occrp.org/en/investigations/5106-russia-businessman-handles-insider-homes>

... "A murky Russian businessman that formerly ran a state property agency has been buying apartments in Moscow for a number of young women that include the daughter of Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin; Putin's alleged girlfriend; and a woman who, in a flirty web posting titled "Pussy for Putin," offers the Russian leader a kitten and praises his leadership skills.

Grigory Baevskiy, 47, works for Arkadiy Rotenberg, a Kremlin insider and long-time Putin friend and his judo sparring partner. Records show Baevskiy not only helped Putin handle some of his most delicate personal situations

but also made a fortune from questionable deals with the Russian state."

....."After leaving his post in the DIA [dealing with state property], Baevskiy joined Rotenberg's business, showing up on a list of people officially affiliated with the SMP Bank, which is owned by the Rotenberg brothers. From 2011 until 2014, Baevskiy also worked as the general director of the Russian Holding Company (RHC) whose ultimate beneficiary is Rotenberg.

The RHC holds many of the jewels of the Russian economy. It is the only shareholder of the National Chemical Group, one of the biggest companies in the Russian fertilizer market. The RHC is also involved in a management role in a US\$ 6 billion highway project as part of the "Silk Way," a highway from the border of Belarus to Kazakhstan which will be a fast overland route from Western Europe to China. Baevskiy is not just an employee. He has been developing his own businesses and, as in the case of Arkadiy Rotenberg, Baevskiy's companies earn most of their money from Russian taxpayers. According to OCCRP calculations, in the past two years Baevskiy's businesses won more than 6 billion rubles (US \$88 million in current value) in state contracts.

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The Main Administration of the Moscow police has created special operational groups to fight the economic aspects of organized crime

\*Crimerussia.ru reports that Anatoliy Yakunin, head of the Moscow police Main Administration, told a 23 March meeting of the Moscow City Council there are 38 thieves-in-law registered in Moscow, of whom 8 live there permanently (other sources differ on these figures). 10 thieves-in-law were arrested in 2015 and four sit-downs were disrupted. This work helped in a 25% decrease in number of armed crimes. Also, new operational groups will fight to undercut the economy of organized crime groups. Experts say, however, that corruption provides a solid basis for the continued existence of organized crime.

\*Full cite: Anatoliy Yakunin will undercut "thieves-in-law" --Анатолий Якунин подорвет «воров в законе», 23 March 2016, <http://crimerussia.ru/criminalauthorities/spetsgruppy-zapustili-mekhanizm-podryva-ekonomicheskoy-platformy-vorov-v-zakone/>

**Nellie Ohr**

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**From:** Nellie Ohr  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 31, 2016 12:56 PM  
**To:** (b) (6) Nellie Email (b) (6); Ohr, Bruce (ODAG)  
**Subject:** Paragon of virtue decries Ukraine corruption and US meddling

{could Firtash be angling for a spot in a new Ukrainian govt?  
Note also that this Sputnik piece seems to be sympathetic to Yatsenyuk, calling him a scapegoat and saying Poroshenko is the corrupt one}

Sputnik [Russian propaganda outlet]  
March 30, 2016  
Ukraine is a 'Failed US Project, a Battlefield With No Solution'

Dmitry Firtash, a Ukrainian billionaire living in Austria, has called his native country a "failed project" of the US, which it has turned into a battlefield for the last two years instead of providing any solution; the US' "handwriting" in Ukraine, he noted, resembles very much that in Syria.

"As the past two years have shown, Ukraine today is not a successful project. In other words, America has failed to accomplish this task. Instead of providing a solution, it has created a battlefield. It destroys everything, economically and politically, it has almost destroyed the country, made it poor," the businessman said in his interview with Bloomberg.

Firtash also commented on the country's current government, calling it politically bankrupt.

"One cannot expect anything from this government. It has showed itself very clearly in these two years - it has brought the country to the edge of catastrophe. If they remain in power any longer, this will only make things worse. They had two years to prove themselves and they showed themselves as lacking talent, helpless, not able to do anything other than PR."

The businessman acknowledged that the government can by no means be called independent or is able to make any correct decisions.

The country is being governed from abroad by the Americans, he added.

"They may be very smart, I don't have anything against the US, but there is a problem," he said. "One should understand that Ukraine is still an independent country. And I would like it to be Ukrainians who govern Ukraine and not to be under external management."

"This is not the only situation of this kind - just look at Syria and then have a look at Ukraine - the handwriting is the same," the businessman added.

Dmitry Firtash is a Ukrainian oligarch who is now in his self-imposed exile in Austria. In March 2014, Firtash, who was at that time in the offices of his family holding company in central Vienna, was arrested by Austrian police at the request of the FBI. He was wanted in the US on bribery charges.

His release came nine days later, when he posted bail of €125 million (now \$140 million) by wire transfer - an Austrian judicial system record.

An Austrian High Court judge refused to hand him over to the FBI after finding that there had been improper political interference from the US in the matter.

Judge Christoph Bauer argued in his final decision that the case was "politically motivated" and rested solely on the testimony of two anonymous witnesses that the FBI refused to show before the court (the Judge questioned if those

individuals were even real).

Essentially, the case revolves around supposed bribes given in 2006 by Firtash and his associates to Indian officials to launch a titanium project - a project that never materialized.

According to media speculations, Firtash was regarded as having "close links with Russia and as a key player in the Russian-Ukrainian gas trade." His arrest then was seen by some media outlets as an attempt by Washington to put pressure on President Putin.

Bloomberg has already called Ukraine a failed project of the US and EU. Back in November its view columnist Leonid Bershidsky called it "another bankrupt and corrupt post-Soviet regime."

"Rather than the democratic hope it might have become after last year's 'Revolution of Dignity,' Ukraine now looks like just another incompetent and corrupt post-Soviet regime," he wrote.

"Despite attempts at change by a new generation of bureaucrats, Ukraine's economy remains unreformed. Taxes are oppressive but widely evaded, the shadow economy is growing and the regulatory climate for business has barely improved," he said, adding that Ukraine's incredibly corrupt justice system remained equally unreformed."

This year's report compiled by a group of British corruption experts revealed that Ukraine is deeply bogged down in pervasive corruption and red tape.

The level of corruption in Ukraine has reached never before seen levels and directly includes current President Petro Poroshenko's administration, it states.

The experts pointed out that the Ukrainian Administration is simply pretending to change and fight corruption, with Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk taking the brunt of the blame for the country's ills.

Western powers either lack the instruments to monitor Ukraine's level of corruption or choose to ignore it, the report concluded.

Nellie Ohr

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**From:** Nellie Ohr  
**Sent:** Wednesday, February 17, 2016 4:50 PM  
**To:** Ohr, Bruce (ODAG)  
**Subject:** Hezbollah leader threatens Israel with nuclear bomb-like attack

Don't know how reliable this source is  
<https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/29034/>

Nellie Ohr

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**From:** Nellie Ohr  
**Sent:** Tuesday, February 16, 2016 6:20 PM  
**To:** Ohr, Bruce (ODAG); Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF)  
**Subject:** Coincidenza?

[He was 52]

### Russia Anti-Doping Ex-Chief Dies

**Feb. 15 | BBC** — The former head of Russia's anti-doping agency Rusada has died, the organisation says. Nikita Kamaev's death comes two months after he resigned his post following a doping scandal in Russian athletics. Rusada said the cause of death was "a massive heart attack". Russia was suspended from international athletics last November after the World Anti-Doping Agency (Wada) accused Russian athletics of state-backed doping, corruption and extortion. Mr. Kamaev resigned from Rusada in December along with all the organisation's other top executives as Russia began work on lifting the ban in time for its athletes to compete at the Rio de Janeiro Olympics in August.....'those close to him say that he got tired after physical exercise and felt unwell.'....

....His death comes just two weeks after that of Rusada founding chairman, Vyacheslav Sinev.....

Mr Sinev, who left the agency in 2010, died on 3 February.

But Mr Khabriev said there was no link as Mr Sinev had been ill for a long time with heart problems and was supposed to undergo a transplant.

[http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35575774?mc\\_cid=57b8bbdfdc&mc\\_eid=e46842563c](http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35575774?mc_cid=57b8bbdfdc&mc_eid=e46842563c)

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Other intriguing tidbits:

--The Russian delegation to the Munich security conference included experts and oligarchs who can carry on informal couloir discussions:

[Russia Direct: Munich Security Conference: Ukraine still top-of-mind for Russia. With the beginning of the Munich Security Conference, Russia Direct talked to a member of the Russian delegation, Andrey Kortunov, general director of the Russian International Affairs Council \(RIAC\), to discuss this year's conference agenda and the most serious security challenges for Russia and the West.](#)

".....A.K.: [the Russian delegation] will comprise a range of our leading experts, political analysts and former diplomats, including Russia's former Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov. It will also include representatives of Russia's academic community and, probably, Russian oligarchs. For example, I received a call from the administration of [Oleg] Deripaska, the president of Russian aluminum giant United Co. Rusal. I mean there is a certain circle of persons who attend the Munich conference on a regular basis. Our group will consist of about 12-15 people. ....I believe that the major events and bilateral meetings take place not at the plenary sessions [of the Munich conference], but behind the scenes."

--And a diatribe by Congressman Rohrabacher--who turns out to be a subcommittee chair:

Why Is America Restarting the Cold War With Russia? Washington's strategy toward Moscow is outmoded and misdirected.

By Dana Rohrabacher, The National Interest, February 11, 2016, Rep. Dana Rohrabacher, a California Republican, chairs the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats.



Nellie Ohr

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**From:** Nellie Ohr  
**Sent:** Thursday, January 28, 2016 10:10 AM  
**To:** Ohr, Bruce (ODAG)  
**Subject:** EU Court Lifts Asset Freezes On Yanukovych's Prime Ministers Azarov And Arbuzov

EU Court Lifts Asset Freezes On Yanukovych's Prime Ministers Azarov And Arbuzov  
[11:31 \(GMT\)](#)

The General Court of the European Union has [today annulled an EU-wide freezing of assets](#) belonging to two of Viktor Yanukovych's former prime ministers - Mykola Azarov and Sergei Arbuzov. The assets were frozen on March 5, 2014, after they fled Ukraine after Yanukovych abandoned Kiev at the height of the EuroMaidan protests.

Azarov was prime minister when the government introduced a package of severely [restrictive anti-protest laws on January 16](#), 2014, aimed at repressing the demonstrations.

The package, dubbed the "dictatorship laws" was denounced internationally and served to only heighten tensions on the streets.

Azarov resigned on January 28 and was replaced by Arbuzov, who remained in his post until February 27. This period saw some of the most violent repressions on the Maidan, with snipers opening fire on protesters. Dozens had already been killed by riot police or abducted and tortured or killed in the weeks before Azarov's resignation.

Three other men were removed from the EU sanctions list by today's ruling: Eduard Stavvitskyi - former energy and coal industry minister, Sergiy Kluyev - businessman, MP and brother of former Presidential Administration head Andriy, and Oleksiy Azarov, the former prime minister's son.

All were placed under sanctions by the Council of the European Union after the post-Maidan Prosecutor-General, Oleh Makhnitsky, sent a letter to the Council stating that investigators had established that the five had misappropriated large amounts of public funds and illegally transferred them outside Ukraine.

The General Court ruled today that, in the absence of further evidence, the order of the Council failed to match the necessary legal criteria to freeze their assets:

*The Court takes the view that that letter provides no details concerning the matters specifically alleged against the five Ukrainians or the nature of their responsibility.*

*The Court concludes that the freezing of the assets of the five Ukrainians does not satisfy the designation criteria, and therefore annuls that measure for the period from 6 March 2014 to 5 March 2015.*

-- Pierre Vaux

Published in Press-Stream [Day 710: January 28, 2016](#) in Publication [Ukraine Liveblogs](#)

<http://www.interpretermag.com/day-710/>

## Ohr, Bruce (ODAG)

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**From:** Ohr, Bruce (ODAG)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 13, 2016 5:48 PM  
**To:** Nellie Ohr  
**Subject:** RE: "We know that in the United States, FBI agents, as well as police, have unlimited powers"

Amazing!

**From:** Nellie Ohr (b) (6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 13, 2016 5:46 PM  
**To:** Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF); Ohr, Bruce (ODAG)  
**Subject:** "We know that in the United States, FBI agents, as well as police, have unlimited powers"

From today's JRL. (Gazeta.ru, by the way, has not usually been a slavish mouthpiece for the Kremlin. And indeed they ask some pointed questions).

Gazeta.ru  
December 29, 2015  
Head of Russian watchdog interviewed on tightening control over media, internet  
Interview with Aleksandr Zharov, head of Roskomnadzor, Russia's Federal Service for the Supervision of Communications, Information Technology, and Mass Communications, by Svetlana Babayeva and Yevgeniy Shipilov

.....[Gazeta.ru] Journalists today are like mine disposal experts. Media outlets feel as if they are in a minefield: So many restrictions have been introduced on coverage of various subjects. What is the need for such tough regulation of the media?

[Zharov] The question "why" should probably be addressed, above all, to the authors of the laws. Roskomnadzor does not initiate legislation. As for tough regulation, I would not agree with you here. **Our legislation is fairly liberal compared with that of other countries** and with the powers of their supervisory bodies as far as, for example, the seizure of media material during broadcasts is concerned.

[Gazeta.ru] Can you give at least one example of a civilized country whose laws are tougher than ours?

[Zharov] **When one of the cable channels in New York started showing the film 08-08-08, which is about Georgia's attack on South Ossetia and Abkhazia, an FBI agent turned up at the studio 30 minutes after the film started, produced his ID, seized the material, and left. At that point, viewers' screens went blank. We know that in the United States, FBI agents, as well as police, have unlimited powers.** Can you imagine a Roskomnadzor inspector turning up at the offices of a media outlet and interrupting a broadcast? I can't.....

.....[Zharov claims the blacklists against drug-related sites have done good] The number of online stores specializing in the distribution of drugs has fallen drastically. Working together with the Coordination Centre for Top-Level Domains .RU and .RF [in Cyrillic] and experts from the Federal Drug Control Service [FSKN] who are responsible for this, we have made sure that several hundred such shops have simply disappeared from the Internet.

[Gazeta.ru] Are there any statistics showing how this has reduced drug use? According to information from other agencies, the situation is deteriorating, rather than improving.

[Zharov] I cannot give you statistics for drug use. You have to approach the FSKN for that. For me, it is clear that a determined addict will always get to the deadly stuff. There are ways of bypassing blocks: Content can be accessed through VPN [virtual private network] services, anonymizers, and so on. But at the end of the day it is not our job to work with people suffering from drug addiction. It seems to me that our job is to create barriers for young people who fortunately do not yet suffer from this affliction and to limit the chances of them reaching such websites. Together with the FSKN specialists, we estimate that there are currently around 5,000 Russian language websites which are

with the FORN specialists, we estimate that there are currently around 5,000 Russian-language websites which our users can access and which still sell drugs online. This is a large number.

[Gazeta.ru] And what stops you blocking them?

[Zharov] They are migrating and changing names, IP addresses, and domains. There is one step between a website being created and blocked. Clearly, our work has to be conducted in parallel with the work of law-enforcement agencies, which identify and detain such people. We are moving along a difficult path: Drug use is a global problem and does not just exist in Russia.....

Johnson's Russia List 13 Jan 2016

Original: [http://www.gazeta.ru/tech/2015/12/29\\_a\\_8002037.shtml](http://www.gazeta.ru/tech/2015/12/29_a_8002037.shtml)

Nellie Ohr

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**From:** Nellie Ohr  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 06, 2016 4:20 PM  
**To:** (b) (6) Nellie Email; Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF); Ohr, Bruce (ODAG)  
**Subject:** Re: Conspiracy theorizing-- an ex-KGB agent has claimed the Kremlin may have brought down the Russian plane over Egypt

Sorry, I have some more arguments to add to this:

Remember the scene on the night of Nov 16-17 when VVP supposedly first heard the official assessment that the plane had been brought down by a bomb? I was skeptical from the start.

Wayne wrote the following in his Nov 17 notes:

"Bortnikov says a bomb destroyed the Russian airliner over the Sinai:

<http://newsru.com/russia/17nov2015/a321.html> Bortnikov made this announcement at a meeting of the Security Council held last night. Putin said that "we will search for the terrorists no matter where they might be" and "we will punish them."...

Here's a transcript and video of the meeting: <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50707>

Putin also said that "we are counting on people who share our moral values that are the basis of our policy, in this case foreign and security policy, the policy of combating terrorism." Putin added that the Russian air campaign in Syria would be intensified so that the criminals understand that retribution is unavoidable. Russia will act in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter on the right of self defense.

An English translation of the meeting: <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50707>

**Comment: Putin appeared shaken, at times a bit emotional, but seemed to try and look determined. His body language appeared to indicate that he was disturbed, as we might expect. He does not look as shaken up as he did following Beslan, though, but maybe a bit weary. The meeting did take place last night and Putin just returned from a very busy summit in Turkey. Maybe that's why he seemed weary and maybe less steely than you might expect—he had to know this was coming and has had time to prepare himself for this moment.**

Peskov has commented that the meeting took place at 2300 last night. The FSB is reportedly offering a reward of \$50 million for information about those who were involved in the terrorist attack on the airliner. Yesterday, the British Foreign Ministry announced that Prime Minister Cameron had passed on to Putin information on the destruction of A321, the information that convinced the British government that a terrorist attack had taken place: <http://www.newsru.com/russia/17nov2015/peskov.html>

Here is a response I wrote to Wayne:

I'm sorry to be sounding so cynical about all this, but if this announcement were really a surprise that threw Putin for a loop, why would they be publicizing this on the Kremlin website? Even if, as a reader suggested, Bortnikov may have planned to throw VVP off balance with the announcement, would Bortnikov have been able to assure that it got posted on the site? And VVP's talk was clearly pre-written and probably rehearsed.

The timing, coming just a day after the G-20 summit, makes me think they decided to test out the mood

and make sure Russia had indeed broken out of its isolation with foreign partners, and then portray the "discovery" of the terrorist attack at a time when 1) the domestic audience could see it in light of an international anti-ISIS alliance a la WWII, 2) the rest of the world could see the Russian airline passengers as equally important to the Paris victims (I think there was less sympathy for them initially than there was for the Paris victims), and 3) as one commentary put it, Putin was engaging in damage control by allowing enough time to pass after the disaster for the initial passions of grief to cool, so people would not protest too loudly against the Russian activities in Syria that appeared to have motivated the attack.

I admit that in these remarks I'm simultaneously holding onto two possible versii: 1) that the plane crash really was an ISIS attack and that Russia was undertaking damage control and even turning it to its advantage, and 2) the more farfetched versia, that someone in Russia may actually have facilitated the attack, a hypothesis I tried out in an earlier message.

I admit that versia 2 is farfetched, and that your "lucky and opportunistic" formulation probably describes better how VVP has been able to make the best of the tragedy.

-----Original Message-----

From: Nellie Ohr (b) (6)

To: (b) (6) Lisa Holtyn [REDACTED] bruce.g.ohr <bruce.g.ohr@usdoj.gov>

Sent: Wed, Jan 6, 2016 4:02 pm

Subject: Conspiracy theorizing-- an ex-KGB agent has claimed the Kremlin may have brought down the Russian plane over Egypt

From the beginning I wondered whether the 31 October shoot-down of the Russian plane over Egypt could have been the work of the Kremlin itself, comparable to the 1999 apartment bombings.

Other commentators cautiously raised this possibility from the beginning. E.g. this item from Wayne Allensworth's Nov 16 Internet Notes citing the moderate nationalist commentator Solovey:

Solovey says that the situation has improved for Putin: [http://vk.com/id244477574?w=wall244477574\\_11647%2Fall](http://vk.com/id244477574?w=wall244477574_11647%2Fall):

"The situation has begun to improve for the Kremlin. **One more terrorist attack and Moscow will be in the saddle internationally.....**"

[I noted that] Solovey seemed to be toying with the idea that Russia has benefited from both the airliner and the Paris attacks. The way I read Solovey's comment, by extension, it is not excluded that Russia could have had a hand in facilitating the attacks.

I have to admit the thought crossed my mind,

--as soon as I heard that a Syrian passport was found near the body of one of the bombers, which sounded too much like the finding of, was it Yarosh's passport, near the site of some kind of clash in Ukraine?

--and given the precedent of the 1999 apartment bombings (Kathrin Hille in the FT pointed out a few days ago that Putin's statements, saying they'll wipe out terrorists wherever they are in the world, sounded eerily like those of 1999),

--and considering all the ways in which the Paris attack strengthened Russia's position, helped further undermine EU unity and highlight the voices of Le Pen types, bolster the Russian narrative about how decadent liberal Europe had it coming, and make the West come around toward the possibility of allowing Assad to stay longer.

Now someone else has shared my suspicions, which were also expressed by Kommersant back in November (at the end of this email). This time it is an ex-KGB fellow named Karpichkov, here cited in a 25 Dec 2015 article in the

Daily Mail. Karpichkov says the bombing plot was allegedly hatched by the GRU—**100 Dad the GRU head just died suddenly and can't explain.....**

## **Did Putin plant the holiday jet bomb that killed 224 Russians? Ex-KGB agent claims this dossier proves the Kremlin orchestrated the atrocity to justify waging war on Syria**

By [Andrew Malone for the Daily Mail](#)

<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3374231/Did-Putin-plant-holiday-jet-bomb-killed-224-Russians-s-outrageous-theory-ex-KGB-agent-claims-dossier-proves-Kremlin-orchestrated-atrocity-justify-waging-war-Syria-decide-yourself.html>

.....is all really as it seems over the story of Metrojet Flight 9268? Could there be another very disturbing explanation of how the aircraft was blown out of the sky?

One man certainly believes so: Boris Karpichkov, a former spy with the KGB (later renamed the FSB) who now lives under a new identity with his wife and family at a secret location in England after fleeing here in fear for his life.

His sensational claim at first seems unbelievable. For he maintains it was the Kremlin, not ISIS, that deliberately blew the plane out of the sky.

And he says Putin cynically authorised the tragedy not only to obtain worldwide sympathy at a time when Russia was being treated as a pariah because of its aggression towards Ukraine, but also to gain support for its ostensible belligerence against ISIS, which Putin would use as a cover to attack rebel groups in Syria who were sworn enemies of his ally President al-Assad.

Of course, this could simply be the most monstrous slur by a deeply disenchanted man. For it has to be said that Major Karpichkov fell out with his KGB paymasters over money he claimed was owed to him, and ended up in jail before fleeing to Britain.

Yet his case deserves to be aired, particularly in view of the history of black propaganda emanating from Putin and his Kremlin cronies, and his argument is compelling.

The major claims his information comes from a general lieutenant in GRU (one of Russia's numerous military intelligence wings).

This man told him, he says, that around the time of the plane's crash, Putin had been expressing his concerns to Kremlin allies about 'possible losses of political influence' in Syria and the Middle East. Putin, he went on, was worried about the fate of his traditional ally in the region, President al-Assad, given the West's support for rebel groups trying to depose him.

A plan was allegedly hatched by officials within GRU to reverse Russia's declining influence in the region and — as Major Karpichkov claims he was told by a senior source — to 'kill two rabbits with one bullet'.

The aim was to get 'at least silent international approval' for massive military operations against Assad's enemies under the guise of a campaign against the IS terrorists blamed for bombing the Russian passenger jet, and to bolster Russia's multi-billion-pound weapons business with the Middle East.

This was all summarised in a dossier compiled by the former KGB spy: 'In order to accomplish all these aims and to get Western consent to fighting Islamic State (which was, essentially, official support for keeping the Assad regime in power), the Kremlin desperately needed the kind of justification which would generate worldwide attention and full international sympathy and approval for military action.'

The major certainly knows all about the dark arts of espionage.

A graduate of a KGB academy in Minsk, he was taught how to kill with his bare hands as well as how to carry out other so-called 'wet-jobs' — the killing of a target without leaving any traces of evidence.

He served in Russian intelligence for more than a decade, reaching the rank of KGB major and

as such, was privy to Kremlin secrets at a high level. He spent much of his career in the then Soviet republic of Latvia, where he specialised in counter-intelligence for the KGB.

When the Soviet empire collapsed in 1991, he stayed in newly independent Latvia, where he joined the country's intelligence services. But he also remained on the books of the Kremlin, leaking information to his old bosses.

However, he was jailed for two months on weapons charges after a row over payments he claimed were owed to him by the KGB. The Russians, in turn, accused him of being involved in a massive fraud — part of the normal modus operandi of the Kremlin bringing criminal charges against enemies.

After he was placed under house arrest in Latvia, he used four false passports issued to him while he was a spy and fled the country, ending up in Britain a decade ago.

He says he retains high-level contacts in Russian intelligence circles, and that his dossier is an accurate representation of the truth about the worst terrorist atrocity involving an airliner since the terror attacks in New York on September 11, 2001.

The file states that Russian intelligence 'geniuses' in GRU outlined a plan to Putin and his closest aides to bomb a Russian airliner and blame it on Islamic extremists 'to initiate enormous international hate towards ISIS and to create international sympathy to act on its own without any limits or reservations (for military action).'

Once agreed, Major Karpichkov says, the operation was straightforward.

A specialist in 'wet-jobs' and other forms of espionage was despatched to Sharm el-Sheikh, where hundreds of thousands of Russians holiday each year to escape the cold. Posing as a fighter who was recuperating in the Red Sea after serving in Ukraine, the agent befriended a young Russian woman staying in the resort, and began a holiday romance.

When the woman was due to leave for St Petersburg, the Russian agent gave her a 'present' — asking her to deliver it to his parents at home in Russia — and escorted her through the notoriously lax security at Sharm el-Sheikh airport before she boarded the doomed Metrojet flight in the early hours of the morning.

The gift, says Major Karpichkov, was a bomb and the detonator used to ignite the explosives was known as an EHV-7, which is produced exclusively for special forces soldiers. The device itself looked like a piece of plumbing tube, which is primed to explode by an electrolyte 'bath' slowly corroding a metallic wire, which detonates the bomb once it is broken.

The explosive material was — sources add — cyclonite, an enormously powerful substitute for TNT.

It has been suggested that the bomb was most likely placed under the seat 30A or 31A. Plane records show that seat 30A was occupied by Nadezhda Bashakova, 77, from Volkhov in St Petersburg region, travelling with her daughter Margarita Simanova, 43, who sat in 30B. In seat 31A was Maria Ileva, 15, also from St Petersburg region. Could this young woman have been the unwitting carrier of the bomb? She was with her mother Marina Ileva, 44, who occupied seat 31B. My sources say the bomb carrier was older, and sitting nearby.

However extraordinary, the allegations about the Sinai crash are not as far-fetched as they may seem. After all, Putin has allegedly used such a murderous method against his own people to generate support for war before. In 1999, during Putin's first term as president after coming to power following a career as a KGB spy, he was accused of being behind the infamous bombings of four apartment blocks in Moscow as well as the cities of Buynaksk and Volgogradsk.....

Not surprisingly, the Russians have furiously dismissed the claims by their former spy. 'This theory about the plane being deliberately blown up on Putin's orders can only come from someone with a sick mind who is intent on revenge,' snorted one Russian intelligence source.

'Look at Karpichkov's background — he has fallen out with all his old sponsors whether in Moscow, Riga or London, and probably the CIA, too. No one trusts him, and he invents far-fetched

Moscow, Niga or London, and probably the CIA, too. No one trusts him, and he invents far-fetched nonsense. Linking it to the apartment block explosions — well, these were also absurd claims for which no proof was ever produced.’

Perhaps this is true. Perhaps the claims by Boris Karpichkov are fantasy or some attempt to smear the spy’s former Kremlin handlers — part of the intelligence world’s so-called wilderness of mirrors, where nothing and no one is quite what they seem.

Or perhaps we do really live in times when people blow their own out of the sky for arms sales, oil and power.

For the sake of us all, let’s hope that the Russian major is horribly wrong about what really happened to Metrojet Flight 9268.

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And below are some more examples of people suspecting the plane was bombed by the Russian government

## Wednesday, November 18, 2015

### Moscow Projects Its Own Myths onto the West and Then Justifies Russian Actions on the Basis of Those Myths, Solomatin Says

<http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/11/moscow-projects-its-own-myths-onto-west.html>

Paul Goble

Staunton, November 18 – A curious and extraordinarily dangerous feedback loop has emerged, Mikhail Solomatin says. Moscow projects false myths on the West and then uses those myths to justify its own actions at home and abroad – or to put it more succinctly, “Russia seeks to introduce those standards of Western civilization which it dreamed up on its own.”

This projection of Russian myths on the West is becoming increasingly a part not only of Russian ideology but also of Russian practice under Putin, the Moscow historian argues in a commentary on [Kasparov.ru](http://kasparov.ru) today and opens the way to ever greater misunderstandings and disasters in the future ([kasparov.ru/material.php?id=564C2C3F1994E](http://kasparov.ru/material.php?id=564C2C3F1994E)).

Thus, he says, Moscow puts out the myth that the US sends its troops into any country “which it considers the zone of its interests” and then the Kremlin uses that myth to “justify the seizure of Crimea and the provision of military assistance to Asad.” Its myth that the US organizes “color revolutions” is used to justify Moscow’s sponsorship of separatism in Ukraine.

Its myth that the American film, “The Tail Wags the Dog,” “reflects the principles of the foreign and domestic policy of the West led to the creation of Kiselyev-TV,” Solomatin observes. And even Putin’s blatant lying about Russian forces in Crimea reflects “a myth about the total falseness and cynicism of politicians in Western countries.”

But there is another and even more deeply “rooted” for Russian consciousness myth” about the West, the myth “that behind the Islamist terrorists stand the CIA. This myth is old, much older for example that the one that holds that the Maidan was ‘sponsored by the State Department.’”

Given those Kremlin assumptions, Solomatin says, “it is hardly wise to ignore” the fact that “the Kremlin cannot but be thinking” about how it can use weapons it says the CIA has created for Russia’s purposes. Indeed, it would be very surprising if Putin and his entourage were not doing that.

To say that, he points out, is not to say that Moscow organized this or that terrorist action but only that



its myths about the supposed Western organizers of terrorist groups is part of Kremlin thinking and helps to explain why **Moscow so often succeeds in exploiting terrorist acts for its own purposes**. After all, it assumes that the West is trying to do the same thing.

**“The only structure which won from the destruction of the jet over Sinai and from the bloodbath in Paris and the only structure whose earlier declared goals were advanced as a result of these terrorist actions was the Putin regime,”** the Moscow commentator argues.

As a result of Paris, he continues, Putin received carte blanche to isolate his own citizens from the rest of the world and a wonderful opportunity to “force the West to cooperate and forget about Ukraine.” In fact, “not for any other government of any other country of the world did the actions of the terrorists open such perspectives.”

That is what Putin was promoting at the G20 summit, and, one could add on the basis of the latest news, has succeeded in some measure given US President Barack Obama’s declaration today at the Asian-Pacific Summit that he views Putin as a reliable partner in the struggle against terrorism.

Exactly the same thing happened after the 9/11 attacks, Solomatn says. “On the basis of ‘common challenges,’ the West ‘forgave Russia’ for its Chechen campaigns, and ‘Putin became the best friend of Bush Junior.’”

“I am far from convinced in the justice of the thesis that ‘The FSB Blew Up Russia,’ [a reference to the book linking Putin to the apartment bombings in 1999], but three things are completely obvious,” Solomatn says:

1. “The Kremlin believes in the effectiveness of suing Islamist terrorist in the geopolitical struggle because Russian ideologues have already for a long time accused the hated US of this.”
2. “The Kremlin believes that cynicism is the basic contemporary policy.”
3. “The Kremlin consistently is the main and at times the only beneficiary from the activities of Islamist terrorists, something which is not surprising given that among their enemies is not a little in common and the chief among them is contemporary Western civilization with its liberalism and human rights.”

This is not something new for Moscow, he continues. It helps to explain what made possible “the alliance of Stalin with Hitler in 1939.”

Stolomatn says he is far from “accusing Russia in the organization of terrorist actions, but it is undoubtedly the case that Russia for a long time has become at a minimum, the ideological and political backer of terrorism,” as in the case of the shooting down of the Malaysian airliner over Ukraine. Moscow may not have pulled the trigger but it supplied the weapons to those who did.

That case “illustrates the connection of Russia with international terrorism, one that is not direct but neither is it accidental or illogical,” Stolomatn continues. “Russia’s Anti-Westernism and intensified anti-Americanism,” its belief that world leadership rests on displays of military might and repression “have made it “close to those who seek to blow up the world order.”

And this, the Moscow historian says, is “only beginning.”

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**Thursday, November 19, 2015**

## Parallels with 1999 Could Backfire on Putin

Paul Goble

Staunton, November 19 – “Kommersant” reports today that Russian experts say the bomb that brought down the Russian airliner over Sinai resembles those used to blow up apartment blocks in Moscow, with the only differences being the amount of explosive used, the nature of the timing device, and the target ([kommersant.ru/doc/2857174](http://kommersant.ru/doc/2857174)).

Vladimir Putin may be counting on using such reports to mobilize Russian society for a new military action much as he did 16 years ago. (For a discussion, see “Is Moscow about to Use the Sinai Plane Disaster as He did the 1999 Bombings?” November 3, 2015, at [windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/11/is-putin-about-to-use-sinai-plane-crash.html](http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/11/is-putin-about-to-use-sinai-plane-crash.html).)

No doubt, given the Kremlin’s control of the media and the willingness of many Russians to accept as true anything Putin says, he may have some success in doing so. But there is a significant number of Russians and others who don’t accept his version of 1999 and thus may not accept his explanation of the latest terrorist act.

Instead, they believe that the FSB and Putin personally were behind the blowing up of the apartment buildings; and consequently, this comparison may lead some of them to wonder whether he and his agents were behind the latest disaster as well, especially given how quickly and well he has exploited it to his own ends.

(For the most detailed discussion of what happened in 1999 and how various groups have evaluated it, see John Dunlop’s *The Moscow Bombings of September 1999* (Ibidem, 2014).)

Whether or not Russians will draw such parallels, either those the Kremlin would like them to draw or those it very much fears that they might, depends on the level of popular memory, and an article in the latest issue of “Kommersant-Dengi” argues that “the main problem of Russia [today] is memory” ([kommersant.ru/doc/2850128](http://kommersant.ru/doc/2850128))..... [Goble summarizes this article at length, as if he is regretful that most Russians likely won’t draw the possible parallel between now and 1999–NHO]

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The Kommersant article was also cited by Illarionov—but he highlights different aspects of the 1999 parallel ---saying it hints a Russian plan to attack Saudi Arabia! (This is article 2 of two.

(In part 1 he pointed out that VVP probably knew it was a terrorist act earlier but waited to announce it and then focused on financiers rather than on ISIS):

the Russian authorities did not announce that they knew until “after the conclusion of the G20 summit in Antalya in order to “avoid a practically inevitable discussion in that event of the nature of the possible Russian response to the terrorist action.”

...Already at Antalya, Putin had said that it was necessary to strike at those who “finance terrorist activities,” a group of countries which include Saudi Arabia and Qatar....in the near future, Saudi Arabia (and possibly Qatar) could be declared sponsors of international terrorism....Invoking Article 51 of the UN Charter, the Kremlin could carry out an operation of revenge.”

15. The consequences of such attacks on oil prices are obvious, and the refusal of the US and the UK to invoke Article 5 of the NATO Charter for the defense of France marks the de facto paralysis of this organization and in essence an open invitation to the carrying out of new aggression against its other members.”

## Friday, November 20, 2015

### Illarionov Offers Additional Arguments that Putin Planning to Attack Saudi Arabia

Paul Goble

<http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/11/illarionov-offers-additional-arguments.html>

Staunton, November 20 – Yesterday, Andrey Illarionov laid out the logic behind his suggestion that Vladimir Putin is preparing to attack Saudi Arabia in order to destabilize and possibly dismember it ([windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/11/putin-appears-preparing-to-attack-saudi.html](http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/11/putin-appears-preparing-to-attack-saudi.html)).

Not surprisingly, that suggestion precisely because it would involve an action few have thought possible immediately sparked a vociferous reaction in Moscow and elsewhere. And so today, the Moscow analyst provides additional arguments on behalf of his conclusion ([kasparov.ru/material.php?id=564E431AA47E7](http://kasparov.ru/material.php?id=564E431AA47E7)).

As he did yesterday and has done before, Illarionov lays out his argument point by point. In this case, he offers 10 additional detailed discussions that he says force the conclusion that Putin's new war "will be directed not only and not so much against ISIS" as "against Saudi Arabia" with the goals being its "destabilization and it can't be excluded dismemberment."

1. "In the course of the historic session of the force Politburo of the Russian Federation November 16-17," FSB chief Aleksandr Bortnikov focused on the origins of the explosives that blew up the plane over Sinai rather than on who carried out the attack, thus at a minimum confusing the issue concerning who was responsible by "intensifying suspicions that arose earlier" about that.
2. Bortnikov also stressed that the bomb itself was "self-acting" rather than the work of a suicide bomber, a conclusion of course supported by ISIS claims earlier the same day and one that again has the effect of spreading the blame for the bombing beyond Islamic State activists. The FSB chief insisted that Russian experts had established this independently.
3. "Kommersant" carried a story suggesting parallels between the 1999 bombings and the downing of the plane, a potentially dangerous one for the Kremlin if people conclude that it might have been behind both but useful to Putin because the Russian security experts the paper cited mentioned "nameless 'people from the North Caucasus'" as being to blame once again. And these "experts" recalled "the names of those who 'prepared those who carried out the terrorist acts' – 'Khattab and his right-hand Abu al-Walid.'" And what "a surprise!" Illarionov says. "Both of the individuals named as is well known were from Saudi Arabia."
4. "The appearance in Russian anti-terrorist discourse of Saudi Arabia and the absence in Putin's commentaries ... of any reference to ISIS hardly can be considered accidental," the analyst continues. The Kremlin leader talked about unnamed "criminals" rather than being more specific even in terms of suspicions, a marked contrast to analysts in the West who have pointed to ISIS as behind this attack.
5. Despite not naming anyone, Putin nonetheless promised to take the harshest measures immediately to "find and punish the criminals." "In other words," Illarionov says, "Putin declared that there will be conducted extra-judicial reprisals over unknown persons without offering any evidence of their guilt or even their connection with the catastrophe of the Russian jet." And he added that these reprisals will be carried out "with the help 'of people who share our moral values.'" Given what happened after 1999, one can only imagine what that means.

6. Putin announced that Moscow would step up its air raids in Syria without presenting any “cause and effect link” between those in Syria and the airplane disaster. Russian commentators and many Western ones have accepted his logic without any questions about his failure to provide a link or to follow “the basic principles of the Western legal tradition – the presumption of innocence, the need to present evidence of their guilt to the accused, court hearings ... [and] the right of the accused to a defense.”
7. In this way and by attacking people before identifying them as guilty, “Putin in a completely Freudian way demonstrated not only the lack of evidence of their guilt ... but the absence of any desire to find it.”
8. “Despite such a demonstrative violation by the Russian authorities of the basic principles of Western (and now all-human) legal tradition, the expansion of the Kremlin’s use of force won the approval from the side of the current American president: “Barak Obama declared that he has always supported the struggle of Russia against ... ISIS.””
9. All of this, Illarionov points out, follows what has become “the Putin model of unleashing large (open and not hybrid) wars (the second Chechen and the Russian-Georgian).” First, provocations, then terrorist acts, then the loss of innocent life, then finding one’s opponents guilty without evidence, loud promises to destroy them, the physical destruction of the opponents Putin has identified, and then “an essential change in the domestic or geopolitical situation.”
10. “Nevertheless, the war of 2015 in comparison with the former large wars of 1999 and 2008 is different in certain key ways.” It is conducted far beyond Russia’s borders. Unlike the earlier conflicts, “the beginning of the third war is openly supported by the West and the Obama Administration is ready to greet it with ovations.” And the new war is directed at a country Moscow has long blamed for supporting terrorist actions against Russia, Saudi Arabia.

“In large measure,” Illarionov says, “this is not a new war but a continuation directed at the defeat” of an enemy Putin has long had in his mind. And that enemy is Saudi Arabia. If Putin does attack and succeeds in defeating or even dismembering that country, he will achieve “the radical reordering of the entire contemporary world as we have known it.”

Shmulevich considers and rejects the idea that Russia could have caused the Paris attacks, but does say Russia was responsible in a general way for the rise of ISIS:

## Friday, November 20, 2015

### Putin ‘Played No Less Role’ in Creation of ISIS than Stalin did in Rise of Nazis, Shmulyevich Says

Paul Goble

<http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/11/putin-played-no-less-role-in-creation.html>

Staunton, November 20 – Vladimir Putin should be compared with Stalin rather than with Hitler, Avraam Shmulyevich says, not only because he is seeking to use an east-west alliance to legitimize his seizure of territory but also because Putin has played “no less a role” in the creation of ISIS than the Soviet dictator did in “the strengthening of German fascism.”

In an interview with Kseniya Kirillova posted on Krym.ru, the Israeli rabbi and analyst approaches this issue with great caution, indicating what is known and what is only suspected because the Russian government has done little or nothing to dispel the suspicions its actions have generated ([ru.krymr.com/content/article/27374996.html](http://ru.krymr.com/content/article/27374996.html)).

“Radical Islamism began with the invasion of the USSR into Afghanistan,” the Israeli analyst

... says. "All the more radical Islamists including Ben Laden came out of the struggle with the Soviet Union. The second push to the growth of radicalism was given by the invasion of Russia into Chechnya." In both cases, the Islamists saw Moscow as the enemy.

At the same time, "the largest number of ISIS militants are being recruited from Russia and the other countries of the post-Soviet space," he says. "In part, this is connected with the fact that over the course of many years, the Russian special services have 'pushed' their own Islamists toward Syria and Iraq, putting before them the choice: emigration or jail or murder."

"Of course," Shmulyevich says, "we do not know the motives of the FSB in this: did they only want to cleanse their own territory of unsuitable elements or did they intend to strengthen ISIS. But whatever the case, it remains a fact that precisely the Russian special services sent there the most motivated and educated contingent of militants."

The Israeli analyst says that he does not now have "any data about how much the Russian special services are today using their old ties with the Islamic State ... or even how much 'the Islamic underground' in Russia is controlled by the special services."

"However, if Russia wants to avoid accusations of cooperating with ISIS, it should at a minimum clarify this issue." Instead, "Moscow in the course of several years has crated 'a green corridor' for the militants who want to join the terrorists." Moreover, Russian agencies undoubtedly have large dossiers on these people and "one would like to understand how they are using these."

At present, Shmulyevich continues, "we can reliably assert only that Russia extended its hand toward the creation of ISIS" and "undoubtedly has some levers of influence" on the group. But that alone does not mean that Moscow necessarily is behind any particular action of the Islamic State.

Yet another fact which "does not speak in Russia's favor," Shmulyevich continues, is that it is precisely the country "which stands at the origins of Arab terrorism," and "all those method which Islamist terrorists use now, including the seizure of planes and suicide bombers were developed by the KGB and its satellites" in Soviet times.

Despite that, he says, he is "not inclined to consider that Putin stands behind the Paris terrorist attacks and supposes that they were completely organized by ISIS itself. However, "the Russian leader used the tragedy in his own interests to the maximum extent possible" and is seeking "to convince the West that Russia has become a reliable ally in the struggle with terrorism."

The Kremlin leader is having success in that regard, especially since he appears to have accepted the idea that his ally Asad will have to leave office. But that will create problems for him: he will have to assume the difficult task of providing security in the region. At the same time, if he gets bases there, he will have achieved a longstanding Russian dream.

And "it is possible," Shmulyevich continues, that the price for all this that Putin will extract from the West is Ukraine. Already it appears that "unfortunately" the West is moving in the direction on Ukraine that Moscow wants, and that risk "will increase with each new ISIS terror attack."

-----Original Message-----

From: Nellie Ohr (b) (6)

To: (b) (6) Nellie Email ; (b) (6) Allensworth ; (b) (6)

Sent: Mon, Nov 23, 2015 5:38 pm

Subject: Re: Conspiracy theorizing

### **'Soda Can' Bomb From Sinai Crash Resembles Those of '99 Moscow Attacks**

**Nov. 19 | The Moscow Times** —The "soda can" bomb the Islamic State's official magazine claimed brought down a Russian airliner over Egypt's Sinai Peninsula on Oct. 31, killing all 224 people on board, appears similar to the explosive devices that may have been used by terrorists to blow up residential buildings in Moscow in 1999, the Kommersant newspaper wrote Thursday. The paper cited unidentified experts, reporting that the photo of a 0.33 liter Schweppes soft drink can appearing in IS' Daqib magazine was strongly suggestive of grenades and booby traps used in the North Caucasian conflict in the 1990s, especially by militants led by the Saudi-born Chechen independence fighter Ibn al-Khattab. The report added that cans packed with explosives and detonated by a similar mechanism may have been used in the Russian apartment bombings on Sep. 9 and Sep. 13, 1999, which led to the deaths of at least 218 people. Moscow later alleged that al-Khattab had masterminded the attacks.

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**From:** Nellie Ohr (b) (6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, January 5, 2016 5:45 PM  
**To:** Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF)  
**Subject:** Re: How Corrosive Practices from Russia Penetrate and Undermine US and UK

**This message has been archived.**

I hate to burden you with a 55-page document. I only skimmed it myself. It has a nice summary graphic on p.3. Much of the material he mentions is familiar stuff; it's just helpful to have it brought together in one place.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF) (OCDETF) (b) (6)  
**To:** Nellie Ohr (b) (6)  
**Sent:** Tue, Jan 5, 2016 5:35 pm  
**Subject:** RE: How Corrosive Practices from Russia Penetrate and Undermine US and UK

Wow, thank you Nellie – I will have to make time to read this one.

Hope you and the family had a very Merry Christmas and Happy New Year!

**From:** Nellie Ohr (b) (6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, January 05, 2016 5:14 PM  
**To:** Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF); Ohr, Bruce (ODAG)  
**Subject:** How Corrosive Practices from Russia Penetrate and Undermine US and UK

This article has a section summarizing effects of criminal activities, other non-criminal but questionable activities (breaching trade rules, manipulating Interpol), and soft power means of undermining rule of law etc. in the US and UK

[http://imrussia.org/media/pdf/Research/Ilya\\_Zaslavsky\\_\\_How\\_Corrosive\\_Practices\\_from\\_Russia\\_Penetrate\\_and\\_Undermine\\_US\\_and\\_UK.pdf](http://imrussia.org/media/pdf/Research/Ilya_Zaslavsky__How_Corrosive_Practices_from_Russia_Penetrate_and_Undermine_US_and_UK.pdf)

It is by Ilya Zaslavsky, --apparently the one by that name who's at Chatham House

<https://www.chathamhouse.org/about-us/directory/197781>

This appears be the same fellow who worked for TNK-BP and was arrested in Russia on charges of spying on Gazprom--just to make things interesting (<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/us-brothers-found-guilty-of-espionage/376971.html>)

Nellie Ohr

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**From:** Nellie Ohr  
**Sent:** Tuesday, December 29, 2015 9:35 PM  
**To:** (b) (6) Nellie Email; Ohr, Bruce (ODAG); Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF)  
**Subject:** Putin and organized crime -- Allensworth internet notes 29 Dec 2015

[I am omitting the photos when forwarding this--NHO]

**Wayne Allensworth** (b) (6)

### Internet Notes 29 December 2015

Viktor Shenderovich on vlast and organized crime (Vlast as the "Tambov Criminal Group"; Putin's mentor: "Lenya Sambist"; "Lenya" and Rotenberg; Putin, Rakhlin, Rotenberg, and Shestakov; Kumarin, Tsepov, Litvinenko) 1  
The Nemtsov murder investigation: Mukhudinov reportedly named as the zakazchik. 10  
Putin's "Little red book" offers words of wisdom for Russian officials. 10  
"Outspoken" Chaplin sacked by ROC (He wanted the Church to condemn official corruption) 13  
The Saudis are having problems because of low oil prices. 15  
The Russian Defense Ministry on the US and ISIS. 16  
Russia, Taliban, ISIS. 17

**Viktor Shenderovich on vlast [=the authorities, the regime--NHO] and organized crime (Vlast as the "Tambov Criminal Group"; Putin's mentor: "Lenya Sambist"; "Lenya" and Rotenberg; Putin, Rakhlin, Rotenberg, and Shestakov; Kumarin, Tsepov, Litvinenko)**

<http://echo.msk.ru/programs/personalno/1682298-echo/>

The Shenderovich interview has been removed from the Ekho Moskvyy site. You can still see it here, though:  
[http://medialeaks.ru/news/2512vut\\_shender](http://medialeaks.ru/news/2512vut_shender)  
Kashin has noted the disappearance of the Ekho material and re-posted it as well:  
[http://kashin.guru/2015/12/25/shenderovich\\_v\\_ban/](http://kashin.guru/2015/12/25/shenderovich_v_ban/)

Shenderovich told Ekho Moskvyy that there is no law in Russia, there is a "junta," or a "Corporation," or you could call vlast the "Tambov Criminal Group," but there's no law. That group is using all possible means to remain in power—propaganda, the courts, prosecutors, investigators—and has no intention of leaving. Shenderovich called the current regime "Bandit vlast," a vlast with nuclear weapons...

Shenderovich says that "fresh information" on Putin's youth has showed up in the Internet—Shenderovich says that Putin's "teacher" was gangster and Sambo (Comment: "Sambo"—derived from the Russian words for "self defense") instructor Leonid Usvyatsov (AKA "Lenya Sambist") (Comment: Gangland in the late Soviet and the post-Soviet period in Russia drew heavily from sports clubs—gangsters were often wrestlers, boxers, martial arts types. [There's an interesting bit on sports clubs and crime in the second article summarized below] I figured that Putin's links to gangsters were probably at least partly made in his judo training. As the Soviet system collapsed, organized crime played a role in filling the vacuum, as is often the case in such situations, providing (or forcing) protection for/on businesses. Local mobsters sometimes became "Robin Hood" figures, paying for schools, taking care of the problems of locals—some of you out there remember Anatoliy Bykov, AKA "Tolya Byk," a gym teacher and boxer who became a mob boss, aluminum plant owner, and was elected to state office in Krasnovarsk. I'm sure that a lot of the public figures who rose up in the 90's had



state since in *Ekho*... I am sure that a lot of the public figures who rose up in the 90's had similar connections. The ties between the criminal world, law enforcement, politics, and business were established then and became a defining characteristic of post-Communist Russia, though the balance of power in the web of inter-relationships shifted to "the state," the clans that created a hive-like network in official organs, under Putin). Putin mentioned him in his first book, the Sambo instructor "Lenya." Between jail terms, he took part in the education of the future president. "Lenya" knew Putin from age 16, according to Shenderovich, and helped the young Putin get admitted to LGU on the "sports quota." Lenya Usvyatsov was gunned down in a gangland slaying in St. Petersburg in 1994. Shenderovich says that this is where Putin's "strike first" mentality comes from, that Lenya was the source of Putin's gangland speech. Lenya provided life lessons for the young Putin that he would not forget. After Lenya was killed, his place in the Tambov mob was taken by crime boss and boxer Vladimir Kumarin (**Comment: AKA "Barsukov," who starred in a number of notes over the years**). As St. Petersburg vice mayor, Putin worked for the Tambov OPG (**Comment: I don't know that he worked for them, at least not exclusively, but he certainly worked with them as one of the strands of the various "clan" webs Putin intersected with at the time**)...

Without going into detail, during an exchange with Ekho's Irina Vorobyeva, Shenderovich links the Tambov connections to the recent Spanish "Russian Mafia" case (See the 23 December notes). He says the information is there, people are simply afraid to find out or talk about it. Salye was writing about it years ago (**Comment: In his St. Petersburg days, Putin was connected to a company that operated out of Germany, SPAG, which allegedly laundered money for Columbian drug cartels. The late Marina Salye (she died in 2012) claimed that as St. Petersburg vice mayor, Putin had authorized export licenses for natural resources that were supposed to be used in an exchange for food imports, imports that never materialized—the cost was around \$100 million...See, for instance, the 16 July 2012 notes. There's a bit on narcotics trafficking through the port of St. Petersburg in the second piece summarized below**). Shenderovich notes that Kumarin is doing some serious prison time—and says that the Tambov gangster should be concerned for his life. There was probably a deal done—Kumarin would remain silent in exchange for a relatively comfortable prison stay. But Putin won't be in power forever and other people could approach Kumarin with a new deal, people who might be interested in learning more about Putin's time in St. Petersburg. Shenderovich also brings up the assassination (by poisoning) of Roman Tsepov in 2004 (**Comment: Racketeer and one time all-around fixer and bodyguard for Mayor Sobchak in St. Petersburg, Tsepov was the founder of a St. Petersburg security firm, Baltic Eksport, which he co-founded with Putin bodyguard Viktor Zolotov. Tsepov apparently tried to insinuate himself into the Yukos affair as a mediator—I suspected at the time that this was the reason he was assassinated. Zolotov attended Tsepov's funeral. The killing of Tsepov shook up the elite, creating quite a scandal. I had Sechin and Deripaska, who was also interested in Yukos, as likely suspects in the murder—Tsepov reportedly tried to pass himself off as Deripaska's representative**). Shenderovich goes on about Tsepov's connections to the mayor's office and the Tambov mob and about his desire to take part in the "re-division" of Yukos. Shenderovich implies that Tsepov, like Litvinenko, was killed by polonium poisoning...

*This article—"Who was Putin's Real 'Teacher'?"—prompted Shenderovich's remarks to Ekho Moskvy.* Thanks to the reader who sent it along: <http://rusjev.net/2015/12/22/kto-byil-nastoyashhim-uchitelem-putina-ili-kak-fsb-rabotaet-na-vorov-v-zakone/>

And it begins with a bit on Putin and "Lenya"... At the beginning of the 90's and thereafter, the article notes that the KGB/FSB merged with the criminal world...

The article says that in Soviet times, sportsmen were often used as extras in films. Putin Judo sparring partner Arkadiy Rotenberg and Leonid Usvyatsov met at Lenfilm... The photo below has a red arrow showing what it claims is Arkadiy Rotenberg in a 1976 movie "Blokada"

The "prisoner" is Duma Deputy—and also Rotenberg judo student—Vasily Shestakov. Rotenberg, Putin, Shestakov are left to right in the picture below

Putin's and Rotenberg's trainer was Anatoliy Rakhlin (now deceased), a man Putin said had played a "decisive role" in his life—in 2000, Putin and Rakhlin published a book on judo and issued a video course in judo as well. In a 2007 *Izvestiya* interview, Rakhlin spoke of Putin's loyalty to his circle of judo friends, including Arkadiy and Boris Rotenberg and Vasily Shestakov. VVP gave work to the people he trusted. Rakhlin also said that Putin was connected to the KGB—that is, he was an informer—when he was a student. At 16, Putin acquired a new trainer, Leonid Usvyatsov, though VVP does not like to advertise the connection. Usvyatsov was

responsible for Putin's and Rotenberg's being admitted to LGU.

Usvyatsov was a self defense trainer, appeared in films as an extra, served two prison terms (rape and currency violations; Usvyatsov was said to be involved in the Soviet black market in antiques for which he was paid in dollars; His underworld connection was a major player in the black market antiques trade, Aleksandr Khochinskiy) and was widely known to be a "criminal authority." "Lenya" was sixteen years older than Putin. His father had been killed at the front in 1944. "Lenya Sportsman" was assassinated in 1994 at age 58.

A former training partner of both Arkadiy Rotenberg and Putin, Nikolay Vashchilin, says that there was an attempt on Rotenberg's life at Usvyatsov's funeral—he does not elaborate on what Rotenberg was involved in that might have led to the assassination attempt. Lenya Usvyatsov was replaced in the Tambov organization by Vladimir Kumarin. Following Usvyatsov's death, there was an attempt on Kumarin. He was maimed, losing his right arm, but survived.

**Comment: Recall that Kumarin, AKA "Barsukov," has also been a patron of church building projects and was VP of the St. Petersburg Fuel Company, which was awarded major contracts in St. Petersburg in the 1990s. He was known as the "nighttime mayor" of the northern capital.** The picture below, from r-l, Arkadiy Rotenberg, Vaschilin, unknown (does anybody recognize him? He seems familiar to me) and former Premier Viktor Zubkov

The article claims that being admitted on the "sports quota" to the LGU law school meant that Putin did not have to do a lot of course work...

More on the "Tambov OPG" and its connections to those mentioned above... The Tambov OPG was formed in 1988. At the time, Usvyatsov was in prison, Putin was a KGB officer in Dresden, and Rotenberg was head of the RBC wrestling club. The club was formed by the authorities as a means of attempting to use the training to rehabilitate "difficult" teenaged boys (or what the article calls "underage bandits"). Nikolay Vashchilin says that on the contrary, the club served as a "training base" for young gangsters, including Kumarin. The wrestlers and boxers Rotenberg trained became security men for the new businesses that were sprouting up in the 80's USSR. One of Kumarin's friends, Konstatin Goloshchapov, became a judo training partner of Putin's. Goloshchapov was also a masseuse and Putin is said to have often accompanied him to the banya for a massage (Comment: The piece is implying that there was a homosexual relationship: According to the article, Goloshchapov "appropriately" massaged Putin's "organy," which is a "big plus" in the current system [So others have to be "appropriate" with Putin, too?]. There have been rumors about Putin for years and I've pointed out that Litvinenko was assassinated within a few months of claiming Putin was a pedophile. There have been hints dropped about VVP for as long as I can remember—hints that appeared to be warnings, or could have been. I always wondered about those rumors and whether the undercurrent of insecurity I thought I detected in Putin might be connected to them. I also wondered whether he had such relationships while a boy in his judo/self defense training clubs, maybe with an older trainer). Goloshchapov is today a banking partner of Rotenberg's, and is in the construction business.

One of Putin's "businesses" with the Tambov OPG was the shipping of narcotics ("white powder"), which went through the St. Petersburg port in the 90's. Putin's connection to the drug trade was Viktor Ivanov, then a Putin aide, now head of the state's anti-narcotics agency.

Litvinenko began investigating these connections. He met with Tambov gangsters living in Spain. He met with Kumarin. He was poisoned by Lugovoy with polonium 210 for his trouble. Lugovoy got a state award from Putin. Kumarin got 25 years in prison and was thus neutralized.

The release of recent material on the "Russian Mafia" case includes phone conversations between the gangsters in Spain and their people in Russia—they discussed getting Bastrykin appointed to head the Investigative Committee, what to do with "Putin's villa," and Kumarin's 2007 arrest (on orders from "the Tsar")... They say that every nation gets the government it deserves...

Regarding Rakhlin... From the 19 August 2013 notes:

[Comment: Watching the TV coverage of Rakhlin's funeral, I got the impression that Putin was genuinely very upset by his old trainer's death—the "solitary walk" sequence seemed melodramatic, but it was almost as if Putin, who sometimes, as I noted on 13 August, has shown signs of weariness and disenchantment, was trying to break his isolation by conveying his sense of loss to the TV audience. There's video at the 9 August newsru report on the funeral and Putin's walk (

[http://www.newsru.com/sport/09aug2013/sensei\\_print.html](http://www.newsru.com/sport/09aug2013/sensei_print.html))—which was, as several observers noted, filmed from various angles (And several security men were nearby, one oddly carrying an umbrella on what looked like a clear day), and newsru reminds us that Rakhlin in 1964 selected Putin and Rotenberg for training and Putin became St. Petersburg champion and Master of Sport under his guidance. The walk is on YouTube as well: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IHPcNq-cE4M> I've seen Rakhlin described as a "second father" to Putin.

Vedomosti ponders Putin's isolation after a divorce and his distancing himself from the elite. He is alone at the top: <http://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/news/15108011/razvivaya-platona#ixzz2bjOjAOp>

### **The Nemtsov murder investigation: Mukhudinov reportedly named as the zakazchik**

<https://slon.ru/posts/61947>

The Investigative Committee (SK) is claiming that suspect Ruslan Mukhudinov [also spelled Mukhutdinov] has been named as the person who "ordered" (the "Zakazchik") up the contract hit on Nemtsov. The investigators also consider Mukhudinov to have been the direct organizer of the murder.

### **Putin's "Little red book" offers words of wisdom for Russian officials**

<http://www.rferl.org/content/putin-little-red-book-offers-up-prophetic-words-russian-president/27453861.html>

**S**trapped for gift ideas this holiday season?

How about a 400-page book of Vladimir Putin's most "world-changing" words?

That's what about 1,000 Russian officials and politicians [can expect under their New Year's trees this year.](#)

"World-Changing Words, Key Quotes of Vladimir Putin," offers up the Russian president at his best (at least from the Kremlin's perspective) in 19 speeches and articles that critics say is the latest effort to build up Putin's image as the country's infallible leader and harkens back to Mao Zedong's "Little Red Book."

The book is being published by Network, a youth group which has its fingerprints on other pro-Kremlin projects, including an alphabet-learning tool with a hearty helping of the new political correctness in Russia.

Anton Volodin of Network, or "Set" in Russian, told RBK "Putin's words can be considered prophetic."

### **'No Personality Cult'**

"Listening to the speeches by Vladimir Putin, we were struck with the idea from time to time: a lot of what he says has turned out to be true in one form or another," Volodin told RFE/RL's Russian Service.

Asked if the book is part of attempts to build a personality cult, Volodin responded, "Absolutely not."

"If you think this book is the attribute of some kind of totalitarian government, that's absolutely absurd," he said. "You need to look at the content of the book, not just the headlines. In our book there are not only quotes. We took what we felt were the most revealing addresses, including articles by Putin, and put them together in the book."

According to the RBK report, Putin's First Deputy Chief of Staff Vyacheslav Volodin -- no relation to Network's Volodin -- pushed for the book to be handed out to Russian officials across the country during a meeting with about 50 top political figures last week, including members of the two houses of the Russian parliament.

Natalya Matienko, the secretary of the Public Chamber of Russia's Jewish Autonomous Region, said she had received a copy of the book in the mail along with a letter signed by Volodin, which, according to Matienko, stressed the publication lays out the principles and values guiding Russia on domestic and international issues.

The compilation begins with Putin's address to the UN General Assembly in 2003, and ends with his speech to the same world body earlier this year. It also includes Putin's 2008 interview with CNN, which as the authors note "occurred after Georgia attacked Tskhinvali" -- a reference to Moscow's brief war with Tbilisi over Georgia's breakaway region of South Ossetia, viewed by most of the world as an act of Russian aggression.

The book also includes the full text of Putin's speech to the Munich Security Conference in 2007, when Putin accused the United States of establishing, or trying to establish, a "unipolar" world.

Putin's address to the parliament and nation on March 18, 2014, lauding Russia's illegal annexation of the Ukrainian Peninsula of Crimea also makes the cut.

In fawning tones, the introduction gushes over Putin's alleged power to predict, saying "these are the same words which predicted and predetermined changes to the global political system."

While eager to praise Putin, Volodin of Network is less willing to disclose the source of the book's funding, only saying there were "numerous sources."

## **Heir To Nashi**

Financing may be murky, but Network's ties to the Kremlin are crystal clear.

Network is the spiritual heir to Nashi, the prototypical and now defunct pro-Putin youth outfit that was founded in 2005 in the aftermath of Ukraine's Orange Revolution as part of a Kremlin effort to inoculate Russia against a similar uprising.

But unlike Nashi, which was formed to appeal to working-class provincial youth, **Network is aiming to attract the urban middle class**

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Earlier this year, when Kyiv students released an impassioned video appeal to their Russian counterparts to question the Kremlin line, Network sprang into action.

Activists of the group in the exclave of Kaliningrad on February 1 posted a video much in the style of the Ukrainian one, [spewing the Kremlin line](#): it attacks Ukraine's pro-European Euromaidan protests as a "coup," decries the February 2014 ouster of former President Viktor Yanukovich, defends Russia's subsequent annexation of Crimea, and zeroes in on civilian deaths in the country's east.

Network also thought up a new learning device in the Siberian city of Irkutsk in May 2014, highlighting to what lengths the Kremlin will go to inculcate a pro-Kremlin worldview.

[The primer to help children master the 33 letters of the Russian alphabet has "A" for "Anti-Maidan," Ukraine's pro-Russian groups -- with "P" predictably for "Putin" and "R" for "Russia."](#)

[Network dubbed it the "Polite Alphabet," after the "polite" forces that brought about Russia's annexation of Crimea.](#)

At the time, Network said it [planned to distribute the primers to schools](#) throughout Irkutsk in the spring of 2014 and bring them to other cities soon.

Network has big plans as well with its latest project, saying the Putin book will be made available to a wider audience beyond Russia's movers and shakers.

"World-Changing Words," should be on the shelves of Russian book stores sometime in January, Volodin has said, adding an English-language version for a foreign audience is also in the works.

"They should understand the justice of Russian politics abroad as well," Volodin says.

#### **“Outspoken” Chaplin sacked by ROC (He wanted the Church to condemn official corruption)**

<http://news.yahoo.com/russian-orthodox-church-sacks-outspoken-cleric-moscow-202425937.html>

The Russian Orthodox Church has sacked an outspoken official who pushed the church to take a more aggressive role in public life.

[Father Vsevolod Chaplin, who has headed the Moscow Patriarchate's department for cooperation between church and society since 2009, has been released of his duties and his department has been disbanded. The church explained its decision Thursday by citing the need to increase efficiency.](#)

[Following his ouster, Chaplin issued strong criticism of Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch Kirill, saying on Dozhd TV that the two men had "seriously disagreed" over the church's role. He added the church should be more independent and not ingratiate itself with government officials. He also said it should publicly condemn official corruption.](#)

~~should publicly condemn official corruption.~~

The 47-year-old Chaplin described his dismissal as an attempt to purge the church of independent voices.

Chaplin long has attracted attention with outspoken statements on topics ranging from spiritual matters to fashion. He famously said once said women should dress more modestly to avoid provoking rapes.

He recently said that Russia was waging a "holy war" against extremists in Syria, drawing strong criticism.

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### ***The Russian Defense Ministry on the US and ISIS***

<http://tass.ru/en/politics/847380>

MOSCOW, December 28. /TASS/. The Pentagon, refusing to transfer the data on terrorist targets in Syria to the Russian military, continues to fight against the Islamic State terrorist group "in word only", Russian Defense Ministry spokesman Igor Konashenkov told reporters on Monday. He thus commented on a recent statement by the Pentagon spokesperson Michelle Baldanza who confirmed that the US military did not intend to share with Moscow the information on IS targets until Russia changes its policy towards Syrian President Bashar Assad. "We are not going to cooperate with Russia on Syria until they change their strategy of supporting Assad and instead focus on ISIL (IS)," Baldanza said. "The hackneyed thesis has once again confirmed that the Pentagon will fight against IS in word only, instead of taking real action," Konashenkov said. "The statement by the US Defense Department spokesperson Michelle Baldanza about the [US side's] refusal from any cooperation in the fight against Islamic State is a broken record, and it's high time to change it," he said. The Russian Defense Ministry spokesman said that at last week's news briefing of the chief of the Main Operations Directorate of the Russian General Staff, General Sergey Rudskoy, the military presented data on changes in the routes of illegal transportation of oil by the Islamic State militants. According to the Russian Defense Ministry, the new routes run through the north-western regions of Iraq, which "are in the focus of constant attention of the United States." "We publicly told our American colleagues that it is necessary not to discuss the IS activities in Iraq, but to take real action to block the terrorists' sources of income in the region," Konashenkov said.

On December 25, Sergey Rudskoy told journalists that Russian intelligence found almost 12,000 tank/delivery trucks on the Turkish-Iraqi border near Zakho, where the 'eastern' oil smuggling route used by the Islamic State terrorist group runs. "As of the time the imagery was shot, there were 11,775 tank and delivery trucks on both sides of the Turkish-Iraqi border in the vicinity of Zakho, with 4,530 of them in Turkey and 7,250 in Iraq," he added. "It is worth mentioning that oil extracted both in Iraq and in Syria is smuggled via the checkpoint there," he added. The Defense Ministry had said previously that the Russia-banned Islamic State's eastern oil smuggling route led from the oilfields in Syria's northeast and Iraq's northwest to Turkey via the border towns of Kara Chokh, Cham Khanik, Tavan and Zakho. Since the beginning of the operation in Syria, Russian aircraft have taken out around 2,000 tank trucks operated by the militants. "Thirty-seven oil wells and refineries operated by the terrorists and 17 tank truck convoys hauling oil products have been eliminated over the last week," Rudskoi said. The Russian military launched an air operation against the militants with the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria on September 30 by request of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The Russian air task force in Syria included over 50 aircraft, including Su-34 (NATO reporting name: Fullback) and Su-24M (Fencer) tactical bombers, Su-25 (Frogfoot) attack aircraft, Su-30SM (Flanker-H) multirole fighters and Mi-8 (Hip) and Mi-24 (Hind) helicopters. The Russian Defense Ministry issued a statement in mid-November that it would focus its strikes on the oil production, storage, refining and transportation facilities controlled by Islamic State militants.

### ***Russia, Taliban, ISIS***

<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/taliban-says-no-contacts-with-russia-over-islamic-state/554297.html>

The Taliban denied reports that representatives had met Russian officials to discuss the common threat from Islamic State in Afghanistan as a British newspaper reported that President Vladimir Putin had met the Taliban leader.

Last week, a senior Russian official was quoted saying that Russia's interests "objectively coincided" with the Taliban in the fight against Islamic State, which has established a foothold in eastern Afghanistan. See the 23 December notes.

He said channels of communication had been established with the Taliban to exchange information.

Moscow, currently conducting a bombing campaign in Syria it says is directed against Islamic State forces, has been concerned about the possible spread of the radical movement from Afghanistan into neighbouring states including Tajikistan or Uzbekistan.

In a statement, the Taliban said it was in contact with countries in the region but had not discussed support against Islamic State, which it calls Daesh.

"The Islamic Emirate has made and will continue to make contacts with many regional countries to bring an end to the American invasion of our country and we consider this our legitimate right," it said, using its formal name.

"But we do not see a need for receiving aid from anyone concerning so-called Daesh and neither have we contacted nor talked with anyone about this issue."

Britain's Sunday Times newspaper this week quoted an unnamed "senior Taliban commander" as saying that Putin met Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mansour in September to discuss possible Russian support.

"Putin is said to have met Mansour over dinner at a late-night meeting on a military base in Tajikistan in September," the newspaper said.

It quoted a Kremlin spokesman as saying the reports were "not relevant".

Mansour, longtime deputy to Taliban founder Mullah Mohammad Omar, assumed leadership of the movement after the announcement in July that Omar had died more than two years previously and his death concealed.

Taliban militants have been engaged in a bloody struggle with groups declaring loyalty to Islamic State, particularly in the eastern province of Nangarhar, where they are challenging the Taliban for leadership of the insurgency.

The struggle has also been linked to an internal power battle within the Taliban, where several factions have rejected Mansour's leadership claims.

Nellie Ohr

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**From:** Nellie Ohr  
**Sent:** Tuesday, December 15, 2015 11:06 AM  
**To:** (b) (6) Nellie [redacted]; Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF); Ohr, Bruce (ODAG)  
**Subject:** Re: In case you wondered: Browder is acting on behest of "controllers" in the "US special services"

p.s. one more on Chayka, from Wayne's 11 Dec notes:

This is from the moderate nationalist Solovey, who often sounds reasonable....

[*Solovey on stability*

[http://vk.com/id244477574?w=wall244477574\\_12888%2Fall](http://vk.com/id244477574?w=wall244477574_12888%2Fall)

Solovey writes that there's something we need to know about "stability"—in the last six-eight months, the Defense Ministry has been bringing military units to buildings housing state departments in order to familiarize personnel with places they may have to defend in a crisis...But among themselves, the rank-and-file say to one another "I'm not defending them...Let the 'menty' do it..."]

**Comment: A reader pointed out to me that the VK post had been taken down.**

**Solovey, however, does mention the MoD story in this interview:**

<http://obzor.press/intervyu/12719>

He also touches on some other points...

**On Chayka:** Solovey thinks it likely that Chayka will be forced out of his job, but not just now, since Putin does not like to react to pressure. As far as who might be interested in spreading kompromat on Chayka, Solovey points out that Chayka has powerful enemies in the Investigative Committee (SK) and the FSB. He also mentions Sechin as a Chayka enemy. The Navalny film unloaded a wave of compromising material on one of the most influential people in Russia. What we have to think about, says Solovey, is whether the material is reliable. As far as its reliability, Solovey points out that Chayka has not bothered to take Navalny's Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK) to court. That tells us something.

-----Original Message-----

From: Nellie Ohr (b) (6) [redacted]  
To: (b) (6) Lisa Holtyn [redacted]; bruce.g.ohr <bruce.g.ohr@usdoj.gov>  
Sent: Tue, Dec 15, 2015 10:51 am  
Subject: In case you wondered: Browder is acting on behest of "controllers" in the "US special services"

From last night's Allensworth notes (Dec 14)

"...Browder and his controllers in the US special services decided to use the Magnitskiy affair to discredit Russia and the Prosecutor's office....."

[Here's the whole summary:]

[Background: from last Friday's notes: "Magnitskiy list's" Karpov accuses of Navalny of collaborating with Browder on

*Chayka investigation*

<http://newsru.com/russia/11dec2015/chayka.html>



Former MVD Investigator Pavel Karpov, whose name appeared on the “Magnitskiy list,” has directed an appeal to law enforcement claiming that Navalny’s Anti-Corruption

Foundation (FBK) collaborates with Hermitage Capital’s William Browder, now on a wanted list. Karpov claims that the FBK piece on Chayka was prepared after the

Russian MVD and Cyprus police carried out joint searches related to charges that Gazprom shares (R5.4 billion worth) were illegally moved out of Russia. Karpov says

that FBK’s investigation was meant to discredit Russian officials, not fight corruption. Karpov notes that Navalny actively participated in “advertising and distributing” the video “A Caste of Untouchables” produced by Browder.

Browder’s Hermitage Capital is charged in a criminal case opened by the MVD with using a front company, “Dalnyaya Step” (founded in 1998), to get around a ban on

foreign acquisitions of Gazprom shares that lasted until 2006. Using the front company, Hermitage allegedly acquired over 37 million Gazprom shares. The front company was declared bankrupt and closed, the shares moved to a Cyprus offshore firm.

Karpov’s appeal could prompt an official inquiry (proverka) into Navalny’s and FBK’s relationship with Browder. ]

Now Chayka is saying the same thing—Browder was behind the FBK investigation:

<http://newsru.com/russia/14dec2015/specbrauder.html>

Chayka made the charge in a letter published in Kommersant:

<http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2876887> Chayka says that Browder knows that the investigation into the machinations with Gazprom shares will eventually end badly for him, thus the attack on the Prosecutor General... Browder and his controllers in the US special services decided to use the Magnitskiy affair to discredit Russia and the Prosecutor’s office. As a result of Browder’s PR campaign, the US adopted the so-called “Magintskiy law”...

Kommersant also published Navalny’s reply to Chayka’s claims: Navalny says that following Berezovksiy’s death, vlast needed someone to blame for everything and they now have Browder as the all-purpose bad guy. Anyway, says Navalny, Browder is not interested in us (**Comment: I think he means the FBK**)—why does Browder come up in a case involving connections to the Tsapkov gang? Navalny goes on to say that he believes Chayka acted a krysha for his sons and their associates and their criminal activities...

There’s been a reply to Chayka’s letter from Browder as well: <http://lawandorderinrussia.org/2015/russian-prosecutor-chaika-makes-unhinged-allegations-against-bill-browder-offering-no-explanation-on-murder-and-abuse-of-office-allegations-involving-his-two-sons/>

*“I’m very impressed with the investigation which went into making this movie and applaud Alexei Navalny and his colleagues for their bravery in exposing the shocking allegations against Chaika and his family, but I had nothing to do with the investigation, financing or production of this film,”* said Bill Browder, author and Head of the Magnitsky Justice Campaign.

*“Chaika’s 7 pages of unhinged allegations that I am a CIA agent who was running a special operation designed to destroy Russia looks like the emotional ranting of someone who has been caught red-handed and is desperately looking for an escape route,”* continued Mr. Browder.

*Latvina on the reaction to the FBK Chavka investigation*

<http://echo.msk.ru/programs/code/1675290-echo/>

Latynina notes that the number of those defending Chayka has been minimal—only four Duma deputies, for instance, signed a declaration in support of the Prosecutor general... Medvedev (See below) commented that only law enforcement can make formal accusations—and he said the FBK claims were part of the political struggle and that it's not the 1930s. Medvedev did not say a word in defense of Chayka, however. Karpov's accusations were a "gift" to the FBK, claims coming from a corrupt former investigator on the "Magnitskiy list"... Regarding the less than impressive list of deputies and Karpov, these are not the kind of people the Kremlin would assign to defend Chayka—so Latynina (like Solovey—see the 11 December notes) says that Chayka will be removed, but not just now, so as not to make it look like a reaction to the FBK investigation. The regime cannot react to what the public says, much less the opposition. That's even though some 3 million people watched the FBK video, probably including people from Putin's "nuclear electorate." And she thinks the main reason for Chayka's departure won't be the connections to Tspakov, but Chayka's son Artyom receiving Swiss citizenship—this after Crimea became "nash."

*Russian court refuses slander lawsuit against Chayka*

<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/moscow-court-refuses-to-consider-slander-lawsuit-against-chaika/552775.html>

Moscow's Presnensky district court has refused to consider a slander lawsuit against Prosecutor General Yuri Chaika filed by Alexei Navalny's Anti-Corruption Fund (FBK), the RIA Novosti news agency reported.

"The lawsuit was given back to the applicant due to the Presnensky court's lack of jurisdiction," court spokeswoman Nina Yurkova said, RIA Novosti reported.

The defendant Chaika does not reside in the district subordinate to the Presnensky court, Yurkova said, the RBC newspaper reported Monday.

In response, Navalny wrote on his blog — citing Chaika's tax report that says he owns a flat in the Presnensky district — that Presnensky court is legally where the lawsuit has to be filed.

"If Chaika lives elsewhere — he is lying in his tax report. If he does not lie in his tax report — the court is lying to us," Navalny said.

The FBK filed a slander lawsuit against Chaika after the prosecutor general claimed the film detailing his sons' illegal activities made by FBK was "commissioned."

On Dec. 1, FBK published an investigation incriminating Yuri Chaika, as well as his sons Artyom and Igor, in a range of shady business deals, the illegal seizure of a state-owned enterprise and murder — as well as a listing of foreign assets allegedly owned by the family.

Ohr, Bruce (ODAG)

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**From:** Ohr, Bruce (ODAG)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, November 25, 2015 8:26 AM  
**To:** Nellie Ohr  
**Subject:** RE: writeup of Galeotti's talk

I like it!

**From:** Nellie Ohr (b) (6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, November 24, 2015 10:29 PM  
**To:** Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF); Ohr, Bruce (ODAG)  
**Subject:** writeup of Galeotti's talk

This article sums up a lot of the talk he gave at the Hudson Institute last month (and I think he's given it at several other places too)

## STOLYPIN: Will 2016 see the three Russias diverging?

<http://www.intellinews.com/stolypin-will-2016-see-the-three-russias-diverging-83962/?source=russia>

Mark Galeotti

There have been many attempts to understand Russia by subdividing it. Is it a feudal Russia of rulers and ruled, or the 'four Russias' posited by scholar Natalya Zubarevich, divided geographically and socio-economically? My own sense is that alongside such formulations, we also need to see the country and society divided into three, and the competition between them – one as much philosophical as practical – is likely to become all the sharper in 2016, defining Russia's future trajectory, and the eventual post-Putin order.

### The three

However little attention it may get in foreign coverage, Russia has a working, rational state. This is not some neo-fascist imperialism, nor an out-of-control kleptocracy where everything is plundered and funnelled into foreign bank accounts. There are inefficiencies, there is petty corruption – apparently on the rise again as a result of officials' shrinking real incomes – but in the main, the country works. Roads are paved, refuse is collected, teachers teach and police officers police. Most people essentially want to do their jobs, live – that perennial Russian dream and mantra – a "normal" life.

However, above 'Real Russia' squats the smaller, but vastly richer 'Kleptocratic Russia'. This ugly parasite is much of the time happy to let its host do its thing, but has ultimate authority over the structures of state, routines of life and workings of justice, when it chooses to exert it. This is the realm of the embezzling senior officials, the pampered sons and daughters of the mighty, the businesspeople who depend as much on sweetheart deals and covert cartels as any real acumen.

Yet this country cannot simply be dismissed as a kleptocracy, because at the very top of the stepped ziggurat of national power lies the smallest and, perhaps, most dangerous and pernicious incarnation: 'Ideological Russia'. It is hard to doubt that, whatever his motivations during his earlier presidencies, Vladimir Putin is driven now not by personal economic interest but an ideological programme – a vision of a nation restored to its due place in history and the world (and, by extension, a vision of his appropriate legacy). He has surrounded himself with a small coterie of like-minded cohorts – or at least figures willing and able to play that role – and they are ultimately in charge. The Kleptocrats get to reach in to Real Russia when they choose, to divert a procurement contract here, dictate a court decision there, but the Ideologists in turn have the final say. Ever since Crimea, the primary thrust of national policy has been towards confrontational geopolitics, which have hit at the heart of the kleptocrats' interests, grinding an already-suffering economy downwards and limiting their scope to move themselves and their assets at will. Beyond that, whereas in the past these two blocs collaborated smoothly, there are now indications that the Ideologues see some of the Kleptocrats and their parasitic habits as a growing problem in an age when dwindling

ideologists see some of the kleptocrats and their parasitic habits as a growing problem in an age when dwindling resources need to be focused more directly on the ideological project. Witness, presumably, Russian Railways chief Vladimir Yakunin's dismissal and the increasing evidence of a not-as-bogus-as-usual anti-corruption campaign on the way.

Of course, no such simple pattern can be exact and accurate. There are individuals high up in the system, from cabinet ministers to central bank chief Elvira Nabiullina, whose technocratic instincts seem closest to those of Real Russia. Likewise, even Ideologists still seem happy to help their children find comfortable and highly lucrative positions, from whence to steal with savage abandon. However, as a broad model for trying to understand the disparate and often contradictory forces working to shape Russia's future, this seems to have some value.

### **Widening gaps in 2016**

Although it is probably wishful thinking to expect dramatic and positive outcomes over the course of the coming year, for a variety of reasons 2016 is likely to see the relationships between the three Russias become increasingly tense, laying the groundwork for change to come.

On September 18 next year, elections will be held for the Duma, the lower house, which will in many ways also be a referendum on the regime. There is no question of United Russia (and its affiliated pseudo-parties) losing their control over the chamber, both because of the propaganda campaign likely to precede the vote and also, where necessary, judicial rigging of the process and the count. We can, for example, expect to see the more vocal and effective Kremlin critics systematically excluded, vilified and pressurised. How the vote will count, though, is that it forces the state to mobilise the masses – and the extent to which it has to struggle to produce the results decreed by the Kremlin will provide insiders with an index of true popular discontent.

After all, Putin's sky-high personal ratings tell us little about the public mood. Arguably, the growing rash of local labour and social protests, from truckers blocking roads to demonstrations against rising utilities prices, are a better measure, as inflation, wage pressures and the effects of social spending cuts all come to bite.

The Ideologists may be tempted to crank up their propaganda about a Russia isolated and embattled, but there is a real risk of 'fantasy fatigue' if this is just a matter of intemperate words and invented threats. On the other hand, manufacturing or introducing Russia into crises abroad to give substance to the hype, from a renewed Ukraine campaign to picking fights over the Arctic sea-lanes, would not only deplete dwindling resources, but likely only deepen its economic and diplomatic isolation.

This is unlikely to please the Kleptocrats, squeezed between economic stagnation, popular dissatisfaction and Kremlin adventurism. However, at present political power trumps all in Russia: the rich are not so much wealthy in their own right so much as the temporary stewards of those assets until the day comes when the Kremlin seeks to reassign them. To this end, they have a perverse incentive to want to see genuine rule of law and secure property rights come to Russia, and an end to its geopolitical struggle with the West.

An archetypal bank-robber wants the police force to be inefficient and corrupt – until he is rich enough to own banks, at which point he wants the state to protect his ill-gotten gains. So, too, a kleptocratic generation of Russian oligarchs, minigarchs and boyar-bureaucrats who have done well thanks to Putin may well come to feel that their interests have come to diverge from his.

And what about the poor Russian people, the perennially disenfranchised? There seems little prospect of their rising against the regime, literally or metaphorically (rising, after all, for what?). Instead, theirs are the weapons of the weak: refusing to conform, turning to the underground economy, passively resisting to behave as their masters want. This does not go unnoticed, and will be visible – at least to those who see the real, uncooked books – in indices from labour unrest and productivity to suicide rates and support for local civic initiatives.

In itself, this will not force change on the elite. However, it may scare the Kleptocrats and technocrats. If the economy worsens, if the elections prove tougher to massage, and if the Kremlin looks increasingly willing to sacrifice their interests in the name of an ideological project, at some point they will begin to look for ways to protect them.

And here's the inevitable prediction buried in all these "year ahead" articles. It may well not come in 2016, but whenever Putin is replaced or succeeded, it will not be with another Ideologist, but with a Kleptocrat. The interests of the elite will take precedence over the masses, but also over Russian geopolitical grandeur, and this new regime will eagerly seek to mend bridges with the West.

As a generation of ruthless exploiters gives way to their more pampered and less sharp-toothed children, the pressure to create reliable protections for property rights (however that property may have been acquired in the first place) will only grow. Meanwhile, ordinary Russians and their technocrat fellow-travellers in the elite will be looking for change, and thus the possibility – no more – is that a Kleptocratic presidency may in turn give way, some day, sometime, to a generation finally eager to make real the promises of 1991 – of building genuine, working political and economic democracy. Perhaps.

*Mark Galeotti is Professor of Global Affairs at the SPS Center for Global Affairs, New York University and Director of its Initiative for the Study of Emerging Threats. He writes the blog *In Moscow's Shadows* (<http://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/>) and tweets as @MarkGaleotti.*

**Nellie Ohr**

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**From:** Nellie Ohr  
**Sent:** Tuesday, November 24, 2015 11:01 PM  
**To:** Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF); Ohr, Bruce (ODAG)  
**Subject:** One Economic Sector Booming in Russia: Corruption (Galeotti article)

This paper contains the other half of the things Galeotti said in his Hudson talk. A few excerpts are below (format doesn't copy and paste very well) but it's all worth reading.

<http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/One-Economic-Sector-Booming-final.pdf>

**One Economic Sector Booming in Russia: Corruption**

.....  
as economic crisis gnaws into the budget  
s of the state and ordinary Russian alike,  
corruption of the old, predatory and unpredictable variety is coming back. As Oleg, a  
small  
businessman trading in imported Turkish textiles puts it, "things had become so to  
speak civilized,  
there was corruption  
but it was ordered, acceptable. Now, things are changing, getting wilder.".....

n the past 15 months or so, things certainly have changed. Corruption and  
embezzlement are on  
the rise. Furthermore, it is  
not just a question of more corruption, but more parasitic corruption. In  
other words, not only are the sums being demanded rising but the scope to avoid  
paying is  
diminishing. It is not a question of deciding whether you want to "upgrade," to skip  
some te  
dious  
paperwork, jump to the head of the line, or cut some corners. Instead, it is  
something that you have  
to  
do, because otherwise someone who can make your life difficult will indeed make  
your life  
difficult.....

you have the right to steal in the form and to the amount appropriate to your rank, and so long as you are loyal to  
the system, to your patrons and to your clients.....

.....  
**The e**  
conomic crisis is squeezing Russian officials, forcing them to be more predatory and

exploitative in order to preserve their quality of life. In the process they are not only bearing down more heavily on ordinary citizens but also beginning to worry a Kremlin that is watching a dwindling treasury being plundered by its own elite. But, for Putin, a war with Ukraine is one thing

—  
fighting a war with his own elite is quite another.

**Nellie Ohr**

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**From:** Nellie Ohr  
**Sent:** Friday, November 13, 2015 6:34 PM  
**To:** Ohr, Bruce (ODAG); Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF)  
**Subject:** Versiia on Lesin's untimely death: FBI staged it....  
**Attachments:** IN13Nov15.doc

It's the first item in today's Allensworth notes.

Also, further down is an item in which a Moscow police official was accused of spying for the CIA.

-----Original Message-----

From: Wayne Allensworth (b) (6)  
To: Wayne and Stacy Allensworth (b) (6)  
Sent: Fri, Nov 13, 2015 6:21 pm  
Subject: Internet Notes 13 November 2015

#### **Internet Notes 13 November 2015**

[More on Lesin](#)

[Bailing out VEB](#)

[Solovey on propaganda and public opinion](#)

[Former Russian policeman convicted of espionage](#)

[New press rules after the "leak"](#)

[Nearly half of Russians fear a terrorist attack](#)

## More on Lesin

See the 6, 9, and 11 November notes.

<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3315994/Vladimir-Putin-s-media-mastermind-dead-DC-hotel-murdered-FBI-informant-alive-claim-Russians.html>

The death from a 'heart attack' of a longtime close ally of [Vladimir Putin](#) in a Washington hotel has led to a swirl of speculation that he was murdered on Moscow's orders after offering to help the FBI. Mikhail Lesin, 57, was announced last weekend to have been found dead in the US capital. He was a Svengali figure for Putin, who was alleged to have menaced the Russian media into idolizing the strongman president. The shock death has created an eave of speculation in Moscow that it is related to previous reports that he was helping the FBI - and could be murder.

There are even separate allegations that Lesin may still be alive, with his demise faked by the US authorities. According to this version, he is being kept safe as part of a witness protection scheme, while spilling to the FBI all he knows on Putin's Russia.

Daily Mail Online can reveal that only weeks before his death was announced, he fathered a child with glamorous model and flight attendant Victoria Rakhimbayeva.

She is believed to be aged 29, with whom he had enjoyed a close relationship since at least mid-2014.

She has not commented on his death other than to thank friends on social media for their commiserations, but before the tragedy she made clear that they intended to set up home permanently in New York.

Despite Russian reports of a heart attack, police in DC have said no cause of death has been determined while also indicating there was no obvious sign of foul play.

'A ruling on the cause and manner of death is pending further investigation,' said a Saturday statement.

Nicknamed the 'Bulldozer', Lesin was one of the key props of the Putin presidency, personally masterminding a wide-ranging media crackdown which has left the vast majority of Russian TV stations and newspapers obedient to the Kremlin.

He also set up Russia Today, now RT, seen by critics as a 'propaganda' channel aimed at the West.

But earlier this year, after the break-up of his marriage, and in a new relationship with his Siberian lover who he may have wed - she referred to him as her 'husband' - he suddenly quit the latest of several high profile positions, as head of Gazprom Media, a major state owned media conglomerate.

There are unsubstantiated claims in Moscow that when he died he was in debt to billionaire Yury Kovalchuk, one of Putin's closest big business friends.

He owed huge amount of money to Kovalchuk, which he supposedly didn't intend to pay back,' an unnamed source told [The Moscow Times](#).

His presence and death in Washington shocked many Russians.

Lesin was found dead at 11:30am on November 6 while staying on an upper floor at the \$240-a-night Dupont Circle Hotel, seen as modest for his multimillionaire lifestyle.

It is unclear if Rakhimbayeva was in the US with him at the time.

Yet some 16 months earlier, Senator Roger Wicker had called for a Justice Department probe into whether Lesin was engaged in money laundering.

The status of any subsequent FBI investigation is unclear, but - rightly or wrongly - in Russia it was widely believed that a probe was indeed under way.

Many elite Russians with links to the Putin regime are currently giving the US, and other parts of the West, a wide berth amid fears of arrest, hence the surprise and bewilderment at him being in Washington.

But there are also suggestions that Lesin had taken a decision to leave Russia for good before his untimely death in America.

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'For over a year he was living under FBI scrutiny and a total check on his assets,' he said.

'For some reason he came to Washington where he suddenly died but not from not of something he had been suffering from.'

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Moscow is prone to conspiracy theories when prominent people die before their time, but while Lesin had a number of



medical issues, they were not seen as life-threatening and there was genuine shock among his friends and those who crossed paths with him.

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'He left the country. September 25 he had a baby daughter. This September, now, so it's been a month, a month and a half.

'And honestly, when I found out about his death, my first thought was about the baby, to be honest. It's also about empathy, because, okay, he's gone but the girl with a baby - how is she?...

The head of Russian media regulator Rospechat, Mikhail Seslavinsky, said of Lesin: 'I saw him a month ago.

'He was full of energy, going through a new period in his life, talking about forgotten feelings because of his newborn little daughter'.

In private, Lesin 'highlighted his responsibility for all the members of his extended family, loved all of his family, and was hoping for an harmonious existence in a world new to him.'

He spoke of a succession of surgeries that Lesin - who had been a heavy drinker and smoker - had undergone. These were not for heart problems, but linked to his spine.

'He was always a fighter, even after going through several complex surgeries, He had recovered, was doing sports, and looked absolutely healthy,' he said.

Simonyan revealed he had lost 66 pounds after breaking his spine three years ago, and undergone 13 operations after his back became infected.

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Another comment from Venediktov: <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/11/12/putin-s-pals-are-russian-patriots-until-they-get-sick.html>

Venediktov confirmed that in the last few months of his life, "Lesin was trapped in problems, investigated in the U.S., facing debts of about \$90 million here in Russia." As such, he expressed doubts about the current version of Lesin's death. "He did not have any ID on him in the hotel room, that is very strange: his family were not with him when he died. They sounded too quick to jump on the heart attack version, as if they were trying to secure some different story." Venediktov added, expressing a hope to hear the truth about Lesin's death.

## Bailing out VEB

<http://kommersant.ru/doc/2852200>

VneshEkonombank has got some major liquidity problems and lots of debt (R1.2 trillion)—a political decision has been made to help the bank, which under Central Bank rules is not eligible for refinancing from the CB, but the government has yet to come up with a plan. At a session yesterday chaired by Igor Shuvalov, there was a possible plan under discussion for shifting some packets of shares held by the state to VEB (worth R1.5 trillion; the shares would be sold to raise capital) and for the government to take over some of VEB's "toxic"

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Apart from the Olympics, VEB has been saddled with a number of other costly projects, including financing the development of the SSJ 100 plane at a low interest rate, a Rostek/Vi Holding plan to develop platinum deposits in Zimbabwe, and aid to Globeks Bank... In October, Medvedev directed the Finance Ministry and the Economic Development Ministry to come up with a plan, but no set plan has as yet materialized... Economist Vladimir Tikhonov says that VEB, a state corporation with considerable weight, should be saved, but only if it increases its own “effectiveness.” At Russian Railways, the leadership was changed, state subsidies cut, and the company set on the path to cutting expenses. Tikhonov thinks that the best plan for avoiding damage to Russia’s financial ratings is to use National Welfare Fund reserves to re-capitalize VEB—although the sum involved would amount to 30% of that fund, and that expenditure would also be taken as a “negative signal”... Tikhonov, however, adds that the budget deficit will probably be less than expected, so maybe the difference between the projection and the actual shortfall could be used for the bailout...

### Solovey on propaganda and public opinion

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MGIMO’s Valeriy Solovey says that the prevalence of TV viewing in Eastern Europe is a holdover from Soviet times, especially among older viewers and, say, ethnic Russians living in the Baltic states. The situation is a bit different with younger people, though sociologists report they watch TV only about 5% less than their elders (Solovey mentions the Internet/social networks as additional sources of information for young people). As the older generations pass on, TV will have less impact, but it will remain the single most influential propaganda instrument as people trust television. Why? It’s psychological—people have a sense of being present at an event when watching TV... Propaganda has its limits—it’s not effective when we are talking about something that has an impact directly on the viewers’ interests or about something they know about. It’s not as hard to convince Russians that Americans are children of the Devil, as they do not know Americans. It’s harder to cast Ukrainians as Satan’s spawn, though... It would make sense to have pluralism in media sources, with different views offsetting each other. That would be a defense against propaganda. It would be better if people limited TV viewing. And it’s very important to read, as reading engages the critical reflex, which tends to become disengaged with TV viewing... The kind of “information wars” we are witnessing today have not been seen for decades, but they will have to end eventually as it is not possible for society to remain in a mobilized state for a long time, even in Russia. People grow weary psychologically. The events in Ukraine have not interested Russian TV viewers for some time, and the war in Syria is taken like a Hollywood action movie.

Most people don’t have their own opinions, maybe 70%-80% are easy marks for propaganda. They have opinions only about things close to them, things that are important to them personally, but most don’t have opinions on political questions. There’s nothing insulting about saying that, it’s just human nature. Propaganda has no effect on maybe 5%, intelligent people with strong critical reflexes. Most people take information in to learn what the social consensus is and support it—those who do not can be the revolutionary core driving change... For an authoritarian or totalitarian regime to sustain itself, it needs a “spiral of silence”—people have to be afraid to speak up. Revolutionary change takes place when the “spiral” stops—sometimes that takes years, sometimes it happens very quickly. Nobody knows why. Revolutions are impossible to predict. It’s only after the fact that commentators look back and say it was inevitable. It’s the 3%-5% who push the limits, who take to the streets, who speak up. But then others will follow. Mass dynamics are unpredictable. We can predict a crisis, but no one knows how it will develop. We see that Russia is in a serious crisis, for example, but no one knows how to end it. Will it end in a revolutionary way? With stagnation? Regardless, the end

game will likely begin soon.

What about polls showing that Russians don't really feel the consequences of the crisis? People say what they think the pollsters want to hear. There are "socially approved answers." People will say everything is alright, everything is moving in the right direction. But those same people who say they are proud of Russian foreign policy victories also say they are preparing for a long term crisis. They don't make any connection between the political and the economic situations—but popular behavior is changing, as people are spending less, they are economizing.

On Putin's high ratings: Well, if you give respondents a list of names—Putin, Medvedev, Navalny—and ask them who they trust, you know what the answer's going to be. Nevertheless, VVP's approval rating is high, though not 90%. But the quality of the support is not real high. Russians are alienated from politics. Society sees politics as the prerogative of a small group of elites. So the 3%-5% turns up on the street, but the rest think that politics is something for vlast, not them (**Comment: This is close to my view of things. Most Russians don't think politics is any of their business. You can get ordinary people stirred up—not just the 5%—when something that directly has an impact on their daily life comes up, as we saw earlier this week with truckers blocking roads over a levy on freight trucks.\* See the 11 November notes. What the issue is usually resolved—maybe the government backs down, for now, or some concession is made—then everyone goes back to their private lives. Putin's support is broad, but not necessarily very deep**). We should keep in mind that this was the state of affairs when the USSR collapsed. The CPSU had 15 million members. And it all disappeared. So we should not overestimate the quality of Putin's rating.

People have selective memories, that's both as individuals and collectively. We remember some things and prefer to forget others. Propaganda can boost the selective element of memory. You can take an account of a certain event and clean up its negative connotations. Right now we hear that the attitude to Stalin has improved, that a lot of people support re-installing the Dzerzhinsky memorial—there is no basis for doubting this. But let's ask people this question: "Would you want to live under Stalin or Dzerzhinskiy?" An attitude toward a symbol is one thing, a person's actual preferences quite another... Speaking seriously, Russians are rather rational, more so than propaganda or polls show. Otherwise, Russian society would simply not have survived.

As far as selective memory, recall how Gorbachev was welcomed by everyone, they all wanted freedom and democracy. Then they welcomed Yeltsin. But if you ask people if they voted for Yeltsin, nobody will say they did. ... Some time down the line, it will be the same for Putin...

\*<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/new-truck-fees-may-lead-to-goods-shortages-russian-retailers-say/548970.html>

Major Russian retailers have warned that the introduction of a new federal levy on 12-ton trucks could disrupt supplies and lead to goods shortages in stores, the Kommersant newspaper reported Friday.

The new fee for using federal roads, set to come into force on Nov. 15, has angered truck owners across the country, with roadblock protests springing up in major cities including St. Petersburg, the Siberian city of Novosibirsk and the Urals' Yekaterinburg.

However, according to the Kommersant report, the main problem for logistics companies will likely be the requirement to have satellite devices installed onboard the trucks. These would be linked to personal accounts, enabling drivers to pay the federal levy in advance of or after a journey.

Truck owners and companies were able to register for the scheme a month in advance. However, representatives of retail chains told Kommersant that many drivers will not have been issued the devices in time.

A spokesperson for X5 Retail Group, a leading Russian food retailer owning the supermarket chains Pyatyorochka, Perekryostok, and Karusel, estimated that a third of their supplies might not reach store shelves in time, the NTV channel reported.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told news agency RIA Novosti on Friday that the Transportation Ministry "was making every effort" to reach a compromise with the protesting truckers, adding that both sides "needed to show flexibility" with regard to the new levy system.

## Former Russian policeman convicted of espionage

<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/former-russian-police-officer-sentenced-to-13-years-for-espionage/548914.html>

A former Moscow policeman has been sentenced to 13 years in prison for spying for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Interfax news agency reported Thursday, citing a statement from the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), the successor to the Soviet KGB.

A Moscow regional court on Thursday convicted former Ministry of Internal Affairs officer Yevgeny Chistov with treason in the form of espionage after the man "pled completely guilty, confirmed the fact that he was recruited by the CIA, and delivered to them information on ministry activities," Interfax reported.

According to Interfax, Chistov's case file shows that in 2011, the officer, "acting out of selfish motives, took the initiative to make contact with the CIA," and began transferring state secrets out of the country.

Chistov's case is the latest in an alarming string of spy scandals to shake Russia since the start of the Ukraine crisis in early 2014.

## New press rules after the "leak"

See yesterday's notes.

<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/kremlin-imposes-strictier-press-rules-following-nuclear-sub-leak/548965.html>

Following the "unintentional" leak of a secret military project by state television on Tuesday, the Kremlin has instituted new guidelines for covering military meetings: cameramen must keep their cameras pointed at the wall until the president arrives, the Kommersant newspaper reported Friday.

During a meeting between President Vladimir Putin and his senior military advisors and officials in the seaside village of Sochi on Tuesday, a cameraman briefly filmed over the shoulder of a military officer, catching a description of a new weapons system known simply as "Status-6."

Status-6 appears to be an unmanned submarine packed with a high-megaton thermonuclear warhead and radioactive material to create a massive dirty bomb, which would render an enemy's port or coastline a radioactive wasteland "for long periods of time."

The Pentagon has reportedly been aware of such a weapon under development in Russia for at least a year, and Russian analysts have argued that the leak was intentional to demonstrate the lengths Russia is willing to go in preserving its nuclear deterrent in the face of U.S. missile defenses.

Nonetheless, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov on Wednesday lamented the allegedly unintentional leak, promising to tighten procedures for state media reporters covering meetings between Putin and his military staff.

Reporters will now have to leave their cell phones with security guards before entering such meetings, photographers cannot take photos before Putin enters the room, and television cameras must be pointed at the wall until the meeting starts, Kommersant reported.

Furthermore, military officials present at meetings are being encouraged to study their documents prior to the arrival of the press.

## Nearly half of Russians fear a terrorist attack

<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/nearly-half-of-russians-fear-terrorist-attack--poll/548960.html>

Nearly half of Russians fear a terrorist attack or hostage-taking situation in the near future, the Interfax news agency reported, citing data from independent pollster the Levada Center. (<http://www.levada.ru/2015/11/13/terakty/>) Of the 48 percent who fear an attack, 76 percent consider terrorist group the Islamic State as the greatest threat, Interfax reported Friday.

International terrorism as a whole worried 39 percent of Russians polled, while 17 percent were concerned by Russian extremists and radicals. One-third (34 percent) of respondents did not believe in the possibility of a terrorist attack.

The poll was conducted on Oct. 23-26 among 1,600 people in 134 cities and towns around Russia, Interfax reported. No margin of error was given.

The Islamic State terrorist group released an Internet video promising to attack Russia "very soon," the SITE monitoring group reported on Thursday.

The Islamic State has previously called for Islamic fighters to take revenge on Russia after President Vladimir Putin launched an air strike campaign in Syria against Islamic State militants and opposition forces fighting against Syrian President Bashar Assad.

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## More on Lesin

See the 6, 9, and 11 November notes.

<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3315994/Vladimir-Putin-s-media-mastermind-dead-DC-hotel-murdered-FBI-informant-alive-claim-Russians.html>

The death from a 'heart attack' of a longtime close ally of [Vladimir Putin](#) in a Washington hotel has led to a swirl of speculation that he was murdered on Moscow's orders after offering to help the FBI.

Mikhail Lesin, 57, was announced last weekend to have been found dead in the US capital. He was a Svengali figure for Putin, who was alleged to have menaced the Russian media into idolizing the strongman president.

The shock death has created an eave of speculation in Moscow that it is related to previous reports that he was helping the FBI and could be murder.

There are even separate allegations that Lesin may still be alive, with his demise faked by the US authorities.

According to this version, he is being kept safe as part of a witness protection scheme, while spilling to the FBI all he knows on Putin's Russia.

Daily Mail Online can reveal that only weeks before his death was announced, he fathered a child with glamorous model and flight attendant Victoria Rakhimbayeva.

She is believed to be aged 29, with whom he had enjoyed a close relationship since at least mid 2014.

She has not commented on his death other than to thank friends on social media for their commiserations, but before the tragedy she made clear that they intended to set up home permanently in New York.

Despite Russian reports of a heart attack, police in DC have said no cause of death has been determined while also indicating there was no obvious sign of foul play.

'A ruling on the cause and manner of death is pending further investigation,' said a Saturday statement.

Nicknamed the 'Bulldozer', Lesin was one of the key props of the Putin presidency, personally masterminding a wide ranging media crackdown which has left the vast majority of Russian TV stations and newspapers obedient to the Kremlin.

He also set up Russia Today, now RT, seen by critics as a 'propaganda' channel aimed at the West.

But earlier this year, after the break up of his marriage, and in a new relationship with his Siberian lover who he may have wed she referred to him as her 'husband' he suddenly quit the latest of several high profile positions, as head of Gazprom Media, a major state owned media conglomerate.

There are unsubstantiated claims in Moscow that when he died he was in debt to billionaire Yury Kovalchuk, one of Putin's closest big business friends.

'He owed huge amount of money to Kovalchuk, which he supposedly didn't intend to pay back,' an unnamed source [told The Moscow Times](#).

His presence and death in Washington shocked many Russians.

Lesin was found dead at 11:30am on November 6 while staying on an upper floor at the \$240 a night Dupont Circle Hotel, seen as modest for his multimillionaire lifestyle.

It is unclear if Rakhimbayeva was in the US with him at the time.

Yet some 16 months earlier, Senator Roger Wicker had called for a Justice Department probe into whether Lesin was engaged in money laundering.

The status of any subsequent FBI investigation is unclear, but rightly or wrongly in Russia it was widely believed that a probe was indeed under way.

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[http://rus.postimees.ee/3395127/valerij\\_solovej\\_bolshinstvo\\_ljudej\\_ne\\_imeet\\_svoego\\_mnenija?utm\\_source=rus.postimees.ee&utm\\_medium=button\\_article&utm\\_content=3395127&utm\\_campaign=vk\\_social](http://rus.postimees.ee/3395127/valerij_solovej_bolshinstvo_ljudej_ne_imeet_svoego_mnenija?utm_source=rus.postimees.ee&utm_medium=button_article&utm_content=3395127&utm_campaign=vk_social)

MGIMO’s Valeriy Solovey says that the prevalence of TV viewing in Eastern Europe is a holdover from Soviet times, especially among older viewers and, say, ethnic Russians living in the Baltic states. The situation is a bit different with younger people, though sociologists report they watch TV only about 5% less than their elders (Solovey mentions the Internet/social networks as additional sources of information for young people). As the older generations pass on, TV will have less impact, but it will remain the single most influential propaganda instrument as people trust television. Why? It’s psychological people have a sense of being present at an event when watching TV...Propaganda has its limits it’s not effective when we are talking about something that has an impact directly on the viewers’ interests or about something they know about. It’s not as hard to convince Russians that Americans are children of the Devil, as they do not know Americans. It’s harder to cast Ukrainians as Satan’s spawn, though...It would make sense to have pluralism in media sources, with different views offsetting each other. That would be a defense against propaganda. It would be better if people limited TV viewing. And it’s very important to read, as reading engages the critical reflex, which tends to become disengaged with TV viewing...The kind of “information wars” we are witnessing today have not been seen for decades, but they will have to end eventually as it is not possible for society to remain in a mobilized state for a long time, even in Russia. People grow weary psychologically. The events in Ukraine have not interested Russian TV viewers for some time, and the war in Syria is taken like a Hollywood action movie.

Most people don’t have their own opinions, maybe 70%-80% are easy marks for propaganda. They have opinions only about things close to them, things that are important to them personally, but most don’t have opinions on political questions. There’s nothing insulting about saying that, it’s just human nature. Propaganda has no effect on maybe 5%, intelligent people with strong critical reflexes. Most people take information in to learn what the social consensus is and support it those who do not can be the revolutionary core driving change...For an authoritarian or totalitarian regime to sustain itself, it needs a “spiral of silence” people have to be afraid to speak up. Revolutionary change takes place when the “spiral” stops sometimes that takes years,

sometimes it happens very quickly. Nobody knows why. Revolutions are impossible to predict. It's only after the fact that commentators look back and say it was inevitable. It's the 3%-5% who push the limits, who take to the streets, who speak up. But then others will follow. Mass dynamics are unpredictable. We can predict a crisis, but no one knows how it will develop. We see that Russia is in a serious crisis, for example, but no one knows how to end it. Will it end in a revolutionary way? With stagnation? Regardless, the end game will likely begin soon.

What about polls showing that Russians don't really feel the consequences of the crisis? People say what they think the pollsters want to hear. There are "socially approved answers." People will say everything is alright, everything is moving in the right direction. But those same people who say they are proud of Russian foreign policy victories also say they are preparing for a long term crisis. They don't make any connection between the political and the economic situations but popular behavior is changing, as people are spending less, they are economizing.

On Putin's high ratings: Well, if you give respondents a list of names Putin, Medvedev, Navalniy and ask them who they trust, you know what the answer's going to be. Nevertheless, VVP's approval rating is high, though not 90%. But the quality of the support is not real high. Russians are alienated from politics. Society sees politics as the prerogative of a small group of elites. So the 3%-5% turns up on the street, but the rest think that politics is something for vlast, not them (**Comment: This is close to my view of things. Most Russians don't think politics is any of their business. You can get ordinary people stirred up—not just the 5%—when something that directly has an impact on their daily life comes up, as we saw earlier this week with truckers blocking roads over a levy on freight trucks.\* See the 11 November notes. What the issue is usually resolved—maybe the government backs down, for now, or some concession is made—then everyone goes back to their private lives. Putin's support is broad, but not necessarily very deep**). We should keep in mind that this was the state of affairs when the USSR collapsed. The CPSU had 15 million members. And it all disappeared. So we should not overestimate the quality of Putin's rating.

People have selective memories, that's both as individuals and collectively. We remember some things and prefer to forget others. Propaganda can boost the selective element of memory. You can take an account of a certain event and clean up its negative connotations. Right now we hear that the attitude to Stalin has improved, that a lot of people support re-installing the Dzerzhinsky memorial there is no basis for doubting this. But let's ask people this question: "Would you want to live under Stalin or Dzerzhinskiy?" An attitude toward a symbol is one thing, a person's actual preferences quite another...Speaking seriously, Russians are rather rational, more so than propaganda or polls show. Otherwise, Russian society would simply not have survived.

As far as selective memory, recall how Gorbachev was welcomed by everyone, they all wanted freedom and democracy. Then they welcomed Yeltsin. But if you ask people if they voted for Yeltsin, nobody will say they did. ...Some time down the line, it will be the same for Putin...

[\\*http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/new-truck-fees-may-lead-to-goods-shortages-russian-retailers-say/548970.html](http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/new-truck-fees-may-lead-to-goods-shortages-russian-retailers-say/548970.html)

Major Russian retailers have warned that the introduction of a new federal levy on 12 ton trucks could disrupt supplies and lead to goods shortages in stores, the Kommersant newspaper reported Friday.

The new fee for using federal roads, set to come into force on Nov. 15, has angered truck owners across the country, with roadblock protests springing up in major cities including St. Petersburg, the Siberian city of Novosibirsk and the Urals' Yekaterinburg.

However, according to the Kommersant report, the main problem for logistics companies will likely be the requirement to have satellite devices installed onboard the trucks. These would be linked to personal accounts, enabling drivers to pay the federal levy in advance of or after a journey.

Truck owners and companies were able to register for the scheme a month in advance. However, representatives of retail chains told Kommersant that many drivers will not have been issued the devices in time.

A spokesperson for X5 Retail Group, a leading Russian food retailer owning the supermarket chains Pyatyorochka, Perekryostok, and Karusel, estimated that a third of their supplies might not reach store shelves in time, the NTV channel reported.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told news agency RIA Novosti on Friday that the Transportation Ministry "was making every effort" to reach a compromise with the protesting truckers, adding that both sides "needed to show flexibility" with regard to the new levy system.

## **Former Russian policeman convicted of espionage**

<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/former-russian-police-officer-sentenced-to-13-years-for-espionage/548914.html>

A former Moscow policeman has been sentenced to 13 years in prison for spying for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Interfax news agency reported Thursday, citing a statement from the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), the successor to the Soviet KGB.

A Moscow regional court on Thursday convicted former Ministry of Internal Affairs officer Yevgeny Chistov with treason in the form of espionage after the man "pled completely guilty, confirmed the fact that he was recruited by the CIA, and delivered to them information on ministry activities," Interfax reported.

According to Interfax, Chistov's case file shows that in 2011, the officer, "acting out of selfish motives, took the initiative to make contact with the CIA," and began transferring state secrets out of the country.

Chistov's case is the latest in an alarming string of spy scandals to shake Russia since the start of the Ukraine crisis in early 2014.

## **New press rules after the "leak"**

See yesterday's notes.

<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/kremlin-imposes-strict-press-rules-following-nuclear-sub-leak/548965.html>

Following the "unintentional" leak of a secret military project by state television on Tuesday, the Kremlin has instituted new guidelines for covering military meetings: cameramen must keep their cameras pointed at the wall until the president arrives, the Kommersant newspaper reported Friday.

During a meeting between President Vladimir Putin and his senior military advisors and officials in the seaside village of Sochi on Tuesday, a cameraman briefly filmed over the shoulder of a military officer, catching a description of a new weapons system known simply as "Status 6."

Status 6 appears to be an unmanned submarine packed with a high megaton thermonuclear warhead and radioactive material to create a massive dirty bomb, which would render an enemy's port or coastline a radioactive wasteland "for long periods of time."

The Pentagon has reportedly been aware of such a weapon under development in Russia for at least a year, and Russian analysts have argued that the leak was intentional to demonstrate the lengths Russia is willing to go in preserving its nuclear deterrent in the face of U.S. missile defenses.

Nonetheless, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov on Wednesday lamented the allegedly unintentional leak, promising to tighten procedures for state media reporters covering meetings between Putin and his military staff.

Reporters will now have to leave their cell phones with security guards before entering such meetings, photographers cannot take photos before Putin enters the room, and television cameras must be pointed at the wall until the meeting starts, Kommersant reported.

Furthermore, military officials present at meetings are being encouraged to study their documents prior to the arrival of the press.

## **Nearly half of Russians fear a terrorist attack**

<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/nearly-half-of-russians-fear-terrorist-attack-poll/548960.html>

Nearly half of Russians fear a terrorist attack or hostage taking situation in the near future, the Interfax news agency reported, citing data from independent pollster the Levada Center. (<http://www.levada.ru/2015/11/13/terakty/>)

Of the 48 percent who fear an attack, 76 percent consider terrorist group the Islamic State as the greatest threat, Interfax reported Friday.

International terrorism as a whole worried 39 percent of Russians polled, while 17 percent were concerned by Russian extremists and radicals. One third (34 percent) of respondents did not believe in the possibility of a terrorist attack.

The poll was conducted on Oct. 23-26 among 1,600 people in 134 cities and towns around Russia, Interfax reported. No margin of error was given.

The Islamic State terrorist group released an Internet video promising to attack Russia “very soon,” the SITE monitoring group reported on Thursday.

The Islamic State has previously called for Islamic fighters to take revenge on Russia after President Vladimir Putin launched an air strike campaign in Syria against Islamic State militants and opposition forces fighting against Syrian President Bashar Assad.

Nellie Ohr

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**From:** Nellie Ohr  
**Sent:** Tuesday, November 10, 2015 7:32 PM  
**To:** Ohr, Bruce (ODAG); Holtyn, Lisa (OCDEF)  
**Subject:** Russian commentators speculate on Lesin's death in Dupont Circle hotel : someone feared he'd sing?

(from Wayne Allensworth, Internet Notes, 9 Nov)

### Lesin's death (This looks "fishy"...) )

See the 6 November notes...

<http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d11b034a-8635-11e5-9f8c-a8d619fa707c.html#axzz3qyff1f7v>

The death in Washington of one of the architects of the media machine in Vladimir Putin's [Russia](#) triggered speculation and conspiracy theories in Moscow at the weekend.

[Mikhail Lesin](#)

former press minister and head of Gazprom Media, the holding that owns many formerly independent Russian media outlets, was found dead in the Dupont Circle hotel in Washington late last week. Police said an autopsy was being conducted and the cause of death would be determined only after that had been completed.

The Russian embassy, which sent an official to the US capital to identify Mr Lesin, said the ex-minister had died of a heart attack, a version echoed by RT, the state news outlet Mr Lesin was involved in establishing, and statements from his family carried in Russian state media.

But Russian government critics on Sunday questioned this version of events. In a Facebook post, Alfred Kokh, a former Russian prime minister (?????) who held the Gazprom Media post more than a decade before Mr Lesin, described the embassy's statement as a "strange flight of fantasy".

Referring to a potential US justice department and FBI investigation into Mr Lesin in connection with corruption allegations, he said: "Why do [they] want so much to make everybody believe that it was a heart attack? Maybe they were afraid that Lesin tells the FBI about something in exchange for them ending the investigation?"

In July last year, Roger Wicker, a senator from Mississippi, requested that the justice department [investigate whether Mr Lesin had violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act](#)

and anti-money-laundering statutes and suggested he might have business ties with people subject to US sanctions. He claimed Mr Lesin had bought homes worth a total of \$28m in Los Angeles and moved his immediate family there. Mr Wicker's request was referred to the justice department and the FBI, which were considering it. Mr Lesin's death means the issue is now closed.

The FBI was notified of Mr Lesin's death but was not assisting in the matter, which was being treated by local police as a death investigation.

Another commentator who posted under the name Wolf said on VKontakte, a Russian social media site: "He is not the first one, and he will not be the last. We have had so many famous Russians murdered abroad that whenever some prominent compatriot dies outside the motherland, you have to assume that they will find poison."

Aged 57, Mr Lesin was one of the highest-profile among the aides who helped Mr Putin rebuild Russia into a more state-centric and authoritarian polity.

Vsevolod Bogdanov, head of the Russian Union of Journalists, called Mr Lesin Russia's "most energetic" minister Russia in the past 20 years. "He was committed to not only the interests of the media industry but also the interests of the authorities," he said.

Mr Putin's spokesman said the president highly appreciated the "enormous contribution" Mr Lesin had made to the formation of the modern Russian media.

An engineer by training, Mr Lesin co-founded Video International, one of Russia's leading advertising agencies, in 1990, and went on to managerial positions in state TV under president Boris Yeltsin.

As media minister between 1999 and 2004, he played a role in taming private television through the takeover of NTV, Russia's first independent news channel, then owned by Yeltsin-era oligarch Vladimir Gusinsky. Until 2009 Mr Lesin served as Mr Putin's adviser, helping build up RT, an English-language TV network that aims to enhance Russian soft power by countering



western news narratives.

In late 2013, he was appointed head of Gazprom Media. But he resigned from that post at the end of 2014. Mr Lesin cited private reasons but his resignation followed an argument with Aleksei Venediktov, editor-in-chief of liberal radio station Echo of Moscow, over a journalist Mr Lesin had demanded be fired.

Two senior journalists at Gazprom Media-owned outlets said Mr Lesin had spent most of his time since his resignation in California but had remained close to Mr Putin.

Here's the outline of a theory involving Wicker, mentioned above: <https://www.facebook.com/pchikov/posts/1006737349399709>

In July, 2011, Lesin registered the Dastel Corporation in California. In 2011-2012, Dastel acquired three homes valued at \$28 million. In 2014, Mississippi Senator Roger Wicker requested that the Justice Department investigate Lesin for money laundering—the Justice Department requested that the FBI conduct an investigation. In December of last year, Lesin resigned as the head of Gazprom Media, a post he had held since October of 2013 (he also resigned a post as advisor to the Television Industrial Committee). Putin reportedly personally approved the resignation. Lesin was found dead in a Washington hotel last week. It's reasonable to assume that Lesin was prepared to agree to cooperate with the FBI in exchange for lesser charges in the case against him—it's premature to talk about murder. Maybe he had health problems. But the whole thing looks fishy.

In this post, Kokh (mentioned above) claims that Lesin could have headed a "Putin Komintern" of connections in the West that could support Kremlin information policy, a form of "soft power": [https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story\\_fbid=1072198709480520&id=100000712037223](https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=1072198709480520&id=100000712037223)

... This network would be a threat to the security of the West, says Kokh. So Lesin, under investigation by the FBI, is found dead in a Washington hotel room. Venediktov says Lesin had cancer. He supposedly had a bad back. But no one mentioned heart problems. Maybe someone was afraid of what he might tell the FBI—and maybe they had some tea with him.

**Ohr, Bruce (ODAG)**

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**From:** Ohr, Bruce (ODAG)  
**Sent:** Friday, October 30, 2015 6:05 PM  
**To:** Nellie Ohr  
**Subject:** FW: SCMP and CCDI articles on JLG Anti-Corruption Working Group

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**From:** Park, Jason L [mailto:ParkJL@state.gov]  
**Sent:** Friday, October 30, 2015 10:44 AM  
**To:** Ohr, Bruce (ODAG); Lee, Kaye A (Beijing); Lee, Amy Chang; Chang, Frances; Weber, Benjamin (Beijing); Bailey, Benjamin S; Davis-Polzin, Jacqueline X (Beijing); Tsao, Byron F; (b) (6); (b) (6); Heumphreus, Julie; Otallah, Nicole I; (b) (6) per IRS; (b) (6); Allen, Charles; Kucera, John (USACAC); Bishop, Christopher W (Beijing); EAP-P-Office-DL  
**Cc:** EAP-CM-Bilat Unit-DL; Haymond, Peter; Goldman, Michael B  
**Subject:** SCMP and CCDI articles on JLG Anti-Corruption Working Group

Dear all:

Please see below for South China Morning Post and the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection's articles on the JLG Anti-Corruption Working Group. SCMP makes a questionable claim that CCDI article praising U.S.-China cooperation on anti-corruption was intentionally released a day after USS Lassen's FONOPs. If you scroll to the bottom you can see CCDI's colorful map showing how many Chinese priority fugitives (40+) have fled to the United States.

Best,

Jason

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## Bilateral talks to counter corruption a 'bright spot' China-US relations

PUBLISHED : Friday, 30 October, 2015, 12:11am

[Jun Maijun.mai@scmp.com](mailto:Jun.Mai@scmp.com)

<http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1873970/bilateral-talks-counter-corruption->

Despite rising Sino-US tensions in the South China Sea, the two countries could be moving closer on other important issues, notably the repatriation of corruption suspects, the Communist Party's anti-graft watchdog said.

An article published on Wednesday on the website of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) said a top-level meeting of the two nations on efforts to counter corruption was hailed by the US team leader.

Bruce Ohr, chief of the organised crime and racketeering section at the US Department of Justice, described the latest meeting of an anti-corruption working group as "a bright spot in US-China relations", according to the CCDI.

"Corruption is the most evil thing for any country in the world," Ohr was quoted as saying. "In a connected world, different countries should step up cooperation and fight cross-border crime."

## In a connected world, different countries should step up cooperation and fight cross-border crime

BRUCE OHR, US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

The article was published on the CCDI's website one week after the 10th China-US joint liaison group's anti-corruption working group meeting but just a day after the US missile destroyer USS Lassen was dispatched to challenge Beijing's sovereignty claims in the South China Sea, raising concerns that the naval confrontation would have serious repercussions on other aspects of Sino-US relations.

The anti-corruption group, set up in 2005, holds regular meetings where officials from both the CCDI and US law enforcement agencies discuss cooperation in fighting graft and transnational organised crime.

"Breakthroughs in individual cases always lead to system-building in anti-graft efforts," said Liu Jianchao, the new director of the CCDI's International Cooperation Bureau. The article did not identify the cases.

"Cooperation and breakthroughs on individual cases mean the US is continuously sending positive signals," said Gao Bo, an anti-graft expert at the Academy of Social Sciences.

*This article appeared in the South China Morning Post print edition as Anti-graft talks a 'bright spot' in Sino-US relations*

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
[http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/special/ztzz/ztzzjxs\\_ztzz/201510/t20151029\\_64208.html](http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/special/ztzz/ztzzjxs_ztzz/201510/t20151029_64208.html)

## 中美JLG反腐败工作组成立10年 更多逃美贪官将被缉拿回国

来源：中央纪委监察部网站 发布时间：2015-10-28 11:40

“腐败对任何国家而言都是最邪恶的事，腐败行为像病毒一样可以蔓延，超越国界。在互联网、联络日益紧密的世界里，各国应该进一步加强合作、打击跨境犯罪。”10月20日，美国司法部助理副部长、中美执法合作联合联络小组（JLG）反腐败工作组美方共同主席布鲁斯·奥尔在北京参加中美JLG反腐败工作组第10次会议时表示，“反腐败在中美两国都取得了越来越重要的地位，反腐败工作组成为双边关系的亮点”。





中央纪委副书记、监察部部长黄树贤会见美方代表团

作为中美最重要的反腐败合作机制，中美JLG反腐败工作组成立于2005年，10月20日至21日在北京召开第10次会议。中美高层对该反腐败合作机制给予高度关注。1个月前，这一机制被写入习近平主席访美成果清单，“双方决定继续以中美执法合作联合联络小组（JLG）为主渠道，进一步落实好两国领导人达成的有关共识，采取切实措施，推进双方共同确定的重大腐败案件的办理。”2014年以来，中美元首会晤和第六轮、第七轮中美战略与经济对话都确认了中美JLG机制的主渠道作用，反腐败议题的重要性在中美合作框架内日益凸显。



中美JLG反腐败工作组第10次会议开幕式现场

由于两国领导人的肯定以及合作越来越富于成效，中美JLG反腐败工作组第10次会议备受各方关注。本次会议以“为了公平正义加强合作”为主题，双方就追逃追赃个案、多双边交流合作

及畅通合作渠道等议题进行深入交流和研讨。会后，中美双方代表还赴湖南省、河南省了解地方反腐败和追逃追赃工作，就有关追逃追赃重点案件进行联合调查。中央纪委副书记、监察部部长黄树贤在会见美方代表团时表示，“希望双方积极全面落实两国之前达成的重要共识，以实现公平正义为目标，本着互利共赢原则，加强以个案为重点的务实合作，构建长效机制，取得更多合作成果”。



国家预防腐败局副局长、中央纪委监察部国际合作局局长刘建超在开幕式上致辞

中国社科院廉政研究中心副秘书长高波接受本网采访时表示，“中美反腐败合作，为中美构建跨太平洋新型大国关系注入了新的活力和元素”。

美方以“亮点”一词形容中美反腐败合作尚属首次。中美反腐败合作“提速升级”的背后，是中美双方在JLG机制下数年的不懈努力。双方针对重点个案，分别指定专人，依据各自法律展开联合调查。工作组定期会晤，并成立了配套的工作组联络人机制、重点案件联系人机制以及执法部门月度会晤机制，确保案件信息沟通及时、顺畅。





美国司法部助理副部长、中美JLG反腐败工作组美方共同主席布鲁斯·奥尔致辞

此次会议，中美双方再度就共同确定的多起个案进行深度磋商。正如国家预防腐败局副局长、中央纪委监察部国际合作局局长刘建超所言，“反腐败工作组始终以个案突破带动机制建设”。




双方代表交谈

中国社科院高波表示，“个案突破和合作意味着美方在不断释放积极的信号和姿态。”有专家分析，这或许预示着美方在遣返腐败犯罪嫌疑人方面将有新的动作，外逃贪官在美生存的空间将更加狭窄。论及中美反腐败合作中存在的困难和障碍，高波认为，“反腐败追逃追赃工作成本高、周期长。由于中美的制度和司法体系有很大的差异，追逃追赃工作在证据提供、证据锁定和认同方面都较为复杂”。

## 外逃人员可能逃往的国家和地区

逃往美国的最多，为40人；逃往加拿大的次之，为26人；新西兰、澳大利亚、泰国、新加坡等也是外逃人员相对集中的国家





中央纪委监察部网站 制作

### “百名红通”人员逃往的国家和地区

“两国加强反腐败合作，不仅符合两国政府和人民的利益和愿望，也有利于向国际社会传递出中美两国崇尚诚信廉洁、拒绝腐败贿赂的正能量”，刘建超表示，“反腐败没有‘完成时’，反腐败永远在路上。我们希望与美方同舟共济、一起前行。”（中央纪委监察部网站 李鹏 图文）

Jason Park  
 Desk Officer  
 U.S. Department of State  
 Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs  
 Phone: (202) 647-6803 | Email: [ParkJL@state.gov](mailto:ParkJL@state.gov)

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

Ohr, Bruce (ODAG)

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**From:** Ohr, Bruce (ODAG)  
**Sent:** Thursday, October 29, 2015 3:59 PM  
**To:** Nellie Ohr  
**Subject:** Re: Putin's Mafia Statecraft

Excellent article!

Sent from my iPhone

On Oct 29, 2015, at 9:34 AM, Nellie Ohr (b) (6) wrote:

This brings a lot of things together nicely.

[http://www.rferl.org/content/putins-mafia-statecraft/27329898.html?mc\\_cid=bf8eb0c766&mc\\_eid=e46842563c](http://www.rferl.org/content/putins-mafia-statecraft/27329898.html?mc_cid=bf8eb0c766&mc_eid=e46842563c)

October 27, 2015

## Putin's Mafia Statecraft

by Brian Whitmore

In the past couple years, Russian hackers have launched attacks on a French television network, a German steelmaker, the Polish stock market, the White House, the U.S. House of Representatives, the U.S. State Department, and The New York Times.

And according to press reports citing Western intelligence officials, the perpetrators weren't rogue cyber-pranksters. They were working for the Kremlin.

Cybercrime, it appears, has become a tool of Russian statecraft. And not just cybercrime.

Vladimir Putin's regime has become increasingly adept at deploying a whole range of practices that are more common among crime syndicates than permanent members of the UN Security Council.

In some cases, as with the hacking, this involves the Kremlin subcontracting organized crime groups to do things the Russian state cannot do itself with plausible deniability. And in others, it involves the state itself engaging in kidnapping, extortion, blackmail, bribery, and fraud to advance its agenda.

Spanish prosecutor [Jose Grinda](#) has noted that the activities of Russian criminal networks are virtually indistinguishable from those of the government.

"It's not so much a mafia state as a nationalized mafia," Russian organized crime expert Mark Galeotti, a professor at New York University and co-host of the Power Vertical Podcast, said [in a recent lecture](#) at the Hudson Institute.

### Hackers, Gangsters, And Goblins

According to a report by the FBI and U.S. intelligence agencies, Russia is home to the most skilled community of cybercriminals on the globe, and the Kremlin has close ties to them.

"They have let loose the hounds," Tom Kellermann, chief security officer at Trend Micro, a Tokyo-based security firm, [told Bloomberg News](#).

Citing unidentified officials, Bloomberg reported that Russian hackers had stepped up surveillance of essential infrastructure, including power grids and energy-supply networks, in the United States, Europe, and Canada.

Dmitri Alperovitch, co-founder of the security firm CrowdStrike, noted recently that the Russian security services have been actively recruiting an army of hackers.

"When someone is identified as being technically proficient in the Russian underground," a pending criminal case against them "suddenly disappears and those people are never heard from again."



Alperovitch said [in an interview with The Hill](#), adding that the hacker in question is then working for the Russian security services.

"We know that's going on," Alperovitch added.

And as a result, criminal hackers "that used to hunt banks eight hours a day are now operating two hours a day turning their guns on NATO and government targets," Kellermann of Trend Micro told The Hill, adding that these groups are "willingly operating as cyber-militias."

The hacking is just one example of how the Kremlin effectively uses organized crime as a geopolitical weapon.

Moscow relied heavily on local organized crime structures in its support for separatist movements in Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Donbas.

In the conflict in eastern Ukraine, organized crime groups served as agents for the Kremlin, fomenting pro-Russia unrest and funneling arms to rebel groups.

In annexed Crimea, the Kremlin installed a reputed gangster known as "[The Goblin](#)" as the peninsula's chief executive.

And of course there is the case of [Eston Kohver](#), the Estonian law enforcement officer who was investigating a smuggling ring run jointly by Russian organized crime groups and the Russian Federal Security Service.

Kohver was kidnapped in Estonia September 2014, brought across the Russian border at gunpoint, and convicted of espionage. He was released in a prisoner exchange last month.

### **The Geopolitics Of Extortion**

But Putin's mafia statecraft doesn't just involve using and colluding with organized crime groups.

It often acts like an organized crime group itself.

In some cases this involves using graft as a means of control. This is a tactic Moscow has deployed throughout the former Soviet space, involving elites in corrupt schemes -- everything from shady energy deals or money-laundering operations -- to secure a "captured constituency."

This is a tactic Russia attempted to use in Georgia following the 2003 Rose Revolution and in Ukraine after the 2004 Orange Revolution, where "corruption and shadow networks were mobilized to undermine the new leadership's reform agenda," according to James Greene in a 2012 [report for Chatham House](#).

This was particularly successful in Ukraine, where opaque gas deals were used "to suborn Ukraine's post-Orange Revolution new leadership," Greene wrote.

And Putin is clearly hoping to repeat this success in eastern Ukraine today -- especially after elections are held in the rebel areas of Donbas.

"His bet in the eastern Ukraine local election, if it ever takes place, won't be on the rebel field commanders but on local oligarchs who ran the region before the 2014 'revolution of dignity.' Through them, he will hope to exert both economic and political influence on Kiev," political commentator [Leonid Bershidsky wrote](#) in Bloomberg View.

In addition to graft, Moscow has also effectively utilized blackmail -- making the international community a series of offers it can't refuse.

It's a neat trick. First you create instability, as in Ukraine, or exasperate existing instability, as in Syria. Then offer your services to establish order.

You essentially create demand -- and then meet it. You get to act like a rogue and be treated like a statesman.

It's how protection rackets operate. And it has become one of the pillars of Putin's foreign policy.

"It's the geopolitics of extortion, but it's probably working," Galeotti told Voice of America [in a recent interview](#).

"He's identifying a whole series of potential trouble spots around the world, places that matter to the West, and is essentially indicating that he can either be a good partner, if they're willing to make a deal with him, or he can stir up more trouble."

**NOTE TO READERS:** The Daily Vertical will not appear on October 28, due to the public holiday in the Czech Republic. We'll be back on October 29.

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<http://www.rferl.org/content/putins-mafia-statecraft/27329898.html>

**Nellie Ohr**

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**From:** Nellie Ohr  
**Sent:** Monday, October 19, 2015 3:59 PM  
**To:** (b) (6) Nellie Email; Ohr, Bruce (ODAG); Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF)  
**Subject:** Kremlin's ties to Russian cyber gangs -- Warsaw Stock Exchange, German steel mill

Here's a new article pulling together several recent attacks that seem to have been backed by the Russian government.

The possibility that it was Russians behind the hack on the German blast furnace was new to me. Other articles on SCADA/ICS attacks did not finger Russia. (Apparently the US gov't has not officially fingered them; it's just that the malware used was similar to malware used by Russians in the past).

I'm copying Lisa on this whole thread too.

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**Cyberspace Becomes Second Front in Russia's Clash With NATO - Bloomberg Business**

<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-14/cyberspace-becomes-second-front-in-russia-s-clash-with-nato>

Russian computer attacks have become more brazen and more destructive as the country grows increasingly at odds with the U.S. and European nations over military goals first in Ukraine and now Syria.

Along with reported computer breaches of a French TV network and the White House, a number of attacks now being attributed to Russian hackers and some not previously disclosed have riveted intelligence officials as relations with Russia have deteriorated. These targets include the Polish stock market, the U.S. House of Representatives, a German steel plant that suffered severe damage and The New York Times.

U.S. officials worry that any attempt by the Russian government to use vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure like global stock exchanges, power grids and airports as pressure points against the West could lead to a broader conflict, according to two people familiar with the debate inside government and who asked to not to be named when discussing intelligence matters. When NATO officials met last week, they voiced alarm about Russia's rapid involvement in Syria, including the firing of cruise missiles, and vowed the biggest reinforcement of their collective defense since the end of the Cold War.

The Warsaw Stock Exchange is but one example of the heightened cyber-activity. Hackers who rifled the exchange last October, in a breach that set off alarms among Western intelligence agencies, proclaimed they were Muslim militants angry over Poland's support for a bombing campaign against the Islamic State.

"It's beginning," the group posted online in a file-sharing site called Pastebin, heavily used by the cyberunderground. "To be continued! Allahu Akbar!"

While stealing some data, the attackers also made dozens of client logins public, opening the exchange's systems to additional chaos from cybercriminals of all stripes. It was sabotage by crowd-sourcing.

Except the infiltrators weren't Islamic militants at all. Behind the smokescreen was a group of hackers with ties to the Russian government, according to three people familiar with the Polish investigation. The incident was viewed by Polish investigators as a stark warning to the country, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization intent on driving a strong alliance response to Russia's moves in eastern Ukraine.

The attack on the exchange, which said in a statement to Bloomberg News that the trading platform wasn't affected, has prompted the Polish government to begin an upgrade of computer systems in government offices, the financial sector and hospitals, said one of the people.

As in other domains, Russians acting directly for the government or with its approval are testing the boundaries of the cyberbattlefield, according to an assessment by U.S. intelligence agencies. The attacks are often called state sponsored by security companies working to arrest the damage, though it is difficult to ascertain which ones might have been done by intelligence agencies and which ones by criminals with access to sophisticated tools hoping to curry government favor.

"They have let loose the hounds," said Tom Kellermann, chief security officer at Trend Micro, a Tokyo-based security firm.

Dmitry Peskov, a spokesman for the Kremlin, rejected suggestions that Russia is behind the attacks. "These are absolutely unsubstantiated allegations, which are often absurd," he said. "We also have been the targets of attacks, which again shows that everyone can just as easily be subject to such attacks. International cooperation is required to expose and deal with these threats. But unfortunately, we don't always see a constructive approach on this issue from our partners."

## Possible Miscalculations

Russia is called America's biggest cyberthreat by U.S. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, and it appears more willing than ever to push up against U.S. doctrine, which holds that destructive hacking attacks could be considered acts of war. So far, the U.S. has not made any public response to the suspected acts. Cyberspace is a messy arena for fighting. Miscalculations, even by skilled operators, are common, fueling concerns about what could happen to essential infrastructure. And Russia is one of the few nations that intelligence officials say can successfully mask its identity in cyberspace, even from the U.S. National Security Agency. The attacks, though, are mounting, leaving officials looking for ways to redraw lines that have already shifted significantly over the last 18 months.

Raising alarms in Europe, Russian hackers damaged a **blast furnace** early last year at a plant in Germany owned by ThyssenKrupp AG, the country's biggest steelmaker, according to four people familiar with the attack. In that case, malware found in the system had previously been tied to Russian espionage activity, but U.S. intelligence agencies have not linked the incident directly to the Russian government, said one person familiar with the matter.

Kilian Roetzer, a spokesman for ThyssenKrupp, **denied any such attack occurred**, as has every other company operating a blast furnace in Germany. A furnace attack was disclosed by the German government last year without naming any company or perpetrator.

In April, the same group that last year attacked the Warsaw stock exchange hit the operations of **TV5Monde**, according to security firms tracking the incidents. The attack shut down the major French television network on April 8 and 9, and restoring the system fully will cost of 15 million euros (\$17 million), its executives estimate.

## Essential Infrastructure

Russian hackers have stepped up surveillance of power grids and energy supply networks in the U.S., Europe and Canada, a provocative move given government sensitivity to tampering with essential infrastructure for millions of people, according to two people familiar with that activity.

U.S. authorities who spoke on condition of anonymity interpret it as a warning. "Russia is exceptionally skilled," said Mike Buratowski, vice president of cybersecurity services for Fidelis Cybersecurity. **"If you see them, chances are it's a decision: Russia is OK with you seeing them, or wants you to see them."**

Russian President Vladimir Putin has continued to pour money and manpower into the country's hacking forces since returning to the presidency in 2012, according to U.S. officials. "While I can't go into detail here, the Russian cyberthreat is more severe than we had previously assessed," Clapper told a congressional committee in February. As economic sanctions have punished Russia for its aggression in Ukraine, the Russian leader has used a combination of regular and irregular cyberforces that are now jockeying for resources and accolades from Moscow, according to Jason Lewis, a former network exploitation specialist with the U.S. Defense Department.

"They're being successful. If you're doing something that's working, you're going to keep doing it," said Lewis, now chief collection and intelligence officer for LookingGlass Cyber Solutions Inc., based in Arlington, Virginia.

Hits by Russian hackers on the e-mail systems of the White House and the State Department were disclosed earlier this year, but they represent only a fraction of the overall activity, according to government and private security specialists.

The same group that breached the Warsaw exchange and the French TV station recently penetrated the e-mail system of the U.S. **House of Representatives**, giving Russia access to the communications of lawmakers, according to a person familiar with that investigation. Dan Weiser, a House spokesman, declined to comment, citing a general policy not to discuss information security systems.

And in July and August, U.S. government agencies were bombarded with poisoned e-mails loaded with malware sent by two different Russian hacking groups. Trend Micro's Kellermann said one of those waves targeted 2,000 senior officials, including at least one member of President Barack Obama's cabinet, as well as the personal e-mail accounts of their spouses.

Another person familiar with the e-mails said the attacks were certain to be detected because of their profusion and the high ranks of the targets, but that did not make them totally unsuccessful. Investigators from the NSA and Department of Homeland Security spent hundreds of hours trying to contain the impact, hacking into servers controlling the attacks and scrubbing government networks, according to people familiar with their efforts.

controlling the attacks and scrubbing government networks, according to people familiar with their efforts. The NSA and DHS declined to comment on the incidents or on Russia's possible cyber-activities.

## Sophisticated Hackers

Putin enjoys some significant advantages over his adversaries in cyberspace. Russia is home to the most sophisticated collection of cybercriminals anywhere in the world, and the government maintains close relationships with many of them, according to assessments by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and U.S. intelligence agencies. Trend Micro says the group that attacked the Warsaw exchange -- nicknamed variously by cybersecurity companies as **APT 28**, Fancy Bear or Pawn Storm -- is most likely staffed by a loose confederation of the country's best criminal hackers. In some instances, they have better skills than the hackers employed by the Russian government, and they have become more motivated after events in Ukraine to help the government, Kellermann said. "These guys have been untouchable for years and now they are coming back to the stable to pay homage," Kellermann said.

Warsaw exchange officials said the damage was limited. "The trading system of Warsaw Stock Exchange itself and data concerning the trading system were not jeopardized," Justyna Rachanska, an exchange spokeswoman, said in a statement. The breached systems, she said, included an investment simulator and a Web portal for managing the exchange's upgrade to a new trading system.

The stock exchange's web site was forced to shut down for about two hours, according to one of the people, and the hackers gained deep intelligence about the exchange's technology road map.

Poland's Internal Security Agency said information about the incident is classified and declined to comment.

**Some private security experts say that APT 28 could be a specialized unit of the FSB, the Russian state security agency.** The group has been linked to hacks of Putin's domestic opponents, including the rock group Pussy Riot, and counter-terrorism missions, tasks that would be natural for Russia's main intelligence agency. APT 28 is using more than run-of-the-mill crimeware. A confidential analysis prepared by Google Inc. of one of the group's tools, known as X-Agent, described it as an extremely sophisticated version of a remote access tool, or RAT, that uses encryption and other techniques on par with U.S. hacking software.

## Google Analysis

Bloomberg News obtained a copy of Google's 41-page analysis, which shows how X-Agent users can swap in various modules for most any conceivable mission, much like the RATs used by the NSA's elite teams, according to a person familiar with that software.

The APT 28 group was also behind an attack last year on the New York Times, starting when hackers took over the personal e-mail account of a Washington-based national security reporter and then targeted more than 50 other staff members, according to two people familiar with the investigation. The hackers failed to get into the paper's primary network, one of the people said. A spokeswoman for the company declined to comment on the incident.

A different group of Russian hackers hit the White House and State Department in incidents disclosed over the last year. That group is called APT 29 by cybersecurity company FireEye and called TEMP.Monkeys by ISight Partners, a cyber-intelligence company that works closely with the federal government. The name refers to monkey videos used in "spear-phishing" e-mails designed to get White House staffers to click on them.

"APT 29 employs some of the most sophisticated techniques we've seen," said Laura Galante, the director of FireEye's intelligence team that specializes in state-sponsored espionage.

"The fact that we're talking in detail about different Russian groups is pretty remarkable," Galante said. "China has always had lots of groups with distinct behaviors and victim types; we're now starting to understand Russian groups in a similar fashion. The uptick in activity over the last few years, especially since Ukraine, has provided us with more data points about potentially state-sponsored groups."

## Assessing Motives

U.S. and European intelligence agencies have struggled in recent months to assess what they see as Russia's newly bellicose behavior in cyberspace.

Intelligence specialists say the hit on TV5Monde may have been a veiled anti-terrorism operation. Like the Warsaw intruders, the hackers claimed to be Islamic militants, the CyberCaliphate, and may have sought to identify other hackers who are actually sympathetic to that cause.

Over the last 18 months, Russian actors have increased the surveillance of electrical grids and pipeline networks throughout North America and Europe, gathering information on critical systems that could be used to launch devastating digital attacks, according to government alerts and cybersecurity firms. The deployed malware, known as Havex, was also found in the damaged German blast furnace, according to people familiar with the steal mill

as Havex, was also found in the damaged German blast furnace, according to people familiar with the steel mill investigation.

## Physical Destruction

The steel mill attack was a rare example of computers being used to cause physical destruction, carrying strong political overtones for the German government.

The hackers hijacked a computer that controlled the blast furnace, inserting malware that caused the machine to overheat and melt down, according to three people familiar with the incident and Germany's Federal Office for Information Security, or BSI, which disclosed the attack in November 2014 without linking it to Russia. The result was "massive damage," according to the BSI report.

Security specialists initially speculated the damage might have been an accident by hackers trying to gather data on how the mill operates, but details have since emerged that point to intentional destruction.

Sometime in late 2013 or early 2014, the hackers began by penetrating the mill's office computers with spear-phishing e-mails and social-engineering tricks against employees, according to a private-security specialist briefed on the attack. Then they found and tunneled through a trusted network connection that led to the factory floor.

Finally, they broke into the digital controls for the blast furnace, tampering with a system of temperature sensors and motors that controlled gas flow. They remotely disabled the furnace's ability to shut down. The entire process took weeks.

Digital traces left in the system immediately pointed back to Russia, but not conclusively to the government itself, according to a U.S. intelligence assessment, as explained by a person familiar with that analysis.

The attack more than a year later of TV5Monde suggests such events will continue unless the U.S. and others can develop an effective response, said John Hultquist, head of cyber-espionage threat intelligence at ISight Partners. "To anyone looking for signs that things are getting a lot worse, there are plenty of them out there," Hultquist said. "Everyone seems a lot less timid about using methods other than just intelligence collection now. They are simply more aggressive and less restrained."

-----Original Message-----

From: Nellie Ohr (b) (6)

To: (b) (6) Nellie Email; bruce.g.ohr <bruce.g.ohr@usdoj.gov>

Sent: Tue, Oct 13, 2015 3:37 pm

Subject: Re: Kremlin's ties to Russian cyber gangs sow US concerns | TheHill-MORE

**How Russian Hackers Stole the Nasdaq**, 17 July 2014, <http://www.businessweek.com/printer/articles/213656-how-russian-hackers-stole-the-nasdaq>

This Bloomberg report appearing on the same day as the MH-17 shutdown over Ukraine describes the investigation of a 2010 intrusion into the NASDAQ computer system, one [apparently] designed to damage rather than just to snoop on a system.

....."After months of work, there were still basic disagreements in different parts of government over who was behind the incident and why. "We've seen a nation-state gain access to at least one of our stock exchanges, I'll put it that way, and it's not crystal clear what their final objective is," says House Intelligence Committee Chairman Mike Rogers, a Republican from Michigan, who agreed to talk about the incident only in general terms because the details remain classified....

The U.S. Secret Service pushed to be the lead investigative agency. Its representatives noted that they had already gone to Nasdaq months earlier with evidence that a group of alleged Russian cybercriminals, led by a St. Petersburg man named Aleksandr Kalinin, had hacked the company and that the two events might be related. The Secret Service lost the argument and sat the investigation out....

The NSA had seen a version before, designed and built by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB), that country's main spy agency. And it was more than spyware: Although the tool could be used to steal data, it also had a function designed to create widespread disruption within a computer network. The NSA believed it might be capable of wiping out the entire exchange....

The team was surprised at how vulnerable a sophisticated operation such as Nasdaq could be. ....

Agents found the tracks of several different groups operating freely, some of which may have been in the exchange's networks for years, including criminal hackers and Chinese cyberspies. Basic records of the daily activity occurring on the company's servers, which would have helped investigators trace the hackers' movements, were almost nonexistent. Investigators also discovered that the website run by One Liberty Plaza's building management

company had been laced with a Russian-made exploit kit known as Blackhole, infecting tenants who visited the page to pay bills or do other maintenance.....

The agents figured the hackers first broke into Nasdaq's computers at least three months before they were detected, but that was just a guess. There were indications that a large cache of data was stolen, though proof was scarce, and it was hard to see what was spirited out.....

As investigators began examining data on other hacks of government and military computers, there was evidence that the Russians' malware was being used by a sophisticated Chinese cyberspy also known to have a thriving criminal business on the side.....

The Asia connection didn't pan out. Investigators turned back to Russia as the most likely suspect but kept stumbling over questions of motive.....

**The CIA began to focus on the relationships between Russia's intelligence agencies and organized crime. Someone in the FSB could have been running a for-profit operation on the side, or perhaps sold or gave the malware to a criminal hacking group.** More analysis on the malware showed that its capabilities were less destructive than earlier believed. It couldn't destroy computers like a wiper virus, but it could take over certain functions in order to cause a network disruption.....

The bureau's agents noticed that the hackers appeared to focus their attention on 13 servers containing Nasdaq's most critical technology.....

By mid-2011, investigators began to conclude that the Russians weren't trying to sabotage Nasdaq. They wanted to clone it.....

Were the malware's disruptive capabilities meant to be used as a weapon or something else? If they hadn't been interrupted, what else would they have done?"

AND I think I've already sent you the following, about **Bogachev (of Gameover Zeus) running both a criminal operation and a separate anti-Ukrainian espionage and damage operation** (these are my tagging notes):

#### **Inside the 100m Business Club Crime Gang**

<http://krebsonsecurity.com/2015/08/inside-the-100m-business-club-crime-gang/>

Krebs summarizes a recent report on Evgeny Bogachev and the Business Club group using the Gameover Zeus botnet for cyberheists and espionage

"Fox-IT, a security firm based in the Netherlands that secretly gained access to a server used by one of the group's members. That server, which was rented for use in launching cyberattacks, included chat logs between and among the crime gang's core leaders, and helped to shed light on the inner workings of this elite group.

"Fox-IT said its access to the gang revealed documents that showed members of the group establishing phony trading and shipping companies in the Heilongjiang province — Raohe county and another in Suifenhe — two cities adjacent to a China-Russia border crossing just north of Vladivostok."

\*...Slavik — the architect of ZeuS and Gameover ZeuS — didn't share his entire crime machine with the other Club members. According to Fox-IT, the malware writer converted part of the botnet that was previously used for cyberheists into a distributed espionage system that targeted specific information from computers in several neighboring nations, including Georgia, Turkey and Ukraine. Beginning in late fall 2013 — about the time that conflict between Ukraine and Russia was just beginning to heat up — Slavik retooled a cyberheist botnet to serve as purely a spying machine, and began scouring infected systems in Ukraine for specific keywords in emails and documents that would likely only be found in classified documents, Fox-IT found.

\*"Likewise, the keyword searches that Slavik used to scout bot-infected systems in Turkey suggested the botmaster was searching for specific files from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Turkish KOM — a specialized police unit. ..."The keywords are around arms shipments and Russian mercenaries in Syria," Sandee said. ....

\*...According to Sandee, Slavik kept this activity hidden from his fellow Business Club members, at least some of whom hailed from Ukraine.....

**Note:** User rakabaraka, a member of the Russian or Ukrainian hacker community, published photos that appear to be Bogachev, including one of him in a sort of leopard suit holding a cat, at

[https://twitter.com/raka\\_baraka/status/629214472952000512](https://twitter.com/raka_baraka/status/629214472952000512). The image URL appears to be

<https://pbs.twimg.com/media/CLtrOivWgAAVnf5.png>. A Google image search for this URL yielded no other instances of that photo.

-----Original Message-----

From: Nellie Ohr (b) (6)

To: bruce.g.ohr <[bruce.g.ohr@usdoj.gov](mailto:bruce.g.ohr@usdoj.gov)>

Sent: Mon, Oct 12, 2015 9:20 am

Subject: Fwd: Kremlin's ties to Russian cyber aaras sow US concerns | TheHill

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6) ) (6)

To: Nellie Ohr (b) (6)

Sent: Mon, Oct 12, 2015 8:18 am

Subject: Kremlin's ties to Russian cyber gangs sow US concerns | TheHill

[http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/256573-kremlins-ties-russian-cyber-gangs-sow-us-concerns?utm\\_source=Salithru&utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_campaign=New%20Campaign&utm\\_term=%2ASituation%20Report](http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/256573-kremlins-ties-russian-cyber-gangs-sow-us-concerns?utm_source=Salithru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=New%20Campaign&utm_term=%2ASituation%20Report)

Sent

from my iPad

**From:** Nellie Ohr  
**Sent:** Sunday, October 18, 2015 8:48 PM  
**To:** Holtyn, Lisa (OCDETF); Ohr, Bruce (ODAG)  
**Subject:** Putin's latest money-men? Makhmudov and Bokarev

## **New Kremlin Kings of State Orders, Makhmudov and Bokarev, have ties with Tambov group Gennadiy Petrov**

Notes:

This article is based on **June 2015** Spanish charges vs. people around Petrov. Also looks at Makhmudov/Petrov's "lobbying" ties in France.

Makhmudov/Bokarev's companies Transmashholding, Metrovagonmash, Oktyabrskiy elektrovagonoremontnyy zavod, Roslokomotiv got big orders from Russian Railways and the Moscow metro, squeezing out Rotenberg from some contracts.

These 2 men also bought up assets from Timchenko to get them out from under sanctions.

According to the Spanish charges, Petrov had ties with Serdyukov, Zubkov, Bastrykin, Gref, Reyman

Separate money laundering case re: Vera Metallurgica (subsidiary of UGMK) features Makhmudov and Mikhail Chernoy. Deri. has already testified. But the case does not mention Bokarev

Petrov, having been let out of Spanish prison for "medical treatment" [wasn't it to see his mother or something?], stayed in Russia and lives in Petersburg in the same building in Kamenny ostrov with Vladimir Kozhin (ex Presidential property dept chief, took a lot of the Sochi construction kickbacks), Nikolay Shamalov and Viktor Myachin (Ozero people)

Spanish police say both Petrov and Kumarin/Barsukov worked with KGB in 1980s.

Makhmudov/Bokarev's "lobbyist" in France: Alstom's Martin Bouygues. (He bought 25% of Transmashholding and Alstom built the Mistrals). They co-own The Breakers Investment (formerly Yakunin owned some too).

Makhmudov is a partner of the Franco-Russian Dialogue group, led by Yakunin and Thierry Mariani of the French National Assembly, who has defended the seizure of Crimea, criticized sanctions etc.

Grigoriy Leps [Lepsviradze, the singer who's on the "Brother's Circle" list] often sings at Bokarev's parties.

Spain handed over docs on the money laundering case, and Russia's MVD Investigative Department is "studying" it

<http://theins.ru/korrupciya/10407>

[I've removed most of the photos, but kept some of their captions]

## **Мафия на госзаказе. Как новые кремлевские олигархи связаны с преступным миром**



37522 просмотров

*В то время как многие олигархи из ближайшего окружения Владимира Путина попали под персональные санкции, в лидерах госзаказа оказались новые имена — Андрей Бокарев и Искандер Махмудов. Именно они, похоже, становятся новыми операторами кремлевских денег. В санкционных списках они до сих пор не значатся, хотя имеют тесные связи с властью. И не только с властью — в распоряжении The Insider оказалось обвинительное заключение по уголовному делу «русской мафии» в Испании, в котором новые короли госзаказа проходят как партнеры главы «тамбовской группировки», имеющей обширные связи в российском правительстве. Сегодня The Insider публикует первую часть расследования, связанного с этим уголовным делом, выясняя, в чем замешана русская мафия, с кем она на «ты» в российских органах власти и почему она получила доступ к кремлевским деньгам.*

#### **Кто потеснил Ротенберга и Тимченко**

Андрей Бокарев любит одеваться во все белое — белый костюм, белые крокодиловые ботинки, передвигается он на роллс-ройсе, разумеется, тоже белом. Очевидно, именно так должен выглядеть победитель — а Андрей Бокарев вместе со своим партнером Искандером Махмудовым, несомненно победитель в области получения государственных заказов. Структуры, основными акционерами которых являются Искандер Махмудов и Андрей Бокарев — «Трансмаш холдинг», «Метровагонмаш», «Октябрьский электровагоноремонтный завод», «Рослокомотив» — получили подрядов на 130,7 миллиардов рублей от РЖД и Московского метрополитена, в первые потеснив Аркадия Ротенберга с его 102,8 миллиарда рублей за 2014 год. А ведь Бокарев, в отличие от Ротенберга, не только не ходил с президентом в один клуб дзюдо, но даже и родом не из Петербурга, а из Москвы.

И это еще не все победы. В апреле структуры Бокарева и Махмудова выкупили 30% в угольной компании «Колмар» у нефтетрейдера «Гунвор». Гунвор до весны 2014 года принадлежал небезызвестному финну Геннадию Тимченко (еще одному другу Путина по клубу дзюдо) и шведу Торбьорну Торнквисту, причем Тимченко продал свою долю Торнквисту за день до вступления западных санкций в силу. Впрочем, сделки купли-продажи начались еще до санкций: в 2012 году Тимченко продал Бокареву и Махмудову 13% акций компании «Трансойл», и, как заявил источник «Коммерсанта», планируется расширение этого сотрудничества.

Почему вдруг друзья президента стали уступать свои активы и позиции в структуре госзаказов? По мнению одного из источников The Insider, хорошо знакомого с ближним кругом президента — главной причиной стали санкции, под которые попал ближний круг Владимира Путина после украинского кризиса: «Тимченко все происходящее очень не нравится, и он стремится избавляться от всего, что ему на самом деле не принадлежит» — прокомментировал он продажу доли в «Гунвор». Когда федеральное казначейство США приняло персональные санкции против ближнего круга Путина, оно исходило из того, что реальным бенефициаром их активов является сам президент. Так это или нет, но так как санкции персональные, то передача активов, позволяет вывести их из-под санкционных ограничений.

Еще одна важная деталь — вхождение в «ближний круг» подразумевает деликатные с точки зрения возможных последствий (то есть, санкций) обязательства, например, вложения в Крым. Андрей Бокарев уже отметился в Крыму: как заявил глава Крыма Сергей Аксенов, *Андрей Бокарев поддерживает крымский футбольный клуб «Таврия».*

#### **Просыпается мафия. Кто стоит за Бокаревым и Махмудовым**

Но почему именно Бокарев, чем он заслужил такое внимание и доверие? Возможно, все дело в его таланте и выдающихся способностях. Но есть и еще одна сторона жизни господина Бокарева, о которой мы узнаем сегодня из уголовного дела.

*Петров в разговорах называл главу СК Бастрыкина «Сашей» и часто пользовался частным самолетом «Славы» — депутата Госдумы Владислава Резника*

В начале июня Испанская прокуратура передала в суд обвинительное заключение по «делу русской мафии» ([имеется в распоряжении The Insider](#)), в рамках расследования которого в 2008 году были произведены аресты на Майорке «авторитетов» Геннадия Петрова и Александра Малышева. Всего обвиняемых 26 человек, а обвинительное заключение содержит 488 страниц. Среди обвиняемых, помимо Петрова и Малышева, значатся также и многоопытный депутат Госдумы Владислав Резник. Кроме того, **главный подозреваемый Геннадий Петров поддерживал, по версии следствия, прямые отношения с Анатолием Сердюковым, Виктором Зубковым, Германом Грефом, Александром Бастрыкиным, Леонидом Рейманом** и другими бывшими и действующими высокопоставленными чиновниками. В частности, согласно обвинительному заключению, Петров в разговорах называл главу СК Бастрыкина «Сашей» и часто пользовался частным самолетом «Славы» — депутата Госдумы Владислава Резника. Фигурантам дела вменяется создание преступного сообщества в Испании, действующего с 1996 года и обвиняемого среди прочего в «убийствах, избиениях и угрозах, торговле оружием, вымогательстве, мошенничестве, фальсификации документов, торговле связями с влиятельными людьми, подкупе, контрабанде, наркотрафике, преступлениях против государственной казны, мошенническом банкротстве предприятий». На 488 страницах перечислены испанские предприятия, имевшие отношение к делу, прослушки разговоров, приведены рукописные записки и схемы.

Главного фигуранта основного дела — Геннадия Петрова — подозревают в отмывании 24,5 миллионов евро, полученных от наркотрафика и других незаконных видов деятельности.

При обыске у Петрова были изъяты документы, содержащие информацию об операциях по отмыванию денег через компанию *Vera Metallurgica*, дочернюю структуру Уральской горно-металлургической компании (УГМК). УГМК сегодня считается главным активом Бокарева и Махмудова, но тогда, в первой половине 2000-х главными владельцами были Махмудов и Дерипаска, а Бокарев был лишь бенефициаром. Именно поэтому Бокареву и тут пока удается выйти сухим из воды. Следствие выделило в отдельное производство дело по отмыванию средств и там фигурируют и *Искандер Махмудов по кличке «Китаец»*, и хорошо известный в криминальном мире *Михаил Черный*, скрывающийся от «Интепола» в Израиле, и Олег Дерипаска (уже давший следствию показания и рассказавший о мафии, крышавшей

его бизнес), а вот Бокарев не упоминается (еще один повод ходить в белоснежном костюме победителя). Впрочем, следствие еще не закончено.

Материалы испанского следствия в отношении Махмудова были переданы в Россию в рамках международного следственного поручения в 2012 году. Из ответа на запрос «Трансперенси Интернейшл» [мы узнаем](#), что Следственный департамент МВД проводит «дальнейшее расследование» по статьям 174 и 210 УК РФ (легализация и отмывание средств и создание преступного сообщества), в отношении Махмудова, Дерипаски и «других лиц» (фамилию Бокарева они также не озвучивают), а сроки следствия постоянно продлеваются.

Но какое отношение связь Бокарева и Махмудова с авторитетом Петровым может быть иметь к попаданию в число приближенных? Все просто – сам Петров имеет долгие и тесные связи с «ближним кругом».

#### **Путин и Петров**

В 1992 году Геннадий Петров и Александр Малышев были арестованы в Петербурге в по обвинению в вымогательстве и создании преступного сообщества, но были выпущены, получив смехотворные сроки за ношение оружия, и уехали в Испанию. По свидетельству члена японской якудза (его имя – Киничи Камиясу есть в питерском деле Петрова-Малышева, копия имеется в распоряжении The Insider), фактически Петров и Малышев [контролировали](#) муниципальное казино «Нева-Шанс», учрежденное мэрией по адресу комитета Владимира Путина (по заявлениям Владимира Путина, деньги от казино должны были пойти «бедным людям», но ничего не получилось, поскольку казино работало с черным налом).

 Description: C6E7797-B5B0-42C7-8D5D-7E904757205F\_w600\_r1

#### *Геннадий Петров, Киничи Камиясу, Александр Малышев*

Как следует из этого же питерского дела Петрова-Малышева, а также [акта](#) проверки КРУ Минфина от 1996 года, структуры Петрова и Малышева при участии друга Владимира Путина шоумена Владимира Киселева (того самого, что не так давно оскандалился с подставным благотворительным фондом «Федерация») организовывали так называемые «Фестивали поп-музыки» в Петербурге в 1992—1994, получая финансирование через корпорацию «XX трест», а та, в свою очередь, — [из бюджета](#) Петербурга. Корпорация очень креативно использовала бюджетные средства, построив особняки и гостиницы в Аликанте и Торревьеха в Испании начале 90-х. Именно в Аликанте уехал Геннадий Петров в 1996 году и здесь же была зарегистрирована «Vera Metallurgica».

В обвинительное заключение попала прослушка разговора между Сергеем Кузьминым и Виктором Гавриленковым, в котором они обсуждают отели в Аликанте и «дом Путина неподалеку, в Торревьехе». Всего Путин упоминается в обвинительном заключении три раза.

В настоящее время Геннадий Петров, которого испанские власти отпустили из-под ареста «на лечение» несколько лет назад, надеясь, что он вернется, [проживает](#) в элитном доме на Каменном острове в Петербурге. Здесь же располагаются, например, квартиры экс-главы управделами президента *Владимира Кожина*, *Николая Шамалова* и *Виктора Мячина* (оба — члены кооператива «Озеро»). На имя его сына Антона Петрова зарегистрированы десятки компаний. Как говорят эксперты по питерскому криминалу, фактически это бизнес его отца, который все еще является крупным игроком в современном Петербурге.

 Description: treet\_1

*Дом на Каменном острове, в котором Петров живет вместе с членами кооператива «Озеро»*

По словам тех же экспертов по криминалу, Геннадий Петров якобы занял «правильную позицию» в поддержке властей в отличие от «тамбовского» авторитета Владимира Кумарина, который занял «непоследовательную позицию» и поэтому отправился в тюрьму. Эти слова подтверждаются данными из обвинительного заключения, где зафиксирована прослушка разговора Петрова с Леонидом Христофоровым от августа 2007 года:

*«26 августа 2007 года (в 15:25:42 часов) в разговоре между Леонидом Д. Христофоровым и Геннадием Петровым, последний говорит о том, что Игорь сообщил ему, что Кумарин-Барсуков был арестован по указанию царя (как полагает Испанская полиция, речь может идти о Владимире Путине)».*

Бывшему руководителю «Петербургской топливной компании» Кумарину (он же «ночной губернатор Петербурга»), находящемуся под стражей с 2007 года, в России предъявляют все новые и новые обвинения, вплоть до убийства Галины Старовойтовой.

Примечательно, что и Кумарина, и Петрова источники испанского правосудия называют людьми, сотрудничавшими с КГБ с конца 80-х годов.

#### **Инджмейкеры Кремля за рубежом**

Уголовное дело в Испании не мешает Искандру Махмудову и Андрею Бокареву выстраивать лоббистские связи во Франции. Их главный партнер в этой стране — французский миллиардер и владелец *Alstom Мартен Буиг*, купивший 25% акций «Трансмашхолдинга». Именно на верфях Alstom строились злополучные «Мистрали», которые никак не доплывут до России.

Другой общий бизнес Буига с Бокаревым-Махмудовым — Корпорация The Breakers Investment. Четверть акций этой компании принадлежит также РЖД, но Якунин (еще один член кооператива «Озеро») планирует продать их Буигу, доведя его долю до 50%.

Россия не единственная страна, с которой Буигу нравится работать. Он также занимается практически монопольным строительством в Туркменистане, где компания возвела дворец туркмен-баш и.

*Мартен Буиг, главный союзник Путина и туркмен-баша во Франции*

Еще одна важная деталь. Искандер Махмудов является партнером ассоциации «Франко-Российский диалог», возглавляемой *Владимиром Якуниным* и депутатом Национальной Ассамблеи Тьери Марьяни. За последний год она стала известна тем, что организовала лоббистские поездки французских депутатов в Москву и наоборот. Так, она организовала визит Сергея Нарышкина, теоретически находящегося под санкциями, в Париж несколько месяцев назад. На закрытой встрече с депутатами Национальной Ассамблеи и французскими бизнесменами (запись встречи имеется у The Insider) Нарышкин посетовал, что санкции являются «незаконными, поскольку нет решения суда», «нет решения ООН», и призвал французских депутатов помочь их отменить. «Поддержать наших российских друзей в непростой период» на Петербургский экономический форум недавно съездил Тьери Марьяни. Он известен заявлениями во Франции о том, что Россия имеет права на Крым и о необходимости развивать сотрудничество с Россией несмотря ни на что. Впрочем, такие заявления делает не только Марьяни, но и некоторые французские интеллектуалы, ранее отобедовавшие с Дерипаской. В свое время Дерипаске было отказано в проведении IPO Русала в Лондоне, и тогда он успешно сделал это в Париже, проведя серию лоббистских встреч.

*Владимир Якунин помогает Бокареву-Махмудову не только с госзаказами, но и с лоббированием кремлевских интересов во Франции*

Так совпало, что и в этой лоббистской деятельности Бокарев и Махмудов стали преемниками Геннадия Тимченко, в 2011 года избранного главой «Экономического совета российских и французских предприятий», с тем чтобы «улучшать имидж России во Франции». Еще до принятия санкций ставший кавалером ордена почетного легиона Тимченко собрался выступить перед французской общественностью, но в последний момент сослался на занятость. После принятия санкций стало очевидно, что Тимченко решил поменьше «светиться» во Франции, во всяком случае, его

адвокаты остановили усилия по подаче исков против критических публикаций во французской прессе. Имидж России с помощью Тимченко улучшить не удалось, но Кремль не отчаивается. Найдены новые «имиджмейкеры», например, Махмудов.

Что же касается перспектив уголовного дела в Испании, пока не понятно, кого именно удастся осудить. Так, Пабло Муньос в разговоре с The Insider выразил сомнение, что без проведения расследования в России возможно привлечение к ответственности главных действующих лиц, среди которых — и Махмудов по кличке «китаец». И уж тем более маловероятно, что в числе осужденных окажется его верный оруженосец, непобедимый Андрей Бокарев. Новые российские олигархи, потеснившие Роттенберга и Тимченко и ставшие главными операторами российских денег за рубежом, чувствуют себя прекрасно. Выражаясь словами завсегдатая бокаревских домашних вечеринок *Григория Лелса*, «моё небо — синее, в алмазах, что-то мне по жизни принесет».

*Анастасия Кириленко*

Chris

1. Alfa server in US as link to campaign

2. Million's Rus/Ame org in US until 2 wks ago used  
an Alfa server

3.

Per FBI: b6 3, b7A 1, b7C 3, b7D 1, b7E 3,4,7

4.

5.

6.

almost ready to talk on US re  
to monitor & stole.

7.

4) These show report

~~discuss~~ reporting on  
similar topics, as-

Members:

[Redacted]

- Had some stars & news  
was outdated (?)

Per FBI: b6 4, b7A 1, b7C 4, b7D 2  
[Redacted]

12/10/16

Met w. Glen Simpson @ 10:00 am at  
Peet's Coffee, 114th St NW

1. Glen gave me a memory stick.
2. He identified Michael Cohen, a lawyer in Brooklyn w. Russian (Brighton Beach) clients, as the go-between from Russia to the Trump campaign who replaced Manafort & Carter Page. Cohen's wife's name is Shusterman.

Per FBI: b6 4, b7C 4

[redacted] Cohen may have attended a meeting in Prague, possibly in September, about this.

3. ~~Peet~~ Much of the collection about the Trump campaign ties to Russia comes from [redacted]

Per FBI: b6 3, b7C 3

[redacted] Glen does not know this name.

4. A former Trump campaign official ~~Peet~~, possibly Rick Wilson, was talking about some of this and the Trump campaign tried to get him for violating his non-disclosure agreement.

(to mobster)

5. A Russian senator named Torshin, whose name came up in the Spanish money laundering investigation & who may also be involved in running the Central Bank of Russia, may have been involved in funneling Russian money to the NRA to use in the campaign. An NRA lawyer named [redacted] found out about the money pipeline and was very upset, but the election was over.

Per FBI: b6 4, b7C 4

There are pictures of Trump with Gen. Torshin. Torshin travels frequently to the US, to meet with the NRA (he is a Tibetan member) & ostensibly works to loosen the gun laws in Russia.

6. Some of Glen's ~~sources~~ people believe that the NRA received an abnormally large amount of money to spend in the election, possibly indicating Russian involvement, but others disagree.

7. The ~~After~~ New York Times story on Oct 31 ~~about~~ downplaying the connection between Alfa servers and the Trump campaign was incorrect. There was communication and it wasn't spam.

Per FBI: (b)(1) 1, (b)(3) 1, (b)(6) 3,4, (b)(7)(A) 1, (b)(7)(C) 3,4, (b)(7)(E) 3,4

8. Glen received a message ~~to~~ yesterday that the ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ He is not 410 whether to believe this.

9. He still thinks ~~the~~ Sergei Millien is a key figure connecting Trump to Russia. Looking at Millien led Glen & company to Michael Cohen. Glen would be surprised if Millien is still in the US. He believes Millien is an SR officer (although he is deducing this from Millien's behavior, not because he was told this) and that Millien may have overseen many transfers from Russia to assist the Trump campaign.



10. Glen asked Chas to speak to <sup>the</sup> Mother Jones reporter. It was Glen's first <sup>the</sup> attempt.

11. I asked Glen if he was concerned about his personal safety. He said he knew, from his 'Russian investigation, reporting ~~on~~ what they were capable of but figured there was no way for him to know if they were coming after him. He did mention that someone called & asked to help him to head out, when all the Alfa 300s were coming down. ~~He would see that~~  
~~that they were not in a position to~~  
~~take him in some way~~

- R & received by NARA  
c4 introduced

- Mr. Cohen <sup>Project</sup>
- Ride Wilson
- Torshin - Sea -  
shows up & L in in Spqun  
Cent Bank. NARA

Per FBI: (b)(1) 1, (b)(3) 1,  
(b)(6) 3, (b)(7)(A) 1, (b)(7)  
(C) 3, (b)(7)(E) 3,4

M. L. NARA -  
L. W. N  
Glenport (NARA)  
up to 2014

Per FBI: b6 4,  
b7C 4 NARA 2