

---

U.S. Department of Justice

# Drug Enforcement Administration

---

FY 2020  
Performance Budget  
Congressional Budget Submission





<b>I. Overview.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>II. Summary of Program Changes .....</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>III. Appropriations Language and Analysis of Appropriations Language.....</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>IV. Program Activity Justification.....</b>	<b>21</b>
A. International Enforcement.....	21
B. Domestic Enforcement.....	37
C. State and Local Assistance.....	61
D. High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas.....	67
E. Diversion Control .....	69
<b>V. Program Increases by Item</b>	
A. Combatting Transnational Criminal Organizations.....	83
B. Cyber Investigations.....	89
C. Heroin Enforcement Groups .....	97
<b>VI. Appendix</b>	
A. HIDTA .....	101
<b>VII. Exhibits</b>	
A. Organizational Chart	
B. Summary of Requirements	
C. FY 2020 Program Increases/Offsets by Decision Unit	
D. Resources by DOJ Strategic Goal/Objective	
E. Justification for Technical and Base Adjustments	
F. Crosswalk of 2018 Availability	
G. Crosswalk of 2019 Availability	
H. Summary of Reimbursable Resources	
I. Detail of Permanent Positions by Category	
J. Financial Analysis of Program Changes	
K. Summary of Requirements by Object Class	
L. Status of Congressionally Requested Studies, Reports, and Evaluations (not applicable)	
M. Senior Executive Service Reporting	
N. DCFA Cash Flow	



# **I. Overview for the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)**

---

## **Introduction**

Since its creation in 1973, DEA has evolved from a small, domestic-oriented law enforcement agency to a globally-recognized agency with nearly 9,000 onboard employees assigned to 226 domestic offices in 23 field divisions and 90 foreign offices in 69 countries. The mission of DEA is to enforce the controlled substances laws and regulations of the United States (U.S.) and bring to the criminal and civil justice system those organizations and principal members of organizations involved in the growing, manufacture, or distribution of controlled substances appearing in or destined for illicit traffic in the U.S. Additionally, DEA recommends and supports non-enforcement programs aimed at reducing the availability of illicit controlled substances on the domestic and international markets.

DEA personnel assigned to domestic and foreign offices focus their investigative efforts on Priority Target Organizations (PTOs). PTOs engage in the highest levels of drug trafficking and/or drug money laundering operations that significantly impact international, national, regional, or local drug availability. DEA focuses its resources on PTOs with and without a direct connection to a Consolidated Priority Organization Target (CPOT). A CPOT is the command and control element of a major international drug trafficking organization and/or money laundering enterprise that significantly impacts the U.S. drug supply.

Today's most significant drug trafficking organizations are the dangerous and highly sophisticated Mexican Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) that traffic drugs throughout the U.S. using established transportation routes and distribution networks. Mexican TCOs continue to be the principal suppliers of heroin, methamphetamine, cocaine, and marijuana to the U.S. Approximately thirty (30) of the 59 criminal targets on the FY 2018 Consolidated Priority Organization Target (CPOT) list (51 percent) are based in Mexico. Domestically, distribution cells have forged alliances with Mexican TCOs, resulting in an increasing threat to the safety and security of communities across the country. For example, TCOs have formed relationships with gangs, who in turn commit violent crimes and serve as retail-level drug distributors for TCOs, presenting a serious risk to public health and safety. It is estimated that there are over one million active gang members, comprising more than 33,000 gangs in the US, many of which provide distribution and/or transportation networks to drug cartels. DEA is uniquely positioned to target and dismantle these local distribution cells and the international drug trafficking organizations with whom they conspire.



The rise of heroin use, the misuse of prescription opioids, and most recently, the threat posed by fentanyl abuse, is collectively the biggest drug challenge we face today, as it impacts public health and safety in every part of America. As heroin use has increased, so have heroin-related overdose deaths – 15,482 people died in 2017 alone<sup>1</sup>. Between 2010 and 2017, the rate of heroin-related overdose deaths increased by almost 400%<sup>2</sup>. A contributing factor to increasing demand for heroin is prescription opioid abuse. Prescription drug abuse is the nation’s fastest-growing drug problem. According to the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) 2017 National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH), an estimated 6 million Americans aged 12 or older misused psychotherapeutic drugs at least once in the past month. Of the four categories of prescription drugs that are presented in this report, prescription pain relievers were the most commonly misused. There are more current misusers of psychotherapeutic drugs than current users of cocaine, heroin, and hallucinogens combined.<sup>3</sup>



*Lethal dose of fentanyl*

<sup>1</sup> Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2018). *Overdose Deaths Involving Opioids, Cocaine, and Psychostimulants-United States, 2016-2017*.

<sup>2</sup> Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2018). *Overdose Deaths Involving Opioids, Cocaine, and Psychostimulants-United States, 2016-2017*.

<sup>3</sup> Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. (2018). Key substance use and mental health indicators in the United States: Results from the 2017 National Survey on Drug Use and Health (HHS Publication No. SMA 17-5044, NSDUH Series H-52). Rockville, MD: Center for Behavioral Health Statistics and Quality, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. Retrieved from <https://www.samhsa.gov/data/>

The sharp increase in drug overdose deaths between 2015 to 2016 was fueled by a surge in fentanyl and fentanyl analogue (synthetic opioids) involved overdoses. Fentanyl is a Schedule II synthetic opioid approved for use as a painkiller and anesthetic. The drug's extremely strong opioid properties—both analgesic and euphoric—have made it an attractive drug of abuse for opioid users. Overdose deaths involving synthetic opioids other than methadone, which includes fentanyl, increased almost 47% from 2016 to 2017<sup>4</sup>. Roughly 28,400 people died from overdoses involving synthetic opioids other than methadone in 2017<sup>5</sup>. Additionally, according to the National Forensic Laboratory Information System (NFLIS), since January 2013 through December 2017, there were roughly 120,000 fentanyl exhibits identified by federal, state, and local forensic laboratories<sup>6</sup>. During 2016, there were 37,259 fentanyl reports compared to 1,043 reports in 2013, an exponential increase over those years.

**DEA ARRESTS ONE OF THE MOST PROLIFIC DARK WEB  
FENTANYL DISTRIBUTORS IN THE UNITED STATES**

In November 2016, DEA officials executed a search on a residence in Cottonwood Heights, Utah after investigating what was believed to be a fentanyl distribution operation manufacturing counterfeit fentanyl pills and other counterfeit medications. The search led to the seizure of \$1.2 million United States Currency (USC); \$2 million virtual currency (VC); 750 grams of fentanyl powder; 400 grams of alprazolam; approximately 200,000 counterfeit oxycodone pills containing fentanyl; approximately 100,000 counterfeit alprazolam pills; and four commercial-grade pill presses.

The distribution network operated by purchasing fentanyl and pill presses over the dark web from China and subsequently selling counterfeit pills containing fentanyl over the dark web. The sales were conducted over AlphaBay, which at the time was the largest dark web market. During this time, the suspect was widely considered by customers to be the number one seller of fentanyl containing pills on AlphaBay due to overwhelmingly positive customer feedback and the ability to ship drugs in bulk quantities. Customers would purchase fentanyl and other counterfeit pills using Bitcoin. The suspect used a close network of friends and associates in and around Salt Lake City to package and mail thousands of orders for customers across all 50 states.

<sup>4</sup> Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2018). *Overdose Deaths Involving Opioids, Cocaine, and Psychostimulants-United States, 2016-2017*.

<sup>5</sup> Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2018). *Overdose Deaths Involving Opioids, Cocaine, and Psychostimulants-United States, 2016-2017*.

<sup>6</sup> U.S. Department of Justice, DEA, NFLIS, actual data queried on October 13, 2017.




Since fentanyl and its analogues can be harmful to public safety personnel who encounter these substances during the course of their daily operations, it is critical they know how to protect themselves. DEA has assisted State and Local Law Enforcement through the publication of guidelines and alerts regarding heroin, fentanyl and its various analogs. This guidance includes:

- 2017- Fentanyl Briefing Guide to First Responders<sup>7</sup>: Provides guidance on how to respond to fentanyl, personal protection to reduce risk, exposure treatment, and remediation and decontamination recommendations; and,
- 2016 - Multiple alerts to Law Enforcement on fentanyl, carfentanil, and counterfeit prescription pills containing fentanyl.



*Fentanyl Response Team Hazmat Cleanup*

## Drug Threat Assessment



The National Drug Threat Assessment (NDTA), produced by DEA’s Intelligence Division, is an annual assessment that provides strategic drug-related intelligence needed to inform effective counterdrug policy, establish law enforcement priorities, and assist in making resource allocations. The NDTA provides a comprehensive, strategic assessment of the threat posed to our communities by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and the illicit drugs they distribute throughout the United States.

The 2018 NDTA is a comprehensive strategic assessment of the threat posed to the U.S. by the trafficking and abuse of illicit drugs. Over the past ten years, the drug landscape has shifted, with the U.S. now facing an opioid epidemic driven by the non-medical use of controlled prescription drugs, illicit fentanyl, and heroin. While the current opioid crisis has deservedly garnered significant attention, the methamphetamine threat has remained prevalent; the cocaine threat was in a state of steady decline, but early indicators suggest that it may be rebounding; new psychoactive substances (NPS) continue to be a challenge; and the focus of marijuana enforcement efforts continues to evolve.

Drug poisoning is the leading cause of injury death in the U.S. Drug poisoning deaths are currently at their highest ever recorded level and, every year since CY 2009 drug poisoning


---

<sup>7</sup> U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration. (2017). *Fentanyl Briefing Guide to First Responders*.



deaths have outnumbered deaths by firearms, motor vehicle crashes, suicide, and homicide.<sup>8</sup> In 2017, drug overdoses killed 70,237 Americans, with 47,600 of those deaths involving opioids.<sup>9</sup> The age-adjusted rate of drug overdose deaths rose in 2017 at 9.6 percent higher than the rate in 2016.<sup>10</sup>

Age-adjusted overdose death rates, by state: United States, 2017



## NDTA Findings

**Fentanyl and Other Synthetic Opioids:** Illicit fentanyl and other synthetic opioids, primarily sourced from China and Mexico, are now the most lethal category of opioids used in the United States. Traffickers—wittingly or unwittingly—are increasingly selling fentanyl to users without mixing it with any other controlled substances and are also increasingly selling fentanyl in the form of counterfeit prescription pills. Fentanyl suppliers will continue to experiment with new fentanyl-related substances and adjust supplies in attempts to circumvent new regulations imposed by the United States, China, and Mexico.

**Controlled Prescription Drugs (CPDs):** CPDs are still responsible for the most drug-involved overdose deaths and are the second most commonly abused substance in the United States. As CPD abuse has increased significantly, traffickers are now disguising other opioids as CPDs in attempts to gain access to new users. Most individuals who report misuse of prescription pain relievers cite physical pain as the most common reason for abuse; these misused pain relievers are most frequently obtained from a friend or relative.

<sup>8</sup> Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2018). *Overdose Deaths Involving Opioids, Cocaine, and Psychostimulants-United States, 2015-2016*.

<sup>9</sup> Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2018). *Overdose Deaths Involving Opioids, Cocaine, and Psychostimulants-United States, 2016-2017*.

<sup>10</sup> Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2018). *Provisional Drug Overdose Death Counts*.

**Heroin:** The use and availability of heroin continues to increase in the United States; as well as the occurrence of heroin mixed with fentanyl. Mexico remains the primary source of heroin available in the U.S. according to all available sources of intelligence. Further, significant increases in opium poppy cultivation and heroin production in Mexico allow Mexican TCOs to supply high-purity, low-cost heroin, even as U.S. demand has continued to increase.

**Mexican Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs):** Mexican TCOs remain the greatest criminal drug threat to the United States; no other group is currently positioned to challenge them. Although 2017 drug-related murders in Mexico surpassed previous levels of violence, U.S.-based Mexican TCO members generally refrain from extending inter-cartel conflicts domestically.

**Illicit Finance:** TCOs' primary methods for laundering illicit proceeds have largely remained the same over the past several years. However, the amount of bulk cash seized has been steadily decreasing. This is a possible indication of TCOs' increasing reliance on innovative money laundering methods. Virtual currencies, such as Bitcoin, are becoming increasingly mainstream and offer traffickers a relatively secure method for moving illicit proceeds around the world with much less risk compared to traditional methods.

**Cocaine:** Cocaine availability and use in the United States have rebounded, in large part due to the significant increases in coca cultivation and cocaine production in Colombia. As a result, past-year cocaine initiates and cocaine-involved overdose deaths are exceeding 2007 benchmark levels. Simultaneously, the increasing presence of fentanyl in the cocaine supply, likely related to the ongoing opioid crisis, is exacerbating the re-merging cocaine threat.

**Methamphetamine:** Methamphetamine remains a prevalent threat, with most of the methamphetamine available in the U.S. being produced in Mexico and smuggled across the Southwest Border (SWB). Domestic production continues to occur at much lower levels than in Mexico, and seizures of domestic methamphetamine laboratories have declined.

## **Core Functions & Strategies**

### **Enforcement Strategy**

To accomplish its mission, DEA focuses its investigations on CPOTs and PTOs, which are the most significant international and domestic drug trafficking and money laundering organizations.<sup>11</sup>

Consistent with the FY 2018- FY 2022 DOJ Strategic Plan, DEA's current long-term outcome goal is to dismantle<sup>12</sup> 420 and disrupt<sup>13</sup> 535 CPOT-linked drug trafficking organizations.


---

<sup>11</sup> PTOs are identified by DEA Special Agents in Charge (SACs) and Regional Directors.

<sup>12</sup> Dismantlement occurs when the organization's leadership, financial base, and supply network are destroyed, such that the organization is incapable of operating and/or reconstituting itself

DEA’s coordinated enforcement and intelligence efforts with federal, state, local, and international partners are resulting in the largest and most dangerous drug trafficking organizations being put out of commission. For example:

- Through the 4<sup>th</sup> quarter of FY 2018, DEA disrupted or dismantled 1,547 domestic and foreign priority targets, of which 163 were linked to CPOT organizations.
- Through the 4<sup>th</sup> quarter FY 2018, 27 of the 49 CPOTs identified on the FY 2018 CPOT list (55 %) had been indicted. In addition, 9 (18 %) of the 49 CPOTs have been arrested.
- The culmination of DEA’s participation in the CPOT initiative through FY 2018 has led to 171 indictments, 134 arrests, and the extradition of 75 of the 234 CPOTs on the CPOT list between FY 2003-FY 2018.



<sup>13</sup> Disruption occurs when the normal and effective operation of a targeted organization is impeded, as indicated by changes in organizational leadership and/or changes in methods of operation, including financing, trafficking patterns, communications, or drug production.

## Data-driven Decision Making

In FY 2017, DEA implemented the Threat Enforcement Planning Process (TEPP), an exploratory drug control strategy, to identify the biggest threats in each division and ensure that the field offices have the necessary resources allocated to mitigate those threats. DEA is making analytical tools available for investigative use, which has helped to better identify doctors and pharmacies of operational interest and understand the cause of the backlog for laboratory analysis. DEA believes that data analysis is a critical aspect of good decision making and will continue to find ways to incorporate it into identifying problems and finding solutions.

Additionally, DEA created the *Staffing Allocation Model (SAM)* that helps to align agent resources to offices based on the risk profile of an area. The model developed a risk profile of offices based on data from the 40 external and internal variables (e.g., drug deaths, violent crime, and drug seizure data) determined to be the most important by the Special Agents in Charge. This model helped identifying the best locations to place new Heroin Enforcement Teams (6 in FY 2017; 3 in FY 2018; and 8 in FY 2019 - proposed).

## Special Operations Division



DEA has relied on the implementation of strategies and the fostering of key partnerships over the course of its 45-year history. Established in 1994, the Special Operations Division (SOD) is a DEA-led, multi-agency operational coordination center with participation from 31 law enforcement agencies, including foreign participation from the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada. Emphasis is placed on major drug trafficking and terrorist organizations financed by drug profits,

which operate across jurisdictional boundaries on a regional, national, and international level. On February 9, 2017, an Executive Order 13773 on Enforcing Federal Law with Respect to TCOs and Preventing International Trafficking. The DOJ and other Federal partners are developing a government-wide TCO strategy. As part of the strategy, SOD is seen as a leading DEA entity to address TCOs.

## DEA 360 Strategy

In combating the heroin and prescription opioid epidemic, DEA recognizes that law enforcement action alone is not enough and has rolled out its 360 Strategy. This new initiative involves coordinated law enforcement, diversion control, and community outreach efforts to tackle the cycle of violence and addiction



**OPERATION  
PREVENTION**



*DEA Community Outreach Efforts*


generated by the link between drug cartels, violent gangs, and the growing problem of prescription opioid and heroin abuse in U.S. cities. In 2016, DEA implemented its 360 Strategy in four cities: Louisville, KY; Milwaukee, WI; St. Louis, MO; and Pittsburgh, PA. In 2017, DEA expanded the strategy to another four cities: Dayton, OH; Albuquerque, NM; Charleston, WV; and Manchester, NH. In 2018, DEA again expanded this program to another six cities: Salt Lake City, UT; Camden, NJ; Newark, NJ; Philadelphia, PA; Knoxville, TN; and Baltimore, MD.<sup>14</sup> As of February 2019, DEA plans to add six new pilot cities in 2019 for a total of 20 cities: New Orleans, LA; Cleveland/Toledo, OH; Los Angeles, CA; New Bedford/South Boston, MA; Phoenix/Flagstaff, AZ; and Tampa, FL. Of the six DEA 360 cities, only Los Angeles has rolled out publicly to-date. The next two cities are scheduled to roll out publicly in mid-April. As part of the 360 Strategy, DEA recently partnered with Discovery Education, a division of Discovery Communications, to develop and distribute a prescription opioid and heroin education curriculum to middle and high school students, their teachers, and parents. *Operation Prevention* has been deployed at no cost to schools nationwide.

Key *Operation Prevention* statistics, as of September 30, 2018:

- More than 50,000 downloads of the lesson plans to educate more than 3,000,000 students
- More than 35,000 views of the Virtual Field Trip to educate more than 1,300,000 students
- DEA awarded the Cynopsis Social Good Awards for Best Health & Wellness Initiative for the *Operation Prevention* initiative

## Medication Disposal

Since 2010, DEA has held its National Drug “Take Back” Initiative (NTBI) to provide a convenient and safe option to dispose of unused, expired, and/or unwanted prescription drugs. The sixteenth, and most recent, National Drug Take Back Day was conducted on October 27, 2018 where DEA collected more than 914,236 pounds (457.12 tons) of medications from more than 5,800 collection sites. As a result of the 16<sup>th</sup> National Take Back Day, DEA, in conjunction with its state, local, and tribal law enforcement



<sup>14</sup> Robert W. Patterson. *Statement before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Committee on Energy and Commerce U.S. House of Representatives for a Hearing Entitled the Drug Enforcement Administration’s Role in Combating the Opioid Epidemic Presented March 20, 2018. Retrieved June 20, 2018* <https://www.dea.gov/pr/speeches-testimony/2018t/032018t.pdf>.

partners, has removed over ten million pounds (5,439.5 tons) of medications from circulation.

### **Diversion Control Program**

DEA's Diversion Control Division (DC) is responsible for enforcing the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) and its regulations pertaining to pharmaceutical controlled substances and listed chemicals while ensuring adequate and uninterrupted supply of controlled substances and chemicals to meet legitimate medical, scientific, and industrial needs without creating an oversupply. The deployment of Tactical Diversion Squads (TDSs) is the primary method of criminal law enforcement in the DC. These TDSs incorporate the enforcement, investigative, and regulatory skill sets of DEA Special Agents, Diversion Investigators, other federal law enforcement, and state and local Task Force Officers. Through the 4<sup>th</sup> quarter FY 2018, DEA had 79 fully operational TDSs throughout the U.S., covering 44 states, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia. Since their initial deployment, TDS groups have initiated an average of more than 1,500 cases per year and made an average of more than 2,000 arrests per year. In addition, DEA established two mobile TDS groups that can deploy quickly to "hot spots" in furtherance of the Diversion Control Program's mission.

### **Office of National Security Intelligence**


DEA shares intelligence as appropriate at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels to federal, state, local, and international partners. DEA is represented in the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) through the Office of National Security Intelligence (ONSI), which facilitates intelligence integration, coordination, and information sharing with other members of the IC and national security elements. ONSI ensures that national security information obtained by DEA during the execution of its worldwide drug law enforcement mission is expeditiously shared with both the national security and intelligence communities. On average, ONSI shares more than 5,000 such reports a year. These reports contain information on topics such as foreign intelligence, international organized crime, international drug trafficking organizations, and terrorism.



### **FY 2020 Budget Request**

DEA's FY 2020 budget request totals \$2,976,295,000. This request includes \$443,142,000 derived from the Diversion Control Fee Account (DCFA). Starting in FY 2020, DEA will oversee the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) Program with an estimated budget of \$254,000,000, which is being transferred from the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). Additionally, DEA anticipates receiving an estimated \$449,944,000 from other agencies via reimbursable agreements and sub allotment for the Asset Forfeiture Fund (AFF) and Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) funding. DEA anticipates that \$2,976 million will support 8,967 positions and 7,865 FTE during FY 2020. The following table summarizes DEA's FY 2014 to FY 2020 funding levels by source.





\* Starting in FY 2019, OCDETF will be moved to a sub allotment within Unified Financial Management System and no longer be included in DEA's reimbursable resources. AFF was moved to a sub allotment in FY 2018.

## Maintaining Current Services

**Salaries and Expenses (S&E) Account:** The \$53,844,000 in base adjustments includes funding for changes in compensable days, the employee compensation fund, retirement costs, rent, security investigations, and charges for positions stationed outside of the U.S. This also includes funding for the relocation of DEA's Special Operations Division and annualization of 2018 positions.

**Diversion Control Fee Account (DCFA):** The \$22,439,000 in base adjustments includes funding for changes in compensable days, FERS rate increase, retirement costs, rent, security investigations, and charges for positions stationed outside of the U.S. This also includes funding for the relocation of DEA's Special Operations Division and annualization of 2018 positions.

**High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA):** In FY 2020, \$254,000,000 in HIDTA funds will transfer from the ONDCP to DEA. While the FY 2018 omnibus provided \$280,000,000 for the program, current services will be reflected at the FY 2019 President's Budget level of \$254,000,000.

## Program Improvements


DEA's FY 2020 program increases directly support several Presidential Executive Orders and Attorney General Priorities and will provide DEA resources to build upon past success and to continue to address the scourge of heroin and controlled prescription drug abuse. Enhancement requests include the following:



1. **Combatting Transnational Criminal Organizations:** provides \$11,650 thousand to enhance vital agency programs focused on targeting, disrupting, and dismantling Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) known for supplying illicit substances to distributors and users in the U.S.
2. **Cyber Investigations:** \$11,722 thousand to bolster key DEA programs to combat highly sophisticated TCOs that use cyber capabilities to further their criminal enterprises.
3. **Heroin Enforcement Groups:** \$11,140 thousand to establish five new heroin enforcement groups in DEA Field Divisions identifying heroin as one of the top drug threats.

## **Full Program Costs**

The following chart reflects all FY 2020 DEA resources including the S&E Account, Reimbursables, Sub-allotments, the DCFA, and HIDTA.



In FY 2020, DEA will assume responsibility and oversight of the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) Program. Currently, DEA participates in and coordinates with 24 HIDTAs. Transferring the administration of the program has several advantages. Under DEA leadership, the program will better leverage existing relationships between DEA and state, local, and tribal counterparts. HIDTA resources will be focused on combatting drug trafficking in areas where the threat is the greatest, more closely dovetailing with DEA’s existing and future enforcement efforts. Additionally, this coordination will enable federal-funded drug enforcement efforts to better target priority drug trafficking organizations including DOJ CPOTs.

The activities and initiatives in each of DEA's programs play a crucial role in accomplishing DEA's overall strategy. Some programs, as well as management and administration costs, cross decision units. Both performance and resource tables within each decision unit justification define the total costs of achieving the strategies DEA will continue in FY 2020.

## **Performance Challenges**

Each of the following challenges directly impacts DEA's ability to: Identify threats and targets; initiate and sustain investigations; nominate and elevate those investigations to Priority Target (PTO) status; link those investigations to TCOs, CPOTs or RPOTs; and, validate and affirm the successful Disruption or Dismantlement of those PTOs (CPOT-linked and Not CPOT-linked).

### **International**

- Corruption of foreign officials can stymie DEA's efforts to affect international enforcement. Some developing nations also face a number of problems that lead to instability in conjunction with drug production and trafficking.
- DEA cannot unilaterally investigate and arrest high-level drug traffickers overseas, so DEA's success is reliant upon host nation law enforcement cooperation to include intelligence sharing and participation.
- Specific countries currently lack self-sustaining counternarcotics police institutions and effective criminal justice systems to adequately address counterdrug efforts.

### **Domestic**

- Continued high levels of heroin abuse continue to put a strain on DEA resources, particularly in terms of the need for additional enforcement, outreach and education efforts; inclusive of DEA's 360 Strategy.
- The rapid pace of new technology, anonymous use of this technology, and the lack of authentication are challenges collectively referred to as "Going Dark." This problem also involves DEA's loss of lawful intercept capabilities for encrypted data "in motion" over electronic networks, but also "at rest" on an electronic device or in the cloud. "Going Dark" impacts DEA's ability to investigate crimes and collect evidence on the operations of drug trafficking organizations and their members.
- Increased use of the dark web and cryptocurrencies challenges DEA's ability to identify and intercept the distribution of illegal narcotics, and affiliated money laundering. This challenge is not unique to DEA as it also hinders the enforcement efforts of federal, state and local Law Enforcement Officers (LEOs), as well as investigations initiated by our foreign counterparts.

## **State and Local Assistance**

- The Office of Training's (TR) quarterly and overall projections were estimated under the assumption that TR's Clan Lab Training Unit would be staffed at full capacity as in previous years. However, since the Clan Lab Training Unit was reduced from eight Special Agents to five, the reduction in staff resulted in reduced State and Local Clan Lab training. Hence, the challenge for DEA is to increase staffing in this area as resources become available. Similarly, due to budgetary impacts at the state and local level, there is an ancillary challenge at that level to support or allow their LEOs to attend DEA's training opportunities. *Performance Measure: State and local law enforcement officers trained in Clandestine Laboratory Enforcement.*

## **Diversion Control**

- The proliferation of synthetic drugs requires additional analytical resources in order to accurately identify and schedule the compounds.
- Continued high levels of heroin abuse continue to put a strain on Department resources, particularly in terms of the need for additional outreach and education.
- Increased diversion of pharmaceutical drugs creates a challenge for enforcement and investigation efforts that lead to successful prosecutions, as the process is extremely labor intensive, time-consuming, technical, document intensive and heavily dependent upon access to or the recruitment of scientific subject matter experts.

## **Environmental Accountability**

DEA maintains and manages the internal Environmental Stewardship Awards Program, awarding two DEA facilities with the DEA Environmental Stewardship Award; two DEA facilities with the Environmental Management System Award; and, one individual with the DEA Environmental Champion Award. DEA continued to promote the DEA Electronics Stewardship Awards program. 2018 was the fourth year for the Awards program. Six awards were presented to DEA facilities across the country: five Platinum Awards and one Silver Award.

At the regional and national level, DEA offices also received awards. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) awarded two DEA facilities with National Federal Green Challenge Awards. The El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) received an award for reducing the amount of paper they purchased by 53 per cent. Southeast Laboratory received an award for reducing their potable water use by 69 per cent. EPA Region 6 also awarded three Federal Green Challenge awards to EPIC for Electronics, Highest Materials Managed, and Education and Outreach. Overall, eight DEA facilities were awarded with national Electronic Product Environmental Assessment Tool (EPEAT) Purchaser Awards.

In August 2018, DEA completed the implementation of an Energy Savings Performance Contract (ESPC) featuring a 2.4 Megawatt (MW) solar photovoltaic (PV) system at EPIC. The PV system produces 85 percent of EPIC's electricity usage, and increases the amount of

renewable energy DEA's claims on its agency-wide sustainability report mandated by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and Executive Order 13834 The PV system also supports energy security and resiliency, which is critical to the around-the-clock operations at EPIC that support DEA's overall mission. The PV system expects to produce about 4.5 million-kilowatt hours (kWh) per year, or \$314,000 in energy costs that would be paid to U.S. Army Fort Bliss for conventional electricity. EPIC received lighting and water upgrades, which saved approximately \$27,000 in utility costs per year as part of the overall ESPC.

DEA is initiating its first Utility Energy Services Contract (UESC) at the Southeast Laboratory in Miami, Florida. The project will be undergoing a preliminary assessment of potential energy efficiency and renewable energy measures in January 2019.

DEA continues to see water savings from previous upgrades of a deionized water system at the Southeast Laboratory in Miami, Florida. The modification allowed the system to recirculate water that reduces the overall water consumption. Overall, water usage has dropped by over 69 percent and resulted in cost savings of over \$6,000 per year. The laboratory saved 656,744 gallons in FY 2017 compared to FY 2016, and an additional 84,524 gallons in FY 2018, for a total savings of 741,268 gallons in two years. In recognition of these accomplishments, EPA awarded Southeast Laboratory the National Federal Green Challenge Award. DEA's is now assessing whether similar measures can be accomplished throughout the lab system.

**This page intentionally left blank**

## II. Summary of Program Changes

---

Item Name	Description	Pos.	FTE	Dollars (\$000)	Page
<b>Combatting Transnational Criminal Organizations</b>	To enhance vital agency programs focused on targeting, disrupting, and dismantling Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) known for supplying illicit substances to distributors and users in the U.S.	-	-	\$11,650	85
<b>Cyber Investigations</b>	To bolster key DEA programs to combat highly sophisticated TCOs that use cyber capabilities to further their criminal enterprises.	44	22	\$11,722	91
<b>Heroin Enforcement Groups</b>	To establish five new heroin enforcement groups in DEA Field Divisions identifying heroin/opioids as one of the top drug threats.	49	25	\$11,140	99

**This page intentionally left blank**



### III. Appropriations Language and Analysis of Appropriations Language

#### Appropriations Language

##### **SALARIES AND EXPENSES**

*For necessary expenses of the Drug Enforcement Administration, including not to exceed \$70,000 to meet unforeseen emergencies of a confidential character pursuant to Section 530C of title 28 USC; and expenses for conducting drug education and training programs, including travel and related expenses for participants in such programs and the distribution of items of token value that promote the goals of such programs, [\$2,102,976,000] \$2,279,153,000; of which not to exceed \$75,000,000 shall remain available until expended and not to exceed \$90,000 shall be available for official reception and representation expenses.*

##### **HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AREAS PROGRAM**

*For necessary expenses of the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas Program, authorized by [21 U.S.C. 1706] the Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 1998, as amended through Public Law 115–271 ("the Act"), \$254,000,000, to remain available until September 30, [2020] 2021, for drug control activities consistent with the approved strategy for each of the designated High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas ("HIDTAs"), of which not less than 51 percent shall be transferred to State and local entities for drug control activities and shall be obligated not later than 120 days after enactment of this Act: Provided, That up to 49 percent may be transferred to Federal agencies and departments in amounts determined by the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, of which up to \$2,700,000 may be used for auditing services and associated activities: Provided further, That, notwithstanding the requirements of Public Law 106–58, any unexpended funds obligated prior to fiscal year 2017 may be used for any other approved activities of that HIDTA, subject to reprogramming requirements: Provided further, That upon a determination that all or part of the funds so transferred from this appropriation are not necessary for the purposes provided herein, such amounts may be transferred back to this appropriation: Provided further, That section 707 of the Act shall be applied by substituting "Attorney General" for "Director" each place it appears: Provided further, That unexpended balances in the "High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas Program, Federal Drug Control Programs, Executive Office of the President" account may be transferred to this appropriation.*

*Note.—A full-year 2019 appropriation for this account was not enacted at the time the budget was prepared; therefore, the budget assumes this account is operating under the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2019 (Division C of P.L. 115–245, as amended). The amounts included for 2019 reflect the annualized level provided by the continuing resolution.*

#### Analysis of Appropriations Language

- No significant changes are proposed for DEA's Salaries and Expenses (S&E) Account.
- Language is added to transfer management of HIDTA from ONDCP to DEA.

**This page intentionally left blank**

## IV. Program Activity Justification

### A. International Enforcement

<i>International Enforcement</i>	<b>Direct Pos.</b>	<b>Estimate FTE</b>	<b>Amount</b>
2018 Enacted	929	883	\$469,558
2019 Continuing Resolution	929	883	\$469,558
Adjustments to Base and Technical Adjustments	-	-	\$14,985
2020 Current Services	929	883	\$484,543
2020 Program Increases	-	-	\$11,650
2020 Program Offsets	-	-	\$-
2020 Request	929	883	\$496,193
<b>Total Change 2019-2020</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>\$26,635</b>

\* This table only displays DEA's S&E resources. Dollars are in thousands.

<i>International -Information Technology Breakout (of Decision Unit Total)</i>	<b>Estimate FTE</b>	<b>Amount</b>
2018 Enacted	10	\$21,373
2019 Continuing Resolution	11	\$20,256
Adjustments to Base and Technical Adjustments	-	-\$37
2020 Current Services	11	\$20,219
2020 Request	11	\$20,219
<b>Total Change 2019-2020</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>-\$37</b>

#### 1. Program Description

DEA has the primary responsibility of enforcing the controlled substances laws and regulations of the U.S. All cocaine, heroin, and most dangerous drugs, to include synthetic opioids like fentanyl, are produced in source countries and smuggled into the U.S. For that reason, reducing the illicit drug availability in the U.S. requires an aggressive international counternarcotic approach. However, DEA cannot unilaterally investigate and arrest high-level drug traffickers operating overseas; therefore, host nation collaboration is vital. As such, DEA personnel deployed to foreign offices exchange valuable intelligence and conduct complex bilateral operations with host nation counterparts. DEA personnel also engage and assist their host nation counterparts during the development of new foreign legislation, treaties, and agreements designed to combat drug trafficking, money laundering, and the diversion of precursor chemicals.

DEA deploys its resources to the highest priority overseas locations to maximize the impact on the global narcotics trade. DEA's global footprint is organized into eight DEA foreign regions which include 90 offices in 69 countries (*Figure 1*). Of particular interest are the regions of

Mexico and Central America. DEA maintains the largest U.S. federal law enforcement presence in Mexico with 11 offices and over 100 authorized personnel. DEA places special emphasis on Mexican Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) because they continue to dominate the trafficking of heroin, methamphetamine, cocaine, marijuana, and, to a lesser extent, fentanyl. Additionally, Mexican TCOs are constantly looking to expand their U.S. presence, particularly in heroin markets.

Key programs and activities funded by the International Enforcement Decision Unit as well as relevant performance measures are discussed below.

### ***Priority Targeting Program***

DEA personnel assigned to foreign offices focus their investigative efforts on Priority Target Organizations (PTOs). PTOs are TCOs that engage in the highest levels of drug trafficking and/or drug money laundering operations that impact international, national, regional, or local drug availability. DEA focuses its resources on PTOs with and without a direct connection to a Consolidated Priority Organization Target (CPOT). The disruption or dismantlement of CPOT-linked organizations is accomplished through bilateral investigations with host nation counterparts as well as multi-agency coordination.

### ***Drug Flow Attack Strategy***

In order to disrupt the flow of drugs, money, and precursor chemicals into the U.S., DEA developed the Drug Flow Attack Strategy (DFAS) and its enforcement arm, *Operation All Inclusive*, in FY 2006. This strategy includes a specific focus on intelligence-driven enforcement, sequential operations, and predictive intelligence. The Southwest Border is an integral part of the DFAS as most illicit drugs smuggled into the U.S. enter through this border. Through the DFAS, DEA and other interagency components attack the operational vulnerabilities of TCOs to eliminate the source of a drug.

### ***Sensitive Investigative Units (SIUs)***

DEA's Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) Program began in 1996 with a \$20 million budget and four participating countries- Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. During the past 22 years, the program has successfully developed and maintained foreign law enforcement units capable of conducting investigations targeting TCOs. By FY 2020, DEA will manage 15 SIUs with a combined staffing capacity of approximately 1,290 host nation law enforcement officials. SIU members are polygraphed, trained, equipped, and mentored by DEA. To date, SIUs are currently located in the following countries: Afghanistan, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Thailand. As planned in FY 2019, the El Salvador Vetted Unit will be converted to a SIU.



*On May 17, 2017, members of the Ecuador SIU boarded a Panamanian merchant ship and discovered 5 tons of cocaine in a hidden compartment. The Ecuador SIU K-9 was an instrumental partner during the search.*

### ***International Training Program***

DEA's International Training Program, with funding from the Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) and the Department of Defense (DoD), serves as a model for a variety of international law enforcement training efforts. DEA's International Training Program offers both in-country and regional training programs conducted by four mobile training teams. In-country programs are conducted for participants from a specific country; whereas, regional training is offered for participants from a number of countries sharing common drug trafficking issues. DEA continually develops new curricula and modifies courses in response to various factors to include evolving international narcotics trafficking routes, new technologies, and requests from host nation governments.

**This page intentionally left blank**

Figure 1

# DEA Foreign Offices

U.S. Department of Justice  
Drug Enforcement Administration





**This page intentionally left blank**

## **International Enforcement Decision Unit Performance Measures**

### ***Priority Targeting Program***

DEA's international investigative efforts focus primarily on CPOT-linked PTOs. The objective is to permanently dismantle these organizations so the source of the drug is eliminated.

The first two drug enforcement-related output performance measures displayed on the Performance and Resources Table relate to DEA's flagship Priority Targeting Program and are the following:

- PTOs Linked to CPOT Targets Disrupted or Dismantled
- PTOs Not Linked to CPOT Targets Disrupted or Dismantled

### ***International Training***

The effectiveness of DEA's international enforcement efforts is also measured by the number of DEA-sponsored international training courses conducted and participants trained. The third drug enforcement-related output performance measure displayed on the Performance and Resources Table is the following:

- Number of International Students Trained

### ***Drug Trafficker Revenue Denied***

DEA's current long-term objective is to maximize the Monetary Value of Currency, Property and Drugs Seized (Drug Trafficker Revenue Denied) to meet the challenge of dismantling drug cartels so they are unable to reconstitute their operations with new leadership. Drug Trafficker Revenue Denied reflects the outcome of activities scored to DEA's International, Domestic, and State and Local Decision Units.

The fourth drug enforcement-related outcome performance measure displayed on the Performance and Resources Table is the following:

- Monetary Value of Currency, Property, and Drugs Seized (Drug Trafficker Revenue Denied)

**This page intentionally left blank**

**PERFORMANCE AND RESOURCES TABLE**

**Decision Unit: International Enforcement**

RESOURCES			Target	Actual	Target	Changes	Requested (Total)					
			FY 2018	FY 2018	FY 2019	Current Services Adjustments and FY 2020 Program Changes	FY 2020 Request					
Active PTOs Linked to CPOTs			80	114	85	-	85					
Active PTOs Not Linked to CPOTs			265	454	270	-	270					
Total Costs and FTE			FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000		
(reimbursable FTE are included, but reimbursable costs are bracketed and not included in the total)			891	\$469,558 [\$23,228]	891	\$469,558 [\$23,228]	891	\$469,558 [\$19,151]	(3)	\$26,635 [\$0]	891	\$496,193 [\$19,151]
TYPE	STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE	PERFORMANCE	FY 2018	FY 2018	FY 2019	Current Services Adjustments and FY 2020 Program Changes	FY 2020 Request					
			FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000		
Program Activity		<b>International Enforcement**</b>	891	\$469,558 [\$23,228]	891	\$469,558 [\$23,228]	891	\$469,558 [\$19,151]	(3)	\$26,635 [\$0]	891	\$496,193 [\$19,151]
Performance Measure: Output	3.2	PTOs Linked to CPOTs Disrupted or Dismantled <sup>1</sup>	13/11	20/11	18/12	-	19/13					
Performance Measure: Output	3.2	PTOs Not Linked to CPOTs Disrupted or Dismantled <sup>1</sup>	99/62	98/49	105/54	-	107/55					
Performance Measure: Output	3.2	Number of International Students Trained	2,300	2,635	2,300	-	2,300					
Performance Measure: Outcome	3.2	Monetary Value of Currency, Property and Drugs Seized (Drug Trafficker Revenue Denied)	\$3.0 Billion	\$5.1 Billion	\$3.3 Billion	-	\$3.3 Billion					

\*\*See Performance/Resources Table 2 for footnotes.

**Data Definition:** Disruption means impeding the normal and effective operation of the targeted organization, as indicated by changes in organizational leadership and/or changes in methods of operation, including, for example, financing, trafficking patterns, communications or drug production. Dismantlement means destroying the organization's leadership, financial base and supply network such that the organization is incapable of operating and/or reconstituting itself.

**Data Validation and Verification:** PTARRS provides a means of electronically validating and verifying PTO data through the following approval chain:

- \* Case Agent - Through PTARRS, the Special Agent (SA) or Diversion Investigator (DI) begins the process by creating and proposing a PTO.
- \* Group Supervisor (GS) – The GS reviews the PTO proposed by the SA/DI and approves it or sends it back to the SA/DI for additional information/clarification.
- \* Country Attache (CA) - The CA reviews the PTO approved by the GS. If all of the necessary information included in the proposal meets the established criteria for a PTO, the CA approves the PTO.
- \* Regional Director - The Regional Director reviews the PTO approved by the CA and provides a case assessment for, or against, the nomination of the PTO. Once nominated by the Regional Director, PTARRS generates and saves a unique identification number for the nominated PTO.
- \* Headquarters – At Headquarters, PTOs nominated by the Regional Directors are assigned to the appropriate section within DEA's Office of Global Enforcement (OE). Once assigned, the corresponding OE Staff Coordinator validates all information reported on the PTO nomination. The validation process includes a review of the PTO nomination for completeness, compliance with established criteria, and confirmation of all related case linkages, including links to CPOTs. Staff Coordinators coordinate with DEA's Special Operations Division and Intelligence Division to ensure that available facts exist to support all case linkages. In the unlikely event the documentation submitted is insufficient to validate the reported links, the Staff Coordinator will coordinate with the submitting GS to obtain the required information.

**Data Limitations:** DEA is currently improving reporting systems that capture investigative work hours and cost data. DEA also has an ongoing initiative, the Managerial Cost Accounting project, that will eventually allow the agency to capture actual full costs of investigating, disrupting, and dismantling PTOs. All statistics are limited by inherent data problems between case files and enforcement outputs (e.g. arrest, seizure, and work hour data). The link between these files are impacted by inherent data problems such as text verses numbers. Through manipulation of these problems, DEA is able to link these data sets.

<b>PERFORMANCE MEASURE TABLE</b>										
<b>Decision Unit: International Enforcement</b>			<b>FY 2014</b>	<b>FY 2015</b>	<b>FY 2016</b>	<b>FY 2017</b>	<b>FY 2018</b>		<b>FY 2019</b>	<b>FY 2020</b>
<b>Strategic Objective</b>	<b>Performance Report and Performance Plan Targets</b>		<b>Actual</b>	<b>Actual</b>	<b>Actual</b>	<b>Actual</b>	<b>Target</b>	<b>Actual</b>	<b>Target</b>	<b>Target</b>
	3.2	<b>Performance Measure</b>	PTOs Linked to CPOT Targets Disrupted or Dismantled <sup>1</sup>	18/29	21/32	16/19	16/13	13/11	20/11	18/12
3.2	<b>Performance Measure</b>	PTOs Not Linked to CPOT Targets Disrupted or Dismantled <sup>1</sup>	82/65	105/78	90/76	106/66	99/62	98/49	105/54	107/55
3.2	<b>Performance Measure</b>	Number of International Students Trained	3,937	3,691	3,668	2,621	2,300	2,635	2,300	2,300
3.2	<b>OUTCOME Measure</b>	Monetary Value of Currency, Property and Drugs Seized (Drug Trafficker Revenue Denied)	\$3.9B	\$3.5B	\$4.2B	\$3.8B	\$3.0B	\$5.1B	\$3.3B	\$3.3B

<sup>1</sup> PTOs disrupted includes PTOs disrupted closed (PTARRS status code E). It excludes PTOs disrupted pending dismantlement (PTARRS status code D).

**This page intentionally left blank**

### 3. Performance, Resources, and Strategies


Pursuant to the DOJ Strategic Plan for FY 2018 – 2022, DEA’s International Enforcement Decision Unit contributes to its Strategic Goals as follows:

**DOJ Goal 3:** Reduce Violent Crime and Promote Public Safety. DEA resources specifically address DOJ’s Strategic Objective 3.2: *Disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking organizations to curb opioid and other illicit drug use in our nation.*

#### a. Performance Plan and Report for Outcomes

**Output Performance Measure:** PTOs Linked to CPOTs Disrupted or Dismantled


**2017 Target:** 23/23  
**2017 Actual:** 16/13  
**2018 Target:** 13/11  
**2018 Actual:** 20/11  
**2019 Target:** 18/12  
**2020 Target:** 19/13





**Performance Measure:** PTOs Not Linked to CPOTs Disrupted or Dismantled

**2017 Target:** 98/72  
**2017 Actual:** 106/66  
**2018 Target:** 99/62  
**2018 Actual:** 98/49  
**2019 Target:** 105/54  
**2020 Target:** 107/55



**Discussion:** From October 1, 2017 through September 30, 2018, DEA disrupted 20 and dismantled 11 PTOs linked to CPOTs. This represents approximately 154 and 100 percent to target for each performance actual, respectively. DEA also disrupted 98 and dismantled 49 PTOs not linked to CPOTs. This represents approximately 99 and 79 percent to target for each performance actual, respectively.

DEA cannot unilaterally investigate and arrest high-level drug traffickers overseas, so DEA's success is reliant upon host nation law enforcement cooperation to include intelligence sharing and participation. Also, specific countries currently lack self-sustaining counternarcotics police institutions and effective criminal justice systems to adequately address counterdrug efforts. Therefore, it is generally challenging for DEA to consistently forecast annual performance.

However, despite these challenges, DEA personnel will continue to engage and assist their host nation counterparts during the development of new foreign legislation, treaties, and agreements designed to combat drug trafficking, money laundering, and the diversion of precursor chemicals. Additionally, DEA will continue to coordinate PTO investigations with its foreign and domestic counterparts to meet or exceed performance targets established for FY 2019-FY 2020.

***Output Performance Measure:*** Number of International Students Trained

***2017 Target:*** 2,300

***2017 Actual:*** 2,621

***2018 Target:*** 2,300

***2018 Actual:*** 2,635

***2019 Target:*** 2,300

***2020 Target:*** 2,300

***Discussion:*** From October 1, 2017, through September 30, 2018, DEA's Office of International Training trained 2,635 foreign law enforcement officers. This represents approximately 115 percent above the performance target established for FY 2018. DEA will continue to offer both in-country and regional training programs in FY 2019-FY 2020 while working to meet performance targets. Overall performance is also contingent upon receiving an adequate level of reimbursable funding from the Departments of State and Defense.

***Outcome Performance Measure:*** Monetary Value of Currency, Property, and Drugs Seized (Drug Trafficker Revenue Denied)

***2017 Target:*** \$2.8 Billion

***2017 Actual:*** \$3.8 Billion

***2018 Target:*** \$3.0 Billion

***2018 Actual:*** \$5.1 Billion

***2019 Target:*** \$3.3 Billion

***2020 Target:*** \$3.3 Billion

***Discussion:*** Drug Trafficker Revenue Denied reflects the outcome of activities scored to DEA's International and Domestic Decision Units. From October 1, 2017 through September 30, 2018, DEA was responsible for denying \$5.1 billion in drug trafficking revenue. This represents approximately 170 percent to the performance target established for FY 2018. DEA will continue to conduct global enforcement operations to meet or exceed performance targets for FY 2019-FY 2020.

**b. Strategies to Accomplish Outcomes**

In FY 2020, DEA's resources included in the International Enforcement Decision Unit will support the Attorney General's strategic goals and objectives. DEA will also continue to pursue

internal agency strategies, goals, and objectives. As such, DEA will provide interagency leadership in the effort to disrupt or dismantle TCOs through its flagship PTO and SIU Programs as well as operational elements of the DFAS, and other agency initiatives.

In support of the Attorney General's applicable priority areas and strategies, DEA will continue to coordinate intelligence worldwide contributing to the dismantlement of TCOs responsible for providing and smuggling cocaine, heroin, and most dangerous drugs to include synthetic opioids like fentanyl, into the U.S. This all-important work includes the coordination of intelligence on the cultivation and manufacture of illicit substances, the sale of precursor chemicals for illegal drug production, and the transportation routes of these drugs into the U.S. DEA also provides intelligence to assist the interagency community in determining future trends in drug trafficking and evaluating these trends to determine their long-term impact. In FY 2020, DEA's personnel abroad will continue to work closely with their foreign and domestic counterparts to investigate leads and dismantle international drug trafficking organizations that target American citizen.

## B. Domestic Enforcement

<i>Domestic Enforcement</i>	<b>Direct Pos.</b>	<b>Estimate FTE</b>	<b>Amount</b>
2018 Enacted	6,080	5,286	\$1,706,930
2019 Continuing Resolution	6,080	5,286	\$1,706,930
Adjustments to Base and Technical Adjustments	-	-	\$39,243
2020 Current Services	6,080	5,286	\$1,746,173
2020 Program Increases	93	47	\$22,862
2020 Program Offsets	-	-	\$-
2020 Request	6,173	5,333	\$1,769,035
<b>Total Change 2019-2020</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>\$62,105</b>

\* This table only displays DEA's S&E resources. Dollars are in thousands.

<b>Domestic-Information Technology Breakout (of Decision Unit Total)</b>	<b>Estimate FTE</b>	<b>Amount</b>
2018 Enacted	187	\$287,475
2019 Continuing Resolution	203	\$272,451
Adjustments to Base and Technical Adjustments	-	-\$506
2020 Current Services	206	\$271,945
2020 Request	206	\$271,945
<b>Total Change 2019-2020</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>-\$506</b>

### 1. Program Description

In conjunction with DEA's foreign offices, DEA Domestic Field Divisions and Offices create a seamless intelligence and investigative approach to disrupt and dismantle the drug trafficking organizations that pose the largest threat to the U.S. DEA focuses on finding and exploiting strategic vulnerabilities in the U.S. drug market utilizing an aggressive, multi-jurisdictional approach designed to focus federal resources on the disruption or dismantlement of Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) that control the illegal drug trade as well as the seizure of the proceeds and assets associated with their criminal enterprises. DEA's Domestic Enforcement Decision Unit comprises the majority of DEA's investigative and support resources, and through July 2018, it includes: Headquarters and its ancillary components, 23 Field Divisions, 42 District Offices, 111 Resident Offices and 46 Posts of Duty (*Figure 2*).

Key programs and activities funded by the Domestic Enforcement Decision Unit, as well as relevant performance measures, are discussed below.

### ***Priority Targeting Program***

DEA implemented its Priority Target Organization (PTO) Program in April 2001 to identify, target, investigate, and disrupt or dismantle those international, national, regional, and local impact drug trafficking and/or money laundering organizations having a significant impact on drug availability within the U.S.

DEA Domestic Field Divisions, under the supervision of Special Agents in Charge (SACs), identify and target major drug threats within their areas of responsibility, also known as PTOs. Specifically, Domestic Field Divisions focus their investigative efforts on PTOs with a direct connection to the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Consolidated Priority Organization Targets (CPOTs), which include the most significant international command and control organizations threatening the U.S. as identified by the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) member agencies.

### ***Threat Enforcement Planning Process***

In FY 2017, DEA developed and introduced a new drug control strategy that shifts agency performance from a quantitative based approach to a more qualitative, results oriented approach that focuses on outcomes. The strategy is called the Threat Enforcement Planning Process (TEPP). The purpose of the TEPP is to proactively manage enforcement efforts and resources, while identifying goals and reporting effectiveness. Though still in its exploratory and deliberative phase, the FY 2018 TEPP identified four DEA-wide National Level Threats that are in alignment with the Departments FY 2018-2022 Strategic Plan and the President's Executive Orders:

- Transnational Criminal Organizations (organized crime/drug networks)
- Opioid Threats (e.g., Heroin, Fentanyl, controlled prescription drugs)
- Violent Domestic Drug Gangs (e.g., MS-13)
- Cyber Drug Threats

### ***State and Local Task Force Program***

DEA uses its task forces as a force multiplier in carrying out DEA's mission through coordination and cooperation with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in the U.S. Task forces act as an extension of DEA's traditional enforcement groups, focusing mainly on targeting significant, high-level TCOs.

DEA assigns state and local Task Force Officers (TFOs) primarily to task force groups within Domestic Field Divisions. DEA continuously monitors the task forces to ensure they remain efficient and effective. Through the 4<sup>th</sup> quarter of FY 2018, DEA led 327 state and local task forces. Moreover, these task forces consisted of an on-board strength of 2,306 Special Agents and 2,737 TFOs, all of whom are deputized with Title 21 authority and dedicated full-time to investigate major TCOs and address local trafficking problems.

TFOs provide local expertise that cannot be matched at the federal level. This expertise includes, but is not limited to: (1) geographical familiarity with respect to specific areas, businesses, or persons involved in trafficking activities; (2) enhanced intelligence regarding local or regional TCO hierarchical structures, co-conspirators, and their corporate or transactional behaviors; and (3) access to relationships with local residents cultivated and fostered through liaison with community and religious leaders, as well as various health, public, and private service agencies therein. In addition, TFOs are well versed and practiced in the local judicial systems or smaller venues, and their support has been invaluable with respect to serving warrants and assisting with the identification and seizure of assets that may not have been identified solely by DEA.

The partnership with state and local personnel also allows DEA access to additional resources. TFOs allow for: (1) close alliances with state and local agencies; (2) the use of platforms for surveillance assets (pole cameras and, in many locations, radio systems and frequencies); (3) access to city facilities and equipment as well as events, meetings, and conferences with a criminal justice agenda; and, (4) access to local and state intelligence databases to include drug databases, gang information, and local identifiers of significant drug trafficking areas.

### ***Special Operations Division (SOD)***

The Special Operations Division's (SOD) mission is to establish seamless law enforcement strategies and operations aimed at dismantling major Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) by attacking their command and control networks. Special emphasis is placed on those transnational criminal and narcoterrorism organizations that operate across jurisdictional boundaries. Tools and the programs available at SOD are used to fully exploit federal law enforcement's investigative authority under Title III of the U.S. Code. In this capacity, SOD actively supports multi-jurisdiction, multi-nation, and multi-agency investigations, while working jointly with federal, state and local agencies. SOD support consists of telephone exploitation, counter network targeting, deconfliction and coordination of overlapping investigations. SOD ensures that tactical and strategic intelligence is shared between law enforcement agencies and provides analytical and financial case support to investigations that meet division and region priorities.

### ***SOD Office of Field Enforcement/Bilateral Investigations Unit (BIU) – 959 and 960a***

The SOD BIU is comprised of four geographically designated field enforcement groups: Western Hemisphere I; Western Hemisphere II; Europe and Africa; and Asia. The enforcement groups are responsible for investigating, infiltrating, indicting, and incarcerating the world's most significant drug traffickers, narcoterrorists, and transnational criminal organizations that affect the U.S. The BIU enforcement groups also identify existing, emerging, and evolving threats within their areas of responsibility and develop investigative plans that support DEA's strategic goals and objectives to address these threats. Each of the four enforcement groups control and direct confidential sources, propose sensitive activities, and work closely with DEA foreign offices and counterparts.

Head of Pakistani drug trafficking network pled guilty to conspiring to import tens of thousands of kilograms of heroin to the United States for distribution in New York City:

On May 31, 2018, BIU target Shahbaz Khan pled guilty to one count of conspiring to import one kilogram and more of heroin into the United States, and to one count of attempting to distribute one kilogram and more of heroin, knowing and intending that it would be imported into the United States. Khan was taken into custody by Liberian authorities on December 1, 2016, and expelled to the United States later that same day based on a pending Complaint in the SDNY. He pled guilty to a Superseding Indictment in Manhattan federal court.

Khan, a Pakistani national, was the leader of a DTO based in Afghanistan and Pakistan that produced and distributed massive quantities of heroin around the world. In 2007, Khan was designated a Narcotics Kingpin under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act by then-president George W. Bush. Between approximately August 2016 and October 2016, Khan conspired to send tens of thousands of kilograms of heroin hidden in maritime shipping containers and air cargo shipments to New York City. He faces a maximum sentence of life in prison and a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years in prison. Sentencing is scheduled for October 9, 2018. On July 24, 2018, the BIU indicted Lalbaz Khan and Gulbaz Khan, the sons of Shahbaz Khan.

*Precursor Chemical Working Group*

In 2017, SOD established a Precursor Chemical Working Group (PCWG), which utilizes the same resources as the HFTF with DEA, HSI, CBP-NTC, DOD elements (JIATF-W and DoD-NTC and the Intelligence Community, to prioritize operations targeting major international and domestic precursor chemical networks. The working group utilizes SOD tools and utilizes SOD's participating interagency databases and programs to attack the scourge of illicit synthetic drugs plaguing communities throughout the United States. Based on intelligence and documented evidence from investigations, the working group attempts to identify "facilitator" organizations responsible for the purchase, diversion and sale of chemicals used for clandestine manufacturing of illicit substances. Once those "facilitator" organizations are identified, the working group compiles a comprehensive lead product to be forwarded to domestic and foreign field elements for action. Lead products include identification of chemical transshipments, communication devices for further exploitation, financial data, shipping data and command/control of those organizations.

*Project Secret Ingredient*

This project was initiated by SOD to identify, target and dismantle the precursor supply chain from manufacturing in Asia, to production operations based in Mexico, Central and South America. SOD leads, analysis and litigation support assisted DEA Miami, DEA Philadelphia, and DEA Lima, Peru, with the arrest of a Chinese national Shao Xi Gu (aka Simon GU) in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, in April 2018. Gu was identified as a major precursor chemical distributor in China responsible for the shipment of approximately 60 metric tons of precursor chemicals seized. SOD coordinated with several DEA offices and supporting agencies to ensure the successful arrest of Gu at the Philadelphia Pharmaceutical Convention. Gu is the 7<sup>th</sup> Chinese

national indicted in the U.S. as a result of law enforcement and SOD efforts in combating the opioid crisis.

*Project Sleeping Giant (PSG):* In 2018, SOD created Project Sleeping Giant, under which SOD will support field investigations, utilizing an interagency task force approach, to disrupt and dismantle Chinese transnational criminal organizations and their connected networks. PSG will focus SOD resources and partners efforts in a manner consistent with previous successful joint operations that targeted major TCO threats.

Operation Pills and Thrills Arrests: This investigation targeted Anton Kulkin, a Bulgarian chemist currently residing in Tijuana, Mexico, who was producing thousands of dosage units of pills laced with carfentanil for distribution in the United States and Canada. SOD intelligence led to the positive identification of Anton Kulkin through border-crossing analysis. In addition, the identification, by SOD, of co-conspirators through phone exploitation and related call analysis resulted in further expansion of this investigation. On August 28, 2018, Kulkin was indicted by a Grand Jury in the District of Massachusetts. On September 6, 2018, DEA and GOM authorities arrested Kulkin and his Sinaloa Cartel handler, Ivan Arredondo Ramirez, and seized a carfentanyl laboratory operated by Kulkin, one kilogram of synthetic heroin, 20,000 carfentanyl pills, and multiple precursor chemicals near Mexicali, Baja California, Mexico.

Operation Postage Due: SOD Operation Postage Due is one of many ongoing operations which clearly expose the relationship between illicit Chinese-based TCOs and the various Mexican Cartels. To date, Operation Postage Due has yielded significant seizures of various types of drugs to include large quantities of fentanyl as well as the arrests and/or indictments of high-ranking command and control elements directing these TCOs, most notably Sinaloa Cartel CPOT Aureliano Guzman-Loera, aka Guano (Chapo Guzman's brother), Sinaloa Cartel CPOT Ruperto Salgueiro-Nevarez, and Chinese CPOT Chuen Fat Yip.

#### *Counter Network Working Group (CNWG)*

In 2017, SOD implemented a Counter Network Working Group (CNWG) in support of Presidential Executive Order (EO13773) on Enforcing Federal Law with Respect to Transnational Criminal Organizations and Preventing International Trafficking. The CNWG employs cutting-edge technology and sophisticated analytical tools to target TCOs and subsidiary organizations, including transnational drug cartels, threatening the safety of the United States and its citizens. This innovative initiative fully harnesses SOD's participating interagency databases, tools, and programs to fully exploit traditional and cyber communications, travel, trade, finance, open source and social media, to illuminate and target unknown TCO networks by pursuing a "top down/bottom up" analytical focus. The CNWG efforts include: Los Angeles Garment District, Ohio Opioid Project, West Virginia Opioid Project, Pennsylvania Opioid Project, National Truck Targeting Project, Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG), MS-13/BOP and the Dark Net Project.



### *Project Clean Sweep*

On July 12, 2018, the Department of Justice announced the creation of Operation Synthetic Opioid Surge (SOS), a new DOJ initiative that aims to reduce the supply of deadly synthetic opioids in high impact areas and to identify wholesale distribution networks and international and domestic suppliers. SOD initiated Project Clean Sweep to aggressively support Operation SOS in the ten identified districts and counties. The surge will involve a coordinated SOD effort to ensure that leads from street-level cases are used to identify and prosecute larger-scale distributors. Through a whole of government approach, SOD will align efforts among its interagency participants to maximize combined efforts in combatting the opioid crisis and degrading the networks connected to drug trafficking.

### *Intelligence and Information Sharing*

DEA's Intelligence Program is comprised of multiple components that are responsible for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating drug-related intelligence to facilitate DEA seizures and arrests, strengthen investigations and prosecutions of major drug trafficking organizations, and inform policy makers' tactical and strategic decisions.

DEA continues to operate a robust intelligence program producing high-priority strategic intelligence reporting inclusive of the annual publication of a National Drug Threat Assessment (NDTA), which provides policy makers, senior law enforcement leaders, and U.S. Intelligence Community managers with a comprehensive assessment of the significant national drug threats. The DEA Intelligence Program continues to produce a wide range of other finished intelligence products on new and emerging drug threats. During FY 2018, a total of 413 intelligence reports authored by DEA intelligence analysts assigned to domestic and foreign offices were published. The Intelligence Program also increased the production and dissemination of unclassified DEA intelligence products in order to share with health care professionals, first responders, and academia via [dea.gov](http://dea.gov). The Intelligence Division contributes to drug-related interagency assessments such as National Intelligence Estimates, Presidential Daily Briefs, and Intelligence Community Assessments or Memoranda.

### *Heroin and Cocaine Signature Programs*

DEA's Heroin and Cocaine Signature Programs exemplify DEA's efforts and progress in intelligence-based policing and information sharing. The Heroin Signature Program (HSP), managed by the Intelligence Division, and the Cocaine Signature Program (CSP), managed by the Office of Forensic Sciences, were initiated in 1977 and 1998, respectively, as essential components of DEA's ability to identify trends in heroin and cocaine trafficking and distribution in the U.S. Supported by scientific methodologies developed at DEA's Special Testing and Research Laboratory (SFL1), the ongoing objectives of these signature programs are to (1) identify trends in heroin and cocaine trafficking and distribution in the U.S.; (2) identify the processing methods and geographic origins of the heroin and cocaine encountered in the U.S. drug market; and, (3) provide intelligence on wholesale purity and track transitions in heroin and cocaine smuggling patterns into the U.S.

### *Heroin Domestic Monitor Program*

The Heroin Domestic Monitor Program (HDMP) has been one of the key drug indicator programs managed by the DEA Intelligence Division for more than 30 years. HDMP is a partnership between the Intelligence Division, DEA Laboratory System, and DEA Field offices.

HDMP provides federal, state, and local law enforcement authorities, as well as drug policy makers and drug abuse researchers, with information regarding the nature of the domestic heroin problem at the retail (“street”) level. The data necessary for HDMP is currently obtained from existing retail-range evidentiary exhibits (investigative heroin purchases) made during the course of ongoing DEA investigations. Evidentiary purchases incorporate urban, suburban, and rural investigative activity and reflect the variety of heroin available at the retail level across the nation. The forensic analysis of these heroin exhibits provides science-based data on, most importantly, the geographic source origin of heroin, price and purity, adulterants and diluents, use patterns, marketing practices, and availability.

HDMP is the sole U.S. Government indicator program which provides scientific certainty of the geographic origin and purity of heroin available on the streets of the United States. Information derived through the HDMP has allowed DEA to aggressively target emerging heroin problems as well as develop strategies to counter them.

### *Office of Special Intelligence*

Within the DEA Intelligence Division, the personnel assigned to the Office of Special Intelligence work in an interagency environment that provides operational intelligence support and identification of investigative overlaps to the DEA Special Operations Division (SOD), DEA field offices, and other Federal, State, Local and Tribal agencies, through the acquisition, management, analysis, and maintenance of electronic transactional data. With the support of DEA’s Office of Information Technology (SI), the Office of Special Intelligence develops, operates, and maintains a wide variety of applications in support of DEA’s mission. Staffed by experienced intelligence, data, and geospatial analysts, these intelligence professionals have the ability and tools to provide timely and meaningful analytical products drawing from multiple, large data sets.

### *Office of National Security Intelligence (ONSI)*

The DEA Office of National Security Intelligence (ONSI) is focused on the national security needs of the United States through a core of dedicated and innovative intelligence professionals who ensure that DEA resources are responsive to national security requirements. They leverage the capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) to strengthen and support efforts to lessen the impact of drugs on this country and better protect our neighborhoods.

One of the major responsibilities of ONSI is to establish and maintain effective liaison relationships with IC partners and represent DEA’s interests and equities on IC boards, committees, and working groups. ONSI responds to national level tasking and requirements from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and inquiries from the IC. It manages

and maintains the DEA Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) Facility as well as the SCI communications connectivity between DEA and its partner agencies. ONSI develops and supports a Central Tasking Management System, including personnel and technical systems, to formalize and manage the DEA information requirements process. ONSI also provides proactive reports of foreign intelligence value to the IC and produces analytical products on topics relevant to national security issues.

### *El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC)*

The El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) enhances public safety through the integration of multi-agency data, intelligence and investigative information, and technology to create knowledge and improve awareness of criminal activity. A force multiplier, EPIC enables law enforcement officers, interdictors, investigators, and leaders to focus on the challenges facing them. It ensures the knowledge, support, and assistance is available around the clock; the current situation is monitored and evaluated; and warning is provided for officer safety and future challenges.

In 2018, to better align with the needs of the U.S. law enforcement community, EPIC began the transition to focus its support to domestic law enforcement; particularly support to State & Local law enforcement agencies. As of May 2018, EPIC houses approximately 300 employees from various federal, state, and local agencies, including representatives from the Intelligence Community and foreign law enforcement organizations. EPIC also has information sharing agreements with law enforcement agencies in 48 states and several international agencies. Through its 24-hour Watch Operations, EPIC provides immediate access to participating agencies' databases for information such as warning and deconfliction, and creates awareness of criminal activity and threats. A force multiplier, EPIC provides 24/7 real-time technical support to law enforcement operations through its Tactical Operations Section. EPIC's Research & Analysis Section is staffed by DEA and partner agencies (FBI, CBP, ICE, TXNG, JTF-N).

### *State and Local Training*

In addition to DEA's State and Local Assistance Programs, DEA's Office of Training offers specialized training and professional development to state and local law enforcement officers in a variety of program areas:

- Drug Law Enforcement School for Patrol Officers - provides updated training to police officers to assist them in detecting drug-related crime in their communities;



*DEA Training Academy, Quantico, VA*


- Drug Enforcement Training Program - offers designed instruction for secondary delivery by the trainers with a detailed program guide, student handouts, instructional aids, and suggested practical exercises;
- Drug Task Force Supervisors School - supports and supplies updated managerial training to supervisors and commanders assigned to multi-agency drug task forces;
- Drug Unit Commanders Academy - provides training in areas including tactical aspects of drug enforcement, operational planning, confidential source management, clandestine laboratory operations, legal issues for management, executive decision making, and professionalism for commanders of federal, state, local, and foreign drug enforcement units.

**This page intentionally left blank**

Figure 2

# DEA Domestic Offices

U.S. Department of Justice  
Drug Enforcement Administration



DEA Map 1 7-2018

\* This map includes the new Louisville and Omaha Division Offices, which became operational in January and July 2018, respectively.

**This page intentionally left blank**

## **Domestic Enforcement Decision Unit Performance Measures**

### ***Priority Targeting Program***

DEA's domestic investigative efforts focus primarily on CPOT-linked targets. The objective is to dismantle these organizations so that reestablishment of the same criminal organization is impossible and the source of the drug is eliminated. The disruption or dismantlement of CPOT-linked organizations is accomplished primarily via multi-agency investigations. These investigations emphasize developing intelligence-driven, multi-regional efforts to identify and target international drug trafficking organizations that play significant roles in the production, transportation, distribution, financing, or other support of large scale drug trafficking.

DEA's first two drug enforcement-related output performance measures on the Performance and Resources Table relate to DEA's flagship Priority Targeting Program and are the following:

- PTOs Linked to CPOT Targets Disrupted or Dismantled
- PTOs Not Linked to CPOT Targets Disrupted or Dismantled

### ***Domestic Training***

The effectiveness of DEA's domestic enforcement efforts is also measured by the number of DEA-sponsored domestic training courses conducted and participants trained. The third drug enforcement-related output performance measure on the Performance and Resources Table is the following:

- Number of Federal, State, and Local Law Enforcement Officers Trained

### ***Drug Trafficker Revenue Denied***

DEA's current long-term objective is to maximize the Monetary Value of Currency, Property and Drugs Seized (Drug Trafficker Revenue Denied) to meet the challenge of dismantling drug cartels so they are unable to reconstitute their operations with new leadership. Drug Trafficker Revenue Denied reflects the outcome of activities scored to DEA's International and Domestic Decision Units.

The fourth drug enforcement - related outcome performance measure on the Performance and Resources Table is the following:

- Monetary Value of Currency, Property, and Drugs Seized (Drug Trafficker Revenue Denied)



**This page intentionally left blank**

## 2. Performance and Resources Tables

PERFORMANCE AND RESOURCES TABLE												
Decision Unit: Domestic Enforcement												
RESOURCES			Target	Actual	Target	Changes	Requested (Total)					
			FY 2018	FY 2018	FY 2019	Current Services Adjustments and FY 2020 Program Changes	FY 2020 Request					
Active PTOs Linked to CPOTs <sup>1,2</sup>			500	440	450	-	455					
Active PTOs Not Linked to CPOTs <sup>1,2</sup>			1,530	3,006	1,540	-	1,545					
Total Costs and FTE <sup>**</sup> (reimbursable FTE are included, but reimbursable costs are bracketed and not included in the total)			FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000		
			6,337	\$1,706,930 [\$229,180]	6,337	\$1,706,930 [\$229,180]	5,289	\$1,706,930 [\$20,137]	47	\$62,105 [\$0]	5,336	\$1,769,035 [\$20,137]
TYPE	STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE	PERFORMANCE	FY 2018	FY 2018	FY 2019	Current Services Adjustments and FY 2020 Program Changes	FY 2020 Request					
Program Activity		Domestic Enforcement	FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000		
			6,337	\$1,706,930 [\$229,180]	6,337	\$1,706,930 [\$229,180]	5,289	\$1,706,930 [\$20,137]	47	\$62,105 [\$0]	5,336	\$1,769,035 [\$20,137]
Performance Measure: Output	3.2	PTOs Linked to CPOTs Disrupted or Dismantled <sup>2,3</sup>	91/55		77/49		93/62		-		98/65	
Performance Measure: Output	3.2	PTOs Not Linked to CPOTs Disrupted or Dismantled <sup>2,3</sup>	535/455		551/460		588/507		-		601/518	
Performance Measure: Output	3.2	Number of Federal, State, and Local Law Enforcement Officers Trained <sup>4</sup>	37,300		32,953		31,930		-		31,930	
Performance Measure: Output	3.2	Monetary Value of Currency, Property and Drugs Seized (Drug Trafficker Revenue Denied)	††		††		††		-		††	
<p>** In FY 2018 and beginning in FY 2019, the Assets Forfeiture Fund and OCEDEF reimbursable funding will transition to a sub allotment, respectively. This table only reflects reimbursable resources.</p> <p>†† This is an agency-wide outcome measure reflecting the activities across DEA's decision units - See International Decision Unit Performance and Resources Table for performance data related to this measure.</p> <p><sup>1</sup> Reflects active PTO investigations as of the end of the specified fiscal year.</p> <p><sup>2</sup> This performance measure does not include PTOs associated with DEA's Diversion Control Program.</p> <p><sup>3</sup> PTOs disrupted includes PTOs disrupted closed (PTARRS status code E). It <u>excludes</u> PTOs disrupted pending dismantlement (PTARRS status code D).</p> <p><sup>4</sup> This performance activity and performance measure does not include State and Local Clandestine Laboratory Enforcement training.</p>												

### **Priority Targeting Program**

**Data Definition:** Disruption means impeding the normal and effective operation of the targeted organization, as indicated by changes in organizational leadership and/or changes in methods of operation, including, for example, financing, trafficking patterns, communications or drug production. Disruption Pending Dismantlement means impeding the normal and effective operation of the targeted organization, but continuing towards the organization's complete evisceration such that it is incapable of operating and/or reconstituting itself. Dismantlement means destroying the organization's leadership, financial base and supply network such that the organization is incapable of operating and/or reconstituting itself. The first CPOT List was issued in September 2002, and is updated semi-annually. The List identifies the most significant international drug trafficking and money laundering organizations and those primarily responsible for America's drug supply. Enforcement agencies are focused on identifying links among disparate domestic drug trafficking and money laundering organizations and on making connections to their ultimate sources of supply. Investigators continually work up and across the supply chain, with the goal of disrupting and dismantling the entire network controlled by or supporting a given CPOT organization. An organization is considered "linked" to a CPOT, if credible evidence exists (i.e., from corroborated confidential source information, phone tolls, Title III intercepts, financial records, or other similar investigative means) of a nexus between the primary target of the investigation and a CPOT target. The nexus need not be a direct connection to the CPOT, so long as a valid connection exists to a verified associate or component of the CPOT organization.

**Data Validation and Verification:** PTARRS provides a means of electronically validating and verifying PTO data through the following approval chain:

- \* Case Agent - Through PTARRS, the Special Agent (SA) or Diversion Investigator (DI) begins the process by creating and proposing a PTO.
- \* Group Supervisor (GS) – The GS reviews the PTO proposed by the SA/DI and approves it or sends it back to the SA/DI for additional information/clarification.
- \* Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) - The ASAC reviews the PTO approved by the GS. If all of the necessary information included in the proposal meets the established criteria for a PTO, the ASAC approves the PTO.
- \* Special Agent in Charge (SAC) - The SAC reviews the PTO approved by the ASAC and provides a case assessment for, or against, the nomination of the PTO. Once nominated by the SAC, PTARRS generates and saves a unique identification number for the nominated PTO.
- \* Headquarters – At Headquarters, PTOs nominated by the SAC are assigned to the appropriate section within DEA's Office of Enforcement (OE). Once assigned, the corresponding OE Staff Coordinator validates all information reported on the PTO nomination. The validation process includes a review of the PTO nomination for completeness, compliance with established criteria, and confirmation of all related case linkages, including links to CPOTs. Staff Coordinators coordinate with DEA's Special Operations Division and Intelligence Division to ensure that available facts exist to support all case linkages. In the unlikely event the documentation submitted is insufficient to validate the reported links, the Staff Coordinator will coordinate with the submitting GS to obtain the required information.

**Data Limitations:** All statistics are limited by a lack of a relational link between case files and enforcement outputs (e.g. arrest, seizure, and work hour data). The link is inferred through data manipulation, but some areas are prone to error until all data systems are linked in a relational manner, and errors are prevented through data validation and referential integrity.

### **State and Local Training**

**Data Definition:** The DEA Training Academy receives quarterly training data from the field on training provided by Division Training Coordinators. The field data are combined with the data generated by the DEA Training Academy and reported quarterly based on the fiscal year.

**Data Validation and Verification:** Data are reviewed upon receipt, but only technical or unusual deviations are checked.

PERFORMANCE MEASURE TABLE										
Decision Unit: Domestic Enforcement										
Strategic Objective	Performance Report and Performance Plan Targets		FY 2014	FY 2015	FY 2016	FY 2017	FY 2018		FY 2019	FY 2020
			Actual	Actual	Actual	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Target
3.2	Performance Measure	PTOs Linked to CPOTs Disrupted or Dismantled <sup>1,2</sup>	158/154	169/132	173/141	108/66	91/55	77/49	93/62	98/65
3.2	Performance Measure	PTOs Not Linked to CPOTs Disrupted or Dismantled <sup>1,2</sup>	794/713	846/743	887/841	573/488	535/455	551/460	588/507	601/518
3.2	Performance Measure	Number of Federal, State, and Local Law Enforcement Officers Trained <sup>3</sup>	38,448	40,111	48,609	37,701	37,300	32,953	31,930	31,930
3.2	OUTCOME Measure	Monetary Value of Currency, Property and Drugs Seized (Drug Trafficker Revenue Denied)	††	††	††	††	††	††	††	††

†† This is an agency-wide outcome measure reflecting the activities across DEA's decision units - See International Decision Unit Performance and Resources Table for performance data related to this measure.

<sup>1</sup> This does not include PTOs associated with DEA's Diversion Control Program.

<sup>2</sup> PTOs disrupted includes PTOs disrupted closed (PTARRS status code E). It excludes PTOs disrupted pending dismantlement (PTARRS status code D).

<sup>3</sup> This performance activity and performance measure does not include State and Local Clandestine Laboratory Enforcement training participants.

**This page intentionally left blank**

### 3. Performance, Resources, and Strategies


Pursuant to the DOJ Strategic Plan for FY 2018 – 2022, DEA’s Domestic Enforcement Decision Unit contributes to its Strategic Goals as follows:

**DOJ Goal 3:** Reduce Violent Crime and Promote Public Safety. DEA resources specifically address DOJ’s Strategic Objective 3.2: *Disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking organizations to curb opioid and other illicit drug use in our nation.*

#### a. Performance Plan and Report for Outcomes

**Output Performance Measure:** Domestic PTOs Linked to CPOTs Disrupted or Dismantled

**2017 Target:** 160/145  
**2017 Actual:** 108/66  
**2018 Target:** 91/55  
**2018 Actual:** 77/49  
**2019 Target:** 93/62  
**2020 Target:** 98/65



\* In FY 2017, DEA implemented the Threat Enforcement Planning Process, which changed its reporting methodology.

**Discussion:** From October 1, 2017 through September 30, 2018, DEA disrupted 77 and dismantled 49 PTOs linked to CPOTs. This represents approximately 84 and 89 percent to target, respectively for each of the aforementioned dispositions.

**Performance Measure:** PTOs Not Linked to CPOTs Disrupted or Dismantled

**2017 Target:** 731/689


**2017 Actual:** 573/488

**2018 Target:** 535/455

**2018 Actual:** 551/460

**2019 Target:** 588/507

**2020 Target:** 601/518



**Discussion:** From October 1, 2017 through September 30, 2018, DEA disrupted 551 and dismantled 460 PTOs not linked to CPOTs. This represents approximately 103 and 101 percent to target, respectively for each of the aforementioned dispositions

In FY 2017, Domestic CPOT-linked and Not-linked PTO performance was tempered in part due to declining number of Special Agents on-board; a net decrease of 397 Special Agents or 8.1 percent from FY 2014 to FY 2017. Over that same period, DEA reported a corresponding reduction in the number of PTO investigations opened (CPOT linked and Not linked). Coincidentally, in response to emerging threats and related challenges to drug enforcement, DEA implemented its new, exploratory drug control strategy, the Threat Enforcement Planning

Process (TEPP). As a result in FY 2018, overall Domestic PTO performance was tempered; 86 and 89 percent among CPOT linked and Not CPOT linked PTOs, respectively.

Moving forward, DEA leadership has adjusted its targets for FY 2019 and FY 2020 to account for the drop in Special Agent work hours (staffing) and amended TEPP's implementation schedule to a more prudent timeline that is prioritized by specific threats and anticipated, community-based outcomes. The added benefit of this approach is that it will challenge TEPP's feasibility and long term sustainability while accommodating its innovation with less risk to performance.

Throughout its ongoing transition to TEPP, DEA will continue to sustain or exceed its level of effort against drug trafficking networks in coordination with OCDETF and its partner agencies, federal and foreign counterparts, and state and local LEOs in the impacted communities. .

Furthermore, DEA will also continue to prioritize investigative efforts to disrupt and dismantle OCDETF Targeted, CPOT-linked TCOs and address the illicit drug activity and violence attributed to these organizations despite constrained resources, and as such, DEA will work with OCDETF partner agencies to apprehend and prosecute the leaders, managers and supervisors of TCOs.

***Output Performance Measure:*** Number of Federal, State, and Local Law Enforcement Officers Trained

***2017 Target:*** 37,300

***2017 Actual:*** 37,701

***2018 Target:*** 37,300

***2018 Actual:*** 32,953

***2019 Target:*** 31,930

***2020 Target:*** 31,930

***Discussion:*** From October 1, 2017, through September 30, 2018, DEA's State and Local Law Enforcement Officer Training Program trained 32,953 federal, state and local law enforcement officers. This represents approximately 88 percent to target.

DEA has adjusted its targets for FY 2019 and FY 2020 due to the demolition and construction at the Clan Lab Building scheduled to start in early 2019. DEA anticipates unpredictable class and venue disruptions while the building is being renovated. Finally, in recognition of the potential for disparate assessments of its targets and actuals, DEA will continue to utilize more robust analytical methods that incorporates policy and operational decisions in concert with historical patterns to better forecast its annual performance.

***Outcome Performance Measure:*** Monetary Value of Currency, Property, and Drugs Seized (Drug Trafficker Revenue Denied)

***Discussion:*** Please refer to the discussion on Drug Trafficker Revenue Denied included in the International Enforcement Decision Unit narrative.



## **b. Strategies to Accomplish Outcomes**

### ***Threat Enforcement Planning Process***

The TEPP seeks to refine and develop DEA's drug control strategy and shift agency performance evaluation from a quantitative based approach to a more qualitative approach. It is anticipated that TEPP will facilitate the establishment of agency wide threat priorities, guide field enforcement strategies and better inform the allocation of limited resources. In its exploratory phase, the TEPP identifies DEA-wide National Level Threats. Field offices, at the Division/Region level, identify threats in their Area of Responsibility (AOR) that fall under DEA-wide National Level Threats, and document their efforts to mitigate those threats through enforcement planning, operations, and initiatives.

Those initiatives focus on the following:

- Better alignment of strategic objectives to DEA-wide threats
- Consistent processes for the threat identification, mitigation plan development, and impact statement development
- Development of optimal methods to measure success and impact
- Effectively evaluate drug threat mitigation performance at Field Divisions/Regions
- Better alignment of resources based on the most critical threats

### ***Disrupt and dismantle Consolidated Priority Organization Targets (CPOTs)***

The OCDETF Program, of which DEA is the leading participant, coordinates investigations targeting organizations on the CPOT list – the “Most Wanted” drug trafficking and money laundering organizations believed to be primarily responsible for the nation's illicit drug supply. The objective is to dismantle these organizations so that reestablishment is impossible and the source of the drug is eliminated. The disruption or dismantlement of CPOT organizations is accomplished primarily by multi-agency investigations. These investigations emphasize developing intelligence-driven operations to identify and target international drug trafficking organizations that play significant roles in the production, transportation, distribution, financing, or other support of large scale drug trafficking.

### ***Deny drug revenue to TCOs to disrupt trafficking activities and reduce drug availability***

With the goal to reduce drug availability, DEA is focused on drug trafficking activities and on the proceeds generated by the illegal drug industry. This money has a devastating effect on the American public and financial services industry, as well as other governments and societies around the world. DEA is addressing the threat that drug proceeds represent as a means of financing terrorist organizations. Due to the nature and scope of DEA's investigations and its global presence, evidence and intelligence gleaned from its investigations often provide critical information on terrorist financing, which is immediately shared through established protocols with those agencies charged with counterterrorism responsibilities. DEA targets the flow of drug money back to sources of drug supply because these funds are destined to finance the next cycle of illegal drugs to be sent to the U.S. consumer market.

***Provide educational resources through the Demand Reduction Program's sponsorship of National Red Ribbon Week***

National Red Ribbon Week is the most far-reaching and well-known drug prevention event in America. The National Family Partnership, which coordinates Red Ribbon activities nationally, estimates that over 80 million Americans participate in Red Ribbon events. During this period, events are held throughout the country and serve as prevention and educational resources for young children and their communities. National Red Ribbon Week also serves as a tribute to Special Agent Enrique Camarena, who was kidnapped and brutally tortured and murdered by drug traffickers in Mexico. This tragic event produced an immediate outpouring of grief, but over time has generated a sense of hope across America. This hope is being kept alive through the hard work of millions of Americans - particularly our young people - who participate in Red Ribbon events during the last week in October.

**This page intentionally left blank**

### C. State and Local Assistance

<i>State and Local Assistance</i>	<b>Direct Pos.</b>	<b>Estimate FTE</b>	<b>Amount</b>
2018 Enacted	26	24	\$13,838
2019 Continuing Resolution	26	24	\$13,838
Adjustments to Base and Technical Adjustments	-	-	\$87
2020 Current Services	26	24	\$13,925
2020 Program Increases	-	-	\$-
2020 Program Offsets	-	-	\$-
2020 Request	26	24	\$13,925
<b>Total Change 2019-2020</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>\$87</b>

\* This table only displays DEA's S&E resources. Dollars are in thousands.

<i>State &amp; Local -Information Technology Breakout (of Decision Unit Total)</i>	<b>Estimate FTE</b>	<b>Amount</b>
2018 Enacted	-	\$177
2019 Continuing Resolution	-	\$168
Adjustments to Base and Technical Adjustments	-	\$-
2020 Current Services	-	\$168
2020 Request	-	\$168
<b>Total Change 2019-2020</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>\$0</b>

#### 1. Program Description

DEA provides assistance to state and local law enforcement agencies through its State and Local Clandestine Laboratory Training and Clandestine Drug Laboratory Cleanup Programs. DEA's S&E Account funds the authorized positions associated with these programs. In FY 2020, the President's Budget includes \$10 million in DEA's base funding for the clean-up of hazardous clandestine methamphetamine labs discovered by state and local law enforcement. DEA may also use clean up funding for equipment, training, and technical assistance needed to initiate the hazardous waste container program in additional states.

#### *State and Local Clandestine Laboratory Training*

DEA has consistently responded to the training needs of the U.S. law enforcement community and recognizes the value of sharing drug law enforcement techniques. DEA's Office of Training's Clandestine Laboratory Unit has developed programs to assist federal, state, and local officers in investigation, dismantling, and disposal of illicit clandestine laboratories. This training provides instruction in the safe dismantling and disposal of clandestine laboratories, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) compliance, current trends in the manufacturing of illicit controlled substances, along with clandestine laboratory tactical training. In addition to training Special Agents and state and local law enforcement personnel

domestically, the Clandestine Laboratory Unit also provides First Responder/Awareness training and a First Responder/Awareness Train-the-Trainer Program to international law enforcement agencies.



*DEA Clandestine Laboratory Training*

### ***Clandestine Drug Laboratory Cleanup Program***

State and local personnel are often confronted with an extremely hazardous environment when called to the scene of clandestine laboratories. Clandestine laboratories, known as “small toxic labs,” are generally unaffiliated with large drug trafficking organizations and produce less than ten pounds of methamphetamine per production cycle. These labs are found in rural areas, tribal and federal lands, cities, and suburbs. Most often, state or local personnel first encounter these laboratories and must ensure that they are investigated, dismantled, and disposed of appropriately. DEA is in a unique position to assist state and local law enforcement with hazardous waste cleanups while maintaining a nationwide set of contracts.

Through the 4<sup>th</sup> quarter of FY 2018, DEA coordinated over 2,011 state and local meth lab cleanups. This total includes 1,940 Container Program lab pickup and disposals, and another 71 on-site cleanups.

### **State and Local Assistance Decision Unit Performance Measures**

#### ***State and Local Clandestine Laboratory Training***

The effectiveness of DEA’s state and local assistance efforts is measured by the number of DEA-sponsored clandestine laboratory trainings conducted and participants trained. The output performance measure on the Performance and Resources Table is the following:

- Number of State and Local Law Enforcement Officers Trained in Clandestine Laboratory Enforcement.

## 2. Performance and Resources Tables

PERFORMANCE AND RESOURCES TABLE												
Decision Unit: State and Local Assistance												
RESOURCES			Target		Actual		Target		Changes		Requested (Total)	
			FY 2018		FY 2018		FY 2019		Current Services Adjustments and FY 2020 Program Changes		FY 2020 Request	
Workload: Varies by Program												
Total Costs and FTE			FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000
(reimbursable FTE are included, but reimbursable costs are bracketed and not included in the total)			24	\$13,838 [\$0]	24	\$13,838 [\$0]	24	\$13,838 [\$0]	0	\$87 [\$0]	24	\$13,925 [\$0]
TYPE	STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE	PERFORMANCE	FY 2018		FY 2018		FY 2019		Current Services Adjustments and FY 2020 Program Changes		FY 2020 Request	
Program Activity		State and Local Assistance	FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000
			24	\$13,838 [\$0]	24	\$13,838 [\$0]	24	\$13,838 [\$0]	0	\$87 [\$0]	24	\$13,925 [\$0]
Performance Measure	3.2	# of State and Local Law Enforcement Officers Trained in Clandestine Laboratory Enforcement	950		1,059		900		-		1,000	

PERFORMANCE MEASURE TABLE										
Decision Unit: State and Local Assistance										
Strategic Objective	Performance Report and Performance Plan Targets		FY 2014	FY 2015	FY 2016	FY 2017	FY 2018		FY 2019	FY 2020
			Actual	Actual	Actual	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Target
3.2	Performance Measure	# of State and Local Law Enforcement Officers Trained in Clandestine Laboratory Enforcement	1,484	1,888	1,106	909	950	1,059	900	1,000

**This page intentionally left blank**

### 3. Performance, Resources, and Strategies

Pursuant to the DOJ Strategic Plan for FY 2018 – 2022, DEA’s State and Local Assistance Decision Unit contributes to its Strategic Goals as follows:

**DOJ Goal 3:** Reduce Violent Crime and Promote Public Safety. DEA resources specifically address DOJ’s Strategic Objective 3.2: *Disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking organizations to curb opioid and other illicit drug use in our nation.*

#### a. Performance Plan and Report for Outcomes

**Output Performance Measure:** Number of State and Local Law Enforcement Officers Trained in Clandestine Laboratory Enforcement

**2017 Target:** 1,300  
**2017 Actual:** 909  
**2018 Target:** 950  
**2018 Actual:** 1,059  
**2019 Target:** 900  
**2020 Target:** 1,000

**Discussion:** Through the 4th quarter of FY 2018, the Office of Training provided state and local training to 1,059 law enforcement officers. This represents approximately 111 percent to target.

DEA has adjusted its targets for FY 2019 and FY 2020 due to the demolition and construction at the Clandestine Lab Building scheduled to start in early 2019. DEA anticipates unpredictable class and venue disruptions while the building is being renovated. Finally, in recognition of the potential for disparate assessments of its targets and actuals, DEA will continue to utilize more robust analytical methods that incorporates policy and operational decisions in concert with historical patterns to better forecast its annual performance.

Since 1999, DEA has trained approximately 25,000 state and local law enforcement officers in identifying and processing clandestine laboratories. Due to the demand for clandestine laboratory training, DEA anticipates meeting the performance targets established for FY 2019 and FY 2020.

#### b. Strategies to Accomplish Outcomes

Over the past several years, DEA has continued to foster and implement a container-based cleanup program in response to evolving methods for the production and trafficking of methamphetamine throughout the United States. In light of the historical and persistent pattern of methamphetamine use/abuse, and in anticipation of potential, recurrent surges in methamphetamine morbidity and mortality in the future, DEA remains fully committed and supportive of this program. Through FY 2020, DEA plans to dedicate resources to the cleanup program in furtherance of its objectives to train and certify law enforcement officers on how to: remove gross contaminants from lab sites; secure and package the waste pursuant to state and



Federal laws and regulations; and, transport the waste to a secure container where it is stored until disposal. The container program provides a mechanism for state and local law enforcement to transport contaminants from labs (including mobile labs) and dumpsites to a secure container site in a safe and timely manner. The Container Program has resulted in significant cost savings in states that have operational container programs (a contractor cleanup averages \$5,063 and a container cleanup averages \$404).

As of the end of FY 2018, there were 19 states with operational container programs: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Virginia.

State and local law enforcement officers are taught how to handle the environmental hazards encountered at clandestine laboratories, as well as the procedural differences between traditional drug investigations and clandestine laboratory investigations. DEA also ensures that state and local personnel receive familiarization training on the required protective equipment that must be worn when dismantling a clandestine laboratory. The U.S. Code of Federal Regulations mandates that all Federal, state, and local law enforcement officers receive at least 24 hours of hazardous chemical handling training prior to entering a clandestine drug laboratory.

## D. High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) Program

<i>High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas Program</i>	<b>Direct Pos.</b>	<b>Estimate FTE</b>	<b>Amount</b>
2018 Enacted*	-	-	[\$280,000]
2019 Continuing Resolution *	-	-	[\$280,000]
Adjustments to Base and Technical Adjustments	-	-	\$-
2020 Current Services	-	-	\$254,000
2020 Program Increases	-	-	\$-
2020 Program Offsets	-	-	\$-
2020 Request	-	-	\$254,000
<b>Total Change 2019-2020</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>\$0</b>

\* In FY 2018 and FY 2019, this program was included in the Office of National Drug Control Policy's budget. The FY 2020 request includes transferring the HIDTA Program from ONDCP to DEA. This table only reflects HIDTA account resources. Dollars are in thousands.

### 1. Program Description

In FY 2020, DEA will assume responsibility and oversight of the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) Program, which is being transferred from the Office of National Drug Council Policy. DEA currently participates in and coordinates with 29 HIDTAs. Transferring the administration of the program will provide several advantages. Under DEA leadership, the program will better leverage existing relationships between DEA and state, local, and tribal counterparts. HIDTA resources will continue to operate as a local-first program focused on combatting drug trafficking in areas where the threat is the greatest, which dovetails with DEA's existing enforcement efforts. HIDTA strategies will continue to be developed by the regional HIDTAs. This proposal is intended to unify the nation's premier federal, state, local, and tribal drug enforcement programs to more effectively combat the drug threat.

The HIDTA Program was established by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, as amended, and the Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 2006, to provide assistance to Federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement entities operating in those areas most adversely affected by drug trafficking. The HIDTA Program provides resources to Federal, state, local, and tribal agencies in each HIDTA region to carry out activities that address the specific drug threats of that region.

The purpose of the HIDTA Program is to reduce drug trafficking and production in the United States by:

- Facilitating cooperation among Federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies to share information and implement coordinated enforcement activities;
- Enhancing law enforcement intelligence sharing among Federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies;
- Providing reliable law enforcement intelligence to law enforcement agencies to facilitate the design of effective enforcement strategies and operations; and,

- Supporting coordinated law enforcement strategies that make the most of available resources to reduce the supply of illegal drugs in designated areas of the United States and in the Nation as a whole.

To qualify for consideration as a HIDTA, an area must meet the following criteria:

- The area is a significant center of illegal drug production, manufacturing, importation, or distribution;
- State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies have committed resources to respond to the drug trafficking problem in the area, thereby indicating a determination to respond aggressively to the problem;
- Drug-related activities in the area are having a significant harmful impact in the area and in other areas of the country; and,
- A significant increase in allocation of Federal resources is necessary to respond adequately to drug related activities in the area.

There are currently 29 HDTAs. HIDTA-designated counties are located in all 50 states, as well as in Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia. The HDTAs are currently overseen by Executive Boards to design and carry out activities that reflect the specific drug trafficking threats found in each HIDTA region. As currently structured, the HIDTA Executive Board can tailor its strategy and initiatives closely to local conditions and can respond quickly to changes in those conditions.

Among the types of activities funded by the HIDTA Program are: drug enforcement task forces comprised of multiple Federal, state, local, and tribal agencies designed to dismantle and disrupt drug trafficking organizations (DTOs); multi-agency intelligence centers that provide drug intelligence to HIDTA initiatives and participating agencies; initiatives to establish or improve interoperability of communications and information systems between and among law enforcement agencies; and, investments in technology infrastructure.

See HIDTA appendix for additional information.

## E. Diversion Control Fee Account

<i>Diversion Control Fee Account</i>	<b>Direct Pos.</b>	<b>Estimate FTE</b>	<b>Amount</b>
2018 Enacted With Sequester	1,839	1,599	\$392,465
2019 President's Budget With Sequester	1,839	1,625	\$394,117
Adjustments to Base and Technical Adjustments	-	-	\$49,025
2020 Current Services	1,839	1,625	\$443,142
2020 Program Increases	-	-	\$-
2020 Program Offsets	-	-	\$-
2020 Request	1,839	1,625	\$443,142
<b>Total Change 2019-2020</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>\$49,025</b>

\* Dollars are in thousands.

<i>Diversion Control Fee Account -Information Technology Breakout (of Decision Unit Total)</i>	<b>Estimate FTE</b>	<b>Amount</b>
2018 Enacted	35	\$55,339
2019 Continuing Resolution	38	\$52,447
Adjustments to Base and Technical Adjustments	-	-\$97
2020 Current Services	39	\$52,350
2020 Request	39	\$52,350
<b>Total Change 2019-2020</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>\$-97</b>

### 1. Program Description

DEA's Diversion Control Program (DCP) is responsible for enforcing the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) and its regulations pertaining to pharmaceutical controlled substances and listed chemicals. In doing so, the DCP conducts and facilitates domestic investigations; supports international investigations with domestic connections; plans and allocates program resources; promulgates regulations; and conducts liaison with healthcare providers and industry, as well as federal, state, and local counterparts. All of the goals, strategies, and initiatives supported by the DCP are intended to establish and maintain strong standards of control; aid in detecting and preventing the diversion of pharmaceutical controlled substances and listed chemicals; enhance public safety by ensuring accountability; and improve qualitative reporting requirements within its network of compliance indicators. DEA actively regulates more than 1.8 million individuals and companies that are registered with DEA to handle controlled substances or listed chemicals through a system of scheduling, quotas, recordkeeping, reporting, and security requirements. DEA uses criminal, civil, and administrative penalties against those who are involved in the diversion of licit controlled substances and listed chemicals, as well as individuals and/or organizations otherwise violating the CSA and its implementing regulations. By statute, registration fees must be set at a level that ensures the recovery of the full costs of operating the DCP.

## **Diversions Control Decision Unit Performance Measures**

### ***Priority Targeting Program***

DEA's Diversion Control (DC) investigative efforts focus primarily on registrant violators of the CSA inclusive of non-registrant criminal enterprises involved in the diversion and trafficking of pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and synthetics. Many of these violators and their criminal counterparts have been identified as PTOs (linked to CPOTs and not-linked to CPOTs). Historically, the vast majority of DC PTO dispositions were not-linked to CPOTs.

The objective is to dismantle these organizations so that reestablishment of the same criminal organization is impossible and the source of the drug is eliminated. The disruption or dismantlement of CPOT-linked organizations is accomplished primarily via multi-agency investigations. These investigations emphasize developing intelligence-driven, multi-regional efforts to identify and target international drug trafficking organizations that play significant roles in the production, transportation, distribution, financing, or other support of large scale drug trafficking.

DC's first two drug enforcement-related output performance measures on the Performance and Resources Table relate to DEA's flagship Priority Targeting Program and are the following:

- PTOs Linked to CPOT Targets Disrupted or Dismantled
- PTOs Not Linked to CPOT Targets Disrupted or Dismantled

### ***Number of Administrative Actions and Civil Penalties***

The effectiveness of DC's enforcement and regulatory efforts is also measured by the number of Administrative Actions and Civil Penalties levied. The third and fourth CSA-related output performance measures on the Performance and Resources Table are the following:

- Number of Administrative Actions [levied]
- Number of Civil Penalties [levied]

### ***Number of Outreach/Public Education Events Completed (Overall)***

The effectiveness of DC's efforts to regulate, train and disseminate critical, life-saving information to practitioners, industry professionals, other state and local regulatory officials, the general public, and other stakeholders in response to the Opioid Crisis and other emerging threats linked to the abuse of controlled substances is also measured by the number of Outreach/Public Education Events Completed (Overall). This measure also captures and reports on the significant outreach activities conducted under DEA's 360 Strategy. In support of DEA's 360 Strategy, the fifth DC output performance measure on the Performance and Resources Table is the following:

- Number of Outreach/Public Education Events Completed (Overall)

***Number of Planned Scheduled Investigations Completed (Overall)***

The effectiveness of DC's enforcement and regulatory efforts is also measured by the number of Planned Scheduled Investigations Completed (Overall). This measure directly reports on the degree and consistency of registrant compliance with the CSA. Violators are subject to a myriad of regulatory sanctions up to and inclusive of criminal prosecution. The sixth DC output performance measure on the Performance and Resource Table is the following:

- Number of Planned Scheduled Investigations Completed (Overall)

**This page intentionally left blank**

## 2. Performance and Resources Tables

PERFORMANCE AND RESOURCES TABLE												
Decision Unit: Diversion Control												
RESOURCES			Target	Actual	Target	Changes	Requested (Total)					
			FY 2018	FY 2018	FY 2019	Current Services Adjustments and FY 2020 Program Changes	FY 2020 Request					
Number of Criminal Case Initiations <sup>1</sup>			1,700	1,853	1,725	-	1,725					
Active Diversion PTOs <sup>2</sup>			475	750	485	-	490					
Number of Drug and Chemical New Applicants Processed (throughout the FY)			90,000	132,278	132,000	-	139,000					
Total Costs and FTE (reimbursable FTE are included, but reimbursable costs are bracketed and not included in the total)			FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000		
			1,599	\$392,465 [S0]	1,599	\$392,465 [S0]	1,625	\$394,117 [S0]	0	\$49,025 [S0]	1,625	\$443,142 [S0]
TYPE	STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE	PERFORMANCE	FY 2018	FY 2018	FY 2019	Current Services Adjustments and FY 2020 Program Changes	FY 2020 Request					
Program Activity		Diversion of Licit Drugs and Chemicals	FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000	FTE	\$000		
			1,599	\$392,465 [S0]	1,599	\$392,465 [S0]	1,625	\$394,117 [S0]	0	\$49,025 [S0]	1,625	\$443,142 [S0]
Performance Measure: Output	3.2	Number of Diversion PTOs Linked to CPOT Targets Disrupted / Dismantled <sup>2</sup>	0/0	2/4	0/0	-	0/0					
Performance Measure: Output	3.2	Number of Diversion PTOs Not Linked to CPOT Targets Disrupted / Dismantled	129/195	78/148	83/163	-	85/167					
Performance Measure: Output	3.2	Number of Administrative Actions	2,000	1,913	2,025	-	2,025					
Performance Measure: Output	3.2	Number of Civil Penalties	66	61	70	-	70					
Performance Measure: Output	3.2	Number of Outreach/Public Education Events Completed (Overall)	700	1,977	1,750	-	1,750					
Performance Measure: Output	3.2	Number of Planned Scheduled Investigations Completed (Overall)	2,775	2,414	1,441	-	1,357					
<sup>1</sup> Criminal cases will be determined by the use of DEA's Case Status Subsystem (CAST) to obtain records with 2000 series Diversion case files and class codes 40/50. In addition, DEA case file records for non-2000 series non-general file with fee fundable GDEP drug codes are included.												
<sup>2</sup> Reflects active PTO investigations as of the end of the specified fiscal year. As a participant in the PTO program, Diversion is required to report PTOs linked to CPOT and not linked to CPOT. However, given the nature of the Diversion program, CPOT linkages are a rare event.												



**Data Definitions:**

*Types of Registrants:*

\* Type A Registrants dispense controlled substances at the retail level. These include pharmacies, hospitals, clinics, practitioners, teaching institutions and mid-level practitioners (nurse practitioners, physician assistants, etc.).

\* Type B Registrants manufacture and distribute controlled substances at the wholesale level. These include manufacturers, distributors, analytical labs, importers/exporters, researchers and narcotic treatment programs.

\* Chemical Registrants manufacture and distribute chemicals at the wholesale and retail level. These include retail distributors, manufacturers, distributors, importers and exporters.

\* Criminal Investigation on CSA/CDTA Registrants: All non-scheduled regulatory investigations of CSA/CDTA violations/violators. These include: Priority Target Organizations (PTOs); criminal investigations; and Drug Oriented Investigations (DOIs).

*Sanction Categories:*

\* Administrative Actions/Civil Penalties: Consists of civil fines, administrative hearings, letters of admonition/MOU, suspension and restriction. Registrants usually retain the DEA Registration with restrictions and/or financial penalty. Registrants may be temporarily denied access to controlled substances/chemicals.

\* Criminal: Consists of surrender for cause, revocation and denial. Registrants lose or forfeit the DEA Registration or are convicted of a drug offense. Registrants are permanently denied access to controlled substances/chemicals pending a reversal of circumstances.

**Data Collection and Storage:** During the reporting quarter, the Diversion field offices change the status of a registrant's CSA2 Master record to reflect any Regulatory Investigative actions that are being conducted on the registrant. The reporting of the Regulatory action by each field office is available on a real-time basis through the reporting system within CSA2, as the investigative status change occurs. The Regulatory investigative actions that are collected in a real-time environment are as follows: letters of admonition/MOU, civil fines, administrative hearing, order to show cause, restricted record, suspension, surrender for cause, revocations, and applications denied. The CSA2 enables DEA to maintain all of the historical and investigative information on DEA registrants. It also serves as the final repository for a majority of punitive (i.e. sanctions) actions levied against CSA violators.

**Data Validation and Verification:** The Diversion Investigator and the field office Group Supervisor (GS) are tasked to ensure that timely and accurate reporting is accomplished as the registrants investigative status change occurs. Both GS and the Diversion Program Manager (DPM) have the ability to view the report of ingoing and completed Regulatory Investigation actions for their office/division at any time during the quarter or at the quarter's end, since the actions are in real-time.

**Data Limitations:** The content of the quarterly reports is restricted to Regulatory Investigative action on controlled substance/chemical registrants and makes no mention of budgetary information. Timeliness is not considered a limitation since the data is collected as the change in the status of the investigation occurs.

PERFORMANCE MEASURE TABLE										
Decision Unit: Diversion Control										
Strategic Objective	Performance Report and Performance Plan Targets		FY 2014	FY 2015	FY 2016	FY 2017	FY 2018		FY 2019	FY 2020
			Actual	Actual	Actual	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Target
3.2	<b>Performance Measure</b>	Number of Diversion PTOs Linked to CPOTs Disrupted & Dismantled <sup>1,2</sup>	3/6	0/0	1 / 1	2/4	0/0	2/4	0/0	0/0
3.2	<b>Performance Measure</b>	Number of Diversion PTOs Not Linked to CPOTs Disrupted & Dismantled <sup>1, 2</sup>	128/229	185/248	193/270	138/209	129/195	78/148	83/163	85/167
3.2	<b>Performance Measure</b>	Number of Administrative Actions	2,392	2,301	2,299	2,162	2,000	1,913	2,025	2,025
3.2	<b>Performance Measure</b>	Number of Civil Penalties	66	66	65	116	66	61	70	70
3.2	<b>Performance Measure</b>	Number of Scheduled Investigations Completed (Overall)	4,397	4,151	4,079	2,684	2,775	2,414	1,441	1,357
3.2	<b>Performance Measure</b>	Number of Outreach/Public Education Events Completed (Overall)	165	122	809	1,256	700	1,977	1,750	1,750

<sup>1</sup> Prior to FY 2010, the Diversion Control Program was not officially part of the DEA's Priority Targeting Program. Beginning in FY 2010, with the creation of Tactical Diversion Squads in every domestic field division, the Diversion Control Program began focusing on the identification of PTOs and their eventual disruption and dismantlement.

<sup>2</sup> PTOs disrupted includes PTOs disrupted closed (PTARRS status code E). It excludes PTOs disrupted pending dismantlement (PTARRS status code D).

**This page intentionally left blank**

### 3. Performance, Resources, and Strategies

Pursuant to the DOJ Strategic Plan for FY 2018 – 2022, DEA’s Diversion Control Decision Unit contributes to its Strategic Goals as follows:

**DOJ Goal 3:** Reduce Violent Crime and Promote Public Safety. DEA resources specifically address DOJ’s Strategic Objective 3.2: *Disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking organizations to curb opioid and other illicit drug use in our nation.*

#### a. Performance Plan and Report for Outcomes

**Output Performance Measure:** Number of Administrative Actions

**2017 Target:** 2,301  
**2017 Actual:** 2,162  
**2018 Target:** 2,000  
**2018 Actual:** 1,913  
**2019 Target:** 2,025  
**2020 Target:** 2,025

**Discussion:** Through the 4<sup>th</sup> quarter FY 2018, Diversion Control (DC) levied 1,913 administrative actions. This represents approximately 96 percent to target. DEA has adjusted its targets to align with the President’s Executive Orders and the Department’s FY 2018-2022 Strategic Plan to include evolving threats. As such, DEA anticipates improved performance moving forward to meet or exceed its targets in FY 2019 and FY 2020.

**Output Performance Measure:** Number of Civil Penalties

**2017 Target:** 66  
**2017 Actual:** 116  
**2018 Target:** 66  
**2018 Actual:** 61  
**2019 Target:** 70  
**2020 Target:** 70


**Discussion:** Through the 4<sup>th</sup> quarter FY 2018, Diversion Control levied 61 civil penalties. This represents approximately 92 percent to target. Due to historic trends in quarterly performance reporting, Diversion Control is reticent to premature adjustments to its target at this time in light of ongoing increases in prescription drug trafficking coupled with a responsive surge in enforcement activities. In the absence of a more reasonable track record for this measure (less than two years), Diversion has elected to maintain its target at baseline for FY 2018 while agreeing to adjust its FY 2020 target to align with the President’s Executive Orders and the Department’s FY 2018-2022 Strategic Plan to include evolving threats. As such, Diversion anticipates improved performance moving forward to meet or exceed its targets in FY 2019 and FY 2020.

**Output Performance Measure:** Diversion PTOs Linked to CPOTs Disrupted and Dismantled

**2017 Target:** 0/0  
**2017 Actual:** 2/4  
**2018 Target:** 0/0  
**2018 Actual:** 2/4  
**2019 Target:** 0/0  
**2020 Target:** 0/0

**Output Performance Measure:** Diversion PTOs Not Linked to CPOTs Disrupted and Dismantled

**2017 Target:** 146/216  
**2017 Actual:** 138/209  
**2018 Target:** 129/195  
**2018 Actual:** 78/148  
**2019 Target:** 83/163  
**2020 Target:** 85/167



**Discussion:** Through the 4<sup>th</sup> quarter FY 2018, DC disrupted 2 and dismantled 4 PTOs linked to a CPOT. Because CPOT-linked investigations are not the focus of the DCP, there may not be any disruptions or dismantlement of PTOs linked to CPOTs for Diversion in any given year.

Through the 4<sup>th</sup> quarter FY 2018, DC disrupted 78 and dismantled 148 PTOs not linked to CPOTs. This represents approximately 60 and 76 percent to target, respectively for each of the aforementioned dispositions. DEA initiates criminal investigations on those suspected of criminal violations of the CSA. As a participant in the PTO program, Diversion PTOs can be criminal and/or regulatory. PTO investigations are administrative, civil, and criminal investigations that have a regional or national impact on a registrant’s ability to handle controlled

substances. Diversion has adjusted its targets to align with the President’s Executive Orders and the Department’s FY 2018-2022 Strategic Plan to include evolving threats. As such, through sustained efforts that capitalize on intelligence sharing and investigative leads to identify and pursue targets of opportunity, Diversion anticipates improved performance moving forward to meet or exceed its targets in FY 2019 as well as FY 2020.

***Output Performance Measure:*** Number of Scheduled Investigations Completed (Overall)

***2017 Target:*** 3,800  
***2017 Actual:*** 2,684  
***2018 Target:*** 2,775  
***2018 Actual:*** 2,414  
***2019 Target:*** 1,441  
***2020 Target:*** 1,357

***Discussion:*** Through the 4<sup>th</sup> quarter FY 2018, DC completed 2,414 Scheduled Investigations. This represents approximately 87 percent to target.

In a collaborative effort to direct manpower, the Diversion Control Division modified the FY 2019 Scheduled Investigation Work Plan. The strategy is to focus resources and create flexibility in conducting investigations of DEA registrants. The modified Work Plan will allow the field to aggressively address the identified threats and concerns within each division that will run parallel with each office’s National Level Threat Enforcement Planning Process (TEPP). The new Work Plan allows an office to choose a timeframe, between one to five years, to initiate a scheduled investigation. DRG has received all of the field divisions’ FY 2019 Work Plans, and will continue to monitor the field’s progress in completing these investigations. In support of this effort, DRG staff coordinators have been providing on-going Work Plan management training and consultation to Diversion field personnel.

Subsequent to its work plan modifications, Diversion adjusted its FY 2019 and FY 2020 targets accordingly. The aforementioned change and the anticipated performance continue to align with the President’s Executive Orders and the Department’s FY 2018-2022 Strategic Plan to include evolving threats. As such, through sustained efforts that that capitalize on a cyclical schedule of inspections and audits as well as follow-up and targeted pursuits that are based on investigative leads, Diversion anticipates improved performance moving forward to meet or exceed its targets in FY 2019 and FY 2020.

***Output Performance Measure:*** Number of Outreach/Public Education Events Completed (Overall)

***2017 Target:*** 300  
***2017 Actual:*** 1,256  
***2018 Target:*** 700  
***2018 Actual:*** 1,977  
***2019 Target:*** 1,750  
***2020 Target:*** 1,750

**Discussion:** Through the 4<sup>th</sup> quarter FY 2018, Diversion Control completed 1,977 outreach/public education events. This represents approximately 282 percent to target. The surge in outreach activities has been the result of actions taken in response to an ongoing directive by the Acting Administrator to educate the public, DEA registrants, and other Medical Professional Organizations on federal laws and regulations, and DEA's role and responsibilities. Due to the severity of the fentanyl and heroin abuse epidemic and its ties to prescription abuse, and the fundamental necessity for a sustained effort by DCP to educate and inform the industry and general public, outreach far exceeded what was originally forecast by DEA.

While Diversion Control recognizes that it has exceeded the FY 2018 target, it is reticent to premature adjustments to its target at this time in light of ongoing increases in prescription drug trafficking coupled with a responsive surge in enforcement activities. In the absence of a more reasonable track record for this measure (less than two years), Diversion has elected to adjust its FY 2019 and FY 2020 targets to align with the President's Executive Orders and the Department's FY 2018-2022 Strategic Plan to include evolving threats. As such, with better planning, scheduling and monitoring in a manner commensurate with the growth of its registrant population, Diversion anticipates improved target forecasts and performance moving forward to meet those targets in FY 2019 and FY 2020.

#### **b. Strategies to Accomplish Outcomes**

The DCP's mission is to prevent, detect, and investigate the diversion of controlled pharmaceuticals and listed chemicals from legitimate sources while ensuring an adequate and uninterrupted supply is available for legitimate medical, commercial, and scientific needs. The following strategies outline DEA's plan to achieve this objective:

#### **Tactical Diversion Squads (TDS)**

The DCP conducts criminal enforcement activities primarily through Tactical Diversion Squads (TDS). TDSs are comprised of many DEA specialties, including special agents and diversion investigators, as well as state and local law enforcement and regulatory personnel, who work together to identify, target, investigate, disrupt, and dismantle those individuals or organizations involved in diversion schemes (e.g., pill mills, street level prescription drug trafficking organizations, prescription forgery rings, and doctor shopping). TDSs also develop sources of information and disseminate intelligence to appropriate elements for the development of leads and targets. The TDS provides support to a Diversion Group and/or Diversion Staff where law enforcement authority or activities are required (e.g., purchase of evidence/payment for information, conducting surveillance, conducting undercover operations, making arrests, and executing search/seizure warrants). TDSs also play an important role in addressing the growing problem of emerging synthetic designer drugs. TDS groups surreptitiously buy these substances which are analyzed and used to support DEA's temporary and permanent scheduling actions.

Through the 4<sup>th</sup> quarter FY 2018, DEA had 79 fully operational TDSs throughout the U.S., covering 44 states, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia. The process of establishing additional TDSs is ongoing. DEA established two Mobile Diversion Teams (MDTs) that are

currently deployed to various field divisions assisting with operations. MDTs provide a targeted focus on operations leading to the disruption of diversion schemes and the targeting of high-level traffickers in order to dismantle their organizations. The MDTs will significantly decrease the strain on resources that are redirected to support large investigations, allow rapid response to shifts in diversion trends, and create an agile resource capable of responding to changing mission requirements.

### **DEA's 360 Strategy**

DEA's 360 Strategy has already deployed in Pittsburgh, PA, Milwaukee, WI, St. Louis, MO, Louisville, KY, Manchester, NH, Charleston, WV, Dayton, OH, and Albuquerque, NM. DEA expanded this program to Salt Lake City, UT; Camden, NJ; Newark, NJ; Philadelphia, PA; Knoxville, TN; and Baltimore, MD through FY 2018. DEA plans to add six new pilot cities in 2019 to New Orleans, LA; Cleveland/Toledo, OH; Los Angeles, CA; New Bedford/South Boston, MA; Phoenix/Flagstaff, AZ; and Tampa, FL. The 360 Strategy leverages existing federal, state, and local partnerships to address the problem of prescription opioid and heroin abuse on three different fronts: diversion control, law enforcement, and community relations.

One of the DCP's responsibilities in the 360 Strategy is the prevention of diversion by providing education and training within the pharmaceutical community and to pursue those practitioners who are operating outside of the law. Since the nonmedical use of prescription opioids is a strong risk factor for future heroin use, the DCP will continue to engage in dialogue with industry, practitioners, and government health organizations and other DEA registrants about the Controlled Prescription Drug (CPD) abuse contributing to the current opioid epidemic. DEA, in collaboration with public health partners, is studying ways to improve access to information identifying the nature of the drug abuse problem plaguing a particular area. As part of the strategy, the DCP will continue to maintain vigilant enforcement and regulation actions to identify and address the diversion of CPDs through TDSs and Diversion Groups. Finally, the DCP's education and outreach efforts will continue through sustained and consistent messaging in our community relation events like the DEA's National Drug Take Back Initiative (NTBI), which is a key component of the 360 Strategy, as it helps communities get rid of unwanted and unused drugs from their homes. The sixteenth, and most recent NTBI was held on October 27, 2018. DEA worked with 4,770 law enforcement partner agencies at 5,839 sites around the country and collected approximately 914,236 pounds of unwanted drugs (457 tons).

### **Scheduled Investigations**

One of the primary functions of the DCP is to ensure that registrants are in compliance with the safeguards inherent in the CSA. This proactive approach is designed to identify and prevent the large scale diversion of controlled substances and listed chemicals into the illicit market. Registrant compliance is determined primarily through the conduct of pre-registration, scheduled, and complaint investigations. The DCP regulatory activities also have an inherent deterrent function: they are designed to ensure that those businesses and individuals registered with DEA to handle controlled substances or listed chemicals have sufficient measures in place to prevent the diversion of these substances. These investigations also help registrants understand and comply with the CSA and identify those registrants who violate the CSA and



implementing regulations. Pre-registration investigations reduce the possibility of registering unauthorized subjects, ensure that the means to prevent diversion are in place, and help determine whether registration is consistent with the public interest.

In a concerted and collective effort to direct manpower based on the needs of each division, four new modifications to the requirements of the scheduled work plan for FY 2019 were implemented. The intention was to create flexibility to focus on pharmaceutical and chemical diversion threats identified within each division that run parallel with DEA's Threat Enforcement Planning Process (TEPP). The modifications were implemented via memorandum "Modification of the Controlled Substance and Chemical Regulatory Work Plan" dated September 7, 2018, signed by Assistant Administrator John J. Martin. Researchers (Schedule I and Schedule II-V), pharmacies, and analytical laboratories, were temporarily suspended. Each division chose a time frame, between one to five years, to initiate a scheduled investigation for registrants with the following business activities: controlled substance manufacturers, distributors, reverse distributors, narcotic treatment programs, importers and exporters as well as chemical handler manufacturers, distributors, importers and exporters. Scheduled investigations are required to be completed on these registrants within five years of the last completed scheduled investigation. In addition to the scheduled investigations, a separate investigation is conducted annually on all renewal or modified applications of all Schedule I and II bulk manufacturers and all Schedule I and II importers.

### **Fentanyl Scheduling**

In 2018, DEA placed all illicit fentanyl analogues not already regulated by the Controlled Substances Act into Schedule I—the category for substances with no currently accepted medical use. Anyone who possesses, imports, distributes, or manufactures any illicit fentanyl analogue will be subject to criminal prosecution in the same manner as for fentanyl and other controlled substances. This temporary scheduling order is effective for two years, with the possibility of a one-year extension, and will expire if a permanent scheduling proceeding is not completed.

## **V. Program Increases by Item**

---

### **Item Name: Combatting Transnational Criminal Organizations**

Strategic Goal: 3  
Strategic Objective: 3.2  
Budget Decision Unit(s): International

Organizational Program: Sensitive Investigative Units and the Foreign Judicial Wire Intercept Program

Program Increase: Positions 0 Agt/Atty: 0 FTE: 0 Dollars: \$11,650,000

### **Description of Item**

The request provides \$11.7 million to enhance vital agency programs focused on targeting, disrupting, and dismantling the Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) responsible for supplying illicit substances to distributors and users in the U.S. Drug trafficking also has a proven connection to violent criminal and terrorist organizations, which presents a serious risk to public safety and national security. Therefore, DEA has identified FY 2020 investments that will support key DEA foreign programs to allow operational flexibility for dismantling TCOs. The requested resources will support the following:

- \$1.7 million to increase the capabilities of existing Sensitive Investigative Units (SIUs). Funding will support re-vetting, training, and other operational costs.
- \$10 million for a new judicial wire intercept system in South America.

### **Justification**

Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) threaten the security of the U.S, DEA's international partners, and the integrity of the U.S. and global financial systems. Drug traffickers, weapons dealers, terrorists, and other actors are always seeking to move and hide their illicit products and proceeds in order to sustain their criminal organizations. Today's most significant drug trafficking organizations are dangerous and highly sophisticated TCOs that traffic drugs throughout the U.S. using established transportation routes and distribution networks. As such, DEA has prioritized its resources and partnered with domestic and international counterparts to combat these threats.

Mexican TCOs continue to dominate the trafficking of heroin, methamphetamine, cocaine, marijuana, and to a lesser extent, fentanyl, throughout the U.S. Due to their infrastructure and power, no other organizations are positioned to challenge them as the greatest drug threat to the U.S.. Distribution cells operating in the U.S. have forged partnerships with Mexican TCOs, increasing the threat to the safety and security of American communities. The Sinaloa Cartel maintains the most expansive footprint in the U.S., while Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacion's

(CJNG) domestic presence has significantly expanded in the past few years. Additionally, TCOs from South America and the Caribbean contribute to the domestic retail availability of heroin. For example, Venezuela is a major drug transshipment country for cocaine and heroin departing Colombia for the Caribbean, Central America, the U.S., Europe, and West Africa. Overall, distribution cells and the Mexican and South American traffickers who supply them are the primary sources of most drugs, including heroin, in the U.S.

In the course of carrying out its drug law enforcement mission, DEA makes many important contributions to other non-drug related criminal justice issues important to the Department of Justice and the U.S. Many of these contributions are possible due to DEA's expansive international presence with 90 offices in 69 countries and its ongoing collaboration with domestic DEA field offices and other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. TCOs are a criminal justice problem that require a criminal justice solution. This solution is to dismantle TCOs through arrests, prosecutions, and asset seizures, in the U.S. and/or overseas. DEA makes substantial contributions to this legal process through enforcement activities and is requesting \$11,650,000 to expand key enforcement programs with a global reach.

### **Sensitive Investigative Units (SIU) Program - \$1,650,000**

DEA's Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) Program began in 1996 with approximately 600 members in four participating countries: Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Bolivia. By 2020, DEA will manage 15 SIUs with a combined authorized staffing capacity of over 1,290 host nation members in the following countries: Afghanistan, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Thailand. During the past 23 years, this program has proven to be effective for building host nation counterdrug units capable of conducting international drug investigations jointly with DEA as well as independently in accordance with host country legislation. SIUs consist of host nation law enforcement investigators that have been polygraphed, trained, and mentored by DEA Special Agents. The success of this program has enhanced DEA's ability to combat drug trafficking and dismantle TCOs on a global scale. In order to maintain this operational momentum, \$1,650,000 is needed to enhance the capabilities of existing SIUs with additional operational funding, training, and re-vetting of SIU members.

DEA will require \$850,000 to enhance SIU operational resources in Panama and El Salvador. This funding would be used primarily for operational travel, purchase of evidence and payments to sources of information, and additional training. These additional resources will assist the newly established El Salvador SIU target specific TCOs involved in the movement of cocaine across the Pacific coastline of El Salvador for distribution through Mexico into the U.S. This SIU will also target Central American gang members involved in significant drug trafficking and drug-related violence. In Panama, host nation members will utilize additional investigative resources to target various TCOs based in Panama, Colombia, and Mexico responsible for multi-ton cocaine shipments through Panamanian waters.

Additionally, DEA will require \$550,000 to support SIU advanced training requirements. The rapid growth of the SIU program has created a backlog in SIU members waiting to receive advanced training courses. This training is critical to ensure SIU members have up-to-date investigative and tactical skills. Some examples of SIU advanced training courses include Airport Interdiction, Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering, Intelligence Collection and Analysis, Financial Investigations, Undercover Operations, and Tactical Safety. As of September 30, 2018, only 14% of all onboard SIU members have received advanced training due to a lack of funding and class availability. DEA anticipates over 700 members will need advanced training with the expansion of specific SIUs and the regular cycle of new applicants projected to replace current members. Since training is critical to the SIU program, the number of host nation officials already lacking the appropriate training will only hinder the operational objectives of the program.

Also, \$250,000 is required for costs associated with re-vetting SIU members to include TDY and interpreter expenses as many contract polygraph examiners are not bilingual. All SIU members are required to undergo periodic re-vetting. However, due to logistics and increasing costs to conduct this comprehensive re-vetting process, DEA has scaled back polygraph testing of SIU members from every two years to three years. The gap in regular polygraph testing could pose a threat to the SIU program by preventing the identification of corruption in various SIUs.

#### **New Judicial Wire Intercept System in South America- \$10,000,000**

DEA considers judicial wire intercepts to be an effective tool for intercepting communications. Intelligence generated from judicially-authorized wire intercepts have led to the arrests of international drug traffickers and seizures in countries where these systems are being utilized. JWIP technology must be refreshed every four to five years to keep pace with the new services offered to customers by telecommunications companies.

This request supports a three-year consolidation project of nine core judicial wire intercept systems into one new judicial wire intercept platform in South America. Each core judicial wire intercept system is approximately 10-12 years old. The requested amount includes new hardware and software, software licenses, battery backup, servers, networking, system storage, offsite storage for disaster recovery, onsite support, and job training for end users. Annual maintenance and recurring support costs are not included in the requested amount. This new system will require a refresh every four years and eliminates the rolling refresh schedule for nine systems.

## **Impact on Performance**

The additional resources included in the TCO enhancement will support DOJ Strategic Goal 3, *Reduce Violent Crime and Promote Public Safety*. Additionally, this request supports the Attorney General's targeted priority areas associated with those goals and objectives. DEA will continue to pursue internal agency strategies, goals, and objectives. Agency-wide performance measures reported in the budget will be used to track the progress of this increase; however, performance targets have not been adjusted at this time. These key measures are the following:

- International Students Trained.
- Priority Target Organizations (PTOs) Linked to Consolidated Priority Organization Targets (CPOT) Disrupted or Dismantled.
- PTOs Not Linked to CPOT Targets Disrupted or Dismantled.
- Monetary Value of Currency, Property, and Drugs Seized (Drug Trafficker Revenue Denied).

DEA's request will have a substantial impact on the following performance gaps associated with the programs previously discussed:

- The SIU Program is behind in advanced training and re-vetting requirements. As this program becomes less effective, it will become more challenging to recruit and retain the best and brightest officers from host nation counterpart agencies, as those officers will apply for similar programs offered by other U.S. government agencies and countries.
- As infrastructural upgrades are completed by foreign telecommunications companies, current JWIP hardware and software will not be compatible. As these infrastructure changes go into effect, certain judicial wire intercept capabilities will begin to be ineffective.

## Funding

### Base Funding

FY 2018 Enacted				2019 Continuing Resolution				FY 2020 Current Services			
Pos	Agt/ Atty	FTE	\$(000)	Pos	Agt/ Atty	FTE	\$(000)	Pos	Agt/ Atty	FTE	\$(000)
0	0	0	\$29,868	0	0	0	\$26,358	0	0	0	\$26,358

### Non-Personnel Increase/Reduction Cost Summary

Non-Personnel Item	Unit Cost	Quantity	FY 2020 Request (\$000)	FY 2021 Net Annualization (change from 2020) (\$000)	FY 2022 Net Annualization (change from 2021) (\$000)
SIU Program			\$1,650	-\$760	
JWIP Program			\$10,000	\$0	
<b>Total Non-Personnel</b>			<b>\$11,650</b>	<b>-\$760</b>	

### Total Request for this Item

	Pos	Agt/ Atty	FTE	Personnel (\$000)	Non-Personnel (\$000)	Total (\$000)	FY 2021 Net Annualization (change from 2020) (\$000)	FY 2022 Net Annualization (change from 2021) (\$000)
Current Services	0	0	0	\$0	\$26,358	\$26,358		
Increases	0	0	0	\$0	\$11,650	\$11,650	-\$760	
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>\$38,008</b>	<b>\$38,008</b>	<b>-\$760</b>	

### Affected Crosscuts

International Activities

Transnational Crime

**This page intentionally left blank**

**Item Name: Cyber Investigations**

Strategic Goal: 3  
Strategic Objective: 3.2  
Budget Decision Unit(s): Domestic Enforcement  
Organizational Program: Domestic Field Offices, Special Operations Division

Program Increase: Positions 44 Agt/Atty: 8 FTE: 22 Dollars: \$11,722,000

**Description of Item**

The request provides \$11.7 million and 44 positions, including 8 special agents, to enhance key DEA programs to combat highly sophisticated Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) that use cyber capabilities to further their criminal enterprises. These resources would enhance DEA’s ability to combat criminal enterprises operating on or through the Internet, with specific focus in the following areas:

- \$1.86 million and 7 positions to establish a Virtual Currency Group.
- \$2.51 million and 8 positions to establish a Cyber Technical Group.
- \$3.58 million and 23 positions for cyber related investigative field support.
- \$2.67 million in support of the Counter Networking Group at SOD.
- \$1.08 million and 6 positions for cyber related activities at DEA’s Digital Evidence Lab.

**Justification**

America’s opioid epidemic is exacerbated by the availability of opioids, counterfeit pharmaceutical drugs, and other illegal drugs online. Additionally, multiple DEA investigations corroborate the extensive use of advanced technology by online traffickers. In one case, a San Francisco-based trafficker used a laptop with encryption software and two-factor authentication to access the Tor network. DEA needs a cadre of experts who can provide technical support to field elements in the development of cyber solutions for investigations of cyber-enabled TCOs in furtherance of DEA’s mission. This is a growing requirement that will affect all DEA investigations.

The Dark Web may be accessed for legitimate purposes or to conceal criminal or otherwise malicious activities. Drugs are estimated to account for around two-thirds of DarkNet market activity, and almost any type of drug is accessible to buyers with basic technical understanding within a few clicks, including new psychoactive substances. One of the most notorious sites formerly located on the Dark Web, *The Silk Road*, was an online global bazaar for illicit services and contraband, mainly drugs. Vendors of these illegal substances were located in more than ten countries around the world, and contraband goods and services were provided to more than 100,000 buyers. The founder and administrator of “Silk Road” earned approximately \$214 million U.S. currency (USC) over the lifetime of the online marketplace, according to Bitcoin transaction logs submitted as evidence in his trial.



The existence and availability of fentanyl compounds, Schedule I drugs, and illicitly manufactured pharmaceuticals on Dark Net Markets (DNM) will likely contribute further to the opioid and addiction crisis. Intelligence and evidence show the emergence of Virtual Currencies (VCs), to include Bitcoin and other “alt-currencies”, as another avenue for the laundering of illicit proceeds. Money brokers for drug cartels and transnational criminals have already exploited the VC space for international payments of illegal precursors and essential services to support their underlying criminal activities. For example, in Colombia brokers are instructed to buy bitcoin with narcotics proceeds in Colombian pesos at a ten percent discounted rate and transfer them to associates in the United States to be sold in U.S. currency (USC) at a higher rate. The profit made from these transactions is sent back to Colombia via virtual currency.

This unprecedented and ever-evolving use of technology to move money enables TCOs to circumvent the legal system and make interdiction efforts extremely difficult. It nearly eliminates the risk of detection by removing the necessity of using couriers, conveyances, and all other means associated to traditional bulk-cash smuggling. Eliminating third parties also reduces all other expenses, which results in an increased profit. In addition, converting narcotics proceeds into virtual currency has the potential of further maximizing net gains for TCOs given the fluctuation in value. In November 2017, the average price for Bitcoin was around \$8,000 USC. *Coin Desk*, a news site specializing in bitcoin and digital currencies, reported that Bitcoin reached an all-time high of \$19,783 in USC in December 2017. These drastic spikes can make traffickers even more profitable when buying at a discounted rate and selling at a higher market value.

Trade in illicit drugs on DNMs is a dynamic area subject to volatility as marketplaces appear and disappear. Because of this, established and proven intelligence-led policing approaches similar to DEA’s strategy which relies heavily on intelligence driven investigations will be important components to effectively combat this phenomenon. For example, in 2016 DEA was able to arrest one of the most prolific Dark Web fentanyl distributors in the United States. The distribution network operated by purchasing fentanyl and pill presses over the dark web from China and then subsequently selling counterfeit pills containing fentanyl over the dark web. The suspect used a close network of friends and associates in and around Salt Lake City to package and mail thousands of orders for customers across all 50 states. The investigation led to the seizure of \$1.2 million USC; \$2 million virtual currency (VC); 750 grams of fentanyl powder; 400 grams of alprazolam; approximately 200,000 counterfeit oxycodone pills containing fentanyl; approximately 100,000 counterfeit alprazolam pills; and four commercial-grade pill presses.

DEA’s case load with a nexus to the internet is already growing; however, limited cyber resources stunt investigative growth and force agents to rely on outside agency assistance to uncover the full scope of an internet investigation. The development of DNMs and the drugs that are sold on them pose a significant threat to the health and security of citizens and communities across the U.S. The National Cyber-Forensics and Training Alliance estimates there are between 100-150 fentanyl vendors currently operating on the dark web. To combat this, DEA is requesting additional funding to enhance its cyber investigative capabilities in an effort to stay abreast of change, remain relevant, and provide efficient and effective operational assistance to the field.

**Cyber Enforcement Groups: \$7.95M and 38 positions (including 8 Special Agents)**

This request creates two new sections at DEA headquarters plus cyber support in each of DEA's domestic field divisions. Collectively, the positions requested would be responsible for the management of DEA's cyber related investigations by focusing on the organizations that use cyber capabilities to further their criminal enterprise.

**Virtual Currency Section: \$1.86M and 7 positions (including 4 Special Agents)**

In January 2016, DEA established the Virtual Currency Initiative (VCI). The objective of this initiative was to oversee the purchasing of VCs for undercover drug buys. Over time the VCI expanded its role significantly as demand from the field increased dramatically. The often borderless nature of VC investigations places an even greater emphasis on coordination between HQ, domestic and foreign offices, the inter-agency community, counterparts worldwide, and the "fintech" industry. The VCI team provides detailed step-by-step technical assistance related to wallet use and deployment for VC seizures, high level "hands-on" training on all facets of DNM-cryptocurrency related investigations, advanced block chain analytics stemming from case evidence and intelligence received, guidance with evolving investigative and seizure protocols, establishment and monitoring of undercover VC accounts held at exchangers and liaison with industry and the inter-agency community.

With the requested funding DEA will convert the VCI into the VC-Cyber Section (VCCS), bringing together all of DEA's relevant entities involved in the VC arena, including: the Office of Financial Investigations (OGF), the Special Operations Division (SOD), the Office of Investigative Technology (ST), the Office of Forensic Sciences (SF), and the Office of Training (TR). The overarching goal of creating the VCCS is to ensure that all field elements receive the benefits, resources and expertise available to DEA in the most comprehensive and efficient manner. In addition to new positions, the requested funding would purchase Bitcoin and support other miscellaneous expenses associated with the new section.

**Cyber Technical Section: \$2.51M and 8 positions (including 4 Special Agents)**

DEA needs a cadre of experts who can focus on countering unforeseen and emerging technical challenges in the cyber arena. Additionally, when deploying the types of tools needed to support cyber investigations, such as the Project Chameleon tool, DEA will also need hands-on technical experts to monitor, manage, and certify the supporting technical infrastructure. The Cyber Technical section would serve as the center of expertise to support DEA's growing need for technical guidance when conducting investigations in the cyber realm. The section's key tasks would be providing support to investigations, coordinating with other DEA stakeholders, providing training and outreach, developing and managing cyber capabilities, and maintaining strategic assessments of the latest cyber threats posed by TCOs. Non-personnel costs include: collaborating with vendors to engineer cyber investigative capabilities; cyber personnel from the Department of Defense (DOD) to be detailed to DEA to train ST and DEA field personnel; contract support; TDY/training/conferences; and IT equipment to train personnel on the latest Cyber Investigations techniques.

### Field Division Cyber Support: \$3.58M and 23 positions

The request provides dedicated analysts in each of DEA's 23 field divisions who will serve as technical support to division personnel in pursuing cyber related leads and online investigative activities. DEA needs robust and efficient deconfliction in the cyber arena, not only for criminal identifiers, but also undercover personas, virtual currency transactions, and other emerging areas. These positions would fill the gap in divisional cyber focused enforcement initiatives. Currently, many divisions do not have dedicated cyber units. These positions would bolster divisional cyber capabilities particularly in divisions that might have recently experienced a shortage in analytical positions. Additionally, the positions would coordinate regularly with both the Technical and Virtual Currency sections at headquarters.

### Counter Network Working Group (CNWG): \$2.67M

The Counter Network Working Group (CNWG) pulls bulk DEA data into analytical tools, combining that with data from other sources, to develop leads and insights based on high-level analysis of bulk data. As a result of increasing communication encryption and Law Enforcement's diminished ability to conduct interceptions, alternate methods of targeting are necessary. Bolstered by CNWG successes to date, SOD's need for CNWG to support field operations has dramatically increased. Further, the ever increasing opioid epidemic has placed an urgent need for SOD to provide immediate operational support to all field elements as well. The CNWG has identified trends and methods that were previously not observed to include the identification of Chinese Organized Crime (COC) as the dominating presence in TCO criminal money laundering. Request supports contract data scientists and data analysts, analytical platform development and implementation, and operational funding to support the existing SOD based CNWG. These resources will enhance SOD's ability to analyze criminal networks and implement more precise targeted strategies.

### Digital Evidence Laboratory: \$1.08M and 6 Digital Evidence Examiners

DEA's Special Testing and Research Laboratory is the premier drug intelligence laboratory in the world. All seized evidence worldwide is sent to the Special Testing Lab for analysis and recovery of deleted files. The Computer Specialists located at the lab are able to retrieve data from such technologies as tapes, disks, cameras, electronic organizers, cell phones, copiers, faxes, watches, etc. The requested funding supports the research and development of a tool (Protocol Analyzer) for use in Dark Web/Cyber related cases. Currently, DEA lacks techniques that would provide access to encrypted Dark Web servers and supporting infrastructure. The requested funding helps address these programmatic shortcomings and specifically includes six Digital Evidence Examiners specializing in forensic analysis of digital evidence. Currently, DEA's Digital Evidence Lab has a backlog of approximately 1,150 exhibits waiting for analysis; the requested Evidence Examiners will also address this backlog.

## **Impact on Performance**

Currently, the VCI is supporting 92 DEA investigations and two full Attorney General Exempted Operations (AGEOs) related to VC money laundering and DNM investigations. Since inception, the VCI has assisted in the seizure of over \$50 million in assets to include approximately \$30 million in VC alone. The VCI has had specific successes in assisting the field in the identification and seizure of cryptocurrency proceeds. The process is inherently complex and consumes an inordinate amount of resources and time to complete. Often this forensic support is done telephonically rather than via remote computer access or in an on-scene capacity. In a recent DEA Baltimore District Office case VCI staff deployed to the field to provide technical assistance in identifying and sweeping VC funds from seized computers. In that instance, various cryptocurrencies valued at approximately \$20 million were seized from examined computers. Several VC wallets were utilized by the target requiring complex forensics and delicate use of sweeping wallets for value transfer to the U.S. Marshals Service.

## Funding

### Base Funding

FY 2018 Enacted				2019 Continuing Resolution				FY 2020 Current Services			
Pos	Agt/ Atty	FTE	\$(000)	Pos	Agt/ Atty	FTE	\$(000)	Pos	Agt/ Atty	FTE	\$(000)
49	0	49	\$9,717	49	0	49	\$9,717	49	0	49	\$9,717

### Personnel Increase Cost Summary

Type of Position/Series	Modular Cost per Position	Number of Positions Requested	FY 2020 Request (\$000)	FY 2021 Net Annualization (change from 2020) (\$000)	FY 2022 Net Annualization (change from 2021) (\$000)
SA	\$262	8	\$2,096	\$25	\$663
IA	\$120	4	\$480	\$150	\$237
ITS	\$156	30	\$4,680	\$222	\$2,124
PA	\$72	2	\$144	\$97	\$118
<b>Total Personnel</b>		<b>44</b>	<b>\$7,400</b>	<b>\$494</b>	<b>\$3,142</b>

### Non-Personnel Increase/Reduction Cost Summary

Non-Personnel Item	Unit Cost	Quantity	FY 2020 Request (\$000)	FY 2021 Net Annualization (change from 2020) (\$000)	FY 2022 Net Annualization (change from 2021) (\$000)
Operational Funding			\$450	-	-
Crypto Currency Training			\$205	-	-
Purchase of Bitcoin			\$45	-	-
Equipment			\$290	-\$219	-
Contract Support			\$300	-	-
Counter Network Working Group			\$2,672	-	-
Cyber Investigative Training			\$360	-	-
<b>Total Non-Personnel</b>			<b>\$4,322</b>	<b>-\$219</b>	<b>-</b>

Total Request for this Item

	Pos	Agt/ Atty	FTE	Personnel (\$000)	Non- Personnel (\$000)	Total (\$000)	FY 2021 Net Annualization (change from 2020) (\$000)	FY 2022 Net Annualization (change from 2021) (\$000)
Current Services	49	-	49	\$8,652	\$1,064	\$9,717	-	-
Increases	44	8	22	\$7,400	\$4,322	\$11,722	\$275	\$3,142
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>\$16,052</b>	<b>\$5,386</b>	<b>\$21,439</b>	<b>\$275</b>	<b>\$3,142</b>

Affected Crosscuts

Cyber Crime

Drugs

**This page intentionally left blank**

**Item Name: Heroin Enforcement Groups**

Strategic Goal: 3  
Strategic Objective: 3.2  
Budget Decision Unit(s): Domestic Enforcement  
  
Organizational Program: Domestic Field Offices

Program Increase: Positions 49 Agt/Atty: 35 FTE: 25 Dollars: \$11,140,000

**Description of Item**

Drug overdoses are now the leading cause of injury-related deaths in the United States, eclipsing deaths from motor vehicle crashes or firearms (37,757 motor vehicle deaths in 2017; 36,252 firearm deaths in 2017).<sup>15</sup> According to initial estimates provided by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), there were more than 70,200 overdose deaths in 2017 or approximately 198 per day. Heroin accounts for 15,958 (22 percent) of the overdose deaths in 2017, and is often laced with fentanyl.<sup>16</sup> Over 49,000 (70 percent) of these deaths were caused by prescription opioids, fentanyl or fentanyl analogues.<sup>17</sup> Fentanyl and fentanyl analogues are potent Schedule II synthetic opioids that present a serious risk of overdose and death by those who misuse these substances. Fentanyl is 50 times stronger than heroin and is sold both alone and laced into other drugs such as heroin. The smallest amount ingested can cause overdose.<sup>18</sup>

In support of the Administration’s efforts to address the heroin epidemic and the opioid crisis, including the Executive Order Establishing the Commission on Combating Drug Addiction and the Opioid Crisis, DEA is requesting \$11.1 million and 49 positions (35 SA).

- \$11.1 million to deploy five new heroin/opioid enforcement teams to the Field Divisions (FD) with the highest threat level.

**Justification**

According to a March 6, 2018 report from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the U.S. opioid overdose epidemic is still worsening; emergency department visits for suspected opioid overdoses increased 30% in 45 states between July 2016 and September 2017, and all five U.S. regions experienced rate increases: 70% in the Midwest, 40% in the West, 21%

---

<sup>15</sup> Rose A. Rudd, Noah Aleshire, Jon E. Zibbell, & R. Matthew Gladden, “Increases in Drug and Opioid Overdose Deaths – United States.” *2000-2014 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report* 64, (2016).

<sup>16</sup> National Institute on Drug Abuse, “Overdose Death Rates,” *National Institute on Drug Abuse*, (2017).

<sup>17</sup> Josh Katz, “The First Count of Fentanyl Deaths in 2016: Up to 540% in Three Years,” *The New York Times*, (2017).

<sup>18</sup> Louis J. Milione, “Testimony before the Subcommittee of Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House Representatives, for a Hearing on Treating the Opioid Epidemic: The State of Competition in the Markets for Addiction,” *U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration*, (2016).



in the Northeast, 20% in the Southwest, and 14% in the Southeast.<sup>19</sup> In 2016, forensic laboratories across the country submitted 56,530 fentanyl reports and 157,055 heroin reports<sup>20</sup> to the National Forensic Laboratory Information System (NFLIS) compared to 945 fentanyl and 151,690 reports in 2013.<sup>21</sup>

Mexican Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) pose the greatest criminal drug threat to the U.S. In the past 10 years, Mexico has significantly increased production of heroin, which subsequently reduces the drug's market price in the U.S. and makes it the drug of choice for many users. In 2017, heroin from Mexico accounted for 91 percent (by weight) of the heroin analyzed through the DEA's Heroin Signature Program (HSP).<sup>22</sup> Mexican TCOs are able to smuggle multi-ton quantities of illicit drugs to the country on a yearly basis by controlling lucrative smuggling corridors across the U.S. Southwest Border (SWB). In 2017, approximately 1,073 kilograms of heroin were seized in the San Diego corridor, a 59 percent increase over the total seized in 2016.<sup>23</sup> Once illicit drugs are smuggled across the SWB, they are delivered to consumer markets via transportation routes and distribution cells overseen by Mexican TCOs. Mexican TCOs also remain the main sources of drug supply for U.S. gangs. Gangs like the Latin Kings generate street-level sales as a result of their supply from TCOs. Further, 44 percent of the 2017 National Drug Threat Survey (NDTS) respondents nationwide affirm that heroin is the dominant drug threat in their area, superseding any other illicit drug. Funding will be used to place enforcement groups at strategic locations across the country to target TCOs and stem the flow of heroin and other drugs being funneled into the United States.

### **Heroin Enforcement Groups: \$11,140,000 and 49 positions (including 35 Special Agents)**

DEA created the *Staffing Allocation Model (SAM)* that helps to align agent resources to offices based on the risk profile of an area. The model developed a risk profile of offices based on data from 40 external and internal variables (e.g., drug deaths, violent crime, and drug seizure data) determined to be the most important by the Special Agents in Charge. This model helped identifying the best locations to place new Heroin Enforcement Teams (6 in FY 2017; 3 in FY 2018; and 8 in FY 2019 - proposed).

In 2017, 17 out of the 23 DEA Field Divisions indicated fentanyl was “more” available compared to the second half of 2016, demonstrating fentanyl use is increasing across all parts of the United States.<sup>24</sup> The requested funding will establish 5 new heroin enforcement groups to help combat the national drug epidemic. Enforcement groups will specifically address high-priority heroin-related enforcement efforts across the U.S. These efforts target the link between

---

<sup>19</sup> Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Emergency Department Data Show Rapid Increases in Opioid Overdoses,” *Centers for Disease Control and Prevention*, (2018).

<sup>20</sup> National Forensic Laboratory Information System, “NFLIS-Drug 2017 Annual Report,” *U.S. Department of Justice*, (2017), p. 3 – 7.

<sup>21</sup> National Forensic Laboratory Information System, “NFLIS-Drug 2013 Annual Report,” *U.S. Department of Justice*, (2013), p. 3 – 14.

<sup>22</sup> Drug Enforcement Administration, “2018 National Drug Threat Assessment,” *U.S. Department of Justice*, (2018), p. 18.

<sup>23</sup> *ibid*, p. 19.

<sup>24</sup> *ibid*, p. 22.

the cartels and the drug trafficking networks operating within the U.S., which is often made up of violent street gangs. By targeting this link, DEA can identify the full spectrum of the criminal network, including the street-level drug dealer, the distribution sources of supply, and the highest levels of the cartel leadership.

### **Impact on Performance**

Increasing DEA's number of heroin enforcement groups will improve performance through better targeting of drug traffickers in heavily affected areas through more investigations, arrests, revenue denied, and destruction of supply availability. DEA has responded to the rising heroin threat by increasing heroin-related enforcement efforts nationwide. The number of DEA cases involving heroin has increased steadily since 2007. In FY 2018, DEA opened over 4,378 heroin cases, an increase of 262 percent over the number opened in 2007 (1,211 cases). Additionally, heroin-related arrests increased 151 percent during that time (From 2,157 arrests in 2007 to 5,410 in 2017). Most of the heroin smuggled into the U.S. is brought overland across the SWB, with lesser amounts transported by couriers on commercial airlines. The SWB remains the primary entry point for heroin into the United States.

## Funding

### Base Funding

FY 2018 Enacted				2019 Continuing Resolution				FY 2020 Current Services			
Pos	Agt/Atty	FTE	\$(000)	Pos	Agt/Atty	FTE	\$(000)	Pos	Agt/Atty	FTE	\$(000)
62	32	62	\$20,533	62	32	62	\$20,533	182	138	182	\$52,224

### Personnel Increase Cost Summary

Type of Position/Series	Modular Cost per Position	Number of Positions Requested	FY 2020 Request (\$000)	FY 2021 Net Annualization (change from 2020) (\$000)	FY 2022 Net Annualization (change from 2021) (\$000)
SA	\$262,000	35	\$9,170	\$128	\$3,318
IA	\$120,000	3	\$360	\$112	\$178
PA	\$72,000	1	\$72	\$49	\$59
CH	\$274,000	3	\$822	-\$256	\$178
ITS	\$156,000	3	\$468	\$22	\$212
TC	\$62,000	4	\$248	\$136	\$4
<b>Total Personnel</b>		<b>49</b>	<b>\$11,140</b>	<b>\$191</b>	<b>\$3,942</b>

### Non-Personnel Increase/Reduction Cost Summary

Non-Personnel Item	Unit Cost	Quantity	FY 2020 Request (\$000)	FY 2021 Net Annualization (change from 2020) (\$000)	FY 2022 Net Annualization (change from 2021) (\$000)
<b>Total Non-Personnel</b>	-	-	-	-	-

### Total Request for this Item

	Pos	Agt/Atty	FTE	Personnel (\$000)	Non-Personnel (\$000)	Total (\$000)	FY 2021 Net Annualization (change from 2020) (\$000)	FY 2022 Net Annualization (change from 2021) (\$000)
Current Services	182	138	182	\$31,068	\$21,155	\$52,224	-	-
Increases	49	35	25	\$11,140	-	\$11,140	\$191	\$3,942
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>231</b>	<b>173</b>	<b>207</b>	<b>\$42,208</b>	<b>\$21,155</b>	<b>\$63,364</b>	<b>\$191</b>	<b>\$3,942</b>

## VI. Appendix

---

### DEA Appendix A: High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA)

#### FY 2020 BUDGET REQUEST

The FY 2020 request for the HIDTA program is \$254,000,000 which includes \$251,300,000 for grants to state, local, and tribal agencies, and transfers to Federal agencies participating in the 29 HIDTAs and up to \$2,700,000 to be used for auditing services and associated activities.<sup>25</sup>

The HIDTA program plays a key role in helping keep communities safe and supports a policy designed to increase the impact of government dollars by leveraging place-conscious planning and place-based programming. It is a regionally and locally managed program tied to a national mission. It principally supports drug supply reduction by bringing together and providing assistance to Federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies (LEAs) operating in areas determined to be critical drug trafficking regions of the United States.

The attached request for each HIDTA includes:

A justification that explains:

- (A) the reasons for the proposed funding level; how such funding level was determined based on a current assessment of the drug trafficking threat in each HIDTA;
  - (B) how such funding will ensure that the goals and objectives of each such area will be achieved; and
  - (C) how such funding supports the *Strategy*.
- (2) The amount of HIDTA funds used to investigate and prosecute organizations and individuals trafficking in methamphetamine in the prior calendar year and a description of how those funds were used.

Once the funding distribution has been approved, each HIDTA will propose to ONDCP initiatives designed to implement its strategy to address the threat identified in its region.

---

<sup>25</sup> With the recent inclusion of the Alaska HIDTA in fiscal year 2018, the HIDTA program now includes 29 regional HIDTAs.

## *Summary*

### **Alaska HIDTA**

#### (A) Threat Assessment

Alaska HIDTA (AK HIDTA) identifies heroin and methamphetamine as the top two drug threats in Alaska. This assessment is based on Federal, state, and local law enforcement drug seizure reporting. Specifically, in 2016, the FBI Safe Streets Task Force seized 11,976 grams of methamphetamine and 99,454 grams of heroin with a street value of \$3.6 million and \$49.7 million, respectively. The rise in demand for heroin as a drug of choice is likely due to its increasing availability and affordability in Alaska. Heroin is associated both directly and indirectly with increased violence and criminal activities, such as drug possession and sales, robbery, and prostitution.

Alaska serves as an importation state, with most drugs entering by mail, body couriers, or the Alaska Marine Highway System (AMHS). Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) have employed drug mules from outside of Alaska to smuggle illegal substances into the state. There is no law enforcement presence on the AMHS, and vehicles and passengers are not routinely inspected prior to boarding the ferry, allowing drug traffickers and smugglers to exploit the region virtually undetected. Distribution of drugs from the regional hubs to the outlying villages is achieved primarily by air carrier.

#### (B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives

AK HIDTA consists of enforcement, support, prosecution, and intelligence initiatives. The enforcement initiatives include the Southeast Alaska Cities Against Drugs Task Force, Fairbanks Area-wide Narcotics Task Force, Southcentral Area-wide Narcotics Task Force, and a Domestic Highway Enforcement initiative that are all comprised of Federal, state, and local law enforcement personnel.

The enforcement initiatives will target significant DTOs through intelligence-led investigations with a focus on distribution, interdiction, financial activity, and drug-related violence within Alaska. The ISC will provide support for LEAs in their efforts to identify, disrupt, and/or dismantle DTOs by collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information on the targets of investigations.

#### (C) Support of the *National Drug Control Strategy*

AK HIDTA will support the *Strategy* through collaborative efforts of its task force initiatives disrupting and dismantling DTOs and money laundering organizations (MLOs) that distribute illicit drugs in the AOR, as well as other areas of the United States.

#### (1) Methamphetamine

Law enforcement reports indicate that DTOs import and distribute methamphetamine in larger quantities than any other illicit drug, with the majority of methamphetamine originating in Mexico. AK HIDTA initiatives will strive to combat the existence of methamphetamine production and distribution in the AOR and beyond. The AK HIDTA does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.

## Appalachia HIDTA

### (A) Threat Assessment

The Appalachia HIDTA (AHIDTA) region faces substantial threats from the distribution and use of heroin, trafficking, and misuse of prescription drugs, methamphetamine production and use, trafficking of cocaine and synthetic drugs, and drug-related violence. In recent years, the prevalence of crystal methamphetamine (ice) has emerged as a notable threat to the region. AHIDTA is also a significant source of domestically-produced marijuana and is often a destination for foreign-produced marijuana. Heroin, cocaine/crack cocaine, pharmaceutical drugs, marijuana, and methamphetamine are transported from areas such as Detroit, Michigan; Columbus, Ohio; Atlanta, Georgia; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; parts of Indiana; North Carolina; Alabama; Missouri; and Mexico. Eight major interstate systems span the AHIDTA region, allowing for ease of access by roadway into, throughout, and out of major cities known to be major drug distribution points in the United States. Subsequently, transportation to and from the AHIDTA area is conducted primarily by private and commercial vehicle, as well as parcel services companies and the United States Postal Service.

### (B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives

AHIDTA is instrumental in fostering cooperation and collaboration among Federal, state, and local LEAs. The Executive Board develops and manages the AHIDTA strategy and its initiatives, focusing resources on the region's primary drug threats and ensuring the achievement of desired outcomes. AHIDTA provides the support, resources, and coordination necessary to facilitate cooperation among its collaborative initiatives. In all, AHIDTA has fostered cooperative and effective working relationships among more than 100 Federal, state, and local agencies to achieve the common goals of disrupting and dismantling DTOs and reducing drug demand. The AHIDTA Executive Board and its subcommittees provide program oversight, policy guidance, and regional coordination, and it serve as a forum for regional planning for all AHIDTA participating agencies.

### (C) Support of the *National Drug Control Strategy*

AHIDTA supports the *Strategy* in a number of ways. Its task forces disrupt and dismantle DTOs and MLOs that distribute heroin, diverted prescription drugs, marijuana, methamphetamine, and cocaine. The task forces also reduce large-scale marijuana production and shipments of large amounts of marijuana to other areas of the country.

#### (1) Methamphetamine

AHIDTA continues to battle a significant methamphetamine threat. While the threat primarily consists of small, unsophisticated, one-step method laboratories, larger labs have been encountered and dismantled. AHIDTA does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking. However, task force initiatives will continue to seek out and eliminate clandestine laboratories and prosecute their operators.

## Atlanta-Carolinas HIDTA

### (A) Threat Assessment

The Atlanta-Carolina HIDTA (AC HIDTA) region is a major distribution center for DTOs, particularly Mexican DTOs (MDTOs) and their associated MLOs that supply the eastern United States. DTOs distribute illicit drugs from the AC HIDTA area of responsibility (AOR) to other major metropolitan areas, including Baltimore, Maryland; Boston, Massachusetts; Cincinnati and Columbus, Ohio; Columbia, South Carolina; Gainesville, Orlando, and Pensacola, Florida; Indianapolis, Indiana; Knoxville, Tennessee; Louisville, Kentucky; and Norfolk, Virginia. The supply lines reach as far as Detroit, Michigan, and New York, New York. Interstate 85 is the major artery for this distribution.

### (B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives

Utilizing strategic, tactical, and predictive intelligence, AC HIDTA has implemented a three-part geographical, functional, and operational focus on command and control elements of DTOs and MLOs operating within the AC HIDTA AOR. Established commingled Federal, state, local, and tribal task force initiatives foster collaborative partnerships with more than 99 participating agencies. Additionally, more than 500 LEAs participate in training provided by AC HIDTA in Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina.

### (C) Support of the *National Drug Control Strategy*

To accomplish AC HIDTA's mission and achieve the goals of the *Strategy*, the Executive Board will focus resources on initiatives that have a direct relationship to:

- disrupting the market for illegal drugs by disrupting and/or dismantling DTOs that transport and distribute drugs and related illicit proceeds;
- increasing intelligence sharing and coordination among initiatives and all regional LEAs; and
- bringing together agency representatives from law enforcement, prevention, and treatment to meet and discuss ways to reduce the impact of drug abuse and provide expert advice regarding policy and legislative decisions through the AC HIDTA Prevention Initiative.

### (1) Methamphetamine

The methamphetamine market in Georgia continues to be dominated by Mexican-sourced product, and supplies have increased over the past year. Law enforcement sources believe that the readily available supply of methamphetamine results from increased production levels in Mexico. This development has allowed Mexico-based supply sources to produce methamphetamine with a higher profit margin and avoid acquiring the product from another source country. This development has resulted in the price of wholesale and retail quantities of methamphetamine to decrease over the past year, and it appear to be attracting new users. Investigators also report that methamphetamine in Georgia is typically transported in liquid form and locally converted into crystalline form. The methamphetamine threat in the Carolinas differs slightly from that in Georgia. In North and South Carolina, methamphetamine (both domestically and foreign-produced) poses an increasing threat. Although liquid methamphetamine is rarely encountered, the number of conversion laboratories has increased

during the past year. Also, locally produced methamphetamine is expected to increase to capitalize on the expanding methamphetamine market in the Carolinas. AC HIDTA does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.

### **Central Florida HIDTA**

#### **(A) Threat Assessment**

In 2017, heroin/fentanyl ranked as the highest drug threats in the region, followed by cocaine and methamphetamine. All Central Florida HIDTA (CFHIDTA) initiatives continue to report high availability levels of heroin in their respective areas. Cocaine transshipped through Puerto Rico via mail parcels is making a larger impact on cocaine supply than last year. Mexican production and distribution of methamphetamine continues to slowly displace local production in CFHIDTA counties. MDTOs pose the greatest organizational drug threat to the region and continue to maintain their dominance over methamphetamine, cocaine, and some heroin distribution. These groups are organized and extensively networked with other MDTOs in the Atlanta-Carolina HIDTA region and along the Southwest border (SWB). Distribution occurs locally throughout the Central Florida region, primarily in the Orange, Osceola, Polk, Volusia, and Hillsborough counties.

#### **(B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives**

CFHIDTA fosters cooperative and effective working relationships among Federal, state, and local agencies to achieve the common goals of dismantling or disrupting DTOs/MLOs and reducing drug demand.

#### **(C) Support of the *National Drug Control Strategy***

CFHIDTA supports *Strategy* goals through robust efforts to reduce drug availability and crime by effectively dismantling and disrupting DTOs and MLOs impacting Central Florida and other areas of the United States.

### **(3) Methamphetamine**

Methamphetamine-related overdose deaths are increasing in the CFHIDTA region. In 2017, several initiatives aggressively attacked and successfully exploited the command and control communications of MDTOs distributing methamphetamine across the AOR. Specifically, 130 methamphetamine labs were dismantled in the region compared to 159 in 2016. All of the 2017 clandestine methamphetamine laboratory seizures in the CFHIDTA region continue to be one-pot laboratories. CFHIDTA does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.



## **Central Valley California HIDTA**

### **(A) Threat Assessment**

Central Valley California HIDTA's (CVC HIDTA) most serious drug threats are methamphetamine and marijuana, followed by heroin and opioid prescription drugs, cocaine, synthetics, and other drugs. Nationally, the 12-county region is a leading source of methamphetamine. The area was once known for an abundance of precursor-based methamphetamine labs that are now all but nonexistent thanks to effective regulation of precursor chemicals and diligent enforcement. In 2017, initiatives dismantled no precursor-based methamphetamine labs. Methamphetamine encountered in the region is now smuggled into the United States from Mexico, either as finished product or in liquid form that is converted to ice at clandestine conversion labs. Through the third quarter of 2018, initiatives seized three such labs, including two capable of producing over 10 pounds of ice per month. During the same period, task forces seized nearly 1,770 pounds of methamphetamine.

The region is infamous for high-grade marijuana, cultivated both indoors and outdoors. Industrial-scale outdoor marijuana cultivation takes place on public and tribal lands administered by the United States Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management, National Park Service, and several Native American tribes. Large-scale grows also occur on private property. Of the nearly 3.4 million marijuana plants eradicated in the United States during 2017 under the DEA's Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppression program, nearly 2 million – or more than 58% – were eradicated by the CVC HIDTA-supported initiatives.

Undocumented aliens, many of whom are armed, frequently tend large cannabis plots. These plots can pose a serious danger to people using public lands for recreation, as well as those employed in forest-based occupations. Assaults and homicides occur in the grow sites, usually a consequence of crop theft. The environmental damage caused by marijuana cultivation is profound since pesticides, herbicides, and fertilizers used by the growers threaten water quality and wildlife, and clear-cutting and water diversion erode and disrupt the water table. Growers abandon hundreds of miles of irrigation lines and tons of equipment and trash at grow sites.

A persistent threat within the CVC HIDTA AOR is the occurrence of tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) extraction labs, most of which use the butane extraction method. These labs use the volatile solvent to produce a concentrated, highly potent cannabis product known as wax, shatter, butter, honey oil, or butane hash oil (BHO). The labs are usually not discovered until after they explode, often causing extensive property damage, horrific injuries, and even death. BHO lab accident victims account for more than 5% of patients admitted to the Central Valley's two regional burn centers. In fact, the centers track BHO burn victim information as a discrete data category. From 2013 to 2017, the two regional burn centers treated 125 BHO burn victims at an average cost of \$435,000 per patient. During the first three quarters of 2018, task forces encountered 34 THC extraction labs. In all of 2017, the number was 40. Clearly, THC extraction labs present a serious and persistent threat to the region.

## (B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives

CVC HIDTA applies a multi-agency task force model to leverage diverse authorities, expertise, and resources to address DTOs. Approximately 157 Federal, state, county, and municipal law enforcement members representing 43 agencies participate in the CVC HIDTA initiatives. The task forces align according to region or drug type. However, there is flexibility in order to address the poly-drug nature of DTOs in the area. A network of criminal intelligence analysts support task force efforts – some embedded within initiatives and others working at the ISC.

## (C) Support of the *National Drug Control Strategy*

To accomplish CVC HIDTA’s mission and achieve the goals of the *Strategy*, the Executive Board will allocate resources to initiatives with a direct relationship to:

- disrupting the market for illegal drugs by disrupting and/or dismantling DTOs that transport and distribute drugs and the illicit proceeds from the sale of drugs (CVC HIDTA disrupted or dismantled 57 DTOs and MLOs in 2017);
- improving investigative effectiveness by providing quality case support and predictive, actionable intelligence through the ISC and its subsystems; and
- strengthening the relationship between law enforcement and prevention organizations through continued collaboration with the other California HIDTAs on a state-wide prevention initiative.

### (1) Methamphetamine

In 2017, CVC HIDTA’s initiatives dismantled no precursor-based methamphetamine labs. Methamphetamine encountered in the region is now smuggled into the United States from Mexico, either as finished product or in liquid form that is subsequently converted to ice at clandestine conversion labs. Through the third quarter of 2018, initiatives seized three such labs, including two capable of producing over 10 pounds of ice per month. During the same period, task forces seized nearly 1,770 pounds of methamphetamine. CVC HIDTA does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.

## **Chicago HIDTA**

### (A) Threat Assessment

Chicago’s geographic location, unique demographics, and MDTO presence, combined with its role as a principal national transportation and financial mecca, have distinguished Illinois as a “non-traditional border state,” particularly as it relates to illicit drug trafficking. The majority of illicit drugs reaching the United States are coming across the SWB, a large portion of which is destined for the Chicago hub, with some to be consumed locally and the remainder to be transshipped elsewhere throughout the country. Within Chicago’s culturally diverse community, MDTOs dominate the transportation and wholesale distribution of illicit drugs since they have developed relationships with Chicago gangs that control mid-level and retail-level distribution. The partnership between the two groups results in expansive poly-drug distribution networks operating throughout the Chicago HIDTA region.

The distribution and use of heroin and fentanyl-laced heroin, and the associated overdose deaths, are the major threats in the region. Escalated demand for pharmaceuticals, increased marijuana availability, and gang violence are also areas of primary concern.

Organized criminal street gangs are the primary retail distributors of illicit drugs. These gangs regularly engage in violent criminal activities to protect their drug supplies, distribution territories, and illicit drug proceeds. These criminal organizations are continuing their incursion into outlying areas and are becoming increasingly problematic for suburban law enforcement.

(B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives

Chicago HIDTA continues to foster cooperative and effective working relationships among Federal, state, and local LEAs in order to eliminate or reduce drug trafficking and its harmful consequences. This includes coordinated efforts to reduce the production, manufacturing, distribution, transportation, and use of illegal drugs, as well as the attendant laundering of drug proceeds.

(C) Support of the *National Drug Control Strategy*

To accomplish Chicago HIDTA's mission and achieve the goals of the *Strategy*, the Executive Board will allocate and focus HIDTA resources on initiatives that have a direct relationship to:

- disrupting the market for illegal drugs by disrupting and/or dismantling the DTOs that transport and distribute drugs and the related illicit proceeds;
- increasing intelligence sharing and coordination among the initiatives and all LEAs in Illinois and the other regions that are impacted by the illegal drug trade emanating from the Chicago HIDTA AOR; and
- seeking ways to enhance its relationship with community organizations, educational institutions, and other organizations engaged in drug education, prevention, and treatment activities.

(1) Methamphetamine

With the high availability and low cost of other narcotics in Chicago, demand for methamphetamine is relatively low. Methamphetamine accounted for less than 2% of drug seized in the Chicago HIDTA AOR. Chicago HIDTA does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.

## Gulf Coast HIDTA

### (A) Threat Assessment

Methamphetamine's continued increase in availability, demand, distribution, and transportation makes it the primary drug threat in the Gulf Coast HIDTA (GC HIDTA) region. The one-pot production method, also referred to as "shake and bake," has traditionally been favored by local methamphetamine producers because it requires fewer ingredients and can be easily created inside a plastic container. To circumvent precursor laws limiting purchasing quantities, many methamphetamine producers travel to out-of-state pharmacies, multiple local pharmacies, and pay multiple individuals to make purchases. These methods to evade detection force law enforcement to counter with their own tactics to disrupt methamphetamine production.

Fentanyl and other synthetic opioids are considered the second greatest drug threat to the region. In recent years, fentanyl has been found more frequently in samples of heroin and counterfeit pharmaceuticals, and reports of fentanyl overdoses outside major cities of the GC HIDTA AOR indicate that its use, both alone and as a cutting agent, have become more commonplace. Treatment and prevention professionals similarly rated fentanyl as a significant drug threat, with 28% reporting it as their primary concern. In addition to methamphetamine, fentanyl, and other synthetic opioids, the diversion, abuse, and misuse of controlled prescription drugs (CPDs) remain a significant problem in the area.

### (B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives

GC HIDTA seeks to promote an effective working relationship among and between its law enforcement initiatives through information sharing to ensure a coordinated response to the drug threat, thereby realizing an environment through which participating agencies may achieve the goals of disrupting and dismantling DTOs and reduce drug demand by focusing on specific drug threat elements unique to their respective areas.

### (C) Support of the *National Drug Control Strategy*

GC HIDTA will continue to support the goals of the *Strategy* by reducing illicit drug availability and its harmful consequences within its designated areas, creating and maintaining intelligence-driven task forces, and supporting infrastructure designed to target, disrupt, and eliminate DTOs impacting the region and beyond.

#### (1) Methamphetamine

According to the Gulf Coast HIDTA Drug Survey, respondents listed methamphetamine as the drug that contributed the most to violent crime, property crime, and law enforcement resources used. The majority of law enforcement respondents claimed a decrease in the number of methamphetamine production and conversion laboratories encountered. This is due to the idea that methamphetamine in the region is thought to originate from Mexico as drug cartels can produce vast quantities of the drug at a higher purity and lower cost than domestically-produced methamphetamine. GC HIDTA does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.

## Hawaii HIDTA

### (A) Threat Assessment

The trafficking and use of methamphetamine, the misuse of diverted pharmaceuticals, and the production and cultivation of marijuana pose the greatest illicit drug threats to the Hawaii HIDTA AOR. Organizations comprising individuals of Asian, Polynesian, Caucasian, and Hispanic descent control most methamphetamine distribution activities in Hawaii. Methamphetamine is transported into the state from the continental United States – primarily California, Nevada, Arizona, and Washington. Occasionally, methamphetamine is transported to Hawaii from Mexico via the continental United States.

Intelligence indicates there are small groups of individuals, some of whom work with one another in a coordinated manner, who obtain pharmaceuticals from physicians and pharmacies for personal use, as well as for distribution. DTOs are also known to solicit users, as well as other disenfranchised members of the community, to obtain pharmaceuticals from physicians known to write prescriptions when there is no legitimate physician/patient relationship. These individuals then illegally fill the prescription at a pharmacy and keeps a portion of the prescription for personal use or sells it to others.

Marijuana has been readily available in Hawaii since medical marijuana legislation passed in 2000. This drug flourishes agriculturally in Hawaii's tropical environment, robust water sources, and fertile soil. The drug is both cultivated locally and transported to Hawaii from the continental United States. Marijuana is routinely grown indoors and outdoors on public or private lands. In addition, recent intelligence indicates that wax, a marijuana concentrate, is being produced and trafficked in Hawaii.

### (B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives

Hawaii HIDTA has a clear mission for its law enforcement and intelligence components and fosters cooperative and effective working relationships between all of Hawaii's Federal, state, and local LEAs. These relationships are demonstrated in the collocated and commingled law enforcement environment of personnel who are strategically aligned into task forces that focus on both long- and short-term multijurisdictional investigations, complex money laundering investigations, violent offender and fugitive apprehensions, border interdiction, and marijuana eradication. Hawaii HIDTA pursues an intelligence-led policing approach within its intelligence components and applies an analytical intelligence cycle to ensure that priorities can be established to address its most pressing law enforcement threats in a focused manner.

### (C) Support of the *National Drug Control Strategy*

To accomplish Hawaii HIDTA's mission and achieve the goals of the *Strategy*, the Executive Board will allocate and focus resources on initiatives with a direct relationship to:

- disrupting the market for illegal drugs by disrupting and/or dismantling the DTOs that transport and distribute drugs and the illicit proceeds from their sale;
- increasing intelligence sharing by continuing to invest heavily in a robust ISC;

- creating a stronger relationship between law enforcement and prevention organizations; and
- working with community stakeholders to bring to light, analyze, and deliver an education/prevention message relating to the emerging trend of prescription drugs and pharmaceutical abuse.

(1) Methamphetamine

Methamphetamine is widely available throughout the Hawaii HIDTA AOR. In 2017, task forces removed 95 kilograms of ice with a wholesale value estimated at \$2.7 million. Initiatives did not dismantle any methamphetamine labs in 2017. Hawaii HIDTA does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.

**Houston HIDTA**

(A) Threat Assessment

The threat from illicit drug trafficking and associated violence within the Houston HIDTA region remains high, in large part due to its close proximity to the SWB, as well as its seaports and national highway infrastructure. As a result, the region is one of the most significant distribution and transshipment areas for the variety of illegal drugs trafficked from Mexico into the United States. It is also a primary consolidation point for bulk cash smuggled back across the border. Therefore, Houston is one of the principal centers for drug activity in the country. Houston has experienced an increased threat from pharmaceutical diversion activities and methamphetamine availability, heightening the level of threat posed to the region and beyond. In addition to the imminent threat posed by the vast supply of illegal drugs moving through the region, drug-related violence continues to escalate, especially among the region's gangs. Gangs within the Houston HIDTA region continue to grow in strength and number. Their violence, often spurred by drug-related turf issues, is increasingly brutal and heightens the severity of the drug trade impact in the region.

(B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives

Houston HIDTA will continue to foster cooperative and effective working relationships among Federal, state, and local agencies that participate and/or operate in the Houston HIDTA region to achieve the common goals of disrupting and dismantling DTOs and reducing the demand for drugs.

(C) Support of the *National Drug Control Strategy*

To accomplish Houston HIDTA's mission and achieve the goals of the *Strategy*, the Executive Board will allocate and focus the HIDTA resources on initiatives that have a direct relationship to:

- dismantling or disrupting DTOs/MLOs, thereby disrupting the market for illegal drugs;
- implementing programs and activities that improve the effectiveness and coordination of agencies participating in the HIDTA;
- increasing intelligence sharing and coordination among the initiatives and all regional LEAs; and

- strengthening the relationship between law enforcement and prevention and treatment organizations.

(1) Methamphetamine

Methamphetamine remains Houston HIDTA’s most substantial drug threat. Mexican drug traffickers have persisted in their efforts to flood the region’s illicit drug market with methamphetamine over the past year, leading to a further reduction in price. Use continues to rise in the region because it is readily available at a decreasing cost. The Methamphetamine Initiative Group (MIG) was formed in 2001 in response to the rise of clandestine methamphetamine laboratories throughout the Houston region. This initiative was the first of its kind in Texas and continues to be the premier support group that deals with dismantling clandestine labs. In 2017, the MIG disrupted or dismantled 6 DTOs, while seizing over \$1.7 million in illicit drugs and dismantling 3 methamphetamine labs. Houston HIDTA does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.

**Indiana HIDTA**

(A) Threat Assessment

The drug threat in the Indiana HIDTA region has increased over the past year because of the rising availability of heroin, cocaine, CPDs, fentanyl, marijuana, and ice. The 2018 drug threat assessment is based on both 2017 seizures and 2018 surveys sent to law enforcement officers within the AOR and outside of the AOR (but within Indiana). Heroin and methamphetamine availability and use continue to increase throughout the region. Treatment facilities are reporting an increase of heroin-related admissions. Overdose deaths related to opioids, including heroin and fentanyl, have increased over the last few years. Based on survey responses from local police agencies within the AOR, cocaine and CPDs are an increasing and evolving threat. A prominent presence of DTOs remain in the region that have direct links to Chicago and the SWB. These DTOs supply most of the heroin, methamphetamine, marijuana, cocaine, and ice to the area. High-potency marijuana is also readily available. Crack cocaine is an isolated threat, especially in the northern cities of Gary, Hammond, and east Chicago.

Key issues identified in the Indiana HIDTA region include the following:

- Heroin remains the number one drug threat in the Indiana HIDTA AOR. Heroin availability is increasing in Lake, LaPorte, Marion, and Porter Counties, contributing to rising levels of heroin use, treatment admissions, and overdoses.
- Fentanyl ranked as the second highest drug threat in the AOR. Availability has increased in 2017.
- CPD availability and misuse, especially prescription opioids, are increasing throughout the AOR and contributing to a recent surge in drug overdose deaths.
- The availability of synthetics is moderate and has remained the same over last year. Both inside and outside of the AOR, synthetics ranked fifth.
- Cocaine was ranked fourth both within and outside of the AOR, and availability has remained the same in 2017

- Marijuana in Lake, LaPorte, Marion, and Porter Counties has resulted in greater availability. While marijuana seizures were 38% of the total drugs seized in 2017, the survey seemed to show that marijuana is not a major drug threat.
- Chicago-based street gangs continue to expand into the region. Gangs are involved in the trafficking of drugs and firearms between northwest Indiana, Indianapolis, and Chicago.

(B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives

Indiana HIDTA works with 36 state and local jurisdictions, 14 law enforcement initiatives, and 7 Federal agencies to bring a coordinated law enforcement effort to the HIDTA region in an effort to address drug trafficking.

(C) Support of the *National Drug Control Strategy*

Indiana HIDTA supports the goals of the *Strategy* to reduce drug availability and use by creating intelligence-driven drug task force initiatives whose objectives are to reduce/eliminate domestic drug trafficking and its harmful effects through the enhancement and coordination of enforcement efforts among Federal, state, and local LEAs.

(1) Methamphetamine

Methamphetamine demand is increasing. With the exception of Marion County, Indiana HIDTA has not seen large amounts within its AOR. However, departments outside of its AOR ranked methamphetamine as the third highest drug threat and seizures of methamphetamine have been second only to marijuana in Marian County. Indiana HIDTA does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.

**Liberty Mid-Atlantic HIDTA**

(A) Threat Assessment

Liberty Mid-Atlantic HIDTA (LMA HIDTA) is contained within the fifth largest metropolitan area in the United States and is home to 5.1 million people. Approximately 100 million additional people live within a 1-day drive of the Philadelphia/Camden region, a key drug transshipment zone along the Interstate 95 Northeast Corridor. LMA HIDTA is also situated within one of the most violent regions in the Nation, as Camden (NJ), Chester (PA), and Wilmington (DE) remain atop or near the top of rankings of the most violent cities per capita in the country. Camden and Wilmington are two of the five cities named by the Department of Justice as part of its Violence Reduction Network, a program designed to help communities with high-rate violent crime.

Heroin, prescription drugs, cocaine, and marijuana are the principal drug threats to the LMA HIDTA, with increased concern and emphasis toward recent increases in heroin and fentanyl-laced heroin availability, use, and fatal and nonfatal overdoses. MDTOs with direct connections to cartel-level syndicates or cells remain the dominant heroin, cocaine, and marijuana suppliers within the LMA HIDTA region. MDTOs have established the region as a central location to temporarily store large quantities of illicit drugs and cash proceeds transiting between the northeastern United States and the SWB region. Within the LMA HIDTA region, MDTOs, allied with various ethnic groups, are capable of distributing



kilogram quantities of high-purity South American and Mexican-produced white heroin, multi-kilogram quantities of cocaine, millions of dosage units of prescription drugs, and thousands of pounds of commercial-grade and high-potency marijuana on a monthly basis. Continuing the prior year's trend, investigations and intelligence confirm that MDTOs are supplying bulk quantities (multi-pound) of ice and liquid methamphetamine within the LMA HIDTA region in an attempt to increase demand among users. Drugs arrive in the LMA HIDTA region through various means, including private and commercial vehicles; commercial air, rail, and bus transit; and postal, commercial parcel, ground, air, and maritime cargo shipments.

These conveyances are also utilized to transport bulk currency to domestic consolidation points across the SWB to Mexico or through the Caribbean to Central and South America. Other money movement techniques used by traffickers in the LMA HIDTA region include bank deposit structuring to avoid Bank Secrecy Act reporting requirements, cash-based and money service businesses to wire proceeds, prepaid stored value cards, purchases of high-priced assets, and laundering through legitimate or front businesses.

Urban areas within the LMA HIDTA region consistently rank among the most dangerous and violent in the country, due in no small part to the impact of drug trafficking, distribution, and drug-related violent crime. Throughout the area, territorial violence is rampant within inner-city neighborhoods where distribution groups, as well as neighborhood-based and nationally-connected street gangs, compete for control of profitable drug markets using violence and intimidation tactics such as homicides, shootings, assaults, home invasions, and robberies to protect their territory, steal product and/or proceeds, obtain an advantage over rivals, or even silence potential witnesses in prosecutions. Various distribution groups exploit inner city neighborhoods and suburban public housing developments to intimidate residents and competitors and protect profitable drug enterprises and markets. Law enforcement and public health professionals alike view heroin, fentanyl, and opioid use as the greatest concern in the LMA HIDTA region due to the continued availability of high-purity, lower priced heroin, and its appeal to teenaged and young adult users priced out of the prescription narcotics market. Compounding these factors, the emergence of fentanyl, fentanyl analogs, and opioid-like synthetic drugs in the regional drug market pose the likelihood of more deaths and hospitalizations, adding to the already alarming numbers of fatal and nonfatal overdose incidents.

#### (B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives

LMA HIDTA's strategy supports the above goals, as well as the goals of the HIDTA program overall. Through information sharing, interdiction, investigative, and prevention initiatives, LMA HIDTA takes a comprehensive approach to thwarting the flow and distribution of drugs and their abuse into the seven-county region. LMA HIDTA's initiatives identify, disrupt, and dismantle DTOs, MLOs, gangs, and violent criminal organizations with a nexus to drug trafficking; locate and apprehend violent fugitives wanted in connection with drug offenses; gather intelligence linking drug traffickers to major national and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), and pursue opportunities for collaboration with public safety and public health agencies and non-governmental organizations that aim to decrease demand for and mitigate the harm from illegal substance use. The investigative and enforcement

initiatives are structured to respond to acute episodes of violence in the most seriously impacted localities – Philadelphia, Atlantic City, Camden, Chester, Coatesville, and Wilmington. LMA HIDTA’s support initiatives enhance the operating environments, professional skillsets, information sharing capabilities, and intelligence assessments and case support services that law enforcement initiatives rely upon to succeed.

(C) Support of the *National Drug Control Strategy*

LMA HIDTA supports the *Strategy* through the disruption and dismantlement of DTOs and MLOs; stopping illegal drugs from reaching regional markets; denying drug proceeds from being expatriated to source countries; curtailing the flow of prescription drugs of abuse; and collecting, coordinating, collating, analyzing, and disseminating criminal intelligence that relates to drug trafficking, violent drug gangs, and money laundering.

(1) Methamphetamine

MDTOs supply bulk quantities of ice and liquid methamphetamine within the LMA HIDTA region in an attempt to increase demand among users. Drugs arrive through various means, including private and commercial vehicles; commercial air, rail, and bus transit; and postal, commercial parcel, ground, air, and maritime cargo shipments. LMA HIDTA does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.

**Los Angeles HIDTA**

(A) Threat Assessment

MDTOs and criminal groups control the wholesale distribution of illicit drugs in the Los Angeles HIDTA (LA HIDTA) region. They supply illicit drugs to distributors within the region and to distributors in most other significant drug markets throughout the country. Their influence is so profound that the region has become one of the most significant illicit drug distribution centers in the United States for cocaine, heroin, marijuana, methamphetamine, 3,4-Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA), and PCP.

Additionally, MDTOs and criminal groups based in the region are increasing their control over illicit drug distribution in many drug markets, most recently in East Coast drug markets that have long been controlled by other trafficking groups, further enhancing the role of the region as a national-level drug distribution center. It clearly is a staging area for MDTOs and some that have a national and/or international presence.

The geographic, cultural, social, and economic diversity, and general affluence of the population within the four-county area (7th largest economy in the world, with approximately 14% of the national GDP, the largest in the United States), have helped make the LA HIDTA region a huge market for drug use and distribution. At the same time, the highly developed transportation routes and the proximity to the SWB have made the area a primary distribution, storage, and supply hub for illicit drugs destined for all the major metropolitan areas in the United States. Although the majority of methamphetamine encountered in the LA HIDTA area is manufactured in Mexico, the large rural and remote desert areas make LA HIDTA an ideal location for clandestine manufacturing of ice.

(B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives

By design, the LA HIDTA strategy provides a comprehensive, dynamic law enforcement/intelligence plan that combines and coordinates regional drug control efforts in areas where they can have the most significant impact on the threat. By Executive Board direction, LA HIDTA consists of seven major operational task forces comprising collocated Federal, state, and local LEAs and three intelligence initiatives. It is their collective purpose to effectively and efficiently work within the strategy to identify and target the major DTOs that operate at the higher levels of the illegal drug “food chain” in order to measurably reduce drug trafficking and its impact in this and other areas of the country.

(C) Support of the *National Drug Control Strategy*

To accomplish LA HIDTA’s mission and achieve the goals of the *Strategy*, the Executive Board will allocate and focus resources on initiatives that have a direct relationship to:

- disrupting the market for illegal drugs by disrupting and/or dismantling the major DTOs that transport and distribute drugs and the illicit proceeds from their sale in and through the Los Angeles region;
- increasing intelligence sharing and coordination among the initiatives and all Federal, state, and local LEAs (The primary mission of the LA CLEAR to ensure officer safety and operational efficiency by providing a robust deconfliction capability serving the LA HIDTA region, case support, advanced technology, intelligence, and enhanced information sharing to all LEAs. Additionally, the joint regional intelligence center serves as one of the components of the national fusion center system, thus fostering better intelligence sharing between the HIDTA and DHS networks.); and
- creating a stronger relationship between law enforcement and prevention organizations by coordinating with the other California HIDTAs on a statewide prevention initiative.

(1) Methamphetamine

In 2017, LA HIDTA initiatives dismantled five methamphetamine powder labs, and three ice super conversion labs (10 pounds or greater), reflecting 100% of all the super ice conversion seized in California. LA HIDTA does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.

**Michigan HIDTA**

(A) Threat Assessment

Michigan HIDTA is located between major drug markets in Chicago and New York City, shares an international border with Canada, and has 3 of the top 25 busiest commercial land ports in the United States. DTOs transport illicit drugs into and through the region from Chicago, New York City, Atlanta, SWB states, and Canada. Michigan HIDTA’s counties include major drug markets in Detroit, Flint, Saginaw, Grand Rapids, and Kalamazoo. These markets serve as distribution centers for smaller markets within the region and neighboring states.

Heroin and fentanyl are serious drug threats in Michigan. Heroin is readily available, and its abuse continues to increase throughout the entire state of Michigan. Over the years, heroin demand has surpassed cocaine, and prescription opiate users have turned to heroin as a cheap alternative to prescription drugs. Prescription drug diversion continues to be a significant threat due to its availability through multiple methods of acquisition.

Marijuana is the most commonly used drug in Michigan. Mexico remains the primary source of supply for low quality, high-yield marijuana imported to Michigan. Since the passing of the Michigan Medical Marihuana Act in 2008, local marijuana production has increased. The increased emphasis on local cultivation has resulted in a greater availability of illicit, Michigan-produced, high-quality marijuana throughout the state.

Cocaine is readily available in the region, but the demand for cocaine is not as great as the demand for heroin. The price of cocaine per kilogram remains high. Crack cocaine use has also gradually decreased. Methamphetamine availability is increasing throughout the state, and local production and consumption are of particular concern for the western and rural parts of Michigan.

Detroit, Flint, and Saginaw continue to be three of the more violent cities in the United States. These cities share similar characteristics that contribute to violent crime, including high poverty rates, high unemployment rates, high narcotics usage, and reduction in local law enforcement staffing. Drug-related violent crime continues to pose a significant threat in these areas. Michigan HIDTA supports the Michigan State Police Secure Cities Partnership, which provides enhanced, regionalized, data-driven law enforcement services to the cities of Detroit, Pontiac, Saginaw, and Flint in an effort to reduce crime and improve the quality of life in these areas. Michigan HIDTA continues to be an integral component of the Detroit One Violent Crime Reduction Initiative. This community and law enforcement partnership, spearheaded by the United States Attorney's Office (USAO) for the Eastern District of Michigan in cooperation with the Detroit Police Department and the HIDTA's Federal, state, and local partners, focuses on identifying and arresting the worst offenders involved in violent firearms offenses in the Detroit.

#### (B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives

Michigan HIDTA has adopted a three-tiered enforcement strategy. The initiatives target street-level dealers threatening the community, mid-level dealers and priority targets, and major drug and MLOs identified in the HIDTA's threat assessment.

Michigan HIDTA accomplishes its mission and addresses the threat in the region through a united response from its Federal, state, local, and tribal partners, taking full advantage of their knowledge, skills, and expertise. Through collocation, interagency cooperation, and consolidation of strategic and tactical information, Michigan HIDTA fosters a comprehensive response to illicit drug trafficking by bringing together all available law enforcement resources. Cooperative working relationships have been developed over many years by the Executive Board and Executive Director to ensure that enhanced communication, collaboration, and information sharing support effective, intelligence-driven investigations.

### (C) Support of the National Drug Control Strategy

To accomplish the mission and achieve the goals of the *Strategy*, the Executive Board focuses HIDTA resources on:

- disrupting and/or dismantling the DTOs that manufacture, transport, and distribute illicit drugs and seizing the illicit proceeds from their sales;
- improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the HIDTA's efforts by increasing intelligence sharing and coordination among HIDTA initiatives, law enforcement partners in Michigan, and law enforcement partners in other regions that are impacted by illegal drugs that originate or flow through the Michigan HIDTA AOR; and
- enhancing relationships with organizations committed to drug education, prevention, and treatment, including community-based and educational institutions.

#### (1) Methamphetamine

Methamphetamine availability, specifically Mexican-produced crystal methamphetamine, is increasing throughout Michigan. Local production and consumption are of particular concern for the western and rural parts of the state. A review of data from the El Paso Intelligence Center National Seizure System conducted by the National Emerging Threat Initiative (NETI) ranked Michigan first in the United States for methamphetamine incidents with 524 reported in 2017. In 2017, one-pot methamphetamine laboratories were reported in 67 of 83 Michigan counties. Production via the one-pot method produces small quantities for personal use or small-scale distribution and is the most prevalent production method in Michigan. The presence of ice transported from the southwestern region of the United States continues to be prevalent. During 2017, task forces seized more than 36 kilograms of ice. Michigan HIDTA does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.

### Midwest HIDTA

#### (A) Threat Assessment

A myriad of drugs are abused throughout the densely populated urban areas, user hubs, and rural territory within the region, and their presence threatens the life and property of abusers and their families, friends and associates, along with the social fabric of the communities. Cocaine, methamphetamine, and marijuana continue to be popular in the Midwest HIDTA AOR. Heroin remains prevalent primarily in large urban inner city communities in St. Louis and Kansas City, but fueled by opioid misuse, the heroin scourge continues to spread to every state in the Midwest. Drugs such as fentanyl, MDMA, gamma-hydroxybutyrate, and other dangerous synthetics are also consistently present in most urban areas. PCP appears to be readily available in the Kansas City metro area, with significant quantities being interdicted between California and Kansas City. In the Midwest HIDTA region, Mexican traffickers continue to dominate wholesale drug distribution and transportation.

Competing gangs and other DTOs use violence to solidify and maintain their hold on drug trafficking within their area of influence. Cooperative local, state, and Federal law enforcement efforts throughout the Midwest HIDTA region have produced noteworthy success in identifying, targeting, and prosecuting active DTOs and gang members involved in violent drug-related activity. Drug trafficking trend analysis has long indicated that high-

level DTOs have become established and entrenched in the Midwest region. Many DTOs in the Midwest are poly-drug operations. As a result, task forces continue to initiate significant Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF), Police Training Officer (PTO)-linked, Consolidated Priority Organization Target (CPOT)-linked, Title III, and financial investigations. In addition, crack cocaine distribution has historically been coupled with significant violent crime and gang activity in inner city neighborhoods of large metropolitan areas such as Kansas City, Omaha, and St. Louis. Misuse of CPDs and opioid pain medications has also driven an increase in the number of heroin/fentanyl users as trafficking groups expand their markets. Heroin overdose deaths and emergency room episodes have also exponentially increased in many Midwest cities.

A significant and chronic problem in Midwest HIDTA suburban and rural areas is methamphetamine use, along with the violence and social costs related to its manufacture, distribution, and use. Ice is highly sought after, and its popularity throughout the region contributes to the dominant presence of MDTOs throughout the Midwest. Methamphetamine is transported into the region by these MDTOs via well-established overland routes. Some reporting also indicates the smuggling of methamphetamine in solution into the region for local conversion.

#### (B) Strategy for Achieving HIDTA Goals and Objectives

Midwest HIDTA has developed a cohesive and comprehensive regional program focused on reducing and disrupting the importation, distribution, and manufacturing of illegal narcotics. Midwest HIDTA drug task forces maintain an aggressive posture toward enforcement activities. Midwest HIDTA has identified primary and secondary threat areas, defined drug importation and transportation corridors, and identified areas of local drug production. Investigators conduct complex, in-depth, multijurisdictional OCDETF, PTO, Special Operations Division, Regional Priority Organization Target (RPOT), CPOT, and DTO investigations with an emphasis on dismantling organizations and reducing drug-related violence. Investigations target the highest level of DTOs and MLOs using undercover operations and surveillance of command and control communications. These investigations are intelligence-driven and are conducted in a spirit of cooperation among Federal, state, and local counterparts in a task force environment.

#### (C) Support of the *National Drug Control Strategy*

Midwest HIDTA contains 72 designated counties in Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota, and it has developed a cohesive and comprehensive regional program that is executed through 57 initiatives to reduce the transportation, distribution, and manufacturing of illegal narcotics, thereby disrupting the illicit drug market.

#### (1) Methamphetamine

Methamphetamine remains a significant enforcement problem in the Midwest region. While maintaining a focus on investigations and interdiction, local and Federal law enforcement in the Midwest region continue to face the challenges of the significant public safety hazards involved with local production methamphetamine labs. These hazards include fires, explosions, violence, child abuse, hazardous waste disposal, and environmental contamination. Methamphetamine

production in the Midwest HIDTA region is assessed as low to moderate. In 2017, the Midwest HIDTA initiatives seized over 1,968 kilograms of methamphetamine with a wholesale value of nearly \$56.9 million. Midwest HIDTA also dismantled 34 clandestine labs rated at less than 2-ounce capacity, 4 rated at 2- to 8-ounce capacity, and 1 rated at 9- to 31-ounce capacity. Midwest HIDTA does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.

## **Nevada HIDTA**

### **(A) Threat Assessment**

Through examination of available intelligence trends, seizures, arrests, treatment admissions, drug death cases, investigative cases, and anecdotal information relating to the Nevada drug market, Nevada HIDTA (NV HIDTA) concluded that methamphetamine, paralleled by the surge in heroin, would be the most significant targets of all task forces.

Marijuana continues to be the most used and available illicit drug. However, changes in public opinion, prosecution requirements, and resources have pushed this drug to a lower level of threat priority to our community. Other drugs, including CPDs, club drugs, synthetic drugs, and cocaine are expected to be areas of deep concern within the NV HIDTA region. The negative effects and associated activities of the DTOs participating in the drug market – violent crime, gang and cartel influence, bulk cash smuggling, money laundering, and increased drug consumption by youth – were all identified as part of the drug threat faced by the NV HIDTA community in the coming year.

### **(B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives**

Since NV HIDTA was established in 2001, the Executive Board has emphasized the goal of targeting and disrupting the most significant DTOs operating within the region. Consistent with the elements that characterize NV HIDTA, many of the organizations identified during 2017 are cells of more extensive international and regional networks. By targeting the largest DTOs for either disruption or dismantlement (methamphetamine DTOs in particular), NV HIDTA should achieve maximum impact on both the regional and national drug markets.

### **(C) Support of the *National Drug Control Strategy***

NV HIDTA supports the *Strategy* by dismantling or disrupting drug trafficking and/or MLOs, thereby disrupting the flow of illegal drugs into the NV HIDTA region and other areas of the country. NV HIDTA investigators conduct complex, in-depth, multi-jurisdictional DTO investigations with an emphasis on dismantling organizations and reducing drug-related violence.

## **(3) Methamphetamine**

The methamphetamine coming into the region is the biggest threat to Nevada. In 2017, NV HIDTA initiatives seized 383 kilograms of methamphetamine with a wholesale value of approximately \$10.9 million. NV HIDTA does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.

## New England HIDTA

### (A) Threat Assessment

The distribution and use of heroin, fentanyl, cocaine, and CPDs are the most significant drug threats to the New England HIDTA (NE HIDTA) region. There were 3,343 opioid-related overdose deaths in 2015, 4,147 in 2016, and 4,147 in 2017. This represented a 24% increase from 2015 to 2016 and no change from 2016 to 2017.

The New York Metropolitan area remained a major source of supply, with an increasing market presence from dealers based in Newark and Jersey City, New Jersey. The Northern border vulnerabilities will continue to be exploited, and the violent crime rate of the major metropolitan areas of New England will continue to be a major cause of concern for state and local law enforcement. This increased crime rate can largely be attributed to poly-drug DTOs and gangs.

Heroin and fentanyl trafficking and consumption constitute the highest threat to New England due to widespread availability, high demand, low cost, and incidence of addiction. Their presence continued to have a significant negative economic impact on the region due to the substantial costs associated with opioid abuse, including emergency medical services, treatment, prevention, and enforcement activities.

Results from the 2018 Threat Assessment Survey (TAS) conducted by the New England HIDTA ISC of Federal, state, and local LEAs reported that 75% of respondents consider heroin the top drug threat to their AOR. Cocaine and crack cocaine availability is robust and increasing throughout the New England region. Seizure and overdose data suggest a corollary resurgence in cocaine use. Like heroin, reporting from law enforcements agencies throughout the region indicated that DTOs increasingly adulterate cocaine with fentanyl.

### (B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives

NE HIDTA has developed a strategy that has been tailored to encourage interagency cooperation and operations coordination, and it remains committed to intelligence-led policing and information-sharing practices. NE HIDTA provides an agency-neutral program to balance regional law enforcement efforts and coordinates a strategy to address the regional threat and national priorities. It continues to foster effective working relationships among six USAO, nine Federal LEAs, and scores of state and local LEAs. Task force initiatives are staffed with collocated Federal, state, and local LEAs. NE HIDTA coordinates the integration of all initiatives to ensure a unified effort in achieving its goals and objectives.

### (C) Support of the *National Drug Control Strategy*

In addition to supporting the *Strategy* by disrupting and dismantling DTOs and MLOs, NE HIDTA has implemented a collaborative partnership with prominent professionals in the education, prevention, and treatment aspects of the *Strategy*. Additionally, through continued cooperation with these partners, NE HIDTA has enhanced drug education and prevention initiatives by providing guidance and information to numerous state-sponsored prescription drug awareness programs and partnering with the New England DFC coalitions, the Massachusetts Prevention Alliance, and Boston University School of Medicine, and the



Safe and Competent Opioid Prescribing Education of Pain training to provide prescribing physicians continuing medical education credits while creating awareness of the delicate balance of chronic pain management and risks associated with opioid prescribing.

(1) Methamphetamine

Methamphetamine remains a relatively low threat and is, therefore, not specifically targeted by the NE HIDTA initiatives. Nevertheless, NE HIDTA will continue to monitor methamphetamine-related activities and potential threats. NE HIDTA does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.

**New York/New Jersey HIDTA**

(A) Threat Assessment

The New York/New Jersey HIDTA (NY/NJ HIDTA) region is a national importation and distribution center of illicit drugs, predominantly heroin, cocaine, and marijuana. Multi-kilogram quantities of these drugs are transported to the region by air, land, and sea from drug source and transit countries in South America, Central America, and the Caribbean, including Colombia, Mexico, and the Dominican Republic, as well as from Canada and domestic locations, including the SWB area. Once in the region, drug shipments are typically broken down into smaller quantities for further distribution within the region and transported to cities throughout the Northeast, Southeast, and Midwest.

Available public health and public safety data and information indicate that heroin remains the primary drug threat in the NY/NJ HIDTA region, followed closely by fentanyl. The growing presence of fentanyl and fentanyl analogs (chemical compounds with similar characteristics) in the region's drug market, as reflected in seizure data, poses grave challenges to both law enforcement and to individuals with opioid use disorder. Heroin, fentanyl-laced heroin, pure fentanyl, and fentanyl analogs are responsible for the majority of overdose deaths in the region, according to available data.

The price of heroin in the region continues to be relatively low, and purity is among the Nation's highest. New York City and multiple urban centers of New Jersey have long served as distribution hubs for the northeastern United States and will continue to do so as demand for heroin persists throughout the region. Heroin, sold at the retail level, is increasingly being mixed with fentanyl and fentanyl analogues to augment yield and potency. Fentanyl is being sourced on the Dark Web and obtained from Mexican sources of supply. Organizations are also distributing fentanyl by itself, either in powder or pill form, with the latter often imitating the look of brand name pharmaceutical oxycodone.

After heroin and fentanyl, cocaine and crack cocaine pose the greatest threat in the NY/NJ HIDTA region, followed by methamphetamine and marijuana. Cocaine and crack cocaine remain a significant threat with indications from law enforcement that availability is on the rise. The mixing of fentanyl and fentanyl analogues into cocaine powder is of growing concern for law enforcement and public health officials in both New York and New Jersey.

Methamphetamine trafficking and abuse in the region are less serious problems when compared to heroin, cocaine, or pharmaceuticals. However, clandestinely manufactured methamphetamine is a significant problem in rural regions of New York State and the presence of Mexican-produced crystal methamphetamine is on the rise in southern New Jersey.

Marijuana availability and use continues to be widespread across the NY/NJ HIDTA region. Reporting from New Jersey indicates that the use of marijuana candy and liquid marijuana is increasing in the state. Mexican marijuana, smuggled through various methods, is widely available throughout New York and New Jersey. The smuggling of high-quality hydroponic marijuana into New York from California, Colorado, and northwestern United States is on the rise, while, notably, the flow of Canadian-produced marijuana into northern New York has declined significantly in recent years.

(B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives

NY/NJ HIDTA accomplishes its mission by promoting cooperation among agencies through the creation of colocated and commingled task forces, providing technological capabilities to enhance and expedite investigations, and leveraging resources to ensure they are used in the most efficient way possible.

(C) Support of the National Drug Control Strategy

NY/NJ HIDTA supports the *Strategy* by dismantling or disrupting DTOs and/or MLOs, thereby disrupting the market for illegal drugs. NY/NJ HIDTA also facilitates the timely and accurate sharing of criminal and drug intelligence among agencies, enabling them to more effectively target regional and international drug and MLOs.

Furthermore, NY/NJ HIDTA will continue its prevention efforts by supporting community-based projects such as the Saturday Night Lights Initiative which offers quality sports programs to inner-city youth and provides a fun, safe haven for otherwise at-risk kids. They learn about teamwork, gain self-confidence, and learn alternatives to drug use and crime. By stopping drug dependency and use before they begin, the Initiative hopes to lower the crime rate associated with illegal drug activities in these communities and also prevent kids from becoming involved in gangs and gun violence.

(1) Methamphetamine

Generally, methamphetamine is not the principal drug being trafficked by DTOs in the NY/NJ HIDTA region. NY/NJ HIDTA does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.

**North Central HIDTA**

(A) Threat Assessment

Wisconsin, specifically the metropolitan areas of Milwaukee and Madison, serves as a midpoint and a destination area for DTOs. These metropolitan areas are positioned along the I-90/I-94 corridor and are in close proximity to the major drug markets of Minneapolis and

Chicago. These factors make the North Central HIDTA region vulnerable to DTOs that establish their presence for illicit activities.

Heroin, fentanyl, and other opioids continue to present the greatest threat to the Wisconsin portion of the North Central HIDTA region. Overdose deaths and other harmful effects resulting from the use of various opioids continue to pose significant risks for the community. Closely associated with the heroin and fentanyl threat is the misuse of prescription medications, especially opioids such as oxycodone. Reports from law enforcement officials and substance abuse treatment providers clearly demonstrate a continuing correlation between pharmaceutical misuse and heroin/fentanyl use. In addition, other highly unstable and potentially lethal opioid synthetics such as carfentanil and counterfeit pills are increasing the risk to the area, including law enforcement and emergency services personnel that come in contact with these substances.

In Minnesota, the primary threat is methamphetamine. In 2017, the North Central HIDTA enforcement initiatives, mainly in Minnesota, seized over 350 kilograms of methamphetamine. Seizures of large quantities of finished-product Mexican methamphetamine in and around the Minneapolis area emanate mainly from the SWB area and are sourced by Mexican-based cartels. Minneapolis has become an upper Midwest methamphetamine distribution hub and transshipment point for the Mexican cartels. Task forces throughout Minnesota and Wisconsin reported an increase in wholesale-level quantities, with half of the responding agencies reporting seizing a pound or more during the course of their investigations. In Wisconsin, methamphetamine trafficking is increasing all across the state. For example, in southeastern Wisconsin, an area that has not traditionally experienced a large volume of methamphetamine activity, law enforcement has been seizing multi-pound quantities of methamphetamine on a much more regular basis. Marijuana continues to remain the most commonly used illicit drug in the North Central HIDTA region. The demand for higher potency marijuana products has remained high over the past several years and continues to present a serious issue within the region. Much of this demand is met by source suppliers and DTOs from the West Coast and Pacific Northwest, especially from the states that have legalized the recreational or medical use of marijuana and marijuana-related products. Concerns related to the distribution of high-grade marijuana are violent criminal activity and firearm use by traffickers and users. Much of the violence can be traced to the large profits that are associated with the distribution of this drug.

There has been a recent increase in the availability of cocaine in the North Central HIDTA region. Law enforcement continues to report that violent criminal activities are often tied to cocaine distribution. This increase appears to be consistent with many intelligence reports predicting such a trend is due to the increased coca production in Colombia and elsewhere.

#### (B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives

The North Central HIDTA strategy is to foster cooperative and effective relationships among over 80 Federal, state, and local participating member agencies in Wisconsin and Minnesota to achieve the common goals of disrupting and dismantling DTOs and reducing the demand for drugs. Through enforcement initiatives, working within the twelve designated counties in both Wisconsin (seven counties) and Minnesota (five counties), investigative emphasis is

placed on targeting DTOs that pose the most significant threats – primarily those with ties to the Southwest and Northern borders (multi-state and international in scope). In addition, particular emphasis is placed on violent DTOs and drug traffickers that pose significant risk to the community, especially those engaged in violent criminal acts, firearm offenses, or trafficking significant supplies of heroin and/or methamphetamine to the North Central HIDTA region. Initiatives work cooperatively and share information with other HIDTAs and LEAs throughout the country to further enhance effective investigations. As described below, and in assessing the threats facing the North Central HIDTA region, the Executive Board directs and adjusts its strategy to reduce the most significant threats and create safer communities. In 2016, five newly designated counties around the Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota, area were added to the umbrella of the North Central HIDTA program. The strategy moving forward is to continue to integrate any newly-formed initiatives from the recently designated Minnesota counties to address the threats to their region, as well as coordinate intelligence and information sharing with this enhanced partnership.

The North Central HIDTA strategy also recognizes the need for strong demand reduction efforts in the community. The mission is to reduce violent crime through targeted law enforcement, community building, raising community awareness, and proactive engagement of youth in activities that increase positive social skills and behaviors and teach resistance to drugs, gangs, guns, and other criminal behavior.

(C) Support of the *National Drug Control Strategy*

North Central HIDTA supports the *Strategy* by dismantling or disrupting DTOs and/or MLOs, thereby disrupting the market for illegal drugs. This is accomplished through coordinated investigative efforts among Federal, state, and local LEAs. In addition, all investigative efforts are supported with active intelligence gathering and information sharing strategies to ensure that the most efficient and effective means are used to accomplish the mission. The key to the *Strategy* is breaking the cycle of drug use, crime, delinquency, and incarceration. Part of the North Central HIDTA strategy is to support activities that emphasize community-based partnerships incorporating the efforts of prevention, prosecution, and enforcement to reduce the threats drugs can pose to the community. North Central HIDTA will continue to enhance and support its long-standing relationship with the HIDTA Safe & Sound Prevention Initiative, a community-based organization engaged in drug education and prevention activities.

(1) Methamphetamine

North Central HIDTA used no funds to specifically investigate or prosecute organizations and individuals trafficking in methamphetamine in 2017. However, enforcement initiatives, mainly in Minnesota, seized over 350 kilograms of methamphetamine in 2017. Seizures of large quantities of finished-product Mexican methamphetamine in and around the Minneapolis area emanate mainly from the SWB and are sourced by Mexican-based cartels.

## **North Florida HIDTA**

### **(A) Threat Assessment**

Imported methamphetamine continues to be the top ranked illicit drug in the North Florida HIDTA (NFHIDTA) region, based on increasing supply, seizure of the meth market, and an increasing death rate. The Florida Medical Examiner's Interim Report of Drugs Identified in Deceased Persons indicates that methamphetamine caused 213 deaths in 2017 compared to 114 deaths in 2016. Widely available and increasingly deadly cocaine powder closely follows methamphetamine. Heroin, diverted pharmaceuticals, marijuana, crack, club drugs, synthetic cannabinoids, and psychedelics are ranked in subsequent order.

Fentanyl continues to fuel rising death rates ascribed to itself and its mixture with both methamphetamine and cocaine. The Jacksonville medical examiner recorded the most deaths in Florida from fentanyl alone, and it was second overall when including fentanyl analogs. While the overall opioid half-year death total increased to 634 for the region, the rate of increase has slowed. That rate had gone from 36 deaths per month in 2015 to 93 per month in 2016 and was at 106 per month through mid-2017. Mapping of opioid drug arrests, overdoses, murders, and drug crime in Duval County, the highest opioid incidence area, confirms that all categories depict a similar pattern.

Seized diverted pharmaceuticals, fueled mostly by steroids and non-opioids, increased by 126%. Benzodiazepines seizures increased by 38% with opioid seizures increasing a modest 8%. Club drug seizures also increased by 62%, reflecting the continuing return of MDMA and steady imports of alpha-PVP (a-PVP) from China. Continued arrival of a-PVP via parcels and seizure of 11.0 million doses of dimethyltryptamine highlight the region's apparent role in drop shipping and supply to other states. Successful DHE seizures, including 99% of all synthetic cannabinoids, 37% of the meth, 12% of all marijuana, and 10% of cocaine, also highlight the area's importance for illicit drug transportation.

### **(B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives**

Data sharing within the law enforcement community is a key component of the NFHIDTA strategy. To maximize this effort, NFHIDTA facilitates cooperation and joint operations among 39 Federal, state, and local LEAs and 280 full- and part-time personnel who participate in its initiatives. NFHIDTA will continue to foster cooperative and effective working relationships among all its initiatives and law enforcement partners to achieve program goals to disrupt the market for illegal drugs by dismantling or disrupting DTOs and/or MLOs and to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of all NFHIDTA initiatives.

### **(C) Support of the *National Drug Control Strategy***

NFHIDTA supports the *Strategy* by giving participating initiatives the tools (training, case and event deconfliction, and analytical support) to efficiently and effectively disrupt the market for illegal drugs through the dismantlement of DTOs/MLOs. Further, NFHIDTA enhances drug control efforts by implementing programs and activities that improve the effectiveness and coordination of participating agencies and by increasing intelligence sharing and coordination among all initiatives, regional LEAs, and other HIDTAs.

NFHIDTA combines its efforts with other HIDTAs facing similar threats to affect these criminal enterprises by disrupting and dismantling such DTOs and criminal groups.

(1) Methamphetamine

Methamphetamine production continues to be a major concern for the NFHIDTA region. There was a 17% increase in methamphetamine seizures from 2016 (38.7 kilograms) to 2017 (45.2 kilograms). During 2017, a total of 39 methamphetamine labs were dismantled. NFHIDTA, through several of its initiatives, continues to address the threat of methamphetamine production and DTOs operating in their areas as use continues to rise in the region. NFHIDTA does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.

**Northern California HIDTA**

(A) Threat Assessment

Methamphetamine is the most significant illicit drug threat facing the Northern California HIDTA (NC HIDTA), followed by heroin, CPDs, and cocaine. Drug seizures continue to increase in volume and frequency, and substance abuse admissions mirror the increasing volume of drugs. Drug prices, however, are consistently deflating, suggesting that a large amount of drugs are circumventing law enforcement detection. This trend is expected to continue.

Law enforcement reporting indicates methamphetamine is readily available within the NC HIDTA region. According to 2017 seizure reporting and enforcement initiative survey responses, methamphetamine seizures continue to surpass other illicit drug seizures (except marijuana) in volume and frequency, while prices consistently decrease. This suggests seizure rates are not high enough to impact product pricing. NC HIDTA expects methamphetamine availability and demand to remain high.

Heroin is also a significant and growing threat within the NC HIDTA region, evidenced by increasing seizure amounts and corresponding user admissions. Increased production and distribution is making heroin more affordable. Mexican black tar heroin remains the most prevalent form of heroin in the area, while other forms such as white and grey powder are increasing in presence.

Cocaine remains readily available in user quantity, but for the past several years has presented a low threat within the NC HIDTA region. Although cocaine has been displaced to a certain extent by the low cost and wide availability of methamphetamine, its steady user base indicates cocaine will maintain a presence in the region.

The abundance of THC extraction labs identified by law enforcement, in addition to THC extract seizures within the NC HIDTA region, represents a shift in the cannabis industry. Growing social media exposure and instructional videos provided novices the knowledge and necessary tools to easily build THC extraction labs. Most of these THC extraction labs appear to produce small quantities of THC extract. However, an increasing number of larger, more sophisticated labs indicate a trend towards production for retail distribution. NC HIDTA expects that THC extract, in addition to the number and sophistication of THC

extraction labs, will likely increase in the coming years. The volatility of THC extraction labs continues to remain a risk to public safety.

**(B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives**

NC HIDTA fosters a comprehensive response in combating illicit drug activity by bringing together all available law enforcement resources in a cohesive strategy to address the problem. NC HIDTA law enforcement initiatives focus on DTOs, MLOs, violent drug offenders, open-air drug markets, marijuana cultivation on public and private lands, and domestic drug movement. Newly emerging narco-terrorism trends are also monitored, and information is shared with the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center, the Federal Bureau of Investigation – Joint Terrorism Task Force, the California State Threat Assessment Center, the California DOJ Bureau of Investigation, and local LEAs.

**(C) Support of the *National Drug Control Strategy***

To accomplish NC HIDTA’s mission and achieve the goals of the *Strategy*, the Executive Board will allocate and focus resources on initiatives that have a direct relationship to:

- disrupting the market for illegal drugs by disrupting and/or dismantling the DTOs that transport and distribute drugs and the illicit proceeds from their sale;
- increasing intelligence sharing and coordination among the initiatives and all regional LEAs; and
- creating a stronger relationship between law enforcement and prevention organizations (NC HIDTA is coordinating with the other California HIDTAs on a statewide prevention initiative).

**(1) Methamphetamine**

Methamphetamine trafficking is primarily controlled by MDTOs that utilize California as a corridor to access Mexico and Canada and are willing to use violence and criminal acts to control turf and trade. Law enforcement in California is challenged by an uptick in the methamphetamine trade due to state and local law enforcement budget reductions and diminished capabilities to manage and seize methamphetamine labs and superlabs. In 2017, initiatives seized 495 kilograms of methamphetamine with a wholesale value of approximately \$14.3 million. The threat to the AOR continues to grow as law enforcement observes an increase in the violence and criminal behavior associated with methamphetamine use and trafficking. NC HIDTA does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.

**Northwest HIDTA**

**(A) Threat Assessment**

Respondents to the 2017 Northwest HIDTA (NW HIDTA) Threat Assessment Survey reported heroin and methamphetamine as the top two drug threats in Washington State. Marijuana continues to pose a considerable challenge as retail marijuana businesses, medical marijuana shops, and LEAs adjust to recently approved laws.

Nationwide, men and women of all ages, ethnicities, and economic statuses have been touched by the opioid epidemic. The NW HIDTA TAS respondents ranked heroin as

Washington's greatest drug threat in 2017. Agencies responding to the survey reported heroin as the drug that expended the most law enforcement resources and was a significant contributor to both property and violent crime. Of the opioid-related overdose deaths in King County, those involving heroin increased from 23% (36 deaths) in 2008 to 56% (131 deaths) in 2017.

For more than a decade, the NW HIDTA TAS respondents have ranked methamphetamine as one of the top drugs associated with violent crime. Even as laws make it difficult and unprofitable to produce methamphetamine locally, the drug remains in high demand, and adult treatment admissions continue to rise. As with the rest of the United States, the overwhelming majority of methamphetamine consumed in Washington comes from Mexico.

Seizures of methamphetamine by the NW HIDTA initiatives have remained relatively stable for the past three years. Drug traffickers continue to smuggle large amounts of methamphetamine north from Mexico, where the drug is produced in abundant quantities with high levels of purity, yet still remain inexpensive for the user. The availability of cheap, high-quality methamphetamine and the growing number of people who combine heroin and methamphetamine may be contributing to the rapid increase in methamphetamine-related overdose deaths in King County. In a 2017 statewide survey conducted by the University of Washington's Alcohol and Drug Abuse Institute, nearly half of all participants said they had combined heroin with methamphetamine for use within the last three months. Since 2010, methamphetamine-related overdose deaths in King County soared 655% from 18 methamphetamine-related overdose deaths to 136 in 2017.

Marijuana, according to Washington law for both recreational and medicinal use, continues to be the most frequently used drug. DTOs continue to tender illicit indoor and outdoor marijuana grows that damage the environment and result in lost tax revenue. In 2017, the Department of Ecology seized approximately 12 tons of harmful chemicals from illegal marijuana grows throughout the state. Customers in states where recreational marijuana is still illegal will pay a higher price for the drug, making it an attractive market for illicit producers. The US Postal Inspection Service in Washington noted a significant increase in marijuana parcels being shipped out-of-state since 2014.

Although Washington continues to be a known transshipment point for cocaine to Alaska and Canada, some of the drug remains within the state. With an exception in 2016, seizures by the NW HIDTA initiatives appeared to be declining over the past five years. However, preliminary data from the Performance Management Process (PMP) for the first quarter of 2018 indicate a possible upward trend. The NW HIDTA initiatives seized 187 kilograms in the first three months of 2018 compared to 141 kilograms seized in 2017. Furthermore, a third of the agencies responding to the NW HIDTA TAS reported an increase in cocaine availability in their jurisdictions.

Although respondents to the 2017 NW HIDTA TAS reported CPDs as a low threat to Washington, prescription opioids and other CPDs remain drugs of concern. For the past decade, prescription opioids have accounted for more than half of all opioid-related overdose



deaths in the state. In 2017, more than 11 million CPDs were dispensed to Washington residents, enough to provide every person in the state with one and a half prescriptions.

(B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives

NW HIDTA comprises 15 law enforcement initiatives made up of Federal, state, and local enforcement personnel; an ISC initiative; administrative initiatives that include management and coordination and training; and a prevention and treatment initiative. The enforcement initiatives target major illicit DTOs through aggressive investigations and enforcement actions that focus on sources of supply, distribution, drug interdiction, and drug-related financial and violent crimes within the AOR. The ISC initiative provides analytical case support to Federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement while the management and coordination initiative supports management and oversight of the HIDTA program and brokers training for the HIDTA community. The treatment and prevention initiative brings together prevention and treatment specialists and law enforcement personnel to reduce the impact of harmful drug abuse on individuals and communities within Washington State.

(C) Support of the *National Drug Control Strategy*

To accomplish NW HIDTA's mission and achieve the goals of the *Strategy*, the Executive Board will allocate and focus resources on initiatives that have a direct relationship to the following:

- disrupting the market for illegal drugs by disrupting and/or dismantling the DTOs that transport and distribute drugs and the illicit proceeds from their sale,
- increasing intelligence sharing and coordination among the initiatives and all regional LEAs (The primary task of the ISC is to provide analytical support and intelligence information services to the NW HIDTA task forces and participating agencies in the region); and
- funding a prevention/treatment manager at NW HIDTA to focus on outreach and education.

(1) Methamphetamine

In 2017, NW HIDTA's enforcement initiatives dismantled 3 clandestine laboratories and seized just over 489 kilograms of methamphetamine with a wholesale value of approximately \$14.1 million. NW HIDTA does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.

**Ohio HIDTA**

(A) Threat Assessment

Opioid trafficking, abuse, and overdoses remain the greatest drug threat in the Ohio HIDTA AOR. As reported every year since 2015, the region continues to deal with heroin, a drug product that is either being cut with fentanyl, or straight fentanyl being sold as heroin. With the majority of LEA resources being exhausted to fight the heroin/fentanyl epidemic these past few years, their perceptions of cocaine trafficking flourishing were most likely accurate. The outbreak of heroin/fentanyl continues to conceal the severity of cocaine and methamphetamine availability and use.

Over the past three years, the majority of the Ohio HIDTA TAS respondents have highlighted the increase in kilogram seizures of methamphetamine which have tripled from 2015 through 2017. Marijuana will continue to be the most popular recreational drug in the Ohio HIDTA region for 2018. The 2018 Ohio HIDTA TAS indicates a downward trend in the use and availability of prescription opioids in the Ohio HIDTA region.

Marijuana remains the number one recreational drug used in the Ohio HIDTA region. Ohio legalized medical marijuana in 2016, and the industry will be operational in 2018. It is anticipated that the presence of medical marijuana will lead to an even greater amount of marijuana usage in the region. Increasing amounts of the marijuana consumed in Ohio HIDTA region are coming from the western region of the United States. Nearly all of the respondents to the 2018 Ohio HIDTA TAS confirmed that bulk shipments of high-grade marijuana are being brought into Ohio from states that have legalized marijuana such as California, Colorado, Oregon, and Washington. Butane hash oil used for vaping and marijuana edibles are still a concern for many of the LEAs in the Ohio HIDTA region.

(B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives

As a coordinating body, Ohio HIDTA stresses equal partnerships and a balance of efforts among regional Federal, state, and local LEAs. Through collocation, interagency cooperation, and consolidation of strategic, operational, and tactical information, Ohio HIDTA fosters a comprehensive response for targeting DTOs and other illicit drug activity. Ohio HIDTA brings together Federal, state, and local agencies and personnel in a comprehensive, coordinated, and effective manner to counter the devastating effects of drug distribution, drug-related violence, and money laundering. Ohio HIDTA's success is measured in large part by its ability to facilitate greater efficiency, effectiveness, and cooperation among and between external participating agencies at the local, state, and Federal levels and yield tangible, measurable results.

(C) Support of the National Drug Control Strategy

Ohio HIDTA supports the *Strategy* by facilitating information sharing in intelligence-led investigations, training, and coordination of drug trafficking control activities among Federal, state, and local LEAs in an effort to disrupt the market for illegal drugs in the United States. Ohio HIDTA also supports the *Strategy* in such areas as pharmaceutical diversion, highway enforcement, parcel interdiction, and prevention awareness.

(1) Methamphetamine

The Ohio HIDTA initiatives report a shift in methamphetamine trends in recent years. Over the past three years, the majority of the Ohio HIDTA TAS respondents highlighted the increase of seizures of ice in their region. Methamphetamine kilogram seizures have steadily increased from 80 kilograms in 2015 to 151 in 2016 to a record high of 245 kilograms in 2017. Ohio HIDTA does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.

## **Oregon-Idaho HIDTA**

### **(A) Threat Assessment**

Methamphetamine use and trafficking has increased in the Oregon-Idaho HIDTA (OI HIDTA) region and represents the area's greatest drug threat, followed by heroin, CPDs, illicit marijuana, cocaine, and other dangerous substances that include synthetic drugs.

Methamphetamine continues to be widely used and trafficked throughout the region. Reported seizures of methamphetamine labs in Oregon remain low due to state legislation eliminating the ability to obtain pseudoephedrine without a physician's prescription. However, ice continues to be readily available as Mexican drug traffickers import methamphetamine powder, liquid, and finished product from laboratories outside the state and from Mexico.

Production of heroin in Mexico has expanded, leading to greater availability of low-cost product in Oregon and Idaho. Reports from law enforcement indicate that heroin is a serious threat in the region due to the substantial rise in the volume of heroin seized and the number of new users and associated overdoses.

The threat posed by non-medical use of prescription drugs, mostly painkillers, has grown in recent years and parallels national trends. The rise in abuse can be attributed to greater availability through increased sales of CPDs, liberal prescribing of opioids by doctors, and ease of access to the drugs through family or friends. Furthermore, people who are addicted to prescription opiates are increasingly switching to heroin because it is more readily available, cheaper, and provides a more intense high than prescription opiates.

Marijuana use, cultivation, and trafficking are pervasive in the AOR. Oregon's Medical Marijuana Act, which allows for quantities of marijuana to be grown and used for qualifying medical conditions, continues to be exploited to facilitate illegal cultivation for profit. In addition, illicit manufacture and distribution of cannabis extracts, such as hash oil and marijuana wax, have increased in the region due to an expanding market for high-potency cannabis products that produce strong psychoactive effects. Greater demand for potent cannabis extracts has led to a higher prevalence of extraction labs and production-related explosions.

Reflecting national trends, cocaine availability and use remain low in Oregon and Idaho, but may increase in the near term due to increased production in Colombia, a source country for the United States. Use of the powder form is common in southern Oregon, whereas both crack and powdered cocaine is popular in the Portland Metropolitan region.

Synthetic drugs such as MDMA, synthetic cannabinoids, synthetic cathinones, dimethyltryptamine, and fentanyl analogues are available and distributed in the region and appear to be rising in prevalence.

(B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives

OI HIDTA will continue to foster cooperative and effective working relationships among the 7 Federal agencies, 6 state agencies, 47 local agencies, 2 tribal agencies, and the USAO in the District of Oregon to achieve the common goals of disrupting and dismantling DTOs and MLOs and reducing the demand for, and availability of, illegal drugs.

(C) Support of the *National Drug Control Strategy*

To accomplish OI HIDTA's mission and achieve the goals of the *Strategy*, the Executive Board will allocate and focus the HIDTA resources on initiatives that have a direct relationship to:

- disrupting the market for illegal drugs by disrupting and/or dismantling the DTOs that transport and distribute drugs and the illicit proceeds from their sale (In 2017, OI HIDTA disrupted or dismantled 63 DTOs);
- increasing intelligence sharing and coordination among the initiatives and all regional LEAs; and
- strengthening the relationship between law enforcement and prevention organizations.

(1) Methamphetamine

In 2017, the OI HIDTA initiatives seized over 663 kilograms of methamphetamine with a wholesale value of approximately \$19.2 million and dismantled 1 clandestine laboratory. OI HIDTA does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.

## **Puerto Rico and United States Virgin Islands HIDTA**

### **(A) Threat Assessment**

The Puerto Rico and United States Virgin Islands HIDTA (PR/USVI HIDTA) AOR is highly vulnerable to drug trafficking because it serves as a transshipment point of illicit drugs from South America through PR and USVI to the continental United States (CONUS). In recent years, larger amounts of drugs have been available to transport across the supply chain, and more security has been implemented along the SWB. Therefore, South American cartels have been forced to traffic more frequently and with larger drug shipments through the Caribbean region. As a result, drug trafficking remains a significant threat to PR and USVI and subsequently, the CONUS. Consequently, violent crimes, unlawful financial activities, and drug abuse continue to deteriorate the regional communities.

### **(B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives**

PR/USVI HIDTA's strategy focuses on regional threats and includes prevention as part of its plan to assist in the reduction of illegal activities and violent crimes. PR/USVI HIDTA, through continued cooperation and effective relationships established with Federal, Commonwealth, territorial, and local agencies, has joint task forces positioned throughout the region to counter drug trafficking and related criminal activity.

### **(C) Support of the *National Drug Control Strategy***

PR/USVI HIDTA fully supports the *Strategy* by dismantling or disrupting DTOs and/or MLOs with an emphasis on violent organizations and conducting interdiction of drug shipments. PR/USVI HIDTA also helps strengthen the local law enforcement establishment through training and sound inter-operational strategies.

### **(1) Methamphetamine**

Methamphetamine is not considered a primary drug threat in the PR/USVI HIDTA region, although methamphetamine and ice have been increasing in popularity in Puerto Rico. Reports indicate that most of the methamphetamine and ice are trafficked from the CONUS via parcel and shipping services. PR/USVI HIDTA does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.

## **Rocky Mountain HIDTA**

### **(A) Threat Assessment**

Methamphetamine distribution and use pose the greatest overall drug threat to the Rocky Mountain HIDTA (RMHIDTA) region, while marijuana is the most widely available and used illicit drug in the region. DTOs are the principal suppliers of wholesale quantities of methamphetamine, marijuana, cocaine, and black tar heroin to the region from locations along the SWB, while the West Coast-based DTOs supply high-potency marijuana and MDMA to the region from sources in Canada. These DTOs exploit the region's centralized location and extensive transportation infrastructure to distribute wholesale quantities of ice, methamphetamine, cocaine, marijuana, and heroin. The region is transected by interstate highways I-15, I-25, I-70, I-80, I-90, and I-94. These major interstate routes are used by DTOs to transport illicit drugs from California, Arizona, and Texas to markets in Denver,

Colorado, and major Midwest cities such as Omaha, Nebraska; Kansas City, Missouri; and Chicago, Illinois. Similar to other areas of the country, prescription drug use has increased significantly in the RMHIDTA area, particularly in areas such as Salt Lake City, Utah, and Denver, Colorado, as illustrated by the number of opioid prescriptions issued and overdose deaths when compared to prior years.

(B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives

RMHIDTA has a strong management team that stresses cooperation and collaboration among the initiatives to address current drug threats at Federal, state, and local levels, while impacting the availability and use of all drugs throughout the country. The Executive Board's ongoing efforts are dedicated to facilitating coordination and cooperation among the 9 Federal agencies and 114 state/local agencies that partner to reduce drug availability by eliminating or disrupting DTOs and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of law enforcement efforts within the region. The Executive Board's efforts help achieve common goals and respond to current drug threats effectively and efficiently. The initiatives facilitate collaboration, coordination, and information sharing among all task forces and drug units both within and outside the RMHIDTA AOR.

RMHIDTA's strategy is supported by an extensive training program, an intelligence initiative, aggressive enforcement initiatives, and a criminal interdiction program. Enforcement initiatives focus on targeting and trying to dismantle or disrupt major DTOs. Criminal interdiction initiatives have been established in Colorado, Wyoming, Utah, and Montana to address DTOs that transport illicit drugs into and through the region. A drug prevention initiative has also been added to the RMHIDTA strategy. Enforcement initiatives, coupled with drug prevention, give RMHIDTA multiple tools to address drug trafficking and use.

(C) Support of the National Drug Control Strategy

RMHIDTA supports the *Strategy* by targeting, investigating, and dismantling or disrupting deeply entrenched and extensively networked DTOs in Colorado, Utah, Montana, and Wyoming (including DTOs that are international, multistate, or local in scope); MLOs; and drug trafficking gangs. In doing so, initiatives disrupt the market for illicit drugs and reduce the quantities of cocaine, methamphetamine, marijuana, MDMA, and heroin supplied to the area and to other United States drug markets in the Midwest, Northeast, and Southeast.

(1) Methamphetamine

The vast majority of the DTOs and gangs investigated by the RMHIDTA initiatives are poly-drug in nature. In 2017, task forces and the Rocky Mountain Highway Patrol Network seized over 1,123 kilograms of methamphetamine with a wholesale value of over \$31.4 million. During the same timeframe, task forces seized 7 clandestine methamphetamine labs. RMHIDTA does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.

## **South Florida HIDTA**

### **(A) Threat Assessment**

The South Florida HIDTA (SFHIDTA) AOR is one of the primary drug trafficking and money laundering areas in the United States. During 2017, SFHIDTA expanded its territory to six counties – Broward, Collier, Martin, Miami-Dade, Monroe, and Palm Beach. South Florida has a diverse population of approximately 6.7 million residents with ties to Latin America, the Bahamas, and other Caribbean countries. As a gateway to the United States, the area offers optimal transportation connections to and from drug source countries and key transit zones. Other distinguishing features include vibrant tourism, international banking, and global trade industries – all of which assist in the flow of illicit drugs from source countries and key transit zones into the United States and facilitate money laundering activity.

SFHIDTA views cocaine and opioids as primary drug threats. Secondary drug threats include CPDs, marijuana, NPSs, and methamphetamine. Cocaine continues its reign as the most readily available of all illicit drugs in South Florida. The revival of coca cultivation and cocaine production in Colombia has amplified the amount of cocaine flowing into South Florida via the Caribbean by South American and Dominican/Caribbean DTOs during the last two years. Cocaine drug seizures by the SFHIDTA initiatives have exceeded the benchmark set in 2007 when coca production and cocaine cultivation were at a high for two consecutive years. Seizure activity represents a fraction of the cocaine smuggling activity that is occurring within the region under the radar, primarily due to the limited availability of dedicated maritime and intelligence resources at pivotal transshipment points.

Cocaine DTOs continue to represent the largest segment of drug-specific DTOs operating in the SFHIDTA AOR. Colombian and Caribbean nationals largely comprise cocaine DTOs and work in concert with multi-ethnic, local, poly-drug DTOs to supply state, regional, and United States cocaine markets. South Florida cocaine DTOs are mostly independent though associated with the major Colombian and Mexican cocaine cartels.

### **(B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives**

SFHIDTA fosters cooperative and effective working relationships among Federal, state, local, and tribal agencies that contribute over 624 collocated full-time personnel who share the common goal to disrupt and dismantle DTOs and MLOs and simultaneously disrupt the flow of drugs and monetary assets through long-term multi-agency investigations and operations. SFHIDTA's strategy is composed of 32 initiatives that exploit the collective expertise of Federal, state, and local agencies to target multiple regional drug threats identified in the SFHIDTA threat assessment.

The expansion of multi-HIDTA approaches to identify, disrupt, and dismantle traditional and emerging threats are key aspects of SFHIDTA's short- and long-term strategy. SFHIDTA has made significant progress in addressing the region's primary threats and will continue to intensify its response to the escalating cocaine trafficking surge, the opioid crisis, and more recently, an increase in the availability of methamphetamine, which is unusual for South Florida.

(C) Support of the *National Drug Control Strategy*

SFHIDTA supports the *Strategy* by disrupting and/or dismantling DTOs and MLOs, thereby disrupting the illicit drug market. Further, SFHIDTA enhances drug control efforts by implementing programs and activities that improve the effectiveness and coordination of agencies participating in the HIDTA and by increasing intelligence sharing and coordination among the initiatives and all regional LEAs. SFHIDTA also seeks to strengthen the relationship between law enforcement and prevention and treatment organizations.

(1) Methamphetamine

Although indicators of methamphetamine are relatively low when compared with other drugs in southeast Florida, TAS data and anecdotal reporting suggests there is an uptick of Mexican methamphetamine trafficked in the region, evidenced by higher than normal availability, seizure activity, and reported consumption trends. According to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) National Forensic Laboratory Information System, Miami-Dade County represents 50% of the region's methamphetamine submissions, followed by Broward County with 35%. The SFHIDTA initiatives seized 34.0 kilograms of methamphetamine in 2017, compared with 43.0 kilograms in 2016 and 8.4 kilograms in 2015. SFHIDTA does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.

**Southwest Border HIDTA – Arizona Region**

(A) Threat Assessment

Southwest Border HIDTA – Arizona (SWB HIDTA/AZ) region is a major arrival zone for multi-ton quantities of marijuana, methamphetamine, heroin, and cocaine entering the United States from Mexico. Sharing more than 370 miles of border with Mexico, most of which is uninhabited desert and mountains, the southern border of Arizona presents a variety of challenges for LEAs in their efforts to stem the tide of both illegal drugs and proceeds.

The Sinaloa Cartel presents the primary operational threat to Arizona, possessing vast resources to distribute, transport, and smuggle large amounts of methamphetamine, heroin, cocaine, and marijuana into and through Arizona. Sinaloa exploits well-established routes into Arizona and has perfected smuggling methods to supply drug distribution networks located throughout the United States. The Mexican state of Sonora is home to key drug trafficking plazas controlled by Sinaloa. The plazas are used for offloading, stashing, and staging drugs, money, and weapons. Furthermore, Sinaloa's influence in Arizona is growing stronger as it continues to gain control of additional drug trafficking corridors and routes in Sonora, Mexico, and neighboring Baja California, Mexico.

Drug seizures clearly indicate that Arizona is a significant drug trafficking corridor and distribution hub for DTOs. Federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement in the region proactively target the transportation and distribution cells of these DTOs to disrupt the flow of drugs through and from Arizona, directly affecting drug markets throughout the United States. Drug seizures indicate that DTOs are increasing heroin, methamphetamine, and cocaine smuggling from Mexico into the region.



### (B) Strategy for Achieving HIDTA Goals and Objectives

SWB HIDTA/AZ uses an intelligence-driven, threat-focused strategy to target the most significant DTOs and MLOs affecting Arizona. SWB HIDTA/AZ is organized into four initiative functions: (1) enforcement (interdiction, investigation, fugitive arrests, and prosecution); (2) intelligence (coordination, deconfliction, targeting, investigative case support, and threat assessment); (3) support (training); and (4) management. SWB HIDTA/AZ continues to coordinate and support the efforts of 601 full-time and 166 part-time participants from 70 Federal, state, local, and tribal agencies.

### (C) Support of the *National Drug Control Strategy*

SWB HIDTA/AZ supports the *Strategy* by disrupting and dismantling DTOs and/or MLOs, thereby disrupting the market for illegal drugs. Specifically, SWB HIDTA/AZ:

- facilitates a coordinated threat-focused, initiative-led strategy against the most significant DTOs impacting Arizona;
- collects, analyzes, and disseminates actionable intelligence enabling the SWB HIDTA/AZ initiatives to identify and investigate current and emerging drug threats; and
- enhances tribal, regional, local, and cross-border demand reduction efforts by working with established community coalitions.

### (1) Methamphetamine

Methamphetamine is the drug most frequently associated with property and violent crime. The SWB HIDTA/AZ initiatives reported a high level of methamphetamine availability in their respective jurisdictions. The high level of methamphetamine availability in Arizona is correlated to increased methamphetamine production in Mexico by the Sinaloa Cartel and other MDTOs. In 2017, 3,090 kilograms of methamphetamine were seized in the SWB HIDTA/AZ region. SWB HIDTA/AZ does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.

## **Southwest Border HIDTA - San Diego Imperial Region**

### (A) Threat Assessment

San Diego and Imperial Counties are national distribution centers for illicit drugs entering the United States from Mexico and Central and South America, including heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine, and marijuana. In 2017, over 126,510 kilograms of drugs valued at over \$1.9 billion and proceeds worth over \$21.0 million were permanently removed from the profit sheets of DTOs, MLOs, and TCOs. The Southwest Border HIDTA - San Diego Imperial region (SWB HIDTA/SDI) initiatives focus efforts on major DTOs and investigated 141 DTOs, resulting in 67 open OCDETF cases. Thirty-three DTOs were linked to CPOT- or RPOT-level organizations. In addition, 128 DTOs were international in scope. In 2017, investigations continue to indicate that traffickers operating within the region continue to supply major markets in almost every state throughout the United States.

(B) Strategy for Achieving HIDTA Goals and Objectives

SWB HIDTA/SDI assists in the coordination of joint operational and supporting initiatives to disrupt and dismantle the most significant DTOs, MLOs, TCOs, and their associated transportation and distribution organizations. SWB HIDTA/SDI also emphasizes efforts against methamphetamine manufacturing, precursor chemical supply, and illicit use through innovative enforcement operations and demand reduction programs using a multi-agency, joint concept of operations. The SWB HIDTA/SDI initiatives continue to foster cooperative and effective working relationships among approximately 700 Federal, state, and local full-time and part-time personnel from almost every LEA in the region. These agencies voluntarily participate in HIDTA initiatives to disrupt and dismantle DTOs, reduce the demand for drugs, and make our communities safer.

(C) Support of the National Drug Control Strategy

SWB HIDTA/SDI supports the *Strategy* by dismantling or disrupting DTOs/MLOs, thereby disrupting the market for illegal drugs, specifically by:

- fostering long-term investigations targeting high-level DTOs that impact the two counties of the region, as well as other parts of the country;
- promulgating and participating as an active partner in the combined ISC/Fusion Center with all intelligence and information gathering units operating from a single site; and
- supporting and implementing a balanced approach to reducing drug abuse by funding and integrating where possible a robust Drug Demand Reduction (prevention) initiative, which fosters the interface between community anti-drug coalitions and HIDTA enforcement initiatives and partner agencies.

(1) Methamphetamine

In 2017, as a result of methamphetamine manufacturing in Mexico and trafficking the drug to the United States by Mexican drug cartels, SWB HIDTA/SDI has seen an increase in methamphetamine use and seizures. In 2010, methamphetamine seizures totaled 2,560 kilograms and has steadily risen every year with 2017 seizures totaling 6,554 kilograms of methamphetamine. Rarely does SWB HIDTA/SDI encounter a fully operation domestic methamphetamine lab. This is continuing to be validated by the increase in seizures at the California ports of entry (POEs) and by the SWB HIDTA/SDI initiatives. SWB HIDTA/SDI does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.

**Southwest Border HIDTA – New Mexico Region**

(A) Threat Assessment

Southwest Border HIDTA – New Mexico region (SWB HIDTA/NM) is a transit state for illicit drugs travelling north and east and currency and weapons travelling south and west. MDTOs continue to dominate the illicit drug trade in the region. The quantity of illegal drugs smuggled into and/or transported through New Mexico far outweighs the consumption rate within the state. However, the distribution and abuse of methamphetamine, heroin, and prescription drugs pose serious threats to SWB HIDTA/NM. The distribution and abuse of heroin continue to grow and are serious threats statewide, but heroin is more prevalent in the

northern part of New Mexico. Prescription drug abuse is a continuing serious threat statewide and has a direct connection to the expanding heroin use problem. Additionally, cocaine continues to be more widely available throughout the region

The state's proximity to Mexico, its topography along the sparsely populated 180-mile border, the presence of well-established DTOs with direct ties to Mexico-based cartels, and its transportation infrastructure make it a principal drug smuggling area and transshipment and distribution center for marijuana, cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, and illegally-manufactured prescription drugs. Illicit drugs transshipped through the region are destined for several domestic drug markets throughout the country. The open border areas between POEs, mostly a mixture of farmlands and mountainous terrain in the boot heel region of southwest New Mexico, coupled with limited law enforcement presence, easy access to the state's transportation infrastructure, and the lack of radio interoperability between agencies, make this area vulnerable for exploitation by DTOs on both sides of the border. Other criminal groups such as street, prison, and motorcycle gangs exacerbate the drug problem in New Mexico by providing distribution networks to the DTOs.

#### (B) Strategy for Achieving HIDTA Goals and Objectives

SWB HIDTA/NM's integrated systems approach uses coordination, information sharing, and intelligence to synchronize the efforts of enforcement, prosecution, information sharing, and support initiatives. There are 21 initiatives that include 13 multi-jurisdictional law enforcement initiatives, 8 prosecution sub-initiatives, and 3 support initiatives. The support initiatives include training, IT, prevention, and forensic laboratory support. The number of participating agencies includes 15 tribal, 37 local, 14 state, and 11 Federal LEAs. These initiatives focus on interdiction, investigation, prosecution, intelligence/information sharing, and support.

The SWB HIDTA/NM initiatives focus efforts to reduce the transshipment/distribution of illicit drugs, including the diversion of CPDs into and through New Mexico, along with the transshipment of bulk cash and weapons south across the SWB. The region emphasizes the development of CPOTs, RPOTs, and OCDETF-level cases initiated through interdiction and investigative efforts. Additionally, the New Mexico region is also focusing on coordinating drug enforcement efforts on Native American lands. Currently, the Indian Country HIDTA Drug Task Force works joint operations with the tribal police departments of Acoma, Isleta, Jemez, Jicarilla Apache, Laguna, Navajo Nation, Ohkay Owingeh, Pojoaque, Ramah Navajo, Santa Ana, Santa Clara, Southern Ute, Tesuque, Ysleta del Sur, and Zuni.

#### (C) Support of the *National Drug Control Strategy*

SWB HIDTA/NM supports the *Strategy* by incorporating its key elements into its own strategy, including:

- outlining a plan to disrupt/dismantle DTOs/MLOs and reduce the smuggling, transshipment, and distribution of illicit drugs into and through New Mexico;
- supporting a prevention component to reduce illicit drug abuse, including pharmaceutical drug abuse and diversion (All funding assigned to the prevention initiative is focused on the successful completion of these efforts. This is part of a

border-wide prevention effort which includes the other four regions of the SWB HIDTA.); and

- partnering with tribal LEAs to target illegal drug activities within or impacting Indian Country.

(1) Methamphetamine

A decrease in methamphetamine laboratory seizures is attributed to the readily available Mexican- produced methamphetamine in New Mexico and throughout the Southwest. In 2017, the SWB HIDTA/NM HIDTA seized and destroyed six clandestine methamphetamine labs. SWB HIDTA/NM does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.

**Southwest Border HIDTA - South Texas Region**

(A) Threat Assessment

Southwest Border HIDTA – South Texas region (SWB HIDTA/STX) is a principal, high transit smuggling corridor for illicit drugs and undocumented individuals along the SWB. SWB HIDTA/STX continues to be a major transshipment corridor for marijuana, cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, and other illegal drugs. These same routes are utilized to repatriate illegal proceeds back to Mexico. SWB HIDTA/STX consists of 15 counties – 13 of which are situated along the SWB. These counties represent 50% of the Texas-Mexico border. Seventeen of the 25 POEs along the Texas-Mexico border are within the SWB HIDTA/STX region. These POEs, coupled with the regional interstate highways, make the AOR one of the most strategically important drug and illicit-proceeds smuggling corridors in use by both domestic and MDTOs. Despite the low population in some areas, the region greatly influences drug trafficking and availability at the national level. Gang activity associated with the Gulf Cartel, Zetas, and other DTOs and cartels continues to be a threat in the area.

(B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives

Federal, state, and local LEAs combine their efforts with multi-jurisdictional collocated/commingled drug task forces and intelligence initiatives. These intelligence-driven drug task forces pursue coordinated efforts to reduce the smuggling, transshipment, and distribution of drugs into and through the state of Texas. In focusing on the disruption and dismantlement of DTOs in accordance with the *National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy*, SWB HIDTA/STX employs intelligence-driven investigations and interdiction activities targeting drug transshipments, including extensive systematic follow-up investigations involving intelligence analysis and information sharing, as well as an aggressive prosecution structure.

The SWB HIDTA/STX initiatives are seamlessly organized into four types – enforcement (interdiction, investigation, and prosecution), intelligence and information sharing, support, and management and coordination. Through an intensive initiative and task force review and inspection process, along with statistical information gathered through the HIDTA PMP system, the Executive Board holds initiatives accountable for their productivity.

(C) Support of the *National Drug Control Strategy*

SWB HIDTA/STX will continue to focus on dismantling and disrupting DTOs and MLOs active within its AOR and is committed to continuing interdiction efforts of seizing illegal narcotics, as well as disrupting the illegal southbound flow of weapons and currency intended for drug cartels. SWB HIDTA/STX continues to support the *Strategy* through these efforts and the exchange of intelligence and information among LEAs. SWB HIDTA/STX will continue to foster partnerships in furtherance of drug prevention programs with LEAs, young people, educational institutions and the public.

(1) Methamphetamine

In 2017, 2,336 kilograms of methamphetamine was seized in the SWB HIDTA/STX AOR. The reported methamphetamine seizure weight of 2,336 kilograms also includes 1,273 kilograms of methamphetamine in solution. SWB HIDTA/STX does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.

**Southwest Border HIDTA – West Texas Region**

(A) Threat Assessment

Southwest Border HIDTA – West Texas region (SWB HIDTA/WTX) comprises 12 counties that make up the AOR and over 520 miles of the United States border with Mexico. El Paso, Texas stands on the Rio Grande River across from Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, which are the two largest cities situated on the Texas-Mexico border. El Paso, the most populous city in West Texas, lies at the intersection of three states (Texas, New Mexico and Chihuahua). El Paso also sits along Interstate Highway 10 (I-10) which has connections to Interstate Highway 20 (I-20) and Interstate Highway 25 (I-25). The DEA *2017 National Drug Threat Assessment* indicates that Mexican TCOs employ intermediaries who oversee shipments across the SWB and facilitate sales to wholesale and mid-level client. These intermediaries can take the form of criminal street gangs. The criminal street gang of greatest concern, Barrio Azteca (BA), has known ties to the Mexican Cartels.

SWB HIDTA/WTX's main concern continues to be that the region is a transshipment and distribution hub for narcotics from Mexico into the United States. Based upon drug seizure quantities, SWB HIDTA/WTX ranks the following drugs as threats to the AOR – marijuana, cocaine, methamphetamine, and heroin.

(B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives

SWB HIDTA/WTX continues to foster cooperative and effective working relationships among 1 USAO, 10 Federal agencies, 7 state agencies, and 19 local agencies to achieve the common goals of disrupting and dismantling DTOs and securing the SWB HIDTA/WTX 12-county area of the SWB by preventing multi-ton quantities of illicit drugs from reaching their intended market.

(C) Support of the *National Drug Control Strategy*

SWB HIDTA/WTX supports the *Strategy* by dismantling or disrupting DTOs and/or MLOs, thereby disrupting the market for illegal drugs. As the keystone region for the *National*

*Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy*, SWB HIDTA/WTX will support all efforts to contain and reduce the impact of DTOs on the region and will continue to:

- provide a broad range of drug intelligence/information to all participating and non-participating LEAs that it could potentially impact (i.e. - information regarding levels of violence south of the border that might have a spillover effect is shared with all task forces, particularly along the border counties);
- work with the area's prevention partners to foster prevention coalitions; and
- use its training capabilities to provide drugged driving recognition expert training using the curriculum prepared by the Department of Transportation.

(1) Methamphetamine

Methamphetamine use remains at increased levels of availability throughout the West Texas area. Agencies report no methamphetamine labs being discovered over the year. However, the smuggling and localized selling of methamphetamine from Mexico is a common trend throughout the region. SWB HIDTA/WTX does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.

**Texoma HIDTA**

(A) Threat Assessment

The overall drug trafficking threat to the Texoma HIDTA region remains stable. Law enforcement and intelligence data clearly indicates methamphetamine continues to pose the most significant drug threat to the region, as North Texas, the Texas Panhandle, and Oklahoma are flooded with cheap, high-purity methamphetamine. Currently, almost all of this methamphetamine is produced in Mexico and sent up to the region by MDTOs. Prescription drugs, heroin, synthetic cannabinoids, cocaine/crack cocaine, and marijuana also pose a significant threat to communities throughout the Texoma HIDTA region. In particular, increased flow of cocaine into the region and signs of increasing distribution of synthetic opioids, including fentanyl and fentanyl-laced drugs, are the most significant emerging trends facing the region.

Both the Dallas-Fort Worth and Oklahoma City metropolitan areas continue to serve as key command and control distribution points for drug loads sent to the region by MDTOs. These DTOs continue to dominate the wholesale trafficking of most major drug types encountered in the region, sending large shipments of methamphetamine, heroin, cocaine, and marijuana to the Texoma HIDTA AOR, either for local distribution or as a transshipment point for loads destined to the Midwest and eastern United States. DTOs and MLOs continue to funnel large sums of drug proceeds through the area, remitting the money to Mexico in bulk cash form, as well as through large numbers of wire transfers and other money laundering techniques.

(B) Strategy for Achieving HIDTA Goals and Objectives:

The Texoma HIDTA Executive Board's oversight of the program ensures that the HIDTA functions within the mission of the National HIDTA program. The Executive Board will ensure the four subcommittees – Budget, Intelligence, Domestic Highway Enforcement

(DHE), and Initiative Review – effectively carry out their stated functions. These actions will all work towards increasing the effectiveness of the Texoma HIDTA. The Executive Board will work with staff on developing effective plans to meet the objectives outlined in the annual Strategy. The Executive Board will maintain interaction through bi-monthly Executive Board meetings, HIDTA subcommittees, and regional meetings.

The Executive Board will continually evaluate initiatives to ensure adherence to the ONDCP, and the HIDTA program goals. The Executive Board will also determine if new initiatives should be implemented to address the annual Threat Assessment.

(C) Support of the *National Drug Control Strategy*

Texoma HIDTA supports the *Strategy* by identifying, investigating, and dismantling/disrupting DTOs that use the Dallas/Fort Worth and Oklahoma City areas to transport, store, and distribute illicit drugs throughout the United States and MLOs that smuggle drug proceeds into Mexico. The Texoma HIDTA initiatives reduce the amounts of cocaine, methamphetamine, marijuana, and heroin supplied to the area and to other national drug markets in the Midwest, Northeast, and Southeast, as well as the amount of money going to criminal activities.

(1) Methamphetamine

The vast majority of the DTOs investigated by the Texoma HIDTA initiatives are multi-drug organizations. Between 2009 and 2016, initiative seizures of methamphetamine increased from 112 kilograms to over 1,318 kilograms. Although the increase has been the most dramatic in the Dallas/Fort Worth Metroplex, law enforcement in Oklahoma and the West Texas/Panhandle areas has also seen significant increases in methamphetamine seizures over the last several years. Texoma HIDTA does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.

**Washington/Baltimore HIDTA**

(A) Threat Assessment

The Washington/Baltimore HIDTA (W/B HIDTA) region is a consumer market rather than a gateway or drug-producing area. Typically, drugs that enter the W/B HIDTA area have been previously imported into a different city or region, where they are repackaged and then transported into the W/B HIDTA region. Now, however, a significant number of W/B HIDTA cases have involved shipments originating in Texas, California, and Arizona. In addition, a growing number of DTOs have reported receiving drugs directly from abroad, specifically from Africa, Central America, and Southwest Asia. In addition to the continuing threat posed by DTOs and MLOs, criminal street gangs represent a growing threat to the region. Throughout the W/B HIDTA region, membership in criminal street gangs has increased, and the violence associated with these gangs and their role in illegal drug trafficking pose a serious threat to the region.

By substantial margins, Federal, state, and local law enforcement officials responding to the W/B HIDTA TAS identified heroin, fentanyl, cocaine, and prescription narcotics as the primary drug threats in their communities. In all four cases, more than three-quarters of the

respondents said the substance caused significant or moderate harm in their communities, and, in the cases of heroin and fentanyl, substantial majorities said the drug caused significant harm. With the exception of fentanyl, these drugs have been long-standing major threats in the W/B HIDTA area.

Heroin and cocaine have been major threats in the region since W/B HIDTA was designated in 1994. Cocaine (powder and crack) has been a continuous and widespread problem since the first year of operation and continues to be the drug that law enforcement believes contributes most to violent crime in area communities. Heroin was primarily a problem in the Baltimore region with relatively little presence in the other W/B HIDTA AORs until 2010. Since then, it has become a major concern for all W/B HIDTA areas. The strength of the addiction that heroin creates, and the extent to which that addiction often leads to overdoses, are reflected in the assessments of W/B HIDTA law enforcement officials. The W/B HIDTA TAS noted that 95% of responding law enforcement officials cited heroin as both the drug that contributes most to property crime and the most significant factor in the expenditure of law enforcement resources. No other drug came close to these figures.

In the last several years, prescription narcotics, especially oxycodone- and hydrocodone-based medicines, have also become very significant threats in the W/B HIDTA region. Fentanyl is the newest of the four major threats, but given the potency and lethality of the substance, it has quickly become a substantial threat second only to heroin. If current trends in availability and use continue, it is possible that fentanyl will surpass heroin as the most significant threat in the W/B HIDTA region.

Marijuana, despite being the most prevalent drug in the region, is a secondary threat. Although half of respondents to the TAS described it as a moderate threat, more than one-third categorized it as a minor threat, and only five of the respondents reported it causes significant harm in their communities.

Methamphetamine and synthetic drugs, including MDMA, LSD, and synthetic cannabinoids and synthetic cathinones, present comparable threats. Both are viewed as a significant or moderate threat by less than half of the survey respondents and very few considered them to cause significant harm. PCP continues to be a significant problem in the immediate Washington, DC, area but is generally not a problem in other W/B HIDTA areas.

#### (B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives

W/B HIDTA believes that coordination among LEAs at all levels is key to disrupting the drug market in the area. Consequently, since it was designated in 1994, W/B HIDTA has fostered cooperative and effective working relationships among Federal, state, and local LEAs. Currently, there are 146 agencies participating in the W/B HIDTA AOR. Information and intelligence sharing is required for all participating agencies and has become a standard practice. The Gang Intelligence System, which identifies suspected members of criminal gangs, and Case Explorer, a case management system, are available to all agencies in the W/B HIDTA area and form the central elements of the information sharing among those agencies. In 2016, W/B HIDTA developed the Overdose Detection Mapping Application Program (ODMAP), providing near real-time suspected overdose surveillance data across jurisdictions



to support public safety and public health efforts to mobilize an immediate response to a sudden increase, or spike, in overdose events. It links first responders and relevant record management systems to a mapping tool to track overdoses to stimulate real-time response and strategic analysis across jurisdictions. Currently, nearly 2,000 agencies in 44 states have signed on to use ODMAP, and more than 61,000 overdoses have been entered into the database.

(C) Support of the *National Drug Control Strategy*

W/B HIDTA supports the *Strategy* in several ways. Fundamentally, it contributes to the disruption of domestic drug trafficking and production. W/B HIDTA also provides significant support to the demand side of the *Strategy* by funding 12 treatment initiatives and 7 prevention initiatives designed to help break the cycle of drug use, crime, delinquency, and incarceration.

(1) Methamphetamine

In 2017, W/B HIDTA's initiatives seized 40 kilograms of methamphetamine. Initiative investigations also led to the dismantlement of 8 laboratories producing methamphetamine and the identification of 10 dumpsites. W/B HIDTA does not track funding specifically used to address methamphetamine trafficking.

**National HIDTA Assistance Center**

(A) Administrative Support Program and Coordination of National Programs

The National HIDTA Assistance Center (NHAC), located in Miami, Florida, provides critical contracted financial services that assist ONDCP in the administration of the HIDTA program, including a desk audit of each request for reimbursement submitted by the regional HIDTAs. The center also hosts the HIDTA Financial Management System (FMS) (a database used for budgeting and grant administration for all state and local awards) and the Clearance Management System (a database used to manage security clearances for the HIDTA program). The NHAC provides HIDTA-related training to the entire program and technology support through its HIDTA Resource Management System, a national HIDTA library and collaboration work space.

The NHAC addresses the need to continuously improve the efficiency and effectiveness of all the designated HIDTAs through seven distinct initiatives – Management and Coordination Unit, Training Unit, Media and Technology Unit, Financial Assistance Unit, National Marijuana Initiative (NMI), DHE, and NETI.

(B) Strategy for Achieving Goals and Objectives:

The NHAC's mission and vision are defined by its key stakeholders, ONDCP, and the 29 regional HIDTA programs. The NHAC provides consistent, indispensable services that meet the needs of the HIDTA program. The NHAC's core services include tracking all grant activity for ONDCP; developing and delivering HIDTA-specific training; organizing national conferences and meetings; and serving as facilitator for three initiatives (NMI, NETI, and DHE). Through these services, the NHAC supports the strategies of all HIDTA regions as they respond to the unique threats facing their respective areas of responsibility.


(C) Support of the *National Drug Control Strategy*

The NHAC proudly supports the *Strategy* by providing indirect service to the HIDTA program. The NHAC does not maintain a direct law enforcement function, but it supports disrupting the illicit drug market by improving the capabilities of the HIDTA supervisors and assisting with the electronic connectivity and fiscal accountability of all HIDTA offices. Thus, the unique strategy focuses on the business practices required to most efficiently coordinate the overall program.

**This page intentionally left blank**

## VII. Exhibits

### A. Organizational Chart



Approved by:  Date: 7-19-2016  
LORETTA E. LYNCH  
Attorney General

**This page intentionally left blank**

B. Summary of Requirements

**Summary of Requirements**  
Drug Enforcement Administration  
Salaries and Expenses  
(Dollars in Thousands)

	FY 2020 Request		
	Positions	Estimate FTE	Amount
<b>2018 Enacted 1/</b>	<b>7,035</b>	<b>6,193</b>	<b>2,190,326</b>
<b>Total 2018 Enacted</b>	<b>7,035</b>	<b>6,193</b>	<b>2,190,326</b>
<b>2019 Continuing Resolution</b>	<b>7,035</b>	<b>6,193</b>	<b>2,190,326</b>
<b>Technical Adjustments</b>			
Expected Change from FY 2019 CR	0	0	471
<b>Total Technical Adjustments</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>471</b>
<b>Base Adjustments</b>			
Pay and Benefits	0	0	30,154
Domestic Rent and Facilities	0	0	14,069
Other Adjustments	0	0	568
Foreign Expenses	0	0	9,053
<b>Total Base Adjustments</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>53,844</b>
<b>Total Technical and Base Adjustments</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>54,315</b>
<b>2020 Current Services</b>	<b>7,035</b>	<b>6,193</b>	<b>2,244,641</b>
<b>Program Changes</b>			
Increases:			
Heroin Enforcement Groups	49	25	11,140
Cyber Enforcement	44	22	11,722
Combatting TCOs	0	0	11,650
Subtotal, Increases	93	47	34,512
<b>Total Program Changes</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>34,512</b>
<b>2020 Total Request</b>	<b>7,128</b>	<b>6,240</b>	<b>2,279,153</b>
2019 - 2020 Total Change	93	47	88,827

<sup>1/</sup> FY 2018 FTE is actual

B. Summary of Requirements

**Summary of Requirements**  
Drug Enforcement Administration  
Salaries and Expenses  
(Dollars in Thousands)

Program Activity	FY 2018 Enacted			FY 2019 Continuing Resolution			FY 2020 Technical and Base Adjustments			FY 2020 Current Services		
	Positions	Actual FTE	Amount	Positions	Est. FTE	Amount	Positions	Est. FTE	Amount	Positions	Est. FTE	Amount
International Enforcement	929	883	469,558	929	883	469,558	0	0	14,985	929	883	484,543
Domestic Enforcement	6,080	5,286	1,706,930	6,080	5,286	1,706,930	0	0	39,243	6,080	5,286	1,746,173
State and Local Assistance	26	24	13,838	26	24	13,838	0	0	87	26	24	13,925
<b>Total Direct</b>	<b>7,035</b>	<b>6,193</b>	<b>2,190,326</b>	<b>7,035</b>	<b>6,193</b>	<b>2,190,326</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>54,315</b>	<b>7,035</b>	<b>6,193</b>	<b>2,244,641</b>
Balance Rescission			0			0			0			0
<b>Total Direct with Rescission</b>			<b>2,190,326</b>			<b>2,190,326</b>			<b>54,315</b>			<b>2,244,641</b>
Reimbursable FTE		1,059			11			0			11	
<b>Total Direct and Reimb. FTE</b>		<b>7,252</b>			<b>6,204</b>			<b>0</b>			<b>6,204</b>	
Other FTE:												
LEAP		787			787			0			787	
Overtime		46			46			0			46	
<b>Grand Total, FTE</b>		<b>8,085</b>			<b>7,037</b>			<b>0</b>			<b>7,037</b>	

Program Activity	2020 Increases			2020 Offsets			2020 Request		
	Positions	Est. FTE	Amount	Positions	Est. FTE	Amount	Positions	Est. FTE	Amount
International Enforcement	0	0	11,650	0	0	0	929	883	496,193
Domestic Enforcement	93	47	22,862	0	0	0	6,173	5,333	1,769,035
State and Local Assistance	0	0	0	0	0	0	26	24	13,925
<b>Total Direct</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>34,512</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>7,128</b>	<b>6,240</b>	<b>2,279,153</b>
Balance Rescission			0			0			0
<b>Total Direct with Rescission</b>			<b>34,512</b>			<b>0</b>			<b>2,279,153</b>
Reimbursable FTE		0			0			11	
<b>Total Direct and Reimb. FTE</b>		<b>47</b>			<b>0</b>			<b>6,251</b>	
Other FTE:									
LEAP		6			0			793	
Overtime		0			0			46	
<b>Grand Total, FTE</b>		<b>53</b>			<b>0</b>			<b>7,090</b>	

**Summary of Requirements**  
Drug Enforcement Administration  
Diversion Control Fee Account  
(Dollars in Thousands)

	FY 2020 Request		
	Positions	Estimate FTE	Amount
<b>2018 Enacted with Sequester 1/</b>	[1,839]	1,599	392,465
<b>Total 2018 Enacted</b>	[1,839]	1,599	392,465
<b>2019 Continuing Resolution</b>	[1,839]	1,625	420,703
2019 Sequester	0	0	-26,586
<b>Total 2019 Continuing Resolution with Sequester</b>	[1,839]	1,625	394,117
<b>Technical Adjustments</b>			
2019 Sequester Available in 2020	0	0	26,586
<b>Total Technical Adjustments</b>	0	0	26,586
<b>Base Adjustments</b>			
Pay and Benefits	0	0	18,291
Domestic Rent and Facilities	0	0	3,848
Other Adjustments	0	0	180
Foreign Expenses	0	0	120
<b>Total Base Adjustments</b>	0	0	22,439
<b>Total Technical and Base Adjustments</b>	0	0	49,025
<b>2020 Current Services</b>	[1,839]	1,625	443,142
<b>2020 Total Request</b>	[1,839]	1,625	443,142
2019 - 2020 Total Change	0	0	49,025

<sup>1/</sup> FY 2018 FTE is actual



B. Summary of Requirements

**Summary of Requirements**  
Drug Enforcement Administration  
Diversion Control Fee Account  
(Dollars in Thousands)

Program Activity	FY 2018 Enacted with Sequester			FY 2019 Continuing Resolution with Sequester			FY 2020 Technical and Base Adjustments			FY 2020 Current Services		
	Positions	Actual FTE	Amount	Positions	Est. FTE	Amount	Positions	Est. FTE	Amount	Positions	Est. FTE	Amount
DEA - Diversion Control	[1,839]	1,599	392,465	[1,839]	1,625	394,117	0	0	49,025	[1,839]	1,625	443,142
<b>Total Direct</b>	<b>[1,839]</b>	<b>1,599</b>	<b>392,465</b>	<b>[1,839]</b>	<b>1,625</b>	<b>394,117</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>49,025</b>	<b>[1,839]</b>	<b>1,625</b>	<b>443,142</b>
Balance Rescission			0						0			0
<b>Total Direct with Rescission</b>			<b>392,465</b>			<b>394,117</b>			<b>49,025</b>			<b>443,142</b>
Reimbursable FTE		0			0			0			0	
<b>Total Direct and Reimb. FTE</b>		<b>1,599</b>			<b>1,625</b>			<b>0</b>			<b>1,625</b>	
Other FTE:												
LEAP		113			114			0			114	
Overtime		18			18			0			18	
<b>Grand Total, FTE</b>		<b>1,730</b>			<b>1,757</b>			<b>0</b>			<b>1,757</b>	

Program Activity	2020 Increases			2020 Offsets			2020 Request		
	Positions	Est. FTE	Amount	Positions	Est. FTE	Amount	Positions	Est. FTE	Amount
DEA - Diversion Control	0	0	0	0	0	0	[1,839]	1,625	443,142
<b>Total Direct</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>[1,839]</b>	<b>1,625</b>	<b>443,142</b>
Balance Rescission			0			0			0
<b>Total Direct with Rescission</b>			<b>0</b>			<b>0</b>			<b>443,142</b>
Reimbursable FTE		0			0			0	
<b>Total Direct and Reimb. FTE</b>		<b>0</b>			<b>0</b>			<b>1,625</b>	
Other FTE:									
LEAP		0			0			114	
Overtime		0			0			18	
<b>Grand Total, FTE</b>		<b>0</b>			<b>0</b>			<b>1,757</b>	

B. Summary of Requirements

**Summary of Requirements**  
Drug Enforcement Administration  
High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas  
(Dollars in Thousands)

	FY 2020 Request		
	Positions	Estimate FTE	Amount
<b>2018 Enacted 1/</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>[280,000]</b>
2018 Balance Rescission	0	0	0
<b>Total 2018 Enacted with Rescissions 1/</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>2019 Continuing Resolution</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>[280,000]</b>
<b>Transfers</b>			
Transfer - HIDTA Program from ONDCP to DEA	0	0	254,000
<b>Total Transfers</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>254,000</b>
<b>Total Transfers and Base Adjustments</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>254,000</b>
<b>2019 Current Services</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>254,000</b>
<b>Program Changes</b>			
<b>Total Program Changes</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>2019 Total Request</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>254,000</b>
2018 - 2019 Total Change	0	0	254,000

<sup>1/</sup> In FY 2018 and FY 2019, this program was included in the Office of National Drug Control Policy's budget. As of FY 2020, the HIDTA Program is being transferred to DEA.

**Summary of Requirements**  
 Drug Enforcement Administration  
 High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas  
 (Dollars in Thousands)

Program Activity	FY 2018 Enacted			FY 2019 Continuing Resolution			FY 2020 Technical and Base Adjustments			FY 2020 Current Services		
	Positions	Actual FTE	Amount	Positions	Est. FTE	Amount	Positions	Est. FTE	Amount	Positions	Est. FTE	Amount
HIDTA	0	0	[280,000]	0	0	[280,000]	0	0	254,000	0	0	254,000
<b>Total Direct</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>254,000</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>254,000</b>
Balance Rescission			0			0			0			0
<b>Total Direct with Rescission</b>			<b>0</b>			<b>0</b>			<b>254,000</b>			<b>254,000</b>
Reimbursable FTE		0			0			0			0	
<b>Total Direct and Reimb. FTE</b>		<b>0</b>			<b>0</b>			<b>0</b>			<b>0</b>	
Other FTE:												
LEAP		0			0			0			0	
Overtime		0			0			0			0	
<b>Grand Total, FTE</b>		<b>0</b>			<b>0</b>			<b>0</b>			<b>0</b>	

Program Activity	2020 Increases			2020 Offsets			2020 Request		
	Positions	Est. FTE	Amount	Positions	Est. FTE	Amount	Positions	Est. FTE	Amount
HIDTA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	254,000
<b>Total Direct</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>254,000</b>
Balance Rescission			0			0			0
<b>Total Direct with Rescission</b>			<b>0</b>			<b>0</b>			<b>254,000</b>
Reimbursable FTE		0			0			0	
<b>Total Direct and Reimb. FTE</b>		<b>0</b>			<b>0</b>			<b>0</b>	
Other FTE:									
LEAP		0			0			0	
Overtime		0			0			0	
<b>Grand Total, FTE</b>		<b>0</b>			<b>0</b>			<b>0</b>	

**FY 2020 Program Increases/Offsets by Decision Unit**

Drug Enforcement Administration  
Salaries and Expenses  
(Dollars in Thousands)

Program Increases	Location of Description by Program Activity	International Enforcement				Domestic Enforcement				State and Local Assistance			
		Positions	Agt./Atty.	Est. FTE	Amount	Positions	Agt./Atty.	Est. FTE	Amount	Positions	Agt./Atty.	Est. FTE	Amount
Heroin Enforcement Groups	Page 97	0	0	0	0	49	35	25	11,140	0	0	0	0
Cyber Enforcement	Page 89	0	0	0	0	44	8	22	11,722	0	0	0	0
Combatting TCOs	Page 83	0	0	0	11,650	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total Program Increases</b>		<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>11,650</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>22,862</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>

Program Increases	Location of Description by Program Activity	Total Increases			
		Positions	Agt./Atty.	Est. FTE	Amount
Heroin Enforcement Groups	Page 97	49	35	25	11,140
Cyber Enforcement	Page 89	44	8	22	11,722
Combatting TCOs	Page 83	0	0	0	11,650
<b>Total Program Increases</b>		<b>93</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>34,512</b>

**This page intentionally left blank**

**Resources by Department of Justice Strategic Goal and Objective**  
 Drug Enforcement Administration  
 Salaries and Expenses  
 (Dollars in Thousands)

Strategic Goal and Strategic Objective	FY 2018 Enacted			FY 2019 Continuing Resolution			FY 2020 Current		FY 2020 Increases		FY 2020 Offsets		FY 2020 Total Request		
	Direct/ Reimb FTE	Sub-Allot/ Dir Coll FTE	Direct Amount	Direct & Reimb FTE	Sub-Allot/ Dir Coll FTE	Direct Amount	Direct & Reimb FTE	Direct Amount	Direct & Reimb FTE	Direct Amount	Direct & Reimb FTE	Direct Amount	Direct & Reimb FTE	Sub-Allot/ Dir Coll FTE	Direct Amount
<b>Goal 1 Enhance National Security and Counter the Threat of Terrorism</b>															
1.1 Disrupt and defeat terrorist operations	50	0	22,318	50	0	22,318	50	22,871	0	0	0	0	50	0	22,871
1.3 Combat unauthorized disclosures, insider threats, and hostile intelligence activities	5	0	1,947	5	0	1,947	5	1,995	0	0	0	0	5	0	1,995
<b>Subtotal, Goal 1</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>24,265</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>24,265</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>24,866</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>24,866</b>
<b>Goal 3 Reduce Violent Crime and Promote Public Safety</b>															
3.2 Disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking organizations to curb opioid and other illicit drug use in our nation	7,197	0	2,166,061	6,149	1,066	2,166,061	6,149	2,219,775	47	34,512	0	0	6,196	1,055	2,254,287
<b>Subtotal, Goal 3</b>	<b>7,197</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2,166,061</b>	<b>6,149</b>	<b>1,066</b>	<b>2,166,061</b>	<b>6,149</b>	<b>2,219,775</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>34,512</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>6,196</b>	<b>1,055</b>	<b>2,254,287</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>7,252</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2,190,326</b>	<b>6,204</b>	<b>1,066</b>	<b>2,190,326</b>	<b>6,204</b>	<b>2,244,641</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>34,512</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>6,251</b>	<b>1,055</b>	<b>2,279,153</b>

**Resources by Department of Justice Strategic Goal and Objective**

Drug Enforcement Administration  
 Diversion Control Fee Account  
 (Dollars in Thousands)

Strategic Goal and Strategic Objective	FY 2018 Enacted with		FY 2019 Continuing		FY 2020 Current		FY 2020 Increases		FY 2020 Offsets		FY 2020 Total	
	Sequester		Resolution with		Services						Request	
	Direct & Reimb FTE	Direct Amount	Direct & Reimb FTE	Direct Amount	Direct & Reimb FTE	Direct Amount	Direct & Reimb FTE	Direct Amount	Direct & Reimb FTE	Direct Amount	Direct & Reimb FTE	Direct Amount
<b>Goal 3 Reduce Violent Crime and Promote Public Safety</b>												
3.2 Disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking organizations to curb opioid and other illicit drug use in our nation	1,599	392,465	1,625	394,117	1,625	443,142	0	0	0	0	1,625	443,142
<b>Subtotal, Goal 3</b>	<b>1,599</b>	<b>392,465</b>	<b>1,625</b>	<b>394,117</b>	<b>1,625</b>	<b>443,142</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1,625</b>	<b>443,142</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,599</b>	<b>392,465</b>	<b>1,625</b>	<b>394,117</b>	<b>1,625</b>	<b>443,142</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1,625</b>	<b>443,142</b>

**Resources by Department of Justice Strategic Goal and Objective**

Drug Enforcement Administration  
 High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas  
 (Dollars in Thousands)

Strategic Goal and Strategic Objective		FY 2018 Enacted 1/		FY 2019 Continuing		FY 2020 Current		FY 2020 Increases		FY 2020 Offsets		FY 2020 Total	
				Resolution		Services						Request	
		Direct & Reimb FTE	Direct Amount	Direct & Reimb FTE	Direct Amount	Direct & Reimb FTE	Direct Amount	Direct & Reimb FTE	Direct Amount	Direct & Reimb FTE	Direct Amount	Direct & Reimb FTE	Direct Amount
<b>Goal 3</b>	<b>Reduce Violent Crime and Promote Public Safety</b>												
3.2	Disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking organizations to curb opioid and other illicit drug use in our nation	0	0	0	0	0	254,000	0	0	0	0	0	254,000
	<b>Subtotal, Goal 3</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>254,000</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>254,000</b>
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>254,000</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>254,000</b>

In FY 2018 and FY 2019, HIDTA was part of ONDCP's budget, and thus not scored to DOJ Strategic Goals/Objectives.



**This page intentionally left blank**

### Justifications for Technical and Base Adjustments

Drug Enforcement Administration  
Salaries and Expenses  
(Dollars in Thousands)

	Positions	Estimate FTE	Amount
<b>Technical Adjustments</b>			
1 Expected Change from FY 2019 CR Because no final 2019 appropriations bills have been enacted, this technical adjustment is to reflect the difference between the 2019 President's Budget and the annualized amounts provided in the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 115-245) (CR).	0	0	471
<b>Subtotal, Technical Adjustments</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>471</b>
<b>Pay and Benefits</b>			
1 <u>Annualization of 2018 Approved Positions - (3rd year)</u> Personnel: This provides for the annualization of 30 new positions appropriated in 2018. Annualization of new positions extends up to 3 years to provide entry level funding in the first year, with a 1 or 2-year progression to a journeyman level. For 2018 increases, this request includes an increase of \$2,381,000 for full-year payroll costs associated with these additional positions.	0	0	2,381
2 <u>Changes in Compensable Days</u> The increased cost for one additional compensable day in FY 2020 compared to FY 2019 is calculated by dividing the FY 2019 estimated personnel compensation, \$763,803,000 and applicable benefits, \$267,042,000, by 261 compensable days, \$3,941,000.	0	0	3,941
3 <u>Employees Compensation Fund</u> The -\$212,000 request reflects anticipated changes in payments to the Department of Labor for injury benefits under the Federal Employee Compensation Act.	0	0	-212
4 <u>FERS Rate Increase</u> Per 2018 OMB Circular A-11 section 32, Personnel Compensation, Benefits, and Related Costs, the agency contribution of regular retirement under FERS will increase from 13.7% to 16%. The FERS contribution for Law Enforcement retirement will increase from 30.1% to 33.4%. The amount requested, \$20,913,000, represents the funds needed to cover this increase.	0	0	20,913
5 <u>Health Insurance</u> Effective January 2020, the component's contribution to Federal employees' health insurance increases by 3 percent. Applied against the 2020 estimate of \$63,075,000, the additional amount required is \$1,908,000.	0	0	1,908

### Justifications for Technical and Base Adjustments

Drug Enforcement Administration  
Salaries and Expenses  
(Dollars in Thousands)

	Positions	Estimate FTE	Amount
<p><b>6 Retirement</b> Agency retirement contributions increase as employees under CSRS retire and are replaced by FERS employees. Based on U.S. Department of Justice Agency estimates, we project that the DOJ workforce will convert from CSRS to FERS at a rate of 0.8 percent per year, for both LEO and Non-LEO, based on the past 5 years of DOJ retirement data. The requested increase of \$1,254,000 is necessary to meet our increased retirement obligations as a result of this conversion.</p>	0	0	1,254
<p><b>7 Retirement FERS Revised Annuity Employees (RAE) Savings</b> Agency retirement contributions will decrease as new FERS RAE employees are hired and replace CSRS and regular FERS employees. Based on OMB Circular A-11 FERS RAE withholding rates, we project agency savings from employees hired after December 31, 2012 of 1.8 percent of salaries for Non-LEO employees and 1.7 percent of salaries for LEO employees in FY 2020, for a savings of \$31,000.</p>	0	0	-31
<b>Subtotal, Pay and Benefits</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>30,154</b>
<b>Domestic Rent and Facilities</b>			
<p><b>1 GSA Rent</b> GSA will continue to charge rental rates that approximate those charged to commercial tenants for equivalent space and related services. The requested increase of \$6,630,000 is required to meet our commitment to GSA. The costs associated with GSA rent were derived through the use of an automated system, which uses the latest inventory data, including rate increases to be effective FY 2020 for each building currently occupied by Department of Justice components, as well as the costs of new space to be occupied.</p>	0	0	6,630
<p><b>2 Moves</b> GSA requires all agencies to pay relocation costs associated with lease expirations. This request provides for the costs associated with new office relocations caused by the expiration of leases in FY 2020.</p>	0	0	16,979
<p><b>3 Moves - Non-Recur</b> GSA requires all agencies to pay relocation costs associated with lease expirations. This is the non-recurrence of the move costs associated with new office relocations provided in the FY 2019 President's Budget.</p>	0	0	-9,540
<b>Subtotal, Domestic Rent and Facilities</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>14,069</b>

### Justifications for Technical and Base Adjustments

Drug Enforcement Administration  
Salaries and Expenses  
(Dollars in Thousands)

	Positions	Estimate FTE	Amount
<b>Other Adjustments</b>			
1 <u>Security Investigations</u> DEA is requesting \$568,000 for an expected rate increase for background investigations and reinvestigations in FY 2020. This estimate is based on OPM's most recent rate increase that occurred in FY 2018.	0	0	568
<b>Subtotal, Other Adjustments</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>568</b>
<b>Foreign Expenses</b>			
1 <u>Capital Security Cost Sharing</u> Per P.L. 108-447 and subsequent acts, "all agencies with personnel overseas subject to chief of mission authority shall participate and provide funding in advance for their share of costs of providing new, safe, secure U.S. diplomatic facilities, without offsets, on the basis of the total overseas presence of each agency as determined by the Secretary of State." Originally authorized for FY 2000-2004, the program has been extended annually by OMB and Congress and has also been expanded beyond new embassy construction to include maintenance and renovation costs of the new facilities. For the purpose of this program, State's personnel totals for DOJ include current and projected staffing. The estimated cost to the Department, as provided by State, for FY 2020 is \$119 million. DEA currently has 773 positions overseas, and funding of \$1,674,000 is requested for this account.	0	0	1,674
2 <u>Education Allowance</u> For employees stationed abroad, components are obligated to meet the educational expenses incurred by an employee in providing adequate elementary (grades K-8) and secondary (grades 9-12) education for dependent children at post. \$3,240,000 reflects the increase in cost to support existing staffing levels.	0	0	3,240
3 <u>Government Leased Quarters (GLQ)</u> GLQ is a program managed by the Department of State (DOS) and provides government employees stationed overseas with housing and utilities. DOS exercises authority for leases and control of the GLQs and negotiates the lease for components. \$1,316,000 reflects the change in cost to support existing staffing levels.	0	0	1,316
4 <u>ICASS</u> The Department of State charges agencies for administrative support provided to staff based overseas. Charges are determined by a cost distribution system. The FY 2020 request is based on the projected FY 2018 bill for post invoices and other ICASS costs.	0	0	2,903

E. Justifications for Technical and Base Adjustments

**Justifications for Technical and Base Adjustments**

Drug Enforcement Administration  
 Salaries and Expenses  
 (Dollars in Thousands)

	Positions	Estimate FTE	Amount
5 <u>Living Quarters Allowance (LQA)</u> The living quarter allowance (LQA) is an allowance granted an employee for the annual cost of adequate living quarters for the employee and the employee's family at a foreign post. The rates are designed to cover the average cost of rent, heat, light, fuel, gas, electricity, water, local taxes, and insurance paid by the employee. Employees who receive the GLQ do not receive LQA and vice versa. -\$80,000 reflects the change in cost to support existing staffing levels.	0	0	-80
<b>Subtotal, Foreign Expenses</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>9,053</b>
<b>TOTAL DIRECT TECHNICAL and BASE ADJUSTMENTS</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>54,315</b>

### Justifications for Technical and Base Adjustments

Drug Enforcement Administration  
 Diversion Control Fee Account  
 (Dollars in Thousands)

	Positions	Estimate FTE	Amount
<b>Technical Adjustments</b>			
1 <u>2019 Sequester Available in 2020</u> Because DCFA is a mandatory, non-defense account, it will be subject to a \$26,586,000 sequestration in FY 2019. In FY 2019, DEA will utilize balances from prior fee collections to maintain its Diversion Control Program. An FY 2020 base adjustment of \$26,586,000 is required to maintain DEA's current service level for the Diversion Control Program in FY 2019.	0	0	26,586
<b>Subtotal, Technical Adjustments</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>26,586</b>
<b>Pay and Benefits</b>			
1 <u>Annualization of 2018 Approved Positions - (3rd year)</u> Personnel: This provides for the annualization of 187 new positions authorized in 2018. Annualization of new positions extends up to 3 years to provide entry level funding in the first year, with a 1 or 2-year progression to a journeyman level. For 2018 increases, this request includes an increase of \$12,526,000 for full-year payroll costs associated with these additional positions.	0	0	12,526
2 <u>Changes in Compensable Days</u> The increased cost for one additional compensable day in FY 2020 compared to FY 2019 is calculated by dividing the FY 2019 estimated personnel compensation, \$177,000,000 and applicable benefits, \$39,800,000, by 261 compensable days,\$830,000.	0	0	830
3 <u>FERS Rate Increase</u> Per 2018 OMB Circular A-11 section 32, Personnel Compensation, Benefits, and Related Costs, the agency contribution of regular retirement under FERS will increase from 13.7% to 16%. The FERS contribution for Law Enforcement retirement will increase from 30.1% to 33.4%. The amount requested, \$4,317,000, represents the funds needed to cover this increase.	0	0	4,317
4 <u>Health Insurance</u> Effective January 2020, the component's contribution to Federal employees' health insurance increases by 3 percent. Applied against the 2020 estimate of \$10,953,000, the additional amount required is \$338,000.	0	0	338

### Justifications for Technical and Base Adjustments

Drug Enforcement Administration

Diversion Control Fee Account

(Dollars in Thousands)

	Positions	Estimate FTE	Amount
<b>5 Retirement</b> Agency retirement contributions increase as employees under CSRS retire and are replaced by FERS employees. Based on U.S. Department of Justice Agency estimates, we project that the DOJ workforce will convert from CSRS to FERS at a rate of 0.8 percent per year, for both LEO and Non-LEO, based on the past 5 years of DOJ retirement data. The requested increase of \$280,000 is necessary to meet our increased retirement obligations as a result of this conversion.	0	0	280
<b>Subtotal, Pay and Benefits</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>18,291</b>
<b>Domestic Rent and Facilities</b> <b>1 GSA Rent</b> GSA will continue to charge rental rates that approximate those charged to commercial tenants for equivalent space and related services. The requested increase of \$1,231,000 is required to meet our commitment to GSA. The costs associated with GSA rent were derived through the use of an automated system, which uses the latest inventory data, including rate increases to be effective FY 2020 for each building currently occupied by Department of Justice components, as well as the costs of new space to be occupied.	0	0	1,231
<b>2 Moves</b> GSA requires all agencies to pay relocation costs associated with lease expirations. This request provides for the costs associated with new office relocations caused by the expiration of leases in FY 2020.	0	0	4,475
<b>3 Moves - Non-Recur</b> GSA requires all agencies to pay relocation costs associated with lease expirations. This is the non-recurrence of the move costs associated with new office relocations provided in the FY 2019 President's Budget.	0	0	-1,858
<b>Subtotal, Domestic Rent and Facilities</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>3,848</b>
<b>Other Adjustments</b> <b>1 Security Investigations</b> DEA is requesting \$180,000 for an expected rate increase for background investigations and reinvestigations in FY 2020. This estimate is based on OPM's most recent rate increase that occurred in FY 2018.	0	0	180
<b>Subtotal, Other Adjustments</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>180</b>

### Justifications for Technical and Base Adjustments

Drug Enforcement Administration

Diversion Control Fee Account

(Dollars in Thousands)

	Positions	Estimate FTE	Amount
<b>Foreign Expenses</b>			
<b>1 <u>Capital Security Cost Sharing</u></b> Per P.L. 108-447 and subsequent acts, all agencies with personnel overseas subject to chief of mission authority shall participate and provide funding in advance for their share of costs of providing new, safe, secure U.S. diplomatic facilities, without offsets, on the basis of the total overseas presence of each agency as determined by the Secretary of State. Originally authorized for FY 2000-2004, the program has been extended annually by OMB and Congress and has also been expanded beyond new embassy construction to include maintenance and renovation costs of the new facilities. For the purpose of this program, State personnel totals for DOJ include current and projected staffing. The estimated cost to the Department, as provided by State, for FY 2020 is \$119 million. DEA currently has 773 positions overseas, and funding of \$22,000 is requested for this account.	0	0	22
<b>2 <u>Education Allowance</u></b> For employees stationed abroad, components are obligated to meet the educational expenses incurred by an employee in providing adequate elementary (grades K-8) and secondary (grades 9-12) education for dependent children at post. \$42,000 reflects the increase in cost to support existing staffing levels.	0	0	42
<b>3 <u>Government Leased Quarters (GLQ)</u></b> GLQ is a program managed by the Department of State (DOS) and provides government employees stationed overseas with housing and utilities. DOS exercises authority for leases and control of the GLQs and negotiates the lease for components. \$17,000 reflects the change in cost to support existing staffing levels.	0	0	17
<b>4 <u>ICASS</u></b> The Department of State charges agencies for administrative support provided to staff based overseas. Charges are determined by a cost distribution system. The FY 2020 request is based on the projected FY 2018 bill for post invoices and other ICASS costs.	0	0	37
<b>5 <u>Living Quarters Allowance (LQA)</u></b> The living quarter allowance (LQA) is an allowance granted an employee for the annual cost of adequate living quarters for the employee and the employee's family at a foreign post. The rates are designed to cover the average cost of rent, heat, light, fuel, gas, electricity, water, local taxes, and insurance paid by the employee. Employees who receive the GLQ do not receive LQA and vice versa. -\$1,000 reflects the change in cost to support existing staffing levels.	0	0	-1



E. Justifications for Technical and Base Adjustments

**Justifications for Technical and Base Adjustments**

Drug Enforcement Administration

Diversion Control Fee Account

(Dollars in Thousands)

	Positions	Estimate FTE	Amount
6 <u>Post Allowance - Cost of Living Allowance (COLA)</u> For employees stationed abroad, components are obligated to pay for the COLA. COLA is intended to reimburse certain excess costs and to compensate the employee for serving at a post where the cost of living, excluding the cost of quarters and the cost of education for eligible family members, is substantially higher than in the Washington, D.C., area. \$3,000 reflects the decrease in cost to support existing staffing levels.	0	0	3
<b>Subtotal, Foreign Expenses</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>120</b>
<b>TOTAL DIRECT TECHNICAL and BASE ADJUSTMENTS</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>49,025</b>

E. Justifications for Technical and Base Adjustments

**Justifications for Technical and Base Adjustments**

Drug Enforcement Administration  
 High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas  
 (Dollars in Thousands)

		Positions	Estimate FTE	Amount
<b>Transfers</b>				
1	<u>Transfers</u> This request permanently transfers \$254,000,000 to the Drug Enforcement Administration for the purposes of managing, administering and controlling the disbursement of HIDTA funds.	0	0	254,000
<b>Subtotal, Technical Adjustments</b>		<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>254,000</b>
<b>TOTAL DIRECT TECHNICAL and BASE ADJUSTMENTS</b>		<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>254,000</b>

**This page intentionally left blank**

### Crosswalk of 2018 Availability

Drug Enforcement Administration

Salaries and Expenses

(Dollars in Thousands)

Program Activity	FY 2018 Enacted			Reprogramming/Transfers			Carryover	Recoveries/ Refunds	FY 2018 Availability		
	Positions	Actual FTE	Amount	Positions	Actual FTE	Amount	Amount	Amount	Position s	Actual FTE	Amount
International Enforcement	929	883	469,558	0	0	17,750	8,886	0	929	883	496,194
Domestic Enforcement	6,080	5,286	1,706,930	0	0	64,948	272,125	11,656	6,080	5,286	2,055,659
State and Local Assistance	26	24	13,838	0	0	305	1,534	0	26	24	15,677
<b>Total Direct</b>	<b>7,035</b>	<b>6,193</b>	<b>2,190,326</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>83,003</b>	<b>282,545</b>	<b>11,656</b>	<b>7,035</b>	<b>6,193</b>	<b>2,567,530</b>
Balance Rescission			0			0	0	0			0
Total Direct with Rescission			2,190,326			83,003	282,545	11,656			2,567,530
Reimbursable FTE		1,059			0					1,059	
Total Direct and Reimb. FTE		7,252			0					7,252	
Other FTE:											
LEAP FTE		804			0					804	
Overtime		47			0					47	
Grand Total, FTE		8,103			0					8,103	

**Enacted:** Enacted included \$2,190,326,000 in Annual Appropriations and \$11,500,000 in Disaster Relief Supplemental for total enacted of \$2,201,826,000.

**Reprogramming/Transfers:** DEA had total net Reprogramming/Transfers in FY 2018 of \$83,002,942; including \$53,493,689 in PY expired funds transferred to No Year, \$15,000,000 No Year Category B transfer in of Land Mobile Radio funding, and net HIDTA transfers in of \$14,509,253.

**Carryover:** DEA carried forward \$282,545,000 in unobligated balances from FY 2017 to FY 2018 from S&E no-year and S&E multi-year appropriations.

**Recoveries/Refunds:** DEA recovered and collected \$11,656,142 in collections and prior year obligations from S&E no-year, Spectrum, COPS, and S&E multi-year appropriations.

### Crosswalk of 2018 Availability

Drug Enforcement Administration  
 Diversion Control Fee Account  
 (Dollars in Thousands)

Program Activity	FY 2018 Collections			Sequestration	Reprogramming/Transfers			Carryover	Recoveries/ Refunds	FY 2018 Availability		
	Positions	Actual FTE	Amount	Amount	Positions	Actual FTE	Amount	Amount	Amount	Positions	Actual FTE	Amount
DEA - Diversion Control	[1,839]	1,599	425,750	-27,109	0	0	0	179,436	19,886	[1,839]	1,599	625,072
<b>Total Direct</b>	<b>[1,839]</b>	<b>1,599</b>	<b>425,750</b>	<b>-27,109</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>179,436</b>	<b>19,886</b>	<b>[1,839]</b>	<b>1,599</b>	<b>625,072</b>
Balance Rescission			0				0	0	0			0
Total Direct with Rescission			425,750				0	179,436	19,886			625,072
Reimbursable FTE		0				0					0	
Total Direct and Reimb. FTE		1,599				0					1,599	
Other FTE:												
LEAP FTE		113				0					113	
Overtime		18				0					18	
Grand Total, FTE		1,730				0					1,730	

**Collections:** In FY 2018, fee collections were \$425,749,601 before \$15 million transfer to the Treasury. Less Sequester amount of \$(27,109,474), plus PY Sequester now available of \$27,697,869.

**Carryover:** In FY 2018, carryover includes \$179,435,840 in unobligated balances.

**Recoveries/Refunds:** DCFA had \$19,886,209 in recoveries and other collections in FY 2018.

**Crosswalk of 2019 Availability**

Drug Enforcement Administration

Salaries and Expenses

(Dollars in Thousands)

Program Activity	FY 2019 Continuing Resolution			Reprogramming/Transfers			Carryover Amount	Recoveries/ Refunds Amount	FY 2019 Availability		
	Position s	Est. FTE	Amount	Position s	Est. FTE	Amount			Position s	Est. FTE	Amount
International Enforcement	929	883	469,558	0	0	15,078	0	0	929	883	484,636
Domestic Enforcement	6,080	5,286	1,706,930	0	0	76,122	295,890	10,973	6,080	5,286	2,089,915
State and Local Assistance	26	24	13,838	0	0	300	0	0	26	24	14,138
<b>Total Direct</b>	<b>7,035</b>	<b>6,193</b>	<b>2,190,326</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>91,500</b>	<b>295,890</b>	<b>10,973</b>	<b>7,035</b>	<b>6,193</b>	<b>2,588,689</b>
Balance Rescission			0			0	0	0			0
Total Direct with Rescission			2,190,326			91,500	295,890	10,973			2,588,689
Reimbursable FTE		9			0					9	
Total Direct and Reimb. FTE		6,202			0					6,202	
Other FTE:											
LEAP FTE		821			0					821	
Overtime		47			0					47	
Grand Total, FTE		7,070			0					7,070	

**Reprogramming/Transfers:** DEA anticipates \$91,500,000 in reprogrammings/transfers in FY 2019:

- 1) \$75,000,000 anticipated transfers from prior year expiring accounts to DEA's No Year account.
- 2) \$16,500,000 anticipated transfers from HIDTA to DEA.

**Carryover:** DEA carried forward \$295,681,454 in unobligated balances from FY 2018 to FY 2019 from S&E no-year, and S&E multi-year approps. Of these Carryover amounts, \$123,889,803 is Category C Spectrum funds than will not be available for obligations until future years. \$15,000,000 in Land Mobile Radio funds and \$44,500,000 in HQ Move funds were transferred from Category A to Category B funds, per JMD.

**Recoveries/Refunds:** DEA anticipates \$10,973,000 in Recoveries/Refunds from S&E No Year, Annual, and multi-year appropriations.

**Crosswalk of 2019 Availability**  
 Drug Enforcement Administration  
 Diversion Control Fee Account  
 (Dollars in Thousands)

Program Activity	FY 2019 Collections			Sequester	Reprogramming/Transfers			Carryover	Recoveries/ Refunds	FY 2019 Availability		
	Positions	Est. FTE	Amount	Amount	Positions	Est. FTE	Amount	Amount	Amount	Positions	Est. FTE	Amount
DEA - Diversion Control	[1,839]	1,625	443,813	-26,586	0	0	0	103,950	33,161	[1,839]	1,625	580,924
<b>Total Direct</b>	<b>[1,839]</b>	<b>1,625</b>	<b>443,813</b>	<b>-26,586</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>103,950</b>	<b>33,161</b>	<b>[1,839]</b>	<b>1,625</b>	<b>580,924</b>
Balance Rescission							0	0	0			0
Total Direct with Rescission			443,813				0	103,950	33,161			580,924
Reimbursable FTE		0				0					0	
Total Direct and Reimb. FTE		1,625				0					1,625	
Other FTE:												
LEAP FTE		114				0					114	
Overtime		18				0					18	
Grand Total, FTE		1,757				0					1,757	

**Collections:** In FY 2019, anticipated fee collections are 443,812,559 before \$15 million transfer to the Treasury. Less anticipated Sequester amount of \$(26,586,379), plus PY Sequester now available of \$27,109,474.

**Carryover:** In FY 2019, carryover includes \$103,949,683 in unobligated balances brought forward.

**Recoveries/Refunds:** DCFA projects \$33,161,000 in recoveries and other collections in FY 2019.

**Crosswalk of 2019 Availability**  
 Drug Enforcement Administration  
 Construction  
 (Dollars in Thousands)

Program Activity	FY 2019 Continuing Resolution			Reprogramming/Transfers			Carryover	Recoveries/ Refunds	FY 2019 Availability		
	Positions	Est. FTE	Amount	Positions	Est. FTE	Amount	Amount	Amount	Positions	Est. FTE	Amount
International Enforcement	0	0	0	0	0	0	331	0	0	0	331
<b>Total Direct</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>331</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>331</b>
Balance Rescission			0			0	0	0			0
Total Direct with Rescission			0			0	331	0			331
Reimbursable FTE		0			0					0	
Total Direct and Reimb. FTE		0			0					0	
Other FTE:											
LEAP FTE		0			0					0	
Overtime		0			0					0	
Grand Total, FTE		0			0					0	

**Carryover:** DEA carried forward \$330,610 in unobligated balances from FY 2018 to FY 2019 from construction.



**This page intentionally left blank**

### Summary of Reimbursable Resources

Drug Enforcement Administration

Salaries and Expenses

(Dollars in Thousands)

Collections by Source	2018 Actual			2019 Estimate			2020 Request			Increase/Decrease		
	Reimb. Pos.	Reimb. FTE	Amount	Reimb. Pos.	Reimb. FTE	Amount	Reimb. Pos.	Reimb. FTE	Amount	Reimb. Pos.	Reimb. FTE	Amount
OCDETF and RDIS Annual Funding 1	1,076	1,049	196,917	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OCDETF No-Year Funding 2	0	0	10,542	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Assets Forfeiture Fund*	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Department of Defense	6	5	2,381	7	7	3,228	7	7	3,228	0	0	0
Department of Homeland Security	1	1	5,307	0	0	5,610	0	0	5,610	0	0	0
Department of Justice	1	1	7,764	1	1	5,934	1	1	5,934	0	0	0
Department of State	3	3	21,728	3	3	11,094	3	3	11,094	0	0	0
Department of Treasury	0	0	250	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc. Federal	0	0	2,734	0	0	10,502	0	0	10,502	0	0	0
Misc. Non-Federal	0	0	4,474	0	0	2,919	0	0	2,919	0	0	0
Office of National Drug Control Policy	0	0	311	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
<b>Budgetary Resources</b>	<b>1,087</b>	<b>1,059</b>	<b>252,408</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>39,288</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>39,288</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>

Obligations by Program Activity	2018 Actual			2019 Estimate			2020 Request			Increase/Decrease		
	Reimb. Pos.	Reimb. FTE	Amount	Reimb. Pos.	Reimb. FTE	Amount	Reimb. Pos.	Reimb. FTE	Amount	Reimb. Pos.	Reimb. FTE	Amount
International Enforcement	8	8	23,228	8	8	19,151	8	8	19,151	0	0	0
Domestic Enforcement	1,079	1,051	229,180	3	3	20,137	3	3	20,137	0	0	0
State and Local Assistance	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Budgetary Resources</b>	<b>1,087</b>	<b>1,059</b>	<b>252,408</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>39,288</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>39,288</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>

H. Summary of Sub-allotments and Direct Collections Resources

**Summary of Sub-Allotments and Direct Collections Resources**

Drug Enforcement Administration

Salaries and Expenses

(Dollars in Thousands)

Collections by Source	2018 Actual			2019 Estimate			2020 Request			Increase/Decrease		
	SubAllot-Dir Coll Pos.	SubAllot-Dir Coll FTE	Amount	SubAllot-Dir Coll Pos.	SubAllot-Dir Coll FTE	Amount	SubAllot-Dir Coll Pos.	SubAllot-Dir Coll FTE	Amount	SubAllot-Dir Coll Pos.	SubAllot-Dir Coll FTE	Amount
AFF	0	0	205,176	0	0	205,100	0	0	205,100	0	0	0
OCDEF	0	0	0	1,076	1,066	203,449	1,076	1,055	205,556	0	-11	2,107
<b>Budgetary Resources</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>205,176</b>	<b>1,076</b>	<b>1,066</b>	<b>408,549</b>	<b>1,076</b>	<b>1,055</b>	<b>410,656</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>-11</b>	<b>2,107</b>

Obligations by Program Activity	2018 Actual			2019 Estimate			2020 Request			Increase/Decrease		
	SubAllot-Dir Coll Pos.	SubAllot-Dir Coll FTE	Amount	SubAllot-Dir Coll Pos.	SubAllot-Dir Coll FTE	Amount	SubAllot-Dir Coll Pos.	SubAllot-Dir Coll FTE	Amount	SubAllot-Dir Coll Pos.	SubAllot-Dir Coll FTE	Amount
Domestic	0	0	205,176	1,076	1,066	408,549	1,076	1,055	410,656	0	0	2,107
International	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
State and Local Assistance	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Budgetary Resources</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>205,176</b>	<b>1,076</b>	<b>1,066</b>	<b>408,549</b>	<b>1,076</b>	<b>1,055</b>	<b>410,656</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>-11</b>	<b>2,107</b>

**Detail of Permanent Positions by Category**  
 Drug Enforcement Administration  
 Salaries and Expenses  
 (Dollars in Thousands)

Category	2018 Enacted			2019 Continuing Resolution			2020 Request					
	Direct Pos.	Reimb. Pos.	SubAllot - Dir Coll Pos.	Direct Pos.	Reimb. Pos.	SubAllot - Dir Coll Pos.	ATBs	Program Increases	Program Offsets	Total Direct Pos.	Total Reimb. Pos.	SubAllot - Dir Coll Pos.
Miscellaneous Operations (001-099)	41	0	0	41	0	0	0	0	0	41	0	0
Security Specialists (080)	77	0	0	77	0	0	0	0	0	77	0	0
Social Science, Psychology, Welfare (0100-0199)	10	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	10	0	0
Intelligence Series (132)	739	64	0	739	2	60	0	7	0	746	2	60
Personnel Management (0200-0260)	99	0	0	99	0	0	0	0	0	99	0	0
Clerical and Office Services (0300-0399)	1,276	211	0	1,276	1	212	0	40	0	1,316	1	212
Accounting and Budget (500-599)	275	0	0	275	0	0	0	0	0	275	0	0
Engineering and Architecture Group (800-899)	7	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	0	7	0	0
Paralegals / Other Law (900-998)	17	0	0	17	0	0	0	0	0	17	0	0
Attorneys (905)	84	0	0	84	0	0	0	0	0	84	0	0
Information & Arts (1000-1099)	25	0	0	25	0	0	0	0	0	25	0	0
Business & Industry (1100-1199)	35	0	0	35	0	0	0	0	0	35	0	0
Physical Sciences (1300-1399)	5	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0
Library (1400-1499)	17	0	0	17	0	0	0	0	0	17	0	0
Mathematics and Statistics Group (1500-1599)	4	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0
Equipment/Facilities Services (1600-1699)	8	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	0
Education (1700-1799)	10	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	10	0	0
Misc. Inspectors/Investigative Assistants (1802)	224	0	0	224	0	0	0	0	0	224	0	0
Criminal Investigative Series (1811)	3,553	812	0	3,553	8	804	0	43	0	3,596	8	804
Quality Assurance Series (1910)	7	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	0	7	0	0
Supply Services (2000-2099)	34	0	0	34	0	0	0	0	0	34	0	0
Transportation (2100-2199)	12	0	0	12	0	0	0	0	0	12	0	0
Information Technology Mgmt (2210-2299)	153	0	0	153	0	0	0	0	0	153	0	0
Laboratory Working (3511)	4	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0
Motor Vehicle Operating (5703)	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Automotive Mechanic (5823)	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Small Arms Repairing (6610)	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Chemist Series (1320)	316	0	0	316	0	0	0	3	0	319	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,035</b>	<b>1,087</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>7,035</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>1,076</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>7,128</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>1,076</b>
Headquarters (Washington, D.C.)	1,923	0	0	1,923	0	0	0	21	0	1,944	0	0
U.S. Field	4,443	1,079	0	4,443	4	1,076	0	72	0	4,515	4	1,076
Foreign Field	669	8	0	669	7	0	0	0	0	669	7	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,035</b>	<b>1,087</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>7,035</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>1,076</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>7,128</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>1,076</b>

**Detail of Permanent Positions by Category**

Drug Enforcement Administration  
 Diversion Control Fee Account  
 (Dollars in Thousands)

Category	2018 Enacted			2019 Continuing Resolution			2020 Request						
	Direct Pos.	Reimb. Pos.	SubAllot - Dir Coll Pos.	Direct Pos.	Reimb. Pos.	SubAllot - Dir Coll Pos.	ATBs	Program Increases	Program Offsets	Total Direct Pos.	Total Reimb. Pos.	SubAllot - Dir Coll Pos.	
Miscellaneous Operations (001-099)	[5]	0	0	[5]	0	0	0	0	0	0	[5]	0	0
Security Specialists (080)	[8]	0	0	[8]	0	0	0	0	0	0	[8]	0	0
Intelligence Series (132)	[98]	0	0	[98]	0	0	0	0	0	0	[98]	0	0
Personnel Management (0200-0260)	[20]	0	0	[20]	0	0	0	0	0	0	[20]	0	0
Clerical and Office Services (0300-0399)	[286]	0	0	[286]	0	0	0	0	0	0	[286]	0	0
Biological Science (400-499)	[4]	0	0	[4]	0	0	0	0	0	0	[4]	0	0
Accounting and Budget (500-599)	[20]	0	0	[20]	0	0	0	0	0	0	[20]	0	0
Medical, Dental & Public Health (600-799)	[14]	0	0	[14]	0	0	0	0	0	0	[14]	0	0
Engineering and Architecture Group (800-899)	[2]	0	0	[2]	0	0	0	0	0	0	[2]	0	0
Paralegals / Other Law (900-998)	[8]	0	0	[8]	0	0	0	0	0	0	[8]	0	0
Attorneys (905)	[31]	0	0	[31]	0	0	0	0	0	0	[31]	0	0
Information & Arts (1000-1099)	[3]	0	0	[3]	0	0	0	0	0	0	[3]	0	0
Business & Industry (1100-1199)	[7]	0	0	[7]	0	0	0	0	0	0	[7]	0	0
Physical Sciences (1300-1399)	[5]	0	0	[5]	0	0	0	0	0	0	[5]	0	0
Library (1400-1499)	[2]	0	0	[2]	0	0	0	0	0	0	[2]	0	0
Mathematics and Statistics Group (1500-1599)	[1]	0	0	[1]	0	0	0	0	0	0	[1]	0	0
Equipment, Facilities, and Services (1600-1699)	[1]	0	0	[1]	0	0	0	0	0	0	[1]	0	0
Education (1700-1799)	[3]	0	0	[3]	0	0	0	0	0	0	[3]	0	0
Inspection, Investigation, Enforcement Analyst(1801)	[770]	0	0	[770]	0	0	0	0	0	0	[770]	0	0
Misc. Inspectors/Investigative Assistants (1802)	[41]	0	0	[41]	0	0	0	0	0	0	[41]	0	0
Criminal Investigative Series (1811)	[412]	0	0	[412]	0	0	0	0	0	0	[412]	0	0
Supply Services (2000-2099)	[3]	0	0	[3]	0	0	0	0	0	0	[3]	0	0
Transportation (2100-2199)	[1]	0	0	[1]	0	0	0	0	0	0	[1]	0	0
Information Technology Mgmt (2210-2299)	[47]	0	0	[47]	0	0	0	0	0	0	[47]	0	0
Chemist Series (1320)	[47]	0	0	[47]	0	0	0	0	0	0	[47]	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>[1,839]</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>[1,839]</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>[1,839]</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
Headquarters (Washington, D.C.)	[496]	0	0	[496]	0	0	0	0	0	0	[496]	0	0
U.S. Field	[1,334]	0	0	[1,334]	0	0	0	0	0	0	[1,334]	0	0
Foreign Field	[9]	0	0	[9]	0	0	0	0	0	0	[9]	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>[1,839]</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>[1,839]</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>[1,839]</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>

### Financial Analysis of Program Changes

Drug Enforcement Administration  
Salaries and Expenses  
(Dollars in Thousands)

Grades	International Enforcement				Domestic Enforcement				Total Program Changes	
	Program Increases		Program Decreases		Program Increases		Program Decreases		Positions	Amount
	Positions	Amount	Positions	Amount	Positions	Amount	Positions	Amount		
GS-9	0	0	0	0	93	9167	0	0	93	9167
<b>Total Positions and Annual Amount</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>9,167</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>9,167</b>
Lapse (-)	0	0	0	0	-46	-6500	0	0	-46	-6500
11.5 - Other personnel compensation		0		0		627		0		627
<b>Total FTEs and Personnel Compensation</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>3,294</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>3,294</b>
12.1 - Civilian personnel benefits		0		0		1528		0		1528
21.0 - Travel and transportation of persons		915		0		276		0		1191
22.0 - Transportation of things		0		0		212		0		212
23.2 - Rental payments to others		0		0		52		0		52
23.3 - Communications, utilities, and miscellaneous charges		0		0		683		0		683
24.0 - Printing and reproduction		0		0		7		0		7
25.1 - Advisory and assistance services		1209		0		1062		0		2271
25.2 - Other services from non-federal sources		485		0		5286		0		5771
25.3 - Other goods and services from federal sources		86		0		297		0		383
25.6 - Medical care		0		0		128		0		128
26.0 - Supplies and materials		981		0		451		0		1432
31.0 - Equipment		34		0		8017		0		8051
32.0 - Land and structures		7940		0		1569		0		9509
<b>Total Program Change Requests</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>11,650</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>22,862</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>34,512</b>

**This page intentionally left blank**

### Summary of Requirements by Object Class

Drug Enforcement Administration

Salaries and Expenses

(Dollars in Thousands)

Object Class	FY 2018 Actual		FY 2019 Continuing		FY 2020 Request		Increase/Decrease	
	Act. FTE	Amount	Resolution		Direct FTE	Amount	Direct FTE	Amount
			Direct FTE	Amount				
11.1 - Full-time permanent	6,193	564,163	6,193	649,782	6,240	656,023	47	6,241
11.3 - Other than full-time permanent	0	4,707	0	5,988	0	6,012	0	24
11.5 - Other personnel compensation	833	126,678	833	115,945	839	117,321	6	1,376
<i>Overtime</i>	46	0	46	0	46	0	0	0
<i>Other Compensation</i>	787	0	787	0	793	0	6	0
11.8 - Special personal services payments	0	50	0	48	0	48	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,026</b>	<b>695,598</b>	<b>7,026</b>	<b>771,763</b>	<b>7,079</b>	<b>779,404</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>7,641</b>
<b>Other Object Classes</b>								
12.1 - Civilian personnel benefits		416,851		398,754		429,516	0	30,762
21.0 - Travel and transportation of persons		44,093		40,218		41,420	0	1,202
22.0 - Transportation of things		10,237		13,459		13,674	0	215
23.1 - Rental payments to GSA		206,598		201,605		208,235	0	6,630
23.2 - Rental payments to others		38,688		40,335		41,709	0	1,374
23.3 - Communications, utilities, and miscellaneous charges		89,372		69,152		69,899	0	747
24.0 - Printing and reproduction		281		684		692	0	8
25.1 - Advisory and assistance services		148,591		145,672		148,214	0	2,542
25.2 - Other services from non-federal sources		197,696		244,921		250,769	0	5,848
25.3 - Other goods and services from federal sources		117,249		111,879		117,441	0	5,562
25.4 - Operation and maintenance of facilities		29,155		32,245		32,253	0	8
25.5 - Research and development contracts		1,598				0		
25.6 - Medical care		1,906		2,200		2,328	0	128
25.7 - Operation and maintenance of equipment		116,374		99,413		100,454	0	1,041
25.8 - Subsistence and support of persons		595		129		129	0	0
26.0 - Supplies and materials		41,482		47,403		47,912	0	509
31.0 - Equipment		94,702		78,164		94,273	0	16,109
32.0 - Land and structures		19,602		27,071		36,092	0	9,021
42.0 - Insurance claims and indemnities		1,467		843		843	0	0
<b>Total Obligations</b>		<b>2,272,135</b>		<b>2,325,910</b>		<b>2,415,257</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>89,347</b>



K. Summary of Requirements by Object Class

<b>Net of:</b>							
Unobligated Balance, Start-of-Year		-282,545		-295,890		-216,685	0 79,205
Transfers/Reprogramming		-83,003		-91,500		-75,000	0 16,500
Recoveries/Refunds		-11,656		-10,973		-10,000	0 973
Supplemental		-11,500		0		0	0 0
Unobligated End-of-Year, Available		295,890		262,901		165,581	0 -97,320
Unobligated End-of-Year, Expiring		11,005		0		0	0 0
<b>Total Direct Requirements</b>		<b>2,190,326</b>		<b>2,190,448</b>		<b>2,279,153</b>	<b>88,705</b>
Reimbursable FTE							
Full-Time Permanent	1,059		11		11		0 0

### Summary of Requirements by Object Class

Drug Enforcement Administration

Diversion Control Fee Account

(Dollars in Thousands)

Object Class	FY 2018 Actual		FY 2019 Continuing		FY 2020 Request		Increase/Decrease	
	Act. FTE	Amount	Direct FTE	Amount	Direct FTE	Amount	Direct FTE	Amount
11.1 - Full-time permanent	1,599	169,637	1,625	160,078	1,625	169,116	0	9,038
11.3 - Other than full-time permanent	0	1,673	0	1,622	0	1,628	0	6
11.5 - Other personnel compensation	137	12,794	140	10,648	140	11,364	0	716
<i>Overtime</i>	18	0	18	0	18	0	0	0
<i>Other Compensation</i>	113	0	114	0	114	0	0	0
11.8 - Special personal services payments	0	4	0	713	0	713	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,736</b>	<b>184,108</b>	<b>1,765</b>	<b>173,061</b>	<b>1,765</b>	<b>182,821</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>9,760</b>
<b>Other Object Classes</b>								
12.1 - Civilian personnel benefits		63,395		61,044		69,555	0	8,511
21.0 - Travel and transportation of persons		7,014		5,227		5,227	0	0
22.0 - Transportation of things		1,370		2,328		2,328	0	0
23.1 - Rental payments to GSA		38,532		33,928		35,159	0	1,231
23.2 - Rental payments to others		621		1,064		1,081	0	17
23.3 - Communications, utilities, and miscellaneous charges		14,463		8,036		8,036	0	0
24.0 - Printing and reproduction		9,781		9,068		9,068	0	0
25.1 - Advisory and assistance services		97,143		58,771		58,771	0	0
25.2 - Other services from non-federal sources		29,988		27,830		27,894	0	64
25.3 - Other goods and services from federal sources		10,719		8,538		8,777	0	239
25.4 - Operation and maintenance of facilities		5,035		4,057		4,057	0	0
25.5 - Research and development contracts		34		0		0	0	0
25.6 - Medical care		299		726		726	0	0
25.7 - Operation and maintenance of equipment		14,538		7,565		7,565	0	0
25.8 - Subsistence and support of persons		5		13		13	0	0
26.0 - Supplies and materials		9,641		6,570		6,570	0	0
31.0 - Equipment		16,561		10,050		10,050	0	0
32.0 - Land and structures		3,459		2,824		5,441	0	2,617
42.0 - Insurance claims and indemnities		4		3		3	0	0
<b>Total Obligations</b>		<b>506,710</b>		<b>420,703</b>		<b>443,142</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>22,439</b>
<b>Net of:</b>								
Unobligated Balance, Start-of-Year		-179,436		-103,950		-54,084	0	49,866
Transfers/Reprogramming		15,000		15,000		15,000	0	0
Recoveries/Refunds		-19,886		-33,161		-35,329	0	-2,168
Sequester Restored		-27,698		-27,109		-26,586	0	523
Additional Use of Collections		0		91,660		55,680		
Sequestration		27,109		26,586		0		
Unobligated End-of-Year, Available		103,950		54,084		63,088	0	9,004
Unobligated End-of-Year, Expiring							0	0
<b>Total Direct Requirements (Collections)</b>		<b>425,749</b>		<b>443,813</b>		<b>460,911</b>		<b>17,098</b>

### Summary of Requirements by Object Class

Drug Enforcement Administration

Construction

(Dollars in Thousands)

Object Class	FY 2018 Actual		FY 2019 Continuing		FY 2020 Request		Increase/Decrease	
	Act. FTE	Amount	Direct FTE	Amount	Direct FTE	Amount	Direct FTE	Amount
11.1 - Full-time permanent	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
11.3 - Other than full-time permanent	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
11.5 - Other personnel compensation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<i>Overtime</i>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<i>Other Compensation</i>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
11.8 - Special personal services payments	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Other Object Classes</b>								
32.0 - Land and structures		0		331		0	0	-331
<b>Total Obligations</b>		<b>0</b>		<b>331</b>		<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>-331</b>
<b>Net of:</b>								
Unobligated Balance, Start-of-Year		0		-331		0	0	331
Transfers/Reprogramming		0		0		0	0	0
Recoveries/Refunds		-331		0		0	0	0
Balance Rescission		0		0		0	0	0
Unobligated End-of-Year, Available		0		0		0	0	0
Unobligated End-of-Year, Expiring		331		0		0	0	0
<b>Total Direct Requirements</b>		<b>0</b>		<b>0</b>		<b>0</b>		<b>0</b>
Reimbursable FTE								
Full-Time Permanent	0		0		0		0	0

### Summary of Requirements by Object Class

Drug Enforcement Administration  
 High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas  
 (Dollars in Thousands)

Object Class	FY 2017 Actual 1/		FY 2018 Continuing		FY 2019 Request		Increase/Decrease	
	Act. FTE	Amount	Direct FTE	Amount	Direct FTE	Amount	Direct FTE	Amount
11.1 - Full-time permanent	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
11.3 - Other than full-time permanent	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
11.5 - Other personnel compensation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<i>Overtime</i>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<i>Other Compensation</i>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
11.8 - Special personal services payments	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Other Object Classes</b>								
12.1 - Civilian personnel benefits		0		0		0	0	0
21.0 - Travel and transportation of persons		0		0		0	0	0
22.0 - Transportation of things		0		0		0	0	0
23.1 - Rental payments to GSA		0		0		0	0	0
23.2 - Rental payments to others		0		0		0	0	0
23.3 - Communications, utilities, and miscellaneous charges		0		0		0	0	0
24.0 - Printing and reproduction		0		0		0	0	0
25.1 - Advisory and assistance services		0		0		0	0	0
25.2 - Other services from non-federal sources		[2700]		[2700]		2,700	0	0
25.3 - Other goods and services from federal sources		0		0		0	0	0
25.4 - Operation and maintenance of facilities		0		0		0	0	0
25.6 - Medical care		0		0		0	0	0
25.7 - Operation and maintenance of equipment		0		0		0	0	0
25.8 - Subsistence and support of persons		0		0		0	0	0
26.0 - Supplies and materials		0		0		0	0	0
31.0 - Equipment		0		0		0	0	0
32.0 - Land and structures		0		0		0	0	0
41.0 - Grants, subsidies, and contributions		[277,300]		[277,300]		251,300	0	0
42.0 - Insurance claims and indemnities		0		0		0	0	0
<b>Total Obligations</b>		<b>[280,000]</b>		<b>[280,000]</b>		<b>254,000</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Net of:</b>								
Unobligated Balance, Start-of-Year		0		0		0	0	0
Transfers/Reprogramming		0		0		0	0	0
Recoveries/Refunds		0		0		0	0	0
Balance Rescission		0		0		0	0	0
Unobligated End-of-Year, Available		0		0		0	0	0
Unobligated End-of-Year, Expiring		0		0		0	0	0
<b>Total Direct Requirements</b>		<b>0</b>		<b>0</b>		<b>254,000</b>		<b>0</b>

1/ In FY 2018 and 2019, the HIDTA program was included in ONDCP's budget. As of FY 2020, it will be under DEA.  
 Exhibit K - Summary of Requirements by Object Class

**This page intentionally left blank**

### Senior Executive Service Report for FY 2018

Drug Enforcement Administration  
(Dollars in Thousands)

SES Pay Band	Staffing (as of 6/30/18)		Awards (Performance year 2017)		SES Removals Due to:		
	Established Positions	Onboard Personnel	Number of Awards	Amount of Awards	Less Than Fully Successful Performance	Reduction in Force	Other Reasons
<b>\$124,406 - 187,000</b>	82*	79	53	\$888,751	0	0	0

\* Includes two appointee positions (Administrator and Deputy Administrator)

Note: OPM no longer sets basic rates of pay for members of the SES. Basic SES pay for an agency with a certified performance management system, which DOJ has, is between \$124,406 and \$187,000.

**This page intentionally left blank**

**Financial Analysis**  
Drug Enforcement Administration  
Diversion Control Fee Account  
(Dollars in Thousands)

	FY 2008 Actual	FY 2009 Actual	FY 2010 Actual	FY 2011 Actual	FY 2012 Actual	FY 2013 Actual	FY 2014 Actual	FY 2015 Actual	FY 2016 Actual	FY 2017 Actual	FY 2018 Actual	FY 2019 Projected	FY 2020 Projected
<b>Budget</b>	\$239,249	\$244,450	\$251,790	\$290,304	\$322,000	\$334,852	\$335,503	\$339,825	\$345,532	\$382,662	\$419,574	\$420,703	\$437,891
<b>Fiscal Year Financial Status:</b>													
Unobligated Balance Carried													
1 Forward from Prior Year	\$64,079	\$60,423	\$87,806	\$68,090	\$41,727	\$52,619	\$83,659	\$106,636	\$153,410	\$175,298	\$179,436	\$103,950	\$54,084
2 Account	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$17,085	\$25,414	\$27,463	\$25,982	\$27,698	\$27,109	26,586
3 Receipt Collections		\$249,512	\$245,836	\$257,674	\$309,223	\$359,326	\$372,876	\$388,765	\$397,085	\$416,418	\$425,749	\$443,813	\$460,911
4 Fund Transfer from Salaries													
5 and Expenses	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
6 Fund Transfer / Retained in													
7 the General Treasury	<u>-\$15,000</u>	<u>-\$15,000</u>	<u>-\$15,000</u>	<u>-\$15,000</u>	<u>-\$15,000</u>	<u>-\$15,000</u>	<u>-\$15,000</u>	<u>-\$15,000</u>	<u>-\$15,000</u>	<u>-\$15,000</u>	<u>-\$15,000</u>	<u>-\$15,000</u>	<u>-\$15,000</u>
8 Net Receipt Collections	\$220,904	\$234,512	\$230,836	\$242,674	\$294,223	\$344,326	\$357,876	\$373,765	\$382,085	\$401,418	\$410,749	\$428,813	\$445,911
9 Other Collections	\$235	\$158	\$209	\$534	\$244	\$261	\$986	\$982	\$488	\$967	\$1,043	\$1,043	\$1,043
10 Obligations (Actual /													
11 Projected)	-\$228,277	-\$216,297	-\$267,997	-\$283,501	-\$293,997	-\$307,885	-\$336,329	-\$337,623	-\$370,648	-\$420,679	-\$506,710	-\$513,406	-\$499,865
9 Recoveries from Deobligations	<u>\$3,482</u>	<u>\$9,010</u>	<u>\$17,235</u>	<u>\$13,930</u>	<u>\$10,422</u>	<u>\$11,423</u>	<u>\$8,773</u>	<u>\$11,785</u>	<u>\$8,482</u>	<u>\$24,148</u>	<u>\$18,843</u>	<u>\$33,161</u>	<u>\$35,329</u>
10 Net Obligations	-\$224,795	-\$207,287	-\$250,761	-\$269,571	-\$283,575	-\$296,462	-\$327,556	-\$325,838	-\$362,166	-\$396,531	-\$487,867	-\$480,245	-\$464,536
11 Sequester	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	-\$17,085	-\$25,414	-\$27,549	-\$25,982	-\$27,698	-\$27,109	-\$26,586	
ENDING BALANCE (Lines	\$60,423	\$87,806	\$68,090	\$41,727	\$52,619	\$83,659	\$106,636	\$153,410	\$175,298	\$179,436	\$103,950	\$54,084	\$63,088
1+2+6+7+10+11)													



**This page intentionally left blank**